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The Yearbook of the Sociology of Islam investigates the making of Islam into an
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debate, abolishing this dichotomous evolutionism while embracing a more
heterogeneous view of coexistence and exchange between local cultures and
modern institutions.
       Islam, however, is often described as a different cultural machine for the
holistic reproduction of pre-modern religion, and Muslims are seen as
community-bound social actors embodying a powerful potential for the rejec-
tion of and opposition to Western modernity.
       Sociologists insist on looking for social differentiation and cultural differ-
ences. However, their concepts remain evolutionist and inherently tied to the
cultural machine of modernity.
       The Yearbook of the Sociology of Islam takes these antinomies and contradic-
tions as a challenge. It aims at no less than an understanding of the ambiguous
positioning of Islam in the global construction of society, and thus attempts to
combine original research on Islam with conceptual debates in social theory
and cultural studies.
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Editors’ Note 
Contributors to this volume come from very different disciplines including clas-
sical oriental studies, history and sociology. This diversity in disciplinary ap-
proach was from the start reflected in terminology and attitude towards sources 
and texts. We thought it valuable to maintain this diversity, and specifically we 
have not engaged in homogenising difference in transliteration and forms of quo-
tation – in some cases resembling different traditions to write Arabic in Latin let-
ters and to give reference to sources and material. The individual texts, as they 
stand, reflect the homogeneous attitudes of the authors and we do believe that 
this contributes to flavour the dialogue which we pursue with this book. 
Sigrid Noekel – as so often – has taken the considerable task of coordinating 
and participating in editing this volume at various stages of its growth and we 
would like to express our very special thanks. 
Professor Jörn Rüsen, President of the KWI (Kulturwissenschaftliches Insti-
tut) in Essen, Germany, and Professor Walter Bisang, Speaker of the “Sonderfor-
schungsbereich 295: Kulturelle und sprachliche Kontakte,” Univerity of Mainz, 
Germany, with their support have made the preparation of this volume possible, 
again we convey our gratitude. 
 
Frankfurt am Main, September 2006. 
G.S. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
JOHANN P. ARNASON, ARMANDO SALVATORE, 
AND GEORG STAUTH 
 
 
The papers included in this issue of the Yearbook of the Sociology of Islam come 
from two workshops held at the Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut (Institute for 
Advanced Study in the Humanities), Essen, in April 2004 and April 2005. The 
program of the first one linked the comparative analysis of Islam to ongoing de-
bates on Axial Age theory as related to the formation of major civilizational 
complexes. The second workshop was primarily concerned with the historical 
sources and constellations involved in the formation of Islam as a religion and a 
civilization. Since the two stages of the project were closely related, it seems ap-
propriate to publish the results in one place and allow for multiple foci. 
 
 
The or ig ins of  the axia l  hypothesis  
 
It has been observed that Max Weber’s sociology of religion and in particular 
some passages from an article on Hinduism and Buddhism published in 1916 in 
the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik prefigures the core hypothesis 
of Axial Age theory (Arnason 2005: 22)1. This theory is based on a comprehen-
sive hypothesis concerning the nature of the radical transformations that made 
possible a momentous breakthrough in the complexification of community life 
and the differentiation of social fields out of archaic communities regulated by 
cyclical and mythical views of the cosmological order. The Axial approach facili-
tates examining on a comparative basis the basically simultaneous discovery of 
“transcendence” across various civilizations.  
Historical and civilizational analysis is oriented here to Axial Age theory in-
tended as a research program for locating and explaining, in historical-compara-
tive and sociological terms, the type of breakthrough that allowed, through the 
shaping of notions of transcendence, for the emergence of a type of human re-
flexivity conventionally identified as the passage from the narrativity of mythos 
to the rationality of logos (Jaspers 1953 [1949]). As maintained by Björn Wit-
trock, transcendence is not to be interpreted in strictly theological terms, but as 
the emergence of a form of reflexivity that transcends those activities tied to the 
 
1  Arnason, Johan P. (2005) “The Axial Age and its Interpreters: Reopening a De-
bate.” In: Johann P. Arnason/Shmuel N. Eisenstadt/Björn Wittrock (eds.) Axial 
Civilizations and World History, Leiden: Brill, pp. 19-49. 
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daily necessities of human beings, as also reflected in elaborate mythologies of 
cosmological shape or in what we might call the ritual integration of community 
(Wittrock 2005: 62)2. 
More than any other particular line of inquiry, new historical and sociological 
approaches to the Axial Age revived the idea of comparative civilizational analy-
sis and channeled it into more specific projects. A closer look at the problematic 
place of Islam in this context will help to clarify questions about the axial version 
of civilizational theory as well as related issues in Islamic studies. For pre-socio-
logical interpretations of the Axial Age, exemplified by Jaspers’s well-known es-
say on The Origin and Goal of History (Jaspers 1953 [1949]), Islam was at best 
of marginal interest. The phase of intellectual and/or religious breakthroughs, oc-
curring in major civilizational centers, was – roughly speaking – dated from the 
eighth to the third century BC; this strictly chronological demarcation excluded 
the much later rise of Islam. Further reflection should, however, have highlighted 
precisely the Islamic case as a problem for the chronological model. The Islamic 
vision of a new order based on transcendent imperatives was at least as close to 
the ideal type of an axial breakthrough as any other example. Islam defined itself 
as a perfected and definitive version of an axial innovation, namely monotheism; 
and it translated its claim into civilizational patterns on a larger scale than any 
earlier culture or religion of the axial type had done.  
Another potentially critical point was the historical role of Islam as a synthe-
sizer and transmitter of Hellenic and Judaic legacies. Comparison with this other 
successor civilization, on which the Western Christian rediscovery of classical 
sources had at first been dependent, might have cast doubt on the tacitly Eurocen-
tric presuppositions of early axial theory. The failure to pursue these problems is 
obviously linked to a longer history of European relations with and perceptions 
of the Islamic world, and to concomitant trends in civilizational studies. Seen 
from Western Europe, Islam had for a long time represented a more advanced 
civilization whose achievements could to some extent be borrowed across reli-
gious barriers. In the early modern era, it was still perceived as a dangerous ad-
versary: until late in the seventeenth century, the strongest Islamic power – the 
Ottoman Empire – could threaten the heartland of Western Christendom, whereas 
Christian advances against the Islamic world were confined to more peripheral 
areas.  
During the 18th century, as the West gained the upper hand against Islam, it 
also began to come into closer contact with the Indian and Chinese worlds, and 
these new encounters posed more complex hermeneutical problems than the in-
teraction with Islam had ever done – because of the greater cultural distance and 
 
2  Arnason, Johan P. (2005) “The Axial Age and its Interpreters: Reopening a De-
bate.” In: Johann P. Arnason/Shmuel N. Eisenstadt/Björn Wittrock (eds.) Axial 
Civilizations and World History, Leiden: Brill, pp. 19-49. 
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as a result of changes to Western self-interpretations. Reflections on civiliza-
tional pluralism and its world-historical meaning (never more than an intermit-
tent tradition in Western thought) tended then to focus on the eminently Oriental 
Indian and Chinese cases, whereas Islam became a more marginal theme. 
 
 
The crux of  Is lam within 
comparat ive c ivi l izat ional  analysis  
 
Two outstandingly seminal visions of universal history, developed in an early 
and a late phase of global European ascendancy, may be cited to illustrate this 
trend. In Hegel’s philosophy of history, China and India appear as distinctive and 
necessary stages on the road to a full realization of reason in history, while Islam 
looks more like an anomalous sideshow: since it exists, it must be fitted into the 
model, but this cannot occur on the same conceptual level as for China or India. 
Max Weber’s comparative studies of Eurasian civilizations deal with multiple 
contrasts between China, India and Western Europe; although a planned study of 
Islam was never written, enough is known about Weber’s views on this subject to 
conclude that conceptual obstacles counted for something in this failure.  
The career of the axial model after Jaspers reflects this traditional neglect of 
Islam, with some qualifications and corrective trends. Marshall Hodgson’s work 
(which will be discussed at some length in this volume) is a crucially important 
exception to the pattern described above. Hodgson responded to Jaspers’s formu-
lation of the axial model, at a time when it went otherwise unnoticed among 
comparative historians, and revised it in ways more conducive to an adequate 
understanding and appraisal of Islamicate civilization or “Islamdom” (a term of 
his coin). But Hodgson was in many respects ahead of his time, and a sustained 
discussion of his work is only beginning; his influence on Islamic studies was 
limited, and there is no evidence of a significant impact of his work on axial the-
ory.  
When S.N. Eisenstadt shifted the methodological terrain of analysis from phi-
losophical interpretation to a historical sociology of axial civilizations, he did not 
– at first – alter the chronological framework. On this view, the rise of Islam was 
the result of much later developments and took place in a very different historical 
milieu; but since the new, historical-sociological model was explicitly designed 
to explain long-term historical trends, it had to go beyond Jaspers’s account and 
accommodate Islam within a broader perspective. Eisenstadt’s initial solution to 
this problem was the concept of a “secondary breakthrough,” applicable to Islam 
as well as Christianity and some less radical innovations in other civilizational 
settings (such as Neo-Confucianism in East Asia). According to Eisenstadt, 
breakthroughs of this kind were characterized by comprehensive reinterpretations 
of axial traditions and strong aspirations to establish a new institutional order. 
The concept was later abandoned, on the compelling grounds that it implied 
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an a priori denial of the originality of post-axial transformations, and Eisenstadt 
moved towards a major revision of the axial model. He argued that a typological 
frame of reference would be more useful than the chronological one: axiality 
could thus be redefined as a set of characteristics that enhance the transformative 
potential of culture, and do so in specific ways linked to visions of transcendent 
reality. Changes along such lines may have been particularly widespread and in-
tensive during the Axial Age, but that is not a valid reason for defining them in 
chronological terms. Axial transformations can occur and axial patterns can crys-
tallize in other historical situations; it is the structural aspect that matters, rather 
than the genetic one.  
From this point of view, Islam appears as a key case to be included in the ty-
pological core. Eisenstadt has unequivocally accepted this conclusion, with the 
result that questions relating to Islamic societies and their historical dynamics 
have become more important in his most recent work.  
Yet the typological turn is only one of the new trends emerging in debates 
around the axial framework of inquiry, and it poses a whole set of new problems. 
If axiality is to be understood as a mode of transformation, it can easily shrink to 
a stage in a rather uniform progression towards higher levels of reflexivity and 
enlarged horizons of human action. On the other hand, the general category of 
“axial civilizations” (supposed to replace “Axial Age civilizations”) seems to in-
volve quite strong and debatable assumptions about cultural orientations embod-
ied in and constitutive of whole civilizational complexes. A more limited concep-
tion of axial patterns, centered on the relationships between intellectual and po-
litical elites and their role in historical transformations, would have to allow for 
contextual determinants that vary from case to case. 
More generally speaking, the axial model is now being transformed through 
discussions that continue to produce arguments for and against contending views. 
It would be vastly premature to try to close the debate, and misguided to bypass 
it. The divergent approaches have more or less direct implications for Islamic 
Studies and for the sociology of Islam. As will be seen, contributors to this vol-
ume differ in their opinions on these issues; for introductory purposes, it may be 
useful to outline a cautiously defined common ground, limited to a heuristic use 
of the axial model finalized to highlight significant features of Islam as a religion 
and a civilizational formation. Some basic considerations in that vein will help to 
sketch in a background to more disputed questions. We can, without making any 
strong assumptions about the scope or status of axial theory, examine the axial 
dimensions of Islam from a comparative viewpoint. This applies, first and fore-
most, to the Islamic vision of transcendence: more precisely, to its version of 
monotheist transcendence. 
The Islamic message defined itself as a purifying, radicalizing and restorative 
twist to preexisting monotheisms; at the same time, it was from the outset much 
more directly intertwined with political strategies and processes. The prophet 
Muhammad and his first following were very soon drawn into a state-building 
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project, and the codification of the new religious teaching soon overlapped with a 
process of empire-building on a vast scale. 
Yet a comparative approach must also take into account the spatial and tem-
poral distance from established models. Islam emerged outside the central do-
main of axial transformations, and long after they had matured into cultural and 
institutional paradigms. The same cannot be said of Christianity: most historians 
would now agree that the original “Jesus movement” was part of an ongoing re-
formist current within Judaism, and that the mutation into a separate universal re-
ligion was a complex process, decisively affected by the catastrophic defeat of 
the Jewish rebellion against Rome in the 1st century CE. 
Because of the different historical context, Islam related to axial sources on a 
different basis and in varying ways. With regard to major axial traditions, the 
emphasis was sometimes on religious and sometimes on broader civilizational 
aspects. Judaism was of crucial importance as a religious source, whereas inter-
action with the persisting diasporic Jewish civilization was very limited; the oc-
casional episodes of more intensive contact were – possibly with the exceptions 
to which the papers of Stauth (chapter 6) and Khoury (chapter 7) point in this 
volume – more productive on the Jewish side; Persian sources were primarily put 
to use on the civilizational level; the Hellenic legacy was essential to the flower-
ing of Islam as a civilization during its classical period, but it also played a sig-
nificant role in attempts to rationalize the religious foundations of Islamic iden-
tity and make them more compatible with philosophical modes of thought.  
Apart from these central connections, recent scholarship has taken note of in-
puts from more marginal or interstitial sources. South Arabian traditions, includ-
ing a monotheist turn that does not seem to have been a simple reproduction of 
the Judaic model, are now widely seen as a distinctive and important part of the 
background. The issue of Islamic links to the Judaeo-Christian sects that had 
tried to bridge the gap between two increasingly alienated communities remains 
more controversial.  
If a comparative history of Islamic civilization has to deal with axial sources, 
it is by the same token tempting to interpret Islam as an axial synthesis. But this 
suggestion calls for some qualifications. It seems clear that Manichaeism had as-
pired to synthesize several axial traditions (including Buddhism). This was, how-
ever, a precedent the prophet Muhammad and his followers were thoroughly un-
willing to recognize. Manichaeism was never included among the religions of the 
book, and when Manichean communities came under Islamic rule, they were 
massively persecuted. On the religious level, the original Islamic vision did not 
aim at a synthesis, but at the final and unadorned grasp of fundamentals that had 
previously been obscured by adaptation to specific contexts and perverted 
through further assimilation.  
Nonetheless, as new civilizational patterns crystallized around the imperial 
power structures built under the banner of a new religion, the radically monothe-
istic and universalistic world-view became a framework for the fusion of differ-
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ent civilizational legacies. But if the cultural traditions of conquered regions were 
brought together in a synthesis, there was no uniform pattern of integration. A 
vigorous but selective appropriation was, as noted above, crucial to the creativity 
and radiating power of Islam during its classical age. Peter Brown has suggested 
that Islamic civilization retained closer links to the Greek ideal of paideia than 
did other heirs to the classical legacy of antiquity. The assimilation of Persian 
traditions was a more long-drawn-out-process, and they became a more enduring 
component of political culture.  
A new pattern of interaction emerged as a result of the Islamic expansion into 
a third major civilizational area. Whether the idea of a civilizational synthesis can 
be applicable to the Indo-Islamic world will depend on more substantive interpre-
tations of this very particular case: was it a civilizational formation encompassing 
two very different religions, or a regional complex made up of two civilizations? 
The question will not be discussed in this volume, but it should at least be noted 
that the Indian part of the Islamic experience was – for both comparative histori-
ans as well as students of Islam – long overshadowed by the more familiar record 
of the Middle East and the Mediterranean. 
The long-term axial dynamics of Islam are a further theme for comparative 
analysis, going beyond and building on those mentioned above. The civilizations 
most directly associated with the axial model are, as has often been stressed, 
characterized by a dialectics of traditionalism and renewal. Reinterpretations of 
core traditions provide frameworks for socio-cultural transformations, while at 
the same time maintaining a recognizable civilizational pattern across historical 
divides. This combination of change and revival is a recurrent and well-known 
feature of Islamic civilization. So is another closely related phenomenon, particu-
larly prominent in analysis of axial traditions: the interplay of orthodoxy and het-
erodoxy.  
Constellations of that kind were central to all phases and branches of Islamic 
history, even if it seems clear that the tension between the two poles never 
reached the level of a civilizational schism comparable to the 16th century rupture 
within Western Christendom. Finally, axial theorists have noted the need for 
more detailed study of the connections between cultural traditions – more spe-
cifically religious ones – and imperial formations, but this is still a relatively un-
derdeveloped domain of comparative analysis. The history of imperial power in 
the Islamic world took a distinctive course that suggests several lines of compari-
son with other traditions. The formative and classical phases (until the later 9th 
century) were characterized by uniquely close links between the growth of impe-
rial power and the crystallization of a new civilizational pattern. During the fol-
lowing five to six centuries (the “middle periods” according to Hodgson’s 
scheme), political fragmentation went hand in hand with the consolidation of cul-
tural unity on a more global scale than any other civilization achieved in premod-
ern times.  
This is not the only case of marked divergences between the dynamics of cul-
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tural and political integration, but the contrast became exceptionally stark in the 
Islamic case, all the more so through the cultural assimilation of the disunited 
heirs to foreign conquest: the Mongol successor states. But the islamization of 
Inner Asian conquerors also became the starting-point for the three imperial pro-
jects of the early modern era: the Ottoman, the Safavid, and the Mughal (Hodg-
son’s “gunpowder empires”). In all three cases, imperial expansion within the Is-
lamic civilizational domain was combined with conquest across its borders. The 
plurality of imperial centers within one civilizational formation bear some re-
semblance to the modern constellation in Western Europe, but because of the 
very different spatial dimensions, contacts between the empires were of a limited 
kind, and these empires never embarked on the distinctively European enterprise 
of overseas conquest. 
The last question to be considered in this context has to do with axial closure. 
This theme has not been in the foreground of the debate, but it merits more dis-
cussion. Although the axial model stresses new openings of multiple kinds, con-
ducive to higher levels of diversity and conflict, efforts to reintegrates such 
trends into definitive and comprehensive frameworks are also typical of the tradi-
tions in question. Axial transformations give rise to new forms of change as well 
as new ways of containing it. Both ideological and institutional modes of closure 
reflect their specific civilizational contexts. Western perceptions of Islam, shaped 
by very asymmetrical encounters, have tended to exaggerate its resistance to 
change, whether generated from within or induced from without. Scholarly 
analysis has modified this view, but not disposed of the problem.  
The distinctively Islamic dynamics and strategies of closure are still impor-
tant topics for comparative analysis. To conclude this part of the discussion, three 
key historical signposts should be noted. The first centuries of the second millen-
nium CE are no longer seen as a phase of transition to long-term stagnation or 
even regression; a much more complex image of this period is emerging from 
current scholarship, so that the specific achievements of Islam’s later centuries 
are now more adequately understood. Yet from a comparative perspective, the 
available evidence and the most plausible accounts of it nevertheless suggest that 
the Islamic world did not experience anything comparable to the innovative de-
velopments that took place in Western Europe and East Asia between the 11th 
and the 13th century.3 
When it comes to more recent transformations, especially those intercon-
nected with the global rise of Western power, there is no denying that the Islamic 
world did not match the most salient non-Western responses to or reinventions of 
Western models. There is no Islamic parallel to the East Asian reinvention of 
 
3  This refers to arguments developed in the two books coming out of Firenze Uppsala 
workshops: Axial Civilizations and World History & Eurasian Transformations, 
1000-1300: Crystallizations, Divergences, Renaissances. 
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both modern capitalism and the project that began as an alternative but became a 
detour towards the same goal, and nothing comparable to the Indian experience 
of democracy. Nationalism in the Islamic world has – notwithstanding crucial 
differences between Arab and non-Arab parts of this world – a long history of 
problematic and unsettled relations with Islam.  
At the beginning of the 21st century, the redefinition of the inherited relation-
ship between religion and politics is posing more complex problems in Islamic 
societies than anywhere else. “Fundamentalism” may be a misleading term, and 
the most insightful analyses of the phenomenon in question have rightly under-
lined its modern features, but this does not alter the fact that it reflects an unfin-
ished and particularly conflict-ridden process of transposing a religious and civi-
lizational legacy into a modern context.  
All these aspects of the Islamic trajectory call for integration into a more sys-
tematic historical analysis, which would in turn lay the foundations for more pre-
cisely targeted comparative studies. But at the present moment, combinations of 
historical and comparative approaches to the study of Islam tend to focus on par-
ticular aspects or episodes, rather than on problems of civilizational identity and 
difference. Marshall Hodgson’s work remains the most ambitious and original at-
tempt to reconstruct the long-term dynamics of the Islamic world as a civiliza-
tional complex. This is not to deny its shortcomings, some of them obvious from 
the outset and others more apparent in retrospect.  
Hodgson’s The Venture of Islam is an unfinished work, and some parts more 
visibly so than others, especially the sections dealing with early modern Islam 
and with Islamic responses to the global impact of what he called “the great 
Western transmutation.” More recent work has thrown new light on various is-
sues and raised questions about established views that Hodgson took for granted. 
To take the most spectacular example, ongoing controversies between traditional-
ists, revisionists and post-revisionists have changed the whole framework of re-
search on Islamic origins (see chapters 4 and 5 by Arnason and Arjomand in the 
present volume). Together with other developments, increased knowledge of the 
Ismaili tradition has enriched and modified the received picture of the late classi-
cal and early middle periods (Hodgson was one of the pioneering scholars in the 
field of Ismaili studies, but further progress was made after his death).  
Finally, the revival of civilizational theory during the last quarter of a century 
has made it easier to identify and criticize Hodgson’s theoretical premises. How-
ever, allowing for all these critical considerations, it must be added that no com-
parable project has so far emerged, and that The Venture of Islam set standards 
for future efforts, even if an enterprise of that caliber can now only be imagined 
as an ipso facto unlikely fusion of multiple specialized perspectives. 
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Is lam in the histor ical  process:  
c ivi l izat ional  and comparat ive perspect ives 
 
Although only a few of the papers in this volume engage explicitly with Hodg-
son’s ideas, they share with his work an interest in the historical dynamics of Is-
lam as a civilization, in a comparative perspective with other cases of similar di-
mensions. The chapters are grouped into three sections which are systematically, 
not chronologically ordered. 
The first section embraces the dimension of “crystallization” of the civiliza-
tional analysis of Islam and is therefore closest to Hodgson’s own approach, al-
beit with sensible alterations. In chapter 1 Johann P. Arnason discusses the con-
ceptual and historical foundations of Hodgson’s program for civilizational stud-
ies, with particular reference to the role of the intellectual and religious traditions 
that constituted the core of city-centered high cultures.  
Hodgson’s variations on axial themes are discussed in relation to his distinc-
tive interpretation of Islam. The second part of the chapter deals with the classi-
cal period in The Venture of Islam, reconstructs its main lines of argument, and 
confronts it with more recent scholarship in key areas. Hodgson’s concept of ab-
solutism as a political pattern typical of agrarianate societies is compared to the 
Weberian model of patrimonialism and taken as a starting-point for a more nu-
anced approach to the processes of state formation.  
Chapter 2, by Babak Rahimi, focuses on the “middle period” of Islamic civi-
lization, as demarcated in Hodgson’s scheme, and links this chronological cate-
gory to the more theoretical questions raised in an essay on the historical interre-
lations of societies, where Hodgson argued for a more polycentric conception of 
world history. Rahimi then develops these combined themes in ways partly 
aligned with more widespread views on the early second millennium CE as a 
time of innovative developments on an Afro-Eurasian scale, by laying a particu-
larly strong emphasis on intercivilizational encounters and transcultural forma-
tions both within and on the margins of major civilizational areas. Against this 
background, he finally analyzes the emergence of Turkish and Persianate re-
gional and civilizational variants within the Islamic world or, as he terms it, “Is-
lamic axiality.” 
Chapter 3, by Arpad Szakolczai, examines contrasts and parallels between Is-
lam and Christianity as prophetic religions, particularly ways of identifying pro-
phetic founders and the implications of different solutions to this problem for the 
self-images of religious communities and their modes of relating to unbelievers. 
Moving away from macro-civilizational analysis, Szakolczai argues that identity 
formation in world religions is best analyzed in terms of the dynamics of experi-
ence and recognition; building-blocks for such a theoretical framework can be 
found in the works of Max Weber, Alessandro Pizzorno, Victor Turner and René 
Girard.  
Johann P. Arnason provides in chapter 4 a theoretical elaboration of the con-
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cept of socio-cultural crystallization to the development of Islamic civilization 
which began with religious and political innovations on a local scale and culmi-
nated in new imperial and civilizational structures. Several aspects as well as 
phases of this process can be distinguished. It resulted in the imperial unification 
of a region that had not been controlled by one political centre since the collapse 
of the Persian empire and its ephemeral Macedonian successor; more impor-
tantly, civilizational unity was for the first time imposed on that same region and 
consolidated in a form that proved capable of further expansion. This chapter 
concludes with a brief discussion of the Ismaili movement as a schismatic current 
within this civilizational pattern.  
The second section probes into specific “crossroads and turning points” 
which are particularly significant for the civilizational analysis of different mo-
mentums of Islamic history, beginning with the rise of Islam. This process has 
occasionally been described as a revolution, without however providing further 
reflection on the implications of that label. Said Amir Arjomand’s chapter 5 is 
the first systematic attempt to situate early Islam within the framework of a ty-
pology of revolutions, and at the same time to draw on this crucial case to ad-
vance our understanding of types less familiar to modern western interpreters of 
revolutionary phenomena. A constitutive revolution is, according to Arjomand, 
one that establishes a new political order by imposing a central authority on a 
previously segmented society. The emergence of Islam exemplifies this general 
pattern, but some unique features set it apart from other cases: in particular, this 
was the only constitutive revolution that coincided with and depended on the 
promulgation of a new monotheism, and this factor affected both the initial pro-
ject and its later metamorphoses in multiple ways. Comparative and theoretical 
perspectives can thus be brought to bear on disputes that have mostly developed 
in isolation from broader contexts. 
Two contributions deal with specific countries and their roles in the historical 
formation of Islamic traditions. Egypt constitutes a markedly different case 
which does not fit easily into typologies linking radical socio-political transfor-
mations and axial crystallizations. The civilization of the Nile had been central to 
religious and intellectual cross-currents of Late Antiquity, but became more mar-
ginal to the schisms and crystallizations of early Islam. Georg Stauth’s chapter 6 
argues that despite the recent interest in Egypt in the context of Late Antiquity, 
the axial framework of analysis, by focusing on monotheism and revelation, has 
largely sidelined Egypt as a residual cultural heritage within patterns of cultural 
reconstruction culminating in Christianity and Islam. This chapter attempts to 
show some of the antagonisms which relate to the synchronic coexistence of the 
civilizational heritage of Pharaonic religion-cum-politics and the reasserted and 
radicalized, monotheistic visions of rising Islam. Such antagonisms have shaped 
the vitality of a lived religion, specifically in local contexts – as viewed here – in 
the Eastern Nile Delta. Taking a view on the role of `Abdallah b. Salam – the 
first Jewish witness of Muhammad’s monotheistic revelations in the prophetic 
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tradition, and at the same time a locally venerated Islamic saint in that region – it 
becomes evident that the ‘denial’ of the civilizational heritage of the Nile is as 
much a source of orthodox monotheist reconstruction in Islam (as it was in Chris-
tianity), as it bears a great part of the symbolic, legendary and mythological leg-
acy which played an important role in orthodox theology and in popular imagi-
nary from the early Islamic period onwards. Paradoxically, the Islamic negations 
of Pharaonic civilization and its wonders still occupy a great role within orthodox 
practice and modern reflection of Islam. This negation at the same time preserves 
and incorporates the archaism which it wishes to suppress. This is a possible 
qualification and a point of critique of the axial framework.  
Yemen was, as historians are now coming to recognize, not only an important 
cultural centre in its own right and a prominent part of the civilizational back-
ground to Islam, but also – as Raif G. Khoury argues in chapter 7 – a meeting 
ground of multiple traditions. The Yemeni share in political, cultural and reli-
gious life during Islam’s early centuries was highly significant, but it has proved 
difficult to trace – not least because it was later obscured by dominant traditions 
– and is still a controversial theme. Khoury shows how important Yemeni con-
nections and crossroads were for conceptual, historiographical and literary devel-
opments that took place during the first phase of the classical period of Islamic 
civilization. 
A concluding paper in this section, chapter 8 by Josef van Ess, critically reas-
sesses the core idea of breakthrough or radical transformation that underlies the 
axial framework of analysis in its successive adaptations and revisions. Van Ess 
digs deeply into the reasons of why the axial idea of Jaspers was itself at odds 
with Islam for being at the service of a distinctive idea of the “modern subject” 
that needs, by definition, a convenient other, a civilization resistant to those radi-
cal transformations that are supposedly rooted in the “self.” Indeed, Islamic civi-
lization is characterized by innovation and reformation within a stronger line of 
continuity with Late Antiquity. Van Ess suggests that the notion of “turning 
points” in a longer term perspective of civilizational developments and cross-civ-
ilizational influences seems to be more suitable to the analysis of Islam than the 
original axial idea of “breakthroughs.” 
The third and last section includes contributions summarizing “cultural and 
institutional dynamics” of Islamic civilization, partly in a comparative perspec-
tive referring to other world religions and their civilizational ramifications. Here 
again the reframing of the axial problematic becomes more explicit.  
Said Amir Arjomand’s chapter 9 considers the divergent paths of Western 
Christendom and the Islamic world from a specific angle, concerning the institu-
tions of higher learning and their relationship to political culture. This approach 
differs from the line taken by those who consider the role of universities only in 
relation to the genesis of modern science; it gives due weight to the interplay of 
structural and contingent factors; and it stresses different ways of appropriating 
older traditions. According to Arjomand, the failure to translate Aristotle’s Poli-
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tics conditioned the development of political thought in medieval Islam. Yet the 
significance of his intellectual blockage can only be understood in connection 
with larger patterns of Islamic history before and after the Mongol invasions.  
Arpad Szakolczai’s chapter 10 links these issues to even broader historical 
horizons. Szakolczai does not deny that the idea of the Axial Age has helped to 
open up comparative perspectives. He insists, however, that it has also obscured 
other important themes for comparative analysis: in particular the question of 
similarities and differences between prophetic religions. Only some of the inno-
vations commonly ascribed to the Axial Age were associated with prophetic fig-
ures; on the other hand, the prophetic religions that had the most massive impact 
on world history emerged long after the end of the Axial Age. A different histori-
cal frame of reference is therefore needed. Moreover, a closer analysis of pro-
phetic religions will draw attention to another topic that has often been noted by 
axial theorists, but never fully integrated into their problematic: the ecumenic 
empires, with which the religions in question interacted in very different ways. 
In chapter 11 Armando Salvatore questions both the typological conception 
of axiality and the interpretation that subsumes axial breakthroughs under a more 
general and much too abstract category of reflexivity. Drawing on Voegelin’s de-
scriptions of the “metastatic,” i.e. exponentially and uncontrollably transforma-
tive character of axial discourse, especially in its prophetic variant, he stresses the 
sustained and divergent but sometimes interconnected dynamics of traditions that 
grew out of axial beginnings, as well as the need for an adequate concept of tradi-
tion that could provide the key to a comparative understanding of varying cases. 
An informed definition of axiality can only emerge out of such historical and 
comparative studies. In that context, Salvatore argues that Islam and Christianity 
are best seen as interrelated parts of a Western complex of axial traditions and 
that much more work remains to be done on Islamic sources of European 
thought.  
The section and the volume conclude with S.N. Eisenstadt’s reflections on 
public spheres and political dynamics in Islamic societies in chapter 12. Growing 
interest in the political aspects of modernity has brought the varying types of 
public spheres and civil societies to the forefront of comparative analysis; and 
since the prospects of political modernity in the Islamic world have seemed par-
ticularly troubled, this has led to distorted views of Islamic political traditions. 
The widespread notion of despotic rule as an enduring characteristic of Islamic 
societies is incompatible with the historical record. But as Eisenstadt argues, the 
Islamic experience is also particularly instructive with regard to the distinction 
between public sphere and civil society. Public spheres exist in widely varying 
forms in different civilizational settings, but the development of civil society de-
pends on more specific conditions for individual and collective access to the po-
litical domain. Vigorous public spheres, centered on a set of distinctive institu-
tions, were characteristic of Islamic societies, but other components of the insti-
tutional framework blocked or minimized access to political centers. 

 
 
 
Crystallizations 

 
Chapter 1 
Marshall Hodgson’s Civilizational 
Analysis of Islam: Theoretical and 
Comparative Perspectives 
 
JOHANN P. ARNASON 
 
Civilizational perspectives, of a more or less consistent kind, are often implicit in 
area studies; but it is very rare for area specialists to engage in sustained reflec-
tion on this background, and to develop their own variations on key themes of 
civilizational analysis. Marshall Hodgson is perhaps the most outstanding exam-
ple. His historical analysis of ‘Islamdom’ and ‘Islamicate civilization,’ to use his 
own neologisms, is grounded in a very explicit and sophisticated version of civi-
lizational theory, and the connection works both ways: the civilizational ap-
proach throws new light on Islam as a historical phenomenon, and at the same 
time, it is developed along specific lines that reflect the distinctive features of the 
case in question.1 The result is, as far as I can judge, the most ambitious and 
theoretically articulate Western attempt to understand the Islamic world. If we 
want to bring Islamic studies and the comparative analysis of civilizations into 
closer mutual contact, this would seem to be the most promising starting-point. 
But it has, so far, attracted much less attention than it would merit. There has 
been no extensive discussion of Hodgson’s assumptions and arguments; the cur-
rent ideological controversies about ‘Orientalism’ (an overstretched notion if 
ever there was one) tend to bypass his work, perhaps because it demands a level 
of historical sensitivity that has now become unfashionable.  
The following discussion – a brief and tentative sketch which I hope to de-
velop into a more systematic interpretation – will begin with a glance at Hodg-
son’s conception of civilizations as ‘primary units of reference’ for large-scale 
comparative history, and then move on to his analysis of Islam. Within the limits 
of this paper, I can only deal with a few parts of a vast field. Hodgson’s interpre-
 
1  ‘Islamdom’ is obviously coined by analogy with ‘Christendom,’ more precisely 
with the use of the latter term to describe a civilization rather than a religion which 
is only a part of it – admittedly a defining part, but not to be equated with the whole. 
Similarly, to describe a civilizational formation as ‘Islamicate,’ rather than ‘Is-
lamic,’ is to stress the general point that a civilization is never educible to its reli-
gious premises, as well as the more specific ones that this civilization integrated 
important elements of other traditions, subordinating them to Islamic principles 
without dissolving their distinctive contents, and that its history was more discon-
tinuous than a straightforward Islamic identity would allow for.  
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tation of the formative period will be examined at some length; I will then con-
clude with some reflections on the broader interrelated questions of unity and di-
versity as well as continuity and discontinuity in the historical destinies of 
Islamicate civilization.  
 
 
Defining and demarcat ing civi l izat ions 
 
In the “general prologue” to the first volume of The Venture of Islam, Hodgson 
describes his project in the following terms (Hodgson 1974, 1: 90-91): 
 
In this work, we shall speak more of masterpieces of art and dynastic policies, of reli-
gious geniuses, and scientific discoveries, than of everyday life on the farm and in the 
kitchen. Hence we will include in our scope those peoples among whom a few privi-
leged men shared such masterpieces and discoveries, however much those peoples dif-
fered among themselves, in farmwork or in homemaking. This may seem like arbitrary 
preference for the spectacular. I believe it answers to a legitimate human need to under-
stand ourselves. In any case, we must be clear as to what we are doing, and its conse-
quences. 
 
A strong interest in ‘high culture,’ or rather a rejection of the various attempts to 
debunk or discount it, is no doubt a defining characteristic of the civilizational 
approach; it is not to be mistaken for a claim that this is where the ultimate mean-
ing or the fundamental determinants of human history will be found. The point is, 
rather, that in specific contexts this level of analysis is crucial to the understand-
ing of the social-historical world; there is no suggestion that we should neglect 
the interaction of civilizational patterns, visible at the level of high culture, with 
local or popular forms of socio-cultural life. But the shared focus on high culture 
(’the arbitrary preference for the spectacular,’ to quote Hodgson’s anticipation of 
a likely critical response) does not necessarily reflect the same line of reasoning – 
or the same choice of context – in every single version of civilizational analysis. 
We must therefore take a closer look at Hodgson’s specific reasons for adopting 
this view. 
To begin with, let us note the most general historical co-ordinates of civiliza-
tion studies, as defined by Hodgson. Writing in the mid-1960s, he argued (and he 
would probably take the same view today) that the analysis of ‘pre-modern citied 
societies’ – another of his neologisms – had lagged behind the study of non-citied 
societies on the one hand and modern technical societies on the other. Anthro-
pologists and sociologists had moved ahead, whereas the world-historical 
framework required for the study of “the periods and areas between – that is, 
from Sumer to the French Revolution” (ibid., 1: 31) had proved more difficult to 
develop. One of the most striking features of this long historical period was the 
constitution of cultural units of a new kind, capable of encompassing a broad va-
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riety of local cultures with a more limited reach. These superimposed cultural 
formations, more self-reflexive and as a result both more clearly demarcated and 
more dynamic than the subordinate ones, are the civilizations that Hodgson 
wants to place at the centre of comparative history. Sociologically speaking, they 
depend on urban centres, literate elites and cumulative traditions. As for the de-
fining contents, they are “constituted by standards of cultural evaluation, basic 
expectations, and norms of legitimation” (ibid., 1: 93). A civilization is, in other 
words, an “expression of formative ideals” (ibid., 1: 90) – this is perhaps the best 
condensed formulation of Hodgson’s approach.  
Among formative ideals, religious ones stand out in virtue of their strong and 
comprehensive claims: “A religious commitment, by its nature, tends to be more 
total than any other” (ibid., 1: 94). Here it is necessary to say a few words about 
Hodgson’s definition of religion, which is crucial to his understanding of Islam, 
and it seems best to begin with a quotation: “Properly, we use the term “reli-
gious” for an ultimate orientation (rather than ‘philosophical’ or ‘ideological’), so 
far as the orientation is personally committing and is meaningful in terms of a 
cosmos, without further precision of what this may come to” (ibid., 1: 88). As 
Hodgson notes in passing, this emphasis on a person’s “ultimate cosmic orienta-
tion and commitments and the ways in which he pays attention to them” (ibid., 1: 
88) leads to the inclusion of Buddhism among religions (atheism is not an obsta-
cle), whereas Marxism does not qualify (“the relation person-cosmos plays a 
relatively slight role there”). The cosmic orientation can turn towards a sense of 
cosmic transcendence and human dependence; this is, of course, particularly pro-
nounced in Islam (although Hodgson does not quote Becker’s description of Is-
lam as the ‘most Schleiermacherian’ of all religions, it seems clear that he agreed 
with it).  
There is thus a close affinity, but not an invariant relationship between reli-
gious and civilizational orientations. Religious commitments tend to figure 
prominently among the formative ideals that constitute a civilizational pattern, 
but some religions are more civilizational than others, and some civilizations are 
more religion-centred than others. At this point we may note some distinctive 
features of the Islamic case, as seen by Hodgson. First and foremost, Islam has – 
more than any other religion – tended to make the ‘kind of total demand on life’ 
that is potentially inherent in a religious commitment as such. A comparison with 
the other monotheistic world religion underscores the point: “The reader will find 
that Islam, rather more than Christianity, tended to call forth a total social pattern 
in the name of religion itself” (ibid., 1: 89). The internal totalizing logic trans-
lates into external unity. Hodgson speaks of an ‘Islamicate civilization,’ almost 
coextensive with the spread of Islam as a religion (although he notes the exis-
tence of Muslims – e.g. in China – whose religion does not entail much participa-
tion in a broader civilizational pattern). He does not think that there is a compa-
rable pan-Christian civilization: the mutual isolation of Ethiopia and Western 
Christendom is cited as a case in point. He also rejects – without further discus-
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sion – the idea of a Buddhist civilization. In short, Islam stands out as the only 
world religion associated with – indeed embodied in – a single civilization.  
On the other hand, “even Islam could not be total” (ibid., 1: 89). The reli-
gious vision could more easily put its stamp on some cultural spheres than others; 
“in many other spheres, such as trade or poetry” (ibid.), it had to grant significant 
autonomy to extra-religious values and meanings. Moreover, “Islam is unique 
among the religious traditions for the diversity of the peoples that have embraced 
it” (ibid., 1: 85). Civilizational unity was superimposed on this diversity, and that 
could not happen without complex adaptive and transformative processes. Hodg-
son concludes: “When we look at Islam historically, the integral unity of life it 
seemed to display when we looked at it as a working out of the act of isl?m al-
most vanishes” (ibid., 1: 85). Almost, but not quite. For one thing, the aspiration 
to integral unity remained alive in pious minds and was intermittently activated 
in more practical ways. The question of unity and diversity is thus posed in very 
stark terms. It will be reconsidered below.  
But first we need to take another look at Hodgson’s case for the civilizational 
approach. He is keenly aware of the limits to its validity and utility: as he 
stresses, it is sometimes – depending on the context of inquiry – more appropri-
ate to analyze history in terms of regional boundaries and continuities. We can 
thus think of the Near East (or the lands from Nile to Oxus, to use Hodgson’s 
preferred term) or of India as regions with a history of their own, before and after 
the emergence or intrusion of Islam; and in some contexts, a European region (in 
a broad sense that includes Anatolia) may be a more meaningful unit of reference 
than the civilization of Western Christendom. Some specific cases will always 
prove difficult to fit into a civilizational framework; Hodgson refers to the Geor-
gians and the Armenians as peoples that cannot be subsumed under one civiliza-
tion. (It is tempting to elaborate a bit further on these two cases: in the first in-
stance, Hodgson is obviously thinking of their borderline position between the 
Eastern Christian and Iranian worlds, but it might be added that they responded 
to this situation by developing particularly distinctive and resilient collective 
identities – somewhat resembling civilizational patterns in miniature, but the re-
stricted scale and scope set limits to the analogy).  
Notwithstanding such qualifications, Hodgson insists on the centrality of the 
civilizational approach to the study of world history ‘from Sumer to the French 
Revolution,’ and we must now try to clarify his reasons. This will entail some re-
construction: The Venture of Islam is an unfinished work, and basic assumptions 
are not always stated as clearly as they might have been if the author had lived 
long enough to put the finishing touches to the text. It seems to me that five main 
points can be distinguished.  
The first has to do with Hodgson’s conception of traditions and their role in 
history. His reflections on this topic read like a radical critique of the impover-
ished concept of tradition that had prevailed in the orbit of modernization theory 
(the University of Chicago was obviously a place where direct contact with this 
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intellectual current was unavoidable). For Hodgson, growth, change and devel-
opment are essential to a cultural tradition: “the more so, the broader its scope” 
(ibid., 1: 79). As we shall see, the reference to a broad scope is important for his 
civilizational perspective. But before going on to consider that point, the dynam-
ics of cultural traditions should be defined in more specific terms. Hodgson’s key 
statement on this subject is worth quoting at length: as he sees it (ibid., 1: 80),  
 
we may describe the process of cultural tradition as a movement composed of three 
moments: a creative action, an occasion of inventive or revelatory, even charismatic en-
counter: for instance, the discovery of a new aesthetic value; the launching of a new 
technique of craftsmanship; a rise to a new level of social expectation, one man of an-
other; the assertion of a new ruling stock or even the working out of new patterns of 
governing; or, in the case of religion, an occasion of fresh awareness of something ulti-
mate in the relation between ourselves and the cosmos – that is, an occasion of spiritual 
revelation, bringing a new vision. 
 
Hodgson goes on to mention the Quran and its challenge as a prime example of 
creative foundation.  
The group commitment and the interaction within the group are inseparable 
from a conflict of interpretations and a “continuing cumulative dialogue” (ibid., 
1: 81). As Hodgson notes, this pattern is not limited to religious, ideological or 
scientific fields; the same applies to the forms of economic and political life, 
where the conflictual dynamic of interests and interpretations is at work. In all 
these regards, the civilizational frame of reference is crucial: the interpretive con-
flicts and the cumulative dialogues unfold on that scale, and we must adopt a cor-
respondingly broad view if we want to put them in proper perspective. The 
widely shared and articulated high cultural traditions are the most representative 
examples of the broader pattern that Hodgson calls the ‘process of cultural tradi-
tion.’ In that sense, the civilizational perspective is needed to do justice to the 
general problematic of tradition. We may add a point that fits into Hodgson’s 
scheme, even if he did not elaborate on it. There is a reflexive side to the creative 
moment which he lists as the first part of his model: Cultural traditions construct 
retrospective images of their foundational episodes and figures, often in the form 
of a more or less explicitly sacred history, and the most important of such con-
structions have crystallized and operated on a civilizational scale. The Islamicate 
civilization is, in that regard, as good an example as any other.  
To conclude this discussion of traditions and their civilizational dimension, 
one more aspect should be noted. After criticizing one-sided comparisons of East 
and West (including some arguments put forward by Max Weber), Hodgson 
draws a very far-reaching conclusion that is best quoted in full (ibid., 1: 37):  
 
The difference between major traditions lies not so much in the particular elements pre-
sent within them, but in the relative weighting of them and the structuring of their inter-
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play within the total context. If this structuring remains relatively constant (in the very 
nature of tradition, it cannot remain absolutely so), it will be because the predisposing 
conditions remain relatively constant, and because they are further reinforced by the in-
stitutionalizing of attitudes appropriate to them. 
 
Different traditions are, in other words, characterized not by the presence or ab-
sence of specific themes, ideas or orientations, but by different combinations of 
shared components. This view is best treated as a working hypothesis that will 
still need extensive testing; but it would seem to be in line with current trends of 
comparative studies (one case that comes to mind is the question of the idea of 
creation in the Chinese tradition: it is now widely accepted that it was not simply 
absent, as earlier historians of ideas tended to think; rather, its contextual mean-
ing differed from the Western Eurasian traditions). And the civilizational per-
spective is at least a plausible corollary of the hypothesis: it takes a civilizational 
scale for the available components and the possible combinations to become fully 
visible. 
2. The second point can be stated relatively briefly, since it has already been 
touched upon in the preceding discussion. Civilizations are, in Hodgson’s view, 
expressions of formative ideals, and there are two sides to the formative poten-
tial. On the one hand, the high cultural traditions that constitute the core of a civi-
lization can be diffused beyond their original social context and affect the pat-
terns of local and popular cultures in more or less decisive ways. This is an obvi-
ous implication of the conception of civilizations as superimposed cultures. On 
the other hand, the formative ideals can be reaffirmed and reinterpreted by con-
cerned minorities, aiming at a reordering of social life. Once again, the historical 
dimensions of such projects can only be grasped if they are studied on a civiliza-
tional scale, and the record of Islamic revivalist movements is as good an exam-
ple as any other.  
3. The third point is linked to a vision of world history and a controversy 
about the proper way of writing it. I mean the – real or potential – debate be-
tween Hodgson and William McNeill, about which we know less than we would 
like to. They were colleagues at the University of Chicago, working on their 
main projects at roughly the same time, but it is unclear whether there was an 
ongoing exchange of views. But the only published part of the debate (apart from 
arguments implicit in The Venture of Islam is a long excerpt from Hodgson’s let-
ter to John O. Voll, dated 1966 and included in a posthumous collection of essays 
(Hodgson 1993: 91-94). Here Hodgson begins with a brief criticism of three de-
funct visions of history: the Christian, the Marxist and the Westernist, and then 
moves on to discuss an emerging alternative which he calls the “four region pat-
tern.” As he sees it, the new paradigm reached its “first fulfilment” in McNeill’s 
Rise of the West (which Hodgson describes as the “first genuine world history 
ever written”); but on close examination, this work appears as an uneasy com-
promise between the four region model (with the Chinese, Indian, Near Eastern 
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and European worlds as the main units of reference) and an underlying West-
ernist one. Hodgson even suggests that McNeill’s version of world history might 
not be immune to a Westernist takeover, and he links this to a complaint about 
the “unphilosophical structure” of the work: an absence of critical reflection on 
philosophical presuppositions inherited from Western traditions, and an insensi-
tivity to the contexts of meaning that determine the nature and limits of diffusion. 
To Hodgson, the four-region pattern was obviously a step in the right direc-
tion, but it did not go far enough. As other texts show, he was developing a more 
elaborate model of regional differentiation. More importantly (in the present con-
text), he insisted on the distinction as well as the connection between regions and 
civilizations. To counter the persistent influence of Westernism, world history 
had to be reconstructed in both regional and civilizational terms. Hodgson’s dis-
cussion of this task did not get beyond rough outlines, but we can reconstruct the 
basic orientations, and it seems appropriate to begin with the references to the 
Axial Age: although Hodgson’s views on that subject differ markedly from the 
most influential approaches, his case confirms that the axial connection is essen-
tial to a full-fledged model of civilizational analysis. When discussing Hodgson’s 
specific version of it, we should bear in mind that he engages directly with Jas-
pers’s philosophical interpretation of the Axial Age; the later historical-sociologi-
cal approaches had not yet taken shape.  
For Hodgson, the Axial Age was less unique than Jaspers had suggested. 
‘Citied agrarianate societies,’ as he called the social formations that succeeded 
each other from Sumer to the French Revolution, were on the whole resistant to 
radical innovation. Technological conditions set limits to the accumulation and 
investment of surplus, and in a more elusive general sense, cultural patterns 
privileged continuity: “there was an inherent tendency in style which militated 
against radical innovation” (ibid., 1: 236-37). There were, nevertheless, a few 
strikingly creative periods of “cultural florescence,” as Hodgson called it, and the 
Axial Age was one of them (other, more localized examples included India in the 
early centuries CE, China under the Tang and Song dynasties, and the Western 
European Renaissance – but in this last case, florescence was followed by some-
thing much more unprecedented: the ‘Great Western Transmutation’). As for the 
specific achievements of the Axial Age, Hodgson seems to have drawn from Jas-
pers’s reflections the sceptical conclusion that interpretations in terms of a shared 
intellectual or spiritual direction were premature. He refers in very general terms 
to a new interest in transcendence (this is perhaps comparable to Benjamin 
Schwartz’s loose definition of that concept as a way of “standing back and look-
ing beyond” – cf. Schwartz 1975), and to a widespread concern with the individ-
ual, but all things considered, he thinks it makes more sense to define the Axial 
Age in terms of its long-term consequences than its initial aspirations or self-un-
derstandings. The innovations of the Axial Age laid the foundations for civiliza-
tional traditions that divided the main cultural zones of Eurasia between them-
selves during the following two millennia of premodern history. Greek, San-
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skritic (or Indic) and Chinese (or Sinic) traditions go back to these parallel but 
not common beginnings. In all cases, the civilizational patterns have a regional 
identity: Hodgson would no doubt have agreed with Braudel’s statement that 
civilizations can in principle be located on a map. But the abovementioned dis-
tinction between regions and civilizations is also relevant: the traditions in ques-
tion are characterized by a capacity – unequally developed and channelled in dif-
ferent directions – to spread beyond their original regional settings.  
There is, of course, a major and obvious exception to this generalization 
about the Axial Age. In the Nile-to-Oxus region, the birthplace of the most im-
portant archaic civilizations, no new unifying pattern emerged from the innova-
tions of the middle centuries of the last millennium BCE. Hodgson refers to 
monotheistic tendencies in the Iranian and Semitic traditions (he thought that Zo-
roastrian ‘dualism’ was best understood as a version of or a step in the direction 
of monotheism); but these developments did not crystallize into a pattern of re-
gional unity and trans-regional diffusion, comparable to those of the previously 
less developed regions. We should perhaps note in passing that although Hodg-
son mentions only Iranian and Semitic forms of monotheism, his general argu-
ment does not exclude the possibility of analogous trends in earlier phases and 
other places: both the abortive monotheistic revolution in Egypt (Akhenaten) and 
the peripheral monotheistic turn in South Arabia could be fitted into the picture.  
This incomplete axial transformation of the Nile-to-Oxus region is the back-
ground to Hodgson’s interpretation of Islam. It was Islamicate civilization that 
for the first time achieved the cultural unification of this part of the world, and it 
did so through a new elaboration of the monotheistic themes inherited from Ira-
nian and Semitic sources. But the civilizational pattern that served to integrate 
the region also manifested a trans-regional expansive and integrative dynamic 
that has no parallel in premodern history. The formative classical period of 
Islamicate civilization (Hodgson dates it from 692 to 945, i.e. from the definitive 
crystallization of the Marwanid caliphate to the irreversible decline of the 
Abbasid one) thus stands apart as a very specific phase of cultural florescence, 
different from the more dispersed innovations of the Axial Age as well as from 
the more localized ones of the other periods mentioned above.  
4. The fourth point has to do with responses of non-Western civilizations in 
general and the Islamicate one in particular – to the ‘Great Western Transmuta-
tion.’ This latter formulation sums up one of the most interesting but least devel-
oped parts of Hodgson’s argument. Here it must suffice to say that he was adum-
brating a very distinctive (but in a very general sense Weberian) analysis of early 
European modernity, centred on the 17th century and on interconnections be-
tween the absolutist state, the scientific revolution and the developments that 
later economic historians have described as ‘industrious’ or ‘proto-industrial’ 
revolutions. But in the present context, our main concern is with repercussions 
and responses on the non-Western side, and although Hodgson’s reflections on 
this are not always easy to follow, there seem to be two main thematic foci.  
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On the one hand, he suggests that reactions to the abrupt global empower-
ment of the West – as a result of the transmutation – must be interpreted in civili-
zational terms. The legacies of the respective high cultural traditions and their 
‘cumulative dialogues’ were in all cases reflected in the ideological and practical 
responses to the Western challenge. But in the light of more recent experience, it 
is tempting to go beyond Hodgson’s explicit statements and argue that the sig-
nificance of civilizational legacies manifests itself most clearly in the failure of 
attempts to neutralize them. The ascendancy of political Islam – on the ruins of 
various nationalisms and socialisms – is obviously the most spectacular case in 
point. But the politicization of Hinduism in post-Congress India and the ideo-
logical development of post-Communist China would seem to support the same 
conclusion.  
On the other hand, Hodgson finishes his third volume with reflections on the 
crisis of modernity and the possible significance of premodern traditions in that 
regard. The thrust of these reflections is best described as aporetic: Hodgson ar-
gues that the dynamic of modernity generates a whole series of problems – from 
the atomization of social life to the destruction of the environment – that call for 
a ‘new vision.’ But such a vision cannot be built on the utilitarian-technicalistic 
premises that have come to dominate modern culture. It is tempting to turn to the 
surviving premodern traditions. But “we cannot say that the religious heritages 
are in fact able to offer such vision: it may be that they are too drastically handi-
capped by the element of wishful thinking that has been so rooted in their whole 
history” (ibid., 3: 436). We can only find out through closer study; and the work 
that Hodgson put into the study of Islamic traditions suggests that he was pre-
pared to give them the benefit of doubt. 
5. The fifth and final point will only be briefly mentioned here. It has to do 
with the ultimate presuppositions of Hodgson’s work, and with a philosophical 
anthropology which he was rather reluctant to spell out. But he said enough to 
make it clear that he saw a comparative analysis of civilizations as essential to 
the understanding of the human condition and its potentialities, and that he liked 
to think of the major civilizations as ‘human heritages,’ some of which surpassed 
others in the exploration and articulation of specific dimensions of human being-
in-the-world. As for the most distinctive achievements of Islamicate civilization, 
seen from that angle, I will only quote a few remarks from the last passages of 
the ‘general prologue’ in the first volume of The Venture of Islam. On the aes-
thetic level, Hodgson described Islamicate visual arts as “the greatest ever known 
in which the elements of sheer visual design could be given priority over all other 
considerations.” More provocatively, he suggests that Islamicate literatures are 
“perhaps unparalleled in – among other things – their mastery of the esoteric as a 
dimension of human experience,” here he was obviously thinking of the Sufi tra-
dition, to which he felt strongly attracted. But he goes on to note that “the Islami-
cate society represents, in part, one of the most thoroughgoing attempts in history 
to build a world-wide human community as if from scratch on the basis of an ex-
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plicitly worked out ideal” (ibid., 1: 98). The implications of that point for com-
parative study of human societies and their histories can hardly be overstated. 
 
 
Is lamic re l ig ion and Is lamicate c ivi l izat ion 
 
Civilizational patterns are, in principle, irreducible to religious visions; but reli-
gious orientations are, by definition, likely to play a central role among the for-
mative ideals that characterize a civilization, and some sets of religious orienta-
tions are more translatable into a civilizational logic than others. As we have 
seen, the Islamic vision was – compared to other world religions – more totaliz-
ing and more explicitly oriented towards an all-round ordering of human life, 
from it most natural foundations to its most demanding moral dimensions. But 
even so, it had to fall short of a total impact. The religious vision had to adapt to 
other trends and forces already at work in the region which it took over and from 
which embarked on the path of global expansion; as it unfolded on an ever larger 
geopolitical and geocultural scale, it also released forces and triggered transfor-
mative processes which it had to accommodate but could not absorb.  
To clarify this relationship between religious vision and civilization, we must 
first go back to the beginnings. Islamicate civilization – as Hodgson calls it – 
took shape during the formative period from 692 to 945. It was not simply im-
posed on the Nile-to-Oxus region by conquerors coming in from the periphery; 
rather, it was the outcome of complex developments and innovations, separate at 
first but finally brought together in a new synthesis. The region was a configura-
tion of heterogeneous cultures with a long history of interaction and conflict, but 
aspects of the new pattern had been in the making long before the Islamic con-
quest. According to Hodgson, they included monotheistic traditions – in different 
Semitic and Iranian forms – as well as the growing strength of mercantile classes, 
and the egalitarian social ethics (sometimes spiralling into movements) that drew 
support from both of these trends. But this is not to suggest that the Islamic input 
sensu stricto was of minor importance. The ‘Islamic infusion,’ as Hodgson calls 
it, was the catalyst that brought about a creative fusion of the other components.  
However, when it comes to the concrete history of the events in question, 
Hodgson’s approach seems more conventional than his understanding of classical 
Islamicate civilization as a synthesis of multi-traditional sources. To put it an-
other way, there is a tension between the theoretical framework and the narrative. 
As is well known, there is now a flourishing current of revisionist historiography 
on early Islam. The historical validity of the traditional account of the conquest 
and the early caliphs is being called into question. It would be more than mis-
leading to lump all the revisionists together: for example, the line taken by John 
Wansbrough (1977; 1978) is a good deal more extreme than the view of Chris-
tian Décobert (1991). One can even observe major shifts within the work of indi-
vidual authors (Crone and Cook 1977 is much more extreme and less convincing 
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than Crone 1987). But a search for concrete anticipations of revisionism in 
Hodgson’s work would not be very rewarding. The first part of the first volume 
includes a chapter called “Muhammad’s challenge,” here Hodgson notes that “we 
know far less about Muhammad than was once supposed” (ibid., 1: 160). This 
does not go beyond the critical stance of classical Western scholarship on Islam, 
as represented e.g. by Goldziher. And Hodgson goes on to state that we neverthe-
less know a good deal more about Muhammad than about Jesus. As for the 
sources of this superior knowledge, he seems to have no doubt that “we can rely 
on the Quran as direct evidence” (ibid., 1: 160). Today’s revisionists would take 
strong exception to this statement. Here I cannot pursue the question further. But 
I would like to suggest that Hodgson’s interpretive model, i.e. his analysis of the 
emergence of Islam as a synthesis of multiple sources on a regional scale – is 
perfectly compatible with a moderate version of the revisionist view; indeed, it 
positively calls for that kind of approach. If the ‘infusion’ of a somewhat incho-
ate but also incipiently rationalizing monotheism from the periphery was a cru-
cial factor in the formation of a new civilization, it seems a plausible hypothesis 
that this aspect of the process was retrospectively stylized into a sacred history, 
and that the record transmitted to later generations must be seen in that light. 
These considerations apply to other questions raised by the revisionists. In 
particular, Hodgson had next to nothing to say about the Yemeni connection (no 
surprise, given the then very limited knowledge of the whole South Arabian 
background), but I think it can be easily fitted into his model – it is one more 
component of the synthesis. There is, however, another recent line of thought 
about classical Islam that may pose more serious problems. The traditional idea 
of a ‘decline and fall of the Roman Empire’ has now been replaced by an alterna-
tive model best summed up in terms of a ‘transformation of the Roman world’ 
(this was, among other things, the title of a vast interdisciplinary project launched 
under the auspices of the European Science Foundation [for one of the best dis-
cussions of the whole problematic, cf. Fowden 1993]). This should probably be 
seen as one of the major historical paradigm shifts of the last decades. It involves 
a new perspective on Islam as one of the three successor civilizations into which 
the Roman world mutated, and each of which transformed the legacy of late an-
tiquity in its specific way. It can hardly be said that Hodgson anticipated this 
turn. He was obviously aware of the presence of the Roman Empire in the region 
that was to be transformed by Islam, but he did not do much to place this trans-
formation in a broader context involving the whole Roman world. He made a 
valid point when he noted that the experience of the Maghreb showed how much 
more alien to the Roman past Islam was than the two other successors; but that is 
not the whole story. 
Let us now return to Hodgson’s more specific conception of the formative 
period. The most striking aspect of his periodization is the choice of precise dates 
– 692 and 945 – for the beginning and the end of the ‘classical civilization of the 
High Caliphate.’ The late beginning implies a long prehistory that includes both 
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Arabic origins and the early expansion. Hodgson’s main reasons for separating 
this long-drawn-out prelude from the classical phase have to do with the relation-
ship between religion and politics. He is reluctant to treat the militant Islamic 
community of the first decades as a stage within an ongoing process of state for-
mation. Muhammad’s regime in Medina was a “new and total moral order” 
(ibid., 1: 197), a “new social order” (ibid., 1: 187); but although a subtitle refers 
to a “new polity” (ibid., 1: 176), and Muhammad is – in passing credited with 
building a state (ibid., 1: 193), a later note (ibid., 1: 321 n.) refers to Medina as 
having neither state nor church. The principles and problems of statehood seem 
to have been overshadowed by the total fusion of prophecy and government, the 
total union of the believers’community, and the vision of prophet and community 
as vehicles of divine command. The situation changed when the community 
turned to sustained expansion, but the first solutions to new problems were im-
provised and unstable. According to Hodgson, the caliphate began as an emer-
gency arrangement (there was no preconceived substitute for prophetic rule, and 
no consensus on ways to regulate succession), and continued as a central author-
ity for the community at war. The crisis began with the transition from Umar to 
Uthman and was not overcome until the second fitna ended with Abd-al-Malik’s 
victory over his rivals in 692.  
On this view, the “early Muslim state” mentioned in the title of the last chap-
ter of Hodgson’s “book one” (ibid., 1: 187) was at best a proto-state, and in some 
key respects an anti-state. As will be argued in another contribution to this vol-
ume( on the emergence of Islam), there are – especially in light of more recent 
scholarship – reasons to propose a more nuanced model, and to link a longer 
phase of crystallization to a more continuous dynamic of state formation. Hodg-
son’s interpretation would thus seem too dependent on classical Islamic images 
of Muhammad’s Medina and the early caliphate. However, this does not mean 
that his analysis of formative processes during the period he defined as classical 
should be discarded: it still seems more systematic, more theoretically articulate 
and more attuned to civilizational perspectives than any other available work of 
its kind. Here I will try to reconstruct its essentials in terms somewhat closer to 
the ‘state of the art’ in civilizational analysis, and therefore not always in close 
alignment with Hodgson’s own conceptual framework. More work will be 
needed to integrate his problematic into current debates among civilizational 
theorists.  
In contrast to the first fitna, where religious and communitarian concerns had 
affected the course of events, the second one was fought through to the end, and 
settled by superior military force. The primacy of power was symbolically under-
scored by the fact that a claimant based in conquered territory (Syria) defeated a 
rival in control of Islam’s original centres. As a result, the new empire was for 
the first time brought under unified central rule. The imperial Islamic state now 
had to be consolidated on a huge scale, and throughout a region particularly rich 
in diverse traditions of political organization, culture and imagery. Hodgson sees 
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the development of the Marwanid state after 692 (he prefers this term to the more 
conventional notion of a continuous Umayyad dynasty) against this background. 
His analytical frame of reference merits closer attention: although definitions of 
basic concepts leave much to be desired, and there is no mention of Max Weber, 
it does not seem far-fetched to speak of an implicit alternative to Weber’s sociol-
ogy of domination. The key category is a generalized concept of absolutism, 
which Hodgson explicitly applies to Eurasian societies from Western Europe to 
China, and which may be seen as a less reductionistic answer to the Weberian 
model of patrimonialism. As Hodgson argues, a legitimizing social rationale for 
strong monarchic rule is common to agrarianate societies, or at least to those that 
go beyond minimal size: an unchallenged supreme ruler appears as a necessary 
check on privileged minorities seeking to maximize wealth and power. In a state 
consistently based on this principle, the monarch’s authority must be absolute, 
“one before which the rich and the well-born were as vulnerable as the little 
man” (ibid., 1: 282). It is this claim to unconditional primacy over all other cen-
tres of social power that constitutes the defining feature of the absolutist model. 
It is obviously not realized everywhere to the same degree; the regimes most fa-
miliarly associated with the label should not be mistaken for the most perfect ex-
amples; and to add a qualifying point which Hodgson does not discuss, specific 
circumstances could transform the oligarchic adversaries of absolutism into pio-
neers of broader political transformations.  
The absolutist model is by nature prone to opposite deviations: a weak ruler 
can become an instrument of the forces he is supposed to control, but a more as-
sertive one is easily tempted into arbitrary and oppressive uses of power. Some 
safeguards – or at least mitigating devices – against both dangers are built into 
symbolic and institutional frameworks of monarchic rule. Such patterns develop 
within all political traditions, with significant variations from one civilizational 
context to another. The recurrent core structures include models of court culture 
and society, designed to enhance the authority and prestige of the power centre, 
but also capable of channelling it in certain directions; more or less developed 
bureaucratic apparatuses that translate the monarchic principle into practical con-
trol; and the highly diverse paradigms of sacral rulership (divine kingship in the 
literal sense was only an archaic variant). When the victors of the second fitna set 
about consolidating their imperial domain, they faced a situation where the abso-
lutist model was inescapably operative on a grand scale, and at the same time 
they fell heirs to its multiple traditional versions. As Hodgson stresses, prior pro-
gress towards cultural unity of the ‘Irano-Semitic area’ made empire-building 
easier, but different cultural traditions were still firmly entrenched. On the other 
hand, the conquerors had brought with them not so much a new model as a whole 
new problematic of sacral rulership. The close connection between religion and 
imperial expansion made it obligatory to define and legitimize political power 
with reference to the revealed message and its bearer; but there could be no sim-
ple continuation of the exceptional authority vested in the prophet. Although his-
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torians of early Islam seem to agree that the image of Muhammad as the last 
prophet was not as definitive as it later became, his specific status had to be en-
shrined, and when new models of leadership or rulership seemed to transgress 
that rule, they were vulnerable to accusations of heresy (sectarian traditions also 
faced this problem, but their terms of reference differed from those of the main-
stream). In short, the imperative need to derive legitimacy from prophetic origins 
went together with the unsettled problem of defining the precise nature of the 
connection. Different models of sacral rulership could be envisaged, within limits 
that were in turn disputed by the more militantly heterodox currents. This distinc-
tive but still in many ways undetermined framework for ordering the relationship 
between religion and power was a key part of what Hodgson calls the ‘Islamic 
infusion’: it shaped the Islamic forms of absolutism.  
Another part was, however, a “tradition of faith” that “developed most ac-
tively in an atmosphere of political opposition to the ruling forms” (ibid., 1: 241). 
At its most explicit, it became a “programme of the piety-minded” (ibid., 1: 252) 
that challenged an existing political order. But this political challenge was 
grounded in a broader religious vision. The triumphant faith had a transformative 
logic of its own that could and had to compromise with imperial absolutism, but 
did not lend itself to complete instrumentalization. Universalistic claims, inherent 
in the self-understanding of purified monotheism, had already transcended the 
Arab context, and they found a much more effective outlet at the imperial level. 
The original equality of believers, although never untempered by internal rank-
ing, could be invoked to justify protests against the new power structures. These 
autonomous religious factors were reinforced by the circumstances of early Is-
lamic history. Here it may be useful to link Hodgson’s analysis to later work by 
Fred M. Donner (1998). Donner’s interpretation of historical consciousness and 
historical writing in early Islam stresses the importance as well as the multiple 
modes of legitimation. He uses the latter concept in a very broad sense, perhaps 
best understood as synonymous with self-definition and orientation in the context 
of the divergences and struggles that followed the first conquests. His four types 
of legitimation can then be equated with fundamental but to some extent alterna-
tive ways of articulating the relationships between ethnic, religious and imperial 
aspects of a new formation. Theocratic legitimation, in the loose sense of those in 
power ruling by God’s will, and legitimation through piety – a particularly mili-
tant, all-embracing and at first apocalyptic style of piety – represented different 
and easily polarized positions. Historicizing legitimation, based on narratives 
about the past and especially about the beginnings of Islam, could be aligned 
with both sides; but in Donner’s opinion, it changed the basically ahistorical out-
look of earliest Islam and was in due course refined into a rich historiographical 
tradition. The religious content evident in all these forms of legitimation was also 
associated with the fourth one: genealogical legitimation had a long pre-Islamic 
history, but in this specific case it had to do with genealogical demarcation of the 
Arabic community, in its capacity as a privileged recipient of the revelation, as 
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well as with dissensions and rivalries within its ranks, and problems arising in the 
latter respect converged with those of historicizing legitimation.  
In regard to Hodgson’s line of argument, this analysis lends weight to the 
emphasis on religion as an autonomous factor. The various legitimizing or self-
defining uses of a religious tradition in the making led to increased demand for 
specialized and authoritative knowledge in that field; an emerging religious elite 
of a new kind, with its own agenda, thus became an active participant in the con-
flicts that shaped the course of Islamic history for a long time to come. The result 
was, as Hodgson sees it, that an “Islamic religion in the full sense, as a compre-
hensive aspect of human culture, began to take form” (ibid., 1: 249). The Islamic 
opposition contains the germs of later differentiation, but it would be misleading 
to describe its beginnings in sectarian terms. In an earlier publication, Hodgson 
(1955) had argued – and it now seems to be generally accepted – that the sectar-
ian turn of the Shia took place later than historians had tended to assume. The 
succession to Muhammad was disputed, and conflicts over that issue were trans-
figured into symbolic beginnings of later sectarian divisions, but such concerns 
were not yet paramount for the 7th-century protagonists. Only the Kharijis, who 
according to the traditional chronology broke with Ali in 657, can be seen as an 
early case of ideological opposition: they maintained the “uncompromising 
claims for egalitarian justice” (Hodgson 1974, 1: 216) that were much less im-
portant to the main contenders for the succession. At later stages, their militantly 
dissident stance – with minimal doctrinal elaboration – often merged with tribal 
resistance to state formation; they remained marginal to the history of Islamicate 
civilization. As for the struggle between Ali and his victorious Umayyad rivals, it 
became much more central to conflicting identities and interpretations within the 
Islamic universe of discourse, but Hodgson’s view is that there were two trends 
at work. On the one hand, Ali was retrospectively de-marginalized and integrated 
into the idealized picture of early Islamic leadership that was adopted by the 
mainstream; on the other hand, he and his descendants were re-imagined by the 
sectarian Shia – in increasingly divergent ways – and canonized as embodiments 
of ideas of later origin.  
The ‘Islamic opposition’ that – as Hodgson sees it – emerged in tandem with 
caliphal absolutism was still at the very beginning of a long history of conflicts 
and compromises between orthodoxies and heterodoxies. But it already signalled 
a new twist to the relationship between religion and politics, and more precisely 
between religious authority and imperial power. There was no clear-cut division 
of spheres: the aspirants to absolutist rule could no more dispense with the le-
gitimizing resources of a triumphant religion than the interpreters of a totalizing 
religious vision could ignore the problems of political life. The new constellation 
was, in other words, marked by more problematic relations between mutually de-
pendent forces. This view of the transition to the classical phase is central to 
Hodgson’s understanding of Islamicate civilization, and some key implications 
should therefore be noted. Most obviously, Hodgson’s argument runs counter to 
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the entrenched idea – convincingly criticized by many scholars, but still not quite 
disposed of – that Islam as such excludes the differentiation of religion and poli-
tics that could more easily develop in some other cultural environments. His 
analysis also shows that differentiation was not only a matter of adapting to the 
conditions and legacies of older states conquered during the initial phase of rapid 
expansion. It is true that imperial administration of conquered territories with old 
traditions of statehood brought political imperatives and priorities to the fore in a 
particularly massive way; but the new situation exposed and exacerbated the ten-
sions between religious and political goal-orientations that had remained latent 
during the brief episode of charismatic-prophetic rule over a small territory. At 
the same time, idealized memories of the earliest stage served to reinvigorate vi-
sions of a total unity of the two spheres. The outcome thus reflected a complex 
interaction between internal and external factors. Hodgson’s account of it seems 
more adequate than G.E. Grunebaum’s thesis, first formulated in a lecture on Is-
lam and the medieval world delivered in 1945. Although this text deserves notice 
as one of the first cases of comparative reflection on the three civilizations suc-
ceeding the Roman Empire, there are good reasons to doubt the claim that the re-
lation between temporal and spiritual power “was least troublesome in Islam, 
where the spiritual power was never formally organized, while the temporal re-
mained satisfied with the role of a defensor fidei without arrogating the right of 
developing or even interpreting the body of religious doctrine” (Grunebaum 1969 
[1946]: 2). Neither the recurrent sectarian challenges, nor the new problems 
posed as the dynamics of state formation and religious expansion diverged ever 
more markedly, are easy to fit into this picture.  
The problematic relationship between the religious and political spheres was 
also crucial for further contacts with other civilizations. That aspect of Islamic 
history has often been explained in terms of a generalized cosmopolitan attitude. 
S.D. Goitein (1966: 64) stressed “the general receptivity of Islam which was due 
to its originally universalistic and eclectic character.” This inherent openness is 
supposed to have facilitated extensive borrowing from other traditions and suc-
cessful integration of their cultural products, and most notably the Islamic appro-
priation of the Greek heritage. The long-accepted image of Mecca as a cosmo-
politan trading centre made such perspectives more plausible, but it has now been 
demolished, and as Goitein noted in more detailed comments, the ‘general recep-
tivity’ was in practice very selective. Following Hodgson, it may be suggested 
that the problematic of interrelated but mutually unassimilable religious and po-
litical spheres determined the specific direction and limits of intercivilizational 
borrowing. Efforts to develop a more elaborate doctrinal framework for the pro-
phetic message led to active interest in the intellectual resources of older tradi-
tions, and during the classical period this resulted in extensive appropriation of 
Greek philosophy, up to a point wher the most ambitious philosophical projects 
could aspire to alternative versions of basic religious premises. A later backlash 
imposed a much more restrictive pattern of relations between religion and phi-
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losophy, but considering the trajectory of Islamic thought as a whole, it now 
seems misleading to speak (as Grunebaum did) of an elimination of the Hellenic 
heritage: its later destinies are better described in terms of mutation and reloca-
tion. Henry Corbin’s reconstruction of the continuing and active Neo-Platonic 
strain in later Iranian thought has done much to accredit the latter view.  
On the political side, Fred M. Donner suggests in a recent paper that the Byz-
antine imperial vision, asserted with incomparable vigour by Justinian in the 6th 
century and reaffirmed through Heraclius’s early 7th-century counteroffensive 
against Persia, should perhaps figure more prominently in the genealogy of Islam 
than has mostly been the case. “The idea of a distinctive religious message un-
derpinning a God-guided kingdom that would – or should – embrace all man-
kind, and that was particularly hostile to paganism, was thus another part of the 
intellectual environment in which Muhammad and his Believers worked and 
acted” (Donner 2005: 517). But if there was a historical connection with the final 
Christian-imperial form of Greco-Roman civilization, it did not translate into his-
torical interest in the background: Muslim notions of Greco-Roman history were 
notoriously vague, and the most distinctive aspects of Greco-Roman political ex-
perience were wholly ignored. On the other hand, the demands of court culture 
obviously counted for something in the work undertaken to preserve and con-
tinue Greek philosophy and science. The 9th – and 10th-century translation 
movement, sponsored by the caliphal authorities in Baghdad, may be seen as the 
most productive result of converging political and intellectual interests. In the 
long run, however, both statecraft and court culture were much more decisively 
shaped by reactivated Persian traditions (the legacy of an empire that had been 
taken over in toto) in the first phase of expansion), and in contrast to the Greek 
case, this long-drawn-out encounter with a conquered civilization led to the ac-
ceptance of Persian as another pre-eminent cultural language, albeit without the 
religious status reserved for Arabic.  
Hodgson’s account of the early classical constellation may also help to clarify 
another issue that remains central to debates on Islam’s place in history: the ques-
tion of cultural memory and the specific form it took in relation to Islamic ori-
gins. Western students of Islamicate civilization seem to have had trouble in rec-
onciling the emphasis on cultural openness during the golden age with the clo-
sure and discontinuity evident in the internal view of Islamic origins. Goitein’s 
statements on all-round receptivity, quoted above, sum up the background to his 
description of Islam between 850 and 1250 CE as an “intermediate civilization” 
(Goitein 1966: 54-70).2 As we have seen, Hodgson also stressed the civilizational 
 
2  Goitein’s concluding formulation is worth quoting at length: the Islamic world be-
tween 850 and 1250 (his chronology is very different from Hodgson’s) was “inter-
mediate in time between Hellenism and Renaissance, intermediate in character be-
tween the largely secular culture of the later Roman period and the thoroughly 
clerical world of Medieval Europe, and intermediate in space between Europe and 
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synthesis brought about by the “Islamic infusion.” But his historical narrative be-
gins on a strong note of discontinuity: “The Islamicate was unique among the 
great civilizations of its time in failing to maintain the earlier lettered traditions 
of its region” (Hodgson 1974, 1: 103). In contrast to the survival of Greek, Latin, 
Sanskrit and classical Chinese in other regions, older languages of the Nile-to-
Oxus region were (with the partial exception of Persian) supplanted by Arabic. 
This linguistic break was, for those who brought it about, only one aspect of a 
more fundamental rupture with the past, and that point of view has had a lasting 
influence on Western approaches. Donner’s analysis of classical Islamic histori-
ography concludes with reflections on its legacy inside and outside the Islamic 
world; he argues, in particular, that Western scholarship has “in large measure in-
ternalized certain aspects of the traditional Islamic view,” especially “the notion 
of the rise of Islam as a profound break in human history,” and that this view is 
“profoundly misleading, because it obscures (or tempts us to ignore) important 
continuities spanning the supposed ‘divide’ between the Islamic and pre-Islamic 
eras” (Donner 1998: 294). We might add that it also obscures the real disconti-
nuities resulting from the dynamics of interaction between Islamic conquerors 
and their socio-cultural environment, rather than from a pristine and self-con-
tained religious project. According to Donner, the critical turn in recent scholar-
ship has not been strong enough to dislodge the unwitting traditionalism that still 
affects the organization and evaluation of research. And although he does not 
make the point, it could be argued that radical revisionism is a kind of inverted 
traditionalism. To suggest that evidence and memory were obliterated to the ex-
tent needed for the imposition of a whole fabricated past is, if anything, even 
more implausible than the vision of a mature Islam storming out of Arabia.  
If the critique of traditionalism is an unfinished task, further reflection on the 
construction of the divide between Islamic and pre-Islamic times should be an in-
tegral part of it. And an explanation in terms of a single foundational and pre-
programming factor would not seem convincing – it would amount to another re-
statement of the traditionalist premise. The background to early Islamic self-un-
derstanding should be seen as a concatenation of historical forces, processes and 
situations; a few aspects may be noted, but they are only the most salient parts of 
a complex and still puzzling picture. First and foremost, the notion of a definitive 
revelation, completing and superseding earlier ones while correcting the errors 
that had affected their transmission, was ipso facto conducive to devaluation of 
past traditions: the truth behind them had been restored in a more perfect state, 
and their outward forms were no longer of any positive interest. This conception 
 
Africa on the one hand and India and China on the other hand, thus forming, for the 
first time in history, a strong cultural link between all parts of the ancient world” 
(Goitein 1966: 59). This is obviously an attempt to grasp the discontinuity between 
the classical phase and later Islamic history, but the culture in question is only de-
fined with reference to other epochs and regions, never in terms of its own logic. 
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of the revelation cannot be assumed as present from the very beginning. Schol-
arly opinions seem to have more or less converged on the view that it evolved in 
the course of Muhammad’s prophetic mission and took more definitive shape as 
the confrontation with other religious communities continued on a larger scale af-
ter the early conquests. Nor did it predetermine the whole range of responses to 
pre-Islamic traditions. Rather, its influence became effective in conjunction with 
other factors. The shift to a less apocalyptic stance might at first sight appear to 
have mitigated its impact (the interpretation of earliest Islam as an apocalyptic 
vision, although not uncontroversial, is clearly more widely accepted than it once 
was). But conquest became a kind of substitute for the apocalypse, and the ahis-
torical model of a great divide could thus be maintained in a very different con-
text. The ‘sacred history’ that served to make sense of the conquests also became 
an obligatory frame of reference for succession disputes and factional rivalries 
among the conquerors. As Donner argues, the cumulative impact of such prob-
lems eventually led to a more articulate historical consciousness. But he also 
shows that the resultant vision of history, and the historiography that grew out of 
it, were dominated by specific themes: those of prophecy, community, leadership 
and hegemony. This orientation was not likely to favour recognition or discovery 
of continuities across the divide. The subsequent construction of an empire and a 
civilizational framework for it was, as we have seen, accompanied and aided by a 
massive appropriation of intellectual resources, most importantly those of classi-
cal antiquity. But the self-defining emphasis on discontinuity was strong enough 
to maintain a clear-cut distinction between the properly Islamic branches of 
knowledge and those inherited from the alien world of the ancients. Even if it can 
be argued that philosophers of the classical period tacitly transcended this divi-
sion, it remained a dominant cultural pattern; and although it did not block pro-
ductive use of the classical past when other conditions were propitious, it could 
be activated in a more exclusivist vein when the broader historical environment 
changed. There was, moreover, another side to the exceptional effort put into 
translating Greek texts during the 9th and 10th centuries. Rémi Brague (1992: 85-
92) makes a convincing point when he argues that the focus on translation was 
also a specific way of relating to the past and its legacy, drawing on it while put-
ting it at a distance. And as a later turn of events was to show, this was a fragile 
relationship: the abrupt and complete end to translation from the Greek is no less 
striking than the sustained effort had been. 
One more aspect of Hodgson’s interpretation should be noted. A quasi-cycli-
cal pattern seems to be built into the post-conquest relationship between religion 
and political power. That notion is anything but unfamiliar to students of Islamic 
history. Quite a few modern scholars have proposed more or less adapted ver-
sions of the cyclical model originally developed by Ibn Khaldun. Although 
Hodgson does not explicitly argue in such terms, cyclical outlines are clearly 
visible. It follows from his analysis of absolutism as an inherent tendency of 
agrarianate societies, reinforced when they are unified on an imperial scale, that 
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the political dynamics of Islamic states will obey a logic of their own. At the 
same time, political power will remain vulnerable to interventionist challenges 
from the social and cultural forces that sustain an autonomous religious sphere. 
Too much is left of the totalizing religious vision for it to be safely neutralized. 
But to the extent that projects of religious revival become effective on the politi-
cal level, they expose themselves to a new round of political alienation from their 
origins. The cycle may also be seen as a widening one. The transformations of 
political power – cumulation, fragmentation and internal rationalization – can re-
lease trends that attenuate the legitimizing links to religion; conversely, the 
autonomy of religious elites, interests and ideas can lead to further differentiation 
inside the religious sphere, not least through the divergent directions of law-
minded and personal piety. Finally, it would not seem far-fetched to read Hodg-
son’s model as more general than the Khaldunian one and its modern variants. 
The cycle that involves religious mobilization and political domination of tribal 
warriors would, on that view, be a particular case of the fundamental relationship 
between religion and politics.  
Hodgson’s analysis of the later history of Islamicate civilization is not explic-
itly guided by the model summarized above. It is, in my opinion, implicit in his 
analysis of the “development of political and cultural multiplicity” (Hodgson 
1974, 2: 12) that characterizes the ‘middle periods’ ( from the middle of the 10th 
century to the middle of the second millennium CE). Detailed reconstruction of 
that part of his narrative is beyond the scope of this paper. But to round off the 
argument, a few words should be said about political and cultural trends during 
the classical period, and about Hodgson’s interpretation of their long-term conse-
quences. A brief overview must begin with the forms and circumstances of the 
Islamic turn to absolutism: it specific features were reflected in social and cul-
tural reactions, and the whole constellation set the course of later developments. 
Every account of this crucial period must focus on the respective roles of the two 
dynasties that established and consolidated absolutist rule, the Umayyads (or, as 
Hodgson prefers to call the branch in power from 692 onwards, the Marwanids) 
and the Abbasids. 
As Hodgson sees it, the Marwanid caliphate was caught up in a whole series 
of inescapable dilemmas. It was from the very beginning widely perceived as a 
reversion to kingship of a pre-Islamic kind, notwithstanding official claims to Is-
lamic legitimacy. Within the Arab power structure, it represented a shift towards 
more traditional elites, at the expense of the incipient Islamic aristocracy (the 
companions of the prophet); this relocation of power called for genealogical le-
gitimation, but the traditional criteria were reinforced by a claim to kinship with 
the prophet. All these aspects of the Marwanid model exposed it to challenges 
from those who demanded a return to more genuine Islamic rulership, and their 
credentials were particularly strong when backed up by closer kinship links to the 
prophet. The Marwanids had risen to power through manipulation of factional 
(more or less artificially tribalized) alliances and rivalries among the Arab con-
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querors, and were by the same token vulnerable to ongoing fragmentation and re-
alignment of the forces active in that field. Last but not least, the Syrian power 
basis of the dynasty was not only inconveniently located at the western margin of 
the imperial heartland; it was also – and perhaps more importantly – a conquered 
part of an empire whose centre remained invincible, whereas the whole domain 
of the Sasanian Empire had been overrun and expansion had even continued be-
yond its borders. The continuing conflict with the Byzantine Empire, charged 
with religious significance, was scaled down after the failed siege of Constantin-
ople in 717, but it distracted attention and drained resources; it does not seem to 
have obstructed learning from the much older imperial tradition of the adversary, 
but it certainly constrained the overall strategy of the rulers in Damascus. In 
short, the Marwanid version of absolutism was ideologically, institutionally and 
geopolitically handicapped; Hodgson portrays it as a balancing act, bound to 
come unstuck sooner rather than later. This also explains why he does not – in 
contrast to many other Western historians – refer to an Abbasid revolution. From 
his point of view, the Abbasid seizure of power in 750 should rather be seen as a 
step towards a more normal and consistent form of absolutism, and the founders 
of the new dynasty “were completing the work” (ibid., 1: 284) begun by the 
Marwanids, “the reconstitution of the state in terms of the long-standing absolut-
ist civic ideals of the region” (ibid., 1: 283).3 The Abbasid mode of reconstitution 
entailed a more equal distribution of power and status, both between regions and 
between the now more ethnically diverse members of the Islamic community. 
But on this basis they built a superstructure much closer to Persian models of ab-
solute monarchy than the Marwanid state had ever been.  
If the ‘Abbasid revolution’ is a misnomer for a rationalizing and equilibrating 
twist to an older project, it becomes equally impossible to speak of a betrayal of 
the revolution. After 750, such accusations came from the more radical Islamic 
opposition, and they have sometimes found a sympathetic echo in Western 
scholarship. Hodgson prefers to describe the outcome as an “Abbasid compro-
mise” (ibid., 1: 272) A compromise was already built into the alliance between 
dynastic pretenders and piety-minded activists that overthrew the Umayyads, but 
it was worked out in greater detail after the consolidation of Abbasid rule. It may 
be seen as a mediating framework or a modus vivendi imposed on the problem-
atic relationship between religion and politics, outlined above, and in that capac-
ity, it had – as Hodgson argues – a lasting civilizational impact. Three aspects of 
the institutionalized compromise (as distinct from the initial strategic one) should 
be noted. 
On the political side, the Abbasid settlement enabled first a half-century of 
 
3  There is some affinity between Hodgson’s argument and Grunebaum’s stronger 
claim that the Abbasids engineered a transition from patrimonial to rational state-
hood (Grunebaum 1961 [1955]: 16).  
44  |  CRYSTALLIZATIONS 
vigorous absolutist rule, and then a long-drawn-out process of devolution and 
fragmentation, very different from the explosive crisis that toppled the Umay-
yads. The absolutist states of agrarianate civilizations, however rooted in un-
changing conditions of social life, were always prone to disintegration, or at least 
loss of central control, and in imperial states, such processes unfolded on a corre-
spondingly enlarged scale. Hodgson describes the Abbasid pattern of decline as a 
“dissipation of the absolutist tradition” (ibid., 1: 473) and dates it from 813 (the 
end of the fourth fitna that left al-Mamun in sole control of the caliphate) to 945. 
Political fragmentation during this period was largely due to bids for power by 
provincial elites, often without formal rejection of caliphal authority; but in the 
context of overall devolution, sectarian projects of state-building could also play 
a certain role. The dissipating process thus produced new models of political 
power, adapted to local conditions as well as to lower levels of religious legiti-
macy, and capable of further diffusion throughout an expanding Islamic world. 
On the religious side, the Abbasids “were willing to accord formal and exclusive 
status to the representatives of the former Piety-minded opposition” (ibid., 1: 
275). In other words, they recognized the autonomy of a relatively large and 
loosely structured religious elite, barred it from direct intervention in affairs of 
state but did not obstruct the development of vast doctrinal and legal programmes 
that translated into mechanisms of comprehensive social control. Apart from a 
brief early 9th-century attempt (under al-Mamun) to reclaim religious authority 
for the caliph, this new pattern of relations between the two spheres was left un-
disturbed and took definitive shape during the 9th and 10th centuries. The ulama 
as the defining socio-cultural protagonists of Islamicate civilization, the elabora-
tion of Islamic law as later periods were to know it, and the formation of the 
dominant schools of jurisprudence: these were the key components of a model 
that could be superimposed on a wide variety of local cultures during the later 
phases of decentralized expansion.  
Hodgson’s line of argument is less conclusive when it comes to a third aspect 
of the Abbasid settlement, but the general thrust of his reflections is reasonably 
clear: the institutional framework put in place after 750 enabled a certain devel-
opment of alternative currents within Islamicate civilization, but contained them 
in such a way that their capacity to affect long-term developmental trends re-
mained strictly limited. Philosophical speculation, often converging with the 
more speculative kind of Islamic theology, was an important part of intellectual 
life during the classical period. Several factors seem to have favoured its growth. 
The interpretive and reflective work undertaken within the now more securely 
available socio-cultural space was not confined to the boundaries of a clearly 
demarcated tradition – the demarcating criteria were yet to be defined. Earlier 
traditions that had developed philosophy as a mode of thought and a way of life 
were strong enough to provide themes and models for further elaboration within 
a still flexible Islamic context. The prosperous, mobile and culturally receptive 
society of the early Abbasid period offered various ways of linking philosophical 
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reflection to more professional activities. For all that, both philosophy and the 
more rationalistic versions of theology were at a disadvantage when pitted 
against the currents which Hodgson describes as piety-minded’: the latter were 
both more effectively involved in the regulation of social life and more closely 
linked to the reconstitution of popular religiosity within a new doctrinal and insti-
tutional framework. Similarly, the cosmopolitan court culture (adab culture, as 
Hodgson calls it), most highly developed at the centre of the Abbasid empire, 
was dependent on a basis more adversely affected by the dissipation of the abso-
lutist tradition’ than was the nexus of piety and social order. Court society fos-
tered literary culture and ideals of all-round cultivation, but did not produce a 
civilizational counterweight to the patterns that coalesced around hadith, sacred 
law and Quranic piety. On this point, Hodgson’s conclusions are more negative 
than those of some other historians; for example, Ira Lapidus (2002 [1988]: 99) 
refers to “two principal versions of Islamic civilization, the courtly cosmopolitan 
and the urban religious,” and argues that they “represented the political and reli-
gious elites thrown up by the Arab conquests.” 
Hodgson devotes whole chapters to speculative thought and literary culture. 
By contrast, he has much less to say on a third alternative current that for a while 
posed a much more overt challenge to mainstream Islam: the Ismaili movement 
of the 9th and 10th centuries. The most extensive discussion of Ismailism is to be 
found in the chapter on personal piety (Hodgson 1974, 1: 378-384), where it is 
described as the esoteric faith of an elite and a refuge for spiritual interests unsat-
isfied by other answers; its role in the 9th-century political restructuring of the Is-
lamic world is only briefly mentioned. The civilizational dimension of Ismaili 
heterodoxy is not given its due. This shortcoming of Hodgson’s analysis is obvi-
ously not unrelated to the general state of research at the time. The question will 
be revisited in another contribution to this volume.4 To sum up, the ‘classical 
civilization of the High Caliphate’ left a legacy that set its stamp on develop-
ments during the ‘middle periods.’ In particular, Hodgson underlines the distinc-
tion between two kinds of trends and patterns: those that developed in ways con-
ducive to further expansion and maintenance of civilizational unity across cul-
tural and political borders, and those more closely bound up with transient condi-
tions and therefore much less transferable – although not ipso facto irrelevant – 
to a different historical context. This is not to suggest that the whole course of Is-
lamic history was predetermined by classical paradigms. Internal factors became 
effective in conjunction with external ones, and more specifically with massive 
changes to the global setting of Islamicate civilization. Hodgson notes two major 
 
4  Hodgson has more to say on Ismailism elsewhere, especially in his contribution to 
the Cambridge History of Iran (Hodgson 1968; this goes beyond earlier work on the 
‘order of Assassins.’) But the discussion of Iranian Ismailism underlines the para-
dox that the ideological impact of the movement was more visible within an enclave 
(and a fragmented one at that) than inthe counter-caliphate of Fatimid Egypt. 
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shifts of that kind during the early second millennium, although he does not fully 
spell out the implications. On the one hand, socio-economic, political and cul-
tural transformations in East Asia and Western Europe – unmatched by anything 
comparable in the Islamic world – brought these two parts of the Eurasian macro-
region to new levels of development and of interaction with other civilizations. 
Neither of these two regional mutations amounted to a global reversal of fortunes 
for Islamicate civilization, and although one of them did in the long run lead to 
such consequences, that had less to do with direct confrontation during the mid-
dle period than with subsequent outflanking. Western expansion triumphed 
through the construction of overseas empires, in contrast to the Eurasian arena of 
Islamic expansion. On the other hand (and, in the short run, much more impor-
tantly), the early second millennium saw momentous changes to the balance of 
power between the main agrarianate civilizations and the largely nomadic Inner 
Eurasian zone. The Islamic world was directly and massively affected, but the 
two main waves of Inner Eurasian expansion did not enter Islamic history in the 
same way. The Turks came as converts and participants in an ongoing process of 
political fragmentation and restructuring, the Mongols as pagan conquerors who 
caused widespread destruction before the power structures which they had im-
posed were assimilated and used to launch a new phase of empire building. It 
was the upshot of these successive encounters with inner Eurasia that determined 
the shape and position of Islamicate civilization at the time of global transition to 
modernity. But the present discussion cannot go beyond a brief acknowledge-
ment of these interrelations between civilizational dynamics and global history.  
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Chapter 2 
The Middle Period: Islamic Axiality 
in the Age of Afro-Eurasian 
Transcultural Hybridity 
 
BABAK RAHIMI 
 
[…] taking a global perspective does not imply that 
the world has always been an interconnected one with 
a single center from which development and progress 
spread to less-developed regions. Instead, it makes 
much more sense to think of the world in 1400 as hav-
ing been composed of several regional systems, or in 
other words to have been “polycentric” each with 
densely populated and industrially advanced cores 
supplied from their own peripheries. 
Robert B. Marks, The Origins of the Modern World 
(Marks 2002: 15) 
 
 
In his seminal article “the Interrelations of Societies in History,” published in 
1963, Marshal Hodgson registered a ground-breaking argument against the Euro-
centric conception of the past, which traced history in terms of an unfolding de-
velopment from Mesopotamia and Egypt to Greece and Rome, and finally to the 
Christian of northwestern Europe, where the medieval life paved the path to 
modernity (Burke III, 1993: 3-34). In it, he posited the claim that from a global 
historical perspective the development of civilization is an Asian-based phe-
nomenon, and that it played a crucial role in the rise of the modern world. He 
also argued that the history of the intersecting stretches of agrarian urbanite so-
cieties, which extended across the entire Afro-Eurasian complex – what he 
called, following Toynbee, the Oikoumene – , was an interrelational one with 
persistent and interconnecting traditions, from which interaction between these 
traditions radiated incessantly into wide regions.  
According to Hodgson, an understanding of history in interrelational hemi-
spheric terms would allow us to overcome a “classic ethnocentric dichotomy in 
the main part of the world-ourselves and the others, Jews and Gentiles, Greeks 
and Barbarians, “West” and “East” (Burke III 1993: 7). In a sense, the history of 
societies, understood in interrelational terms, acknowledges a mobile and an in-
teractive sphere of cross-regional complex, wherein cultures have continuously 
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depended on the course of development of the Afro-Eurasian civilizational com-
plex as a whole.  
If we accept, following Hodgson, the notion of interconnection of societies in 
history, it is reasonable to claim that the period from the 9th/10th centuries to the 
13th/14th century marks a crucial phase in an increase of global interconnection 
and integration, involving socio-cultural crystallization of historical significance. 
Through communication, trade, travel, war and nomadic formations – including, 
not least, the histories of migration – in the context of rural and urban relations, 
this period encompasses a set of deep-seated transformations across Afro-Eur-
asian landmass. Manifested in different forms and yet appearing with an intense 
degree of mobility and mobilization, fusion and integration, such era of increas-
ingly civilizational intermingling marked a transcultural age of hybridity.1  
The term “transcultural” refers here to the liminal complexes that signify an 
intricate set of interdependent and cross-fertilizing constant historical processes 
in the production of spaces of exchange and negotiation, encounter and commu-
nication, travel and migration.2 The history of transcultural dynamics is an ac-
count of global interaction between nomadic rootlessness and urban sedentary 
complexes, maritime expedition tied to land-based socio-cultural patterns of 
commercial urbanity and development of citied civilizations. In particular, the 
term “hybridity” underscores an ongoing historical process of constant fusion be-
tween social complexes in such that encounters between different civilizations 
through the process of cultural encounter leads to processes of identity formation 
and new ways of communication. As result, such process constitutes the incorpo-
ratation of different (already hybridized) structures of consciousness.3 
 
1  My claim here is akin to Björn Wittrock’s idea of “Ecumenical Renaissance.” See 
Wittrock (2001). However, Wittrock’s use of the term “Ecumenical Renaissance” 
automatically elicits comparison with an earlier ecumenical period, failing to iden-
tify the unique significance of this historical epoch. My use of the term “transcul-
tural age of hybridity,“ however, is more akin to Armando Salvatore’s argument 
that encounter between the Islamic traditions and modernity has constituted of what 
he refers as “a transcultural Euro-Mediterranean space.” See Armando Salvatore 
(2001).  
2  I borrow the term “transcultural” from A. Höfert and A. Salvatore’s (2000) pro-
vocative argument that historical flows of people between Europe and the Middle 
East, inclusive of the elites and masses, have constructed “transcultural” processes 
in which identity-alterity structures increasingly become dependent on in-between, 
liminal situations. The notion, they argue, “demonstrates the potential to alter the 
demarcating boundaries, not only in the sense of displacing them, but also through 
recomposing markers of identity and alterity in a way that makes it impossible, and 
even irrelevant, to trace back the original root of a certain identity” (Höfert/ 
Salvatore 2000: 17).  
3  This assertion may also be articulated as the intensification of worldwide social re-
lations in terms of global mélange, pervading from the center to peripheries. With 
respect to dynamics of culture, hybridization can also be defined as the way in 
which civilizations become differentiated from existing practices, fuse and remerge 
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In this view, the age of transcultural hybridity did not mark a sudden or radical 
redrawing of the outlines of the Afro-Eurasian landmass. Rather, it inaugurated a 
period in the escalation of shifts in civilizational dynamics towards hemispheric in-
tegration, fusion and cross-fertilization that brought about an impressive degree of 
intense creativity and exceptional broadening of cultural horizons. Increase of con-
tact between societies led to the proliferation of myriad forms of public spaces, so-
cial organizations, institutions and new political orders. Yet the upshot of such 
transcultural interactive zone was determined by conflict, rivalry, exchange, encoun-
ter and chronic collision between competing forms of political orders that, in turn, 
led the way to complex hybridization processes of intercivilizational significance.  
The particular case of the Islamic world in the Middle Period (945-1503) 
serves as an example of such hybridization historical process: an era marked by 
distinct political fragmentation, cultural cross-fertilization and vernacularization 
of intercivilizational significance. In the following discussion my primary con-
cern will be to draw a general outline of the global interconnective patterns in the 
emergence of a transcultural hybrid civilizational complex in the Eurasian land-
mass from 9th/10th to the 13th/14th centuries. I will then focus on the Islamic world 
from the 10th to the 14th centuries and discuss the revolutionary significance in 
the emergence of new Islamic civilizational complexes with the successive waves 
of Turkish tribal migration from the steppe grass lands of Central Asia to the set-
tled regions of the Anatolian-Mediterranean and Irano-Mesoptemian plateaus.  
While elaborating on certain interconnected patterns of global history, without 
presuming linearity of historical development or ubiquitousness of cultural hybrid-
ities, my argument will evolve around the notion of intermingling of cultures, in-
volving momentous shifts along dimensions of reflexivity and modes of communi-
cation. The notion of the “Middle Period Islamic Axiality” denotes, then, a crucial 
civilizational rupture in Islamic history from 10th to the 13th/14th centuries which 
generated new forms of reflexivity, new world views and imaginative ways in ar-
ticulating self, knowledge and reality, based on the notion of transcendence. As a 
result of such civilizational encounters, this age identifies the production of new 
cultural sites situated in increasing processes of global mélange.  
 
 
The Afro-Eurasian complex:  
from 9
t h
/10
t h
 to  13
t h
 centuries 
 
When in 1137-38 Ramisht, a rich Muslim merchant on his way to Mecca, visited 
his hometown of Sirâf, the bustling Iranian port-city on the Persian Gulf repre-
 
with new forms in new practices. Culture, in its hybrid form, is therefore not a co-
herent system but a process that is generated, maintained and transmitted into new 
forms in constant process of formation (Hannerz 1987).  
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sented a cosmopolitan commercial center with a thriving trading basis for mer-
chants to trade directly with China and east Africa (Stern 1967: 10). The port city 
of Sirâf was matched by an abiding ability for commerce to cities, bustling com-
mercial centers, and maritime urbanities like Aden, Alexandria, Baghdad, Cairo, 
Constantinople, Guangzhou, Kiev, Quanzhou, Suhâr and Venice, wherein long-
distance trade was prevalent to help shape myriad zones of economic exchange 
and cultural encounter.  
Muslim merchants of the 12th and 13th centuries, along with Chinese, Indian 
and east/north African merchants, in part, unleashed a global system of com-
merce that signaled the increasing integration of the world into common yet di-
verse commercial networks of production and exchange. Whereas links with the 
Mediterranean lands remained sporadic prior to the late 9th century, the centuries 
that followed the Arab conquest of northern Africa and Iran-Mesopotamia re-
gions saw a quickening of contacts within the Afro-Eurasian zone of cultivation 
and urban life. Prior to the “rise” of the West to preeminence in the 16th century, 
by the turn of the first millennium a system of commerce and cultural interaction 
emerged that reached its apogee toward the end of the 13th century (Abu-Lughod 
1989). First, based in Song China, the 11th century witnessed the appearance of a 
“world economy” with ramifications on a transregional scale. Likewise, the years 
between circa 1250 and 1350 saw a period of expanding international commerce 
in the regions between China and northwestern Europe, entailing economic 
growth and cultural developments in the newly integrated areas.  
The increase of trade drew Japan, Southeast Asia and Middle East closer to-
gether, while a rise in the use of camel caravans led to an expansion of communi-
cation with sub-Saharan Africa (Bentley 1998). In the Asian subcontinent, for in-
stance, an extensive commerce reached southern India by land, and mostly 
around the coastal maritime routes, from Coromandel shores north to the Ganges 
Delta, to Burma, Vietnam and beyond. Divided in diverse zones of transactions, 
mainly defined by language and religion, and dominated by imperial and core ur-
ban settings, as well as hinterland-less commercial enclaves, interaction between 
cities became possible by sealanes, rivers and caravan routes. Ports, like Sirâf, and 
river-based cities, like Baghdad and Cairo, served the important function of bring-
ing goods and people from long distances, enhancing mobility and interaction.  
Moreover, along with developments of maritime and land trade, an increase 
of travel, migration, campaigns of imperial expansion, crossregional religious 
war (Crusades) and conversion inaugurated an age of long-distance mobility and 
transportation, as well as large-scale subordination and conquest. Though the ex-
pansion of Europe into northeast Germany was a continuous movement that 
originated with the campaigns of Charlemagne, the 11th century marked the reli-
gious conversion and political colonization of the Baltic European settlement to 
the northwestern and northeastern Europe. From the 1066 Norman conquest of 
England by Duke William of Normandy to the Spanish campaigns of the Chris-
tian knights, from the expedition of the Scandinavian navigators into the northern 
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seas to the Latinization of Hungarians and eastern Europe, the growth of Europe, 
especially, in the 12th century identified an age of intense interconnection be-
tween Germanic, Slavic and Latin Mediterranean-based cultures. “The birth of 
Europe as a Eurasian phenomenon,” in this fashion, brought about an integrated 
Europe made up of northwestern France, Flanders, lowland England, Spain, 
northern and southern Italy (Moore 1997). While travel provided the new inte-
grated-hybrid civilization of Europe with the incentive of economic adventure, 
especially, in the 13th century (Marco Polo), proliferation in European travel writ-
ings reflected the increasing importance of movement across homeland as a prel-
ude to further conquest of the new territories. 
China experienced similar processes of integration under the Song dynasty 
(960-1279), as elite culture grew more uniform and political systems became 
more unified with the continue growth of the imperial urbanite civilization 
through military-building and interational trade (Haegar 1976). The expansion of 
the examination system, and the growth of bureaucracy saw the concentration of 
power in the hand of the emperor – a process that accelerated in later dynasties. 
Yet the remarkable growth of commercialization and industralization (Hobson 
2004: 51) under the Song dynasty opened up the Chinese society to flow of 
goods, movements of persons, cultures and ideas across Eurasia. 
Similarly, in western Asia, in the 10th century the Byzantine-Russian complex 
ceased being on the defensive and began to aggressively advance its borders east 
and westwards at the expense of Bulgars, increasingly heading towards greater cul-
tural integration through contact with neighborhing civilizations. Through land 
and, most important of all, martime routes that reached Constantinople, the Byzan-
time-Russian civilization grew closer to the Islamic and Latin Christian cultures.  
When in 1279 the Mongols, under the leadership of Genghis Khan’s grand-
son, Kubla Khan, defeated the last outposts of resistance in Song China, the 
newly established nomadic empire signaled the emergence of a huge imperial 
network in the Eurasian landmass. This further connected the Islamic world with 
Southeast Asian societies, a historical process that eventually led to the Islamiza-
tion of south Asian regions – like the case of Indonesia in the 16th century. Ac-
cordingly, in Central and Western Asia before the end of the 13th century most 
of the khans had become Muslim, and hence initiated a process of blending Cen-
tral Asian shamanistic religions and Tibetan form of Buddhism with Islamic 
practices. Although the Mongol conquest of China and Islamdom did not amount 
to any serious interruptions in the Chinese and Islamic civilization, since it re-
mained essentially a military occupation, the Steppe nomad warriors creatively 
adapted to the traditional Chinese and Abbâsid administrative systems.4 This 
 
4  Later in the 14th century, when the Mongols showed signs of weakening, the em-
peror reintroduced the examination system and accommodated Chinese participa-
tion in bureaucratic positions.  
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nomadic imperial process of adaptation is crucial to the transcultural period since 
it marked a historical event which, according to the W. Barthold, ushered in a 
turning point in the construction of a creative synthesis between Chinese and Is-
lamic political orders (Barthold 1928).  
The rise of nomadic empires in this manner played an important role in the 
age of transregional integration. This is so since nomadic imperial orders placed 
high value on trade and diplomacy, which ultimately resulted in, according to 
Janet Abu-Lughod, an “explosion” that effectively paved the path to “world his-
tory” (Abu-Lughod 1989: 154). As Bentley has argued, in the half-millennium 
from 1000 to 1500 large imperial states, like the Mongols, continued to promote 
transregional interaction, embarking both on a remarkable set of empire-building 
processes that expanded from the seas of China to the River Nile (Bentley 1998: 
244-45). By linking China with the outside world, mainly through trade networks 
in Central Asia, the impact of the Mongol conquest facilitated communication 
over long distances, as nomadic political orders encouraged the spread of relig-
ions, the acquisition of knowledge and technological exchanges across inner, 
eastern and western Asia. In addition, with the centralization of the Mongol state 
from tributary to sedentary systems of taxation, diverse sectors of economy, 
namely, agricultural, commercial and pastoral, grew closer together with the ad-
vancements in the size of the military and the centralization of administrative 
control over both sedentary and rural regions. As Di Cosmo explains, “So called 
steppe empires created fluid environments, suitable for travel and trade that al-
lowed the peripheral civilizations to come into contact with one another” (Di 
Cosmo 1999: 4). Nomadic conquests identified a major epoch in the greater in-
terrelation of societies not only in Eurasian terms, but also on the rural-urban and 
nomadic-sedentary scales. 
As an outcome of trade, migration, conversion and conquest, such global 
transformations also involved major breakthroughs of civilizational importance. 
Similar to the original Axial age civilizational transformation in human reflexiv-
ity (roughly from the eighth to the 4th/3rd century B.C.E.), the 9th/10th to the 13th 
centuries displayed a momentous shift in reflexive consciousness on an Afro-
Eurasian scale.5 The transcultural age identifies, in a sense, an extension of the 
original Axial transformation on fundamental basis of human reflexivity and his-
toricity “to reflect upon and give expression to an image of the world as having 
the potential of being different from what it was perceived to be here and now” 
(Wittrock 2001: 8). This mode of reflexity and communication ultimately en-
tailed a new way of conceptualizing and articulating the self and reality in terms 
 
5  By Axial age civilizations, Eisenstadt explains, “we mean those civilizations that 
crystallized during the half-millennium from 500 BCE to the first century of the 
Christian era, within which new types of ontological visions, conceptions of a basic 
tension between the transcendental and mundane orders emerged and were institu-
tionalized in many parts of the world” (Eisenstadt 2000: 2).  
54  |  CRYSTALLIZATIONS 
that go beyond the everyday mundane realities. With the increasing hybridization 
of consciousness (i.e. ways of reflexivity and modes of communication) through 
contact, exchange and conversion the period, then, saw the emergence of distinct 
of cultures, ethos and historical consciousness that intensified creative attempts 
to fuse the gap and, accordingly, overcome the tension between transcendental 
and mundane realities with the construction and regulation of social interaction.  
In the 11th and 12th centuries the gradual appearance of new civilizational 
complexes in northwestern Europe, in what had previously been a marginal re-
gion of the Mediterranean-based civilizations, and the expansion of Italian mari-
time cities inaugurated a revolutionary development of tighter organization of the 
church, state and urbanization. The so-called feudal, urban, papal and intellectual 
revolutions manifested deep-seated changes in economic, political and religious 
institutions that, consequently, entailed cultural shifts of societal epistemic im-
portance. With the rise of universities, for instance, the intellectual revolution not 
only introduced education to laymen, but also facilitated the acquisition of Greek 
knowledge through the intellectual advances made by the Muslims. 
In close connection to the urban revolution and the triumph of papal monar-
chy between 1050 and 1300, the growth of “popular culture,” sectarian and mo-
nastic orders (like the spread of the Cistercian movement in the 12th century), 
ushered in an age of carnivalesque practices and mystical movements, which ul-
timately culminated in the attempt to fuse the mundane and transcendental 
worlds within mass-popular and church-autonomous fields of social interaction. 
Although, as Moore argues, the “revolutionary” characteristics of the period be-
tween the 9th and 12th centuries were profoundly political in nature, the European 
experience of the transcultural age entailed transformations that went beyond 
state-organizational and class structural levels (Moore 2000). In this regard, the 
proliferation of pluralistic institutions – Church, nobility, city-state, and guilds – 
led to the formation of cultural spaces that increasingly separated the official 
from the non-official spheres of publicity.  
In the Indic world, until the late 10th century Hindu rajas controlled Afghani-
stan and parts of eastern Persia to the upper Indus, while Gujerat maritime power 
limited the colonization of Islam from the sea along Indian Ocean shores. But 
when in the beginning of the 11th century northern India saw the southward inva-
sion of the Gazna Turks, who owed allegiance to the Sâmânî rulers of Khurâsân, 
the Indic world began to undergo centuries of civilizational fusion. The 10th to 
the 12th centuries in this manner marked a crucial phase in the Southeast Asian 
civilizations, a period that involved a transition from pan-Indic to three interac-
tive civilizations of Hinduism, Indo-Islam and Theravada Buddhism (Krejcí 
1990). The transition involved cultural and vernacularization transformation, “a 
process of change by which the universalistic orders, formations, and practices of 
the preceding millennium were supplemented and gradually replaced by local-
ized forms” (Eisenstadt/Schluchter/Wittrock 2001: 41). This process of vernacu-
larization not only created new localities of distinct vernacular cultures, but also 
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saw an unprecedented growth of textual production that was unique in its “com-
bination of antiquity, continuity, and multicultural interaction.”6 Central to this 
Indic case of civilizational interaction was primarily the exchange of Islamic and 
Hindu vernacular cultures that generated implicit dogmatic and ritualistic inter-
mingling, to which the eventual emergence of the Sikhism in the 15th century 
would best represent this hybrid historical process.  
As for China, the Neo-Confucian movement ushered the reaffirmation of the 
virtues and the continuity of the Confucian tradition, with its canocial system of 
belief, in the context of dynamic processes of the centralization under the Song 
dynasty. Central to the movement was the pursuit of the ideals of sainthood and 
self-cultivation, a spiritual quest that entailed the overcoming of selfishness and 
the enchantment of noble virutues inherent to human beings. Moreover, the syn-
thesis of Buddhist dogma (and Daoist metaphyics) with Confucian philosophy 
created a new body of thought that underscored the creativily paradoxical process 
of preservation of tradition through the transformation of tradition.7  
In the puzzling case of Japan, where the country enjoyed the natural protec-
tion of its insular position from foreign nomadic incursions, the samurai class, 
the landed lord and warriors, began to develop a distinct form of “honorific cul-
ture” in the 11th and 12th centuries (Ikegami 1995: 72-8). During this period, the 
samurai’s military pride generated the construction of a community of honor, 
which set up the tradition of honorific individualism of self-discipline to produce 
a new consciousness on both individual and collective dimensions. As a conse-
quence to the formation of samurai elite collectivity as a formidable ruling class, 
the emergence of a samurai honorific culture ushered the establishment of Sho-
gunate political order that lasted for the next six and one-half centuries (1192-
1867). Japan represents a distinct yet complicated case for the age of transcul-
tural hybridity. As a non-Axial civilization, set apart from the Axial ones (mainly 
China, India and the Middle East), the dynamics of the Japanense culture was 
tied to the transformation of the samurai elite and its honorific culture, which ef-
fected state-building processes from the medieval to the early modern periods.  
Perhaps in its most dynamic center of transcultural age, the Mediterranean 
 
6  As Pollock explains, the expansion of literary and political textual production, 
which “began in South India, Sri Lanka, and Java around 900 and reached maturity 
by 1200 occurred in northern India at a somewhat later date under conditions of po-
litical change different from what obtained in the south” Eisenstadt, Schluchter and 
Wittrock, 2000: 45-53). Similarly in China, this process of literary production saw 
its apogee under the reign of Song rule, during which the development of literary 
vernacular culture marked one of the high point in the history of Chinese literature. 
Also consider the case of Southeast Asian regions, like Vietnam, that, starting in the 
1300s produced similar developments in the production of literary texts.  
7  Consider, for instance, the case of Zhu Xi. His attempt to synthesize Buddhism and 
Confucian philosophy highlights interesting similiarties to Aquinas’ fusion of 
Christian theology with Greek philosophy.  
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complex emerged to represent networks of commercial exchange, marking a cor-
nerstone of the intercivilizational hybridity. Inseparable from the European agri-
cultural revolution with the emancipation of the serfs, which resulted in the 
growth of trade and the burgeoning of towns, the budding Mediterranean urban-
ite civilizations provided an alternative seaborne route of conquest, pilgrimage 
and trade to traditional land-based means of transportation. Especially through 
trade and warfare, the region included a heightening of long-term structural con-
flict between vying local powers and complex exchanges of culture and religion.  
This proliferation of encounter was twofold. First, with the growth of cities-
states of Genoa, Pisa, and Venice, and the spread of trade, Christianity saw an in-
crease of contact with Islamdom in northern African and eastern Mediterranean 
coastlines (Ashtar 1983: 3-63). The availability of traversing sea routes not only 
provided a new route for import of “Oriental” artifacts, but it also served to fa-
cilitate the existence of shared taste in architecture and cultural practices, vocabu-
laries, meanings and interests that cut across localities.8 Second, the pan-
European expansionist Crusades, which originally began in France in 1095 and 
saw its most decisive defeat with the conquest of Acre by the Mamlûks in 1291, 
opened western Europe to the Islamic world by bringing the Iberian Peninsula, 
the Muslim north Africa and eastern Mediterranean shores closer together.9 War 
and conquest in this fashion brought about commercial activities in such that not 
only supplied war and colonization materials to the warring regions, but also al-
lowed the western Christian forces to take an active part in the importation of 
ideas, texts and cultural materials from the Moslem Levant to northern and 
southern Europe.10 
At the heart of this Levantine interrelation between South European, North 
African and Mesopotamian regions was the greater fusion of Christian and Is-
lamic civilizations, as symbols, rituals and popular expectations of imminent 
transformation, in the form of millenarian cultures, spread throughout the region 
in unprecedented ways. The consequence of this process of exchange by the turn 
of the 15th and 16th centuries, as has been noted by Cornell Fleischer, was the in-
 
8  Consider, for instance, the case of Venice. The Arabic influence on Venetian archi-
tecture, which in part was heavily influenced by Byzantium, is a powerful reminder 
of the interregional complex of the Mediterranean realm (Howard 2000: 2-5).  
9  The first Crusade started in Clermont with the speech of Pope Urban II in 1095, 
which called for the conquest of Jerusalem.  
10  As a result of the crusades, certain Muslim customs spread into late medieval West-
ern Europe. Dress codes and general taste were imported from the Muslim world 
(mainly Muslim Spain, Baghdad, Cairo and Damascus) to the northern shores of 
eastern Mediterranean cities. But the momentum of exchange primarily involved 
ideas, philosophies and “oriental romance” from “Byzantium, Georgia, Armenia 
and Arabia/Persia” (Cardini 2001: 84). The first translations from Arabic texts into 
Latin, for instance, were completed around 1150 in Spain. As Cardini notes, this 
“was to change the face of Western learning” (Cardini 2001: 84). 
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terconnection of the northern and southern Mediterranean shores, sharing certain 
cultural traditions that mainly included common traits of millenarian expecta-
tion.11 In extension, as has been argued in a seminal article by Sanjay Subrah-
manyam, the 1500s saw the crystallization of pan-civilizational exchange of mil-
lenarian symbols, myths and traditions that helped to develop imperial projects 
from the Middle East to Southeast Asia (Subrahmanyam 1997: 735-62). In the 
first-half of the millennium, the Mediterranean domain provided a creative set-
ting for the intermingling of cultures, involving momentous shifts along dimen-
sions of reflexivity in terms of apocalyptic attempts to redefine the relationship 
between the mundane and transcendental worlds. 
The notion of “connected history,” coined by Subrahmanyam, invites us to 
consider the circulation of ideas, myths and rituals, in which cultures relentlessly 
maintain close proximity in hybrid spaces, wherein identity and alterity vie for 
power with unyielding intensity. Respective to the broader intercivilizational his-
torical perspective from the 9th/10th to the 13th/14th centuries, the intraciviliza-
tional Islamic experience in the transcultural age of interconnected histories was 
mainly manifested with the emergence of the Turko-Persian Islamicate cultures, 
a point that I will expand upon in the following section.  
 
 
The Turko-Persian ecumene and 
the r ise of  sûf î -brotherhoods 
 
When non-Arabs became the rulers and obtained royal authority and control over the 
whole Muslim realm, the Arabic language suffered corruption. It would almost have 
disappeared, if the concern of Muslims with the Qur’ân and the Sunnah, which pre-
serves Islam, had not also preserved the Arabic language. This (concern) became an 
element in favor of the persistence of the sedentary dialect used in the cities. But when 
the Tartars and Mongols, who were not Muslims, became the rulers of the East, this 
element in favor of the Arabic language disappeared, and the Arabic language was abso-
lutely doomed. No trace of it has remained in these Muslim provinces: the non-Arab 
Irâq, Khurâsân, Southern Persia, eastern and western India, Transoxania, the northern 
countries, and Anatolia. The Arabic style of poetry and speech has disappeared, save for 
a (remnant) in the provinces of the non-Arab Irâq and beyond to the East, no trace or 
source of (the Arabic language) has remained. Even scientific books have come to be 
written in the Persian language, which is also used for teaching in Arabic classes (Ibn 
Khaldûn 1965: 295). 
 
 
11  Since A Mediterranean Apocalypse has not yet been published, I refer to Sanjay 
Subrahmanyam’s brief description of Fleischer’s work in “Connected Histories: 
Notes Towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia,” Modern Asian Studies 
(Subrahmanyam 1997: 750).  
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So wrote Ibn Khaldûn in his famous Muqddimah. What characterizes the above-
statement is the recognition of the widespread expansion of the Persianate culture 
in the 14th century, an expansion that caused Ibn Khaldûn to lament as the popu-
larity of Persian replaced Arabic as the lingua franca of Islamdom. Although, as 
Ibn Khaldûn correctly notes, the Mongol conquest of the mid 13th century greatly 
helped the ongoing vernacular transformations away from Arabic in the Islami-
cate world, the shift in the choice of making literary and political texts in neo-
Persian (darik) was, however, first undertaken around the 10th century at the 
Sâmânî court (819-1004.) in Transoxiana, which later expanded under the rule of 
Buyids (932-1062) and Persianized Turks, like the Ghaznavîds (989-1149).12 The 
rise of the Muslim Persian states as representatives of Arab-Iranian cultural syn-
thesis in the post-High Caliphate age (692-945) characterizes a major shift of 
civilizational importance; this development signaled the extraordinary efflores-
cence of the Islamized Persianite cosmopolitan culture that expanded over large 
areas of Anatolia, Transoxania and western India, where an exemplary instance 
of Arabic-Persian creolization and vernacularization took place.  
Two centuries earlier, Abû-l-Rayhân al-Bîrûnî (973?-1048), the famous 
Khârazmian-Iranian scientist, in his Kitâb al-Hind dates the reign of Sabuktigîna 
at Ghaznah, Afghanistan, as the ‘the days of the Turks’ (’ayyâm at-turk), a term 
that underlines an increase of interconnection between Iran-Mesopotamian, Ana-
tolian-Mediterranean and Central Asian regions with the – gradual – migration of 
the Turks (Al-Biruni 1953: 16).  
To all appearances the 11th century was a time when relations between the 
sedentary civilizations and the (semi) nomadic populations of Central Asia 
crossed a major threshold, whereby migration, conquest and conversion set off a 
critical socio-political and cultural organizational changes in the Islamdom; a 
process which reached its apogee with the Mongol incursion in the 13th century 
when nomad power reached the full capacity of its political organizational poten-
tial in Eurasia (Lewis 1988: 33-34; 88-89; Saunders 1982: 141). The emergence 
of the Turkish people, in their both detribalized (Ghaznavîds and Mamluks) and 
tribalized form (Seljuqs), ultimately opened the way for the establishment of the 
Persianized-Turkic powers, such as the Ottomans and the Safavis, in Asia Minor 
and Iran-Mesopotamian steppes, and the establishment of the Sultanate of Delhi 
in the 13th century in the Panjab and most of the Gangetic plain (Hindustân). 
The appearance of the Turkish and Persianate cultures in the Middle Period 
(945-1503), to use Hodgson’s periodization, marks an era of unprecedented po-
 
12  Neo-Persian was a simplified literary form of Pahlavî language (Middle Persian) 
from the Sâsânian era, written mainly in Arabic scripts. By raising this point, I am 
not ignoring the ‘Abbâsid debt to the Sâsânîan Persian system of administration and 
government. Rather, I am merely indicating how it was under the Sâmânî power 
that the neo-Persian language emerged as the idiom of administration and court lit-
erary culture.  
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litical fragmentations and cultural creolization in the context of nomadic and sed-
entary relations.13 According to Hodgson, the period of genesis (c. 600-945) saw 
the replacement of Syriac and Pahlavi (“Irano-Semitic”) traditions by an Arabic 
culture on post-axial, agrariante and urbanite civilization; underpinning an inclu-
sive Muslim community between the Nile and Oxus river developed on this ba-
sis. By contrast, the Middle Period was marked by a widening gap between state 
and society, the diffusion and pluralization of Sûfîsm and the expansion of neo-
Persian as a literary language throughout a large part of the Afro-Eurasian land-
mass. In an article published posthumously in 1970, Hodgson described this pe-
riod as an age of great cosmopolitan creativity that reached its height by the 16th 
century, when the main region of Islamdom came under the control of empires 
(Ottoman, Mughal and Safavi), administrated by military patronage states.14  
The most critical threshold of the transcultural age in the (early) Middle Period 
of Islamic history was the Turkish migration from Central Asia. The successive 
waves of the Turkish migration from the steppe grass lands of Central Asia to the 
settled regions of Anatolia and the Iran-Mesopotamian plateaus began in the 9th 
century, when Turkish slaves were recruited in order to create a new military or-
der, loyal to the Byzantine and the early Caliphate state.15 The Turkish socio-
military institution, in its various forms, had been in a sense the backbone of Ca-
liphate, at least, from the end of the 9th century onwards. With the rise of the 
Ghaznavîds, military slave elites of Turkish origin emerged as heirs to the Caliph-
ate political order.16 The Saljuqs suzerainty in the 11th and the early 12th centuries, 
 
13  Hodgson lists six periods of Islamic history: the formative (to 692), the High Ca-
liphate (to 945), the International Civilization (to 1258), the Age of Mongol Prestige 
(to 1503), the era of Gunpowder Empires (to c. 1800) and Modern Times, with the 
emergence of nation-states. The “Middle Period” groups together the third and 
fourth periods of this list (Hodgson 1974, 1: 98).  
14  This was the fifth phase of Islamicate history, namely the era of “Gunpowder Em-
pires.” In this article, Hodgson argues that egalitarian and cosmopolitan elements in 
Islam, incorporated and institutionalized in the civilization of the Irano-Semitic so-
cieties, have made a lasting impact on interregional developments on a hemispheric-
wide base (Hodgson 1970: 99-123).  
15  Although they primarily served in the Muslim armies as early as 674 C.E. the sys-
tematic introduction of Turkish slaves into the Caliphate army occurred under the 
reign of Al-Mansûr (745-75) (Pipes 1981: 152). However, the creation of the slave 
soldier institution consisted of both free mercenaries recruited abroad and captured 
Turks among the tribes in Transoxnia, known in the Muslim world as Mamlûks 
(Crone 1980: 74-80).  
16  It is important to note that the Persianization of Turkish people was a process al-
ready in the making with the rise of the Central-Asian trade in the 5th and early 6th 
centuries, when the Turks were in constant contact with the pre-Islamic Sâsânîd 
culture. Apart from pastoral nomads, the pre-Islamic Turkish society was never 
wholly nomadic; culturally and economically, it also included certain urban ele-
ments that had been shaped by commercial interests (Kwanten 1979: 32; 39-40; 
Cahen 1968: 5-7).  
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however, marked the establishment of the first non-slave Turkish nomadic empire 
that led the way to the revival of Orthodox Sunnism. The establishment of a non-
military slave Turkish power with vast expansionist aspirations represents the first 
major nomadic conquest movement with religious renewalist dimensions.  
In a sense, the migration of the tribal Turks to the Anatolian regions at the 
beginning of the 11th century, led to major demographic transformations.17 This 
occurred in two major successive historical phases. The Saljuq victory over the 
Byzantines forces at the battle of Manzikert in 1071 inaugurated the first decisive 
stage, with major political consequences: the establishment of Turkish-speaking 
principalities in the western borderland marches as a way to challenge Byzantine 
control over Anatolia and the Islamic heartland. The ascend of the Tughil to the 
Caliphate seat of Baghdad in 1055, in this context, marked a combination of de-
cisive leadership and military prowess as well as a deteriorating political and 
economic situation within the Islamic territories that enabled the first tribal 
Turks, the Saljuqs, to make themselves the dominante force in the Iran-
Mesopotamian plateau. This socio-demographic process, known as “Turkiciza-
tion,” entered a second phase of development with the Mongol invasion of 1258, 
which intensified the Turkman migration to the western regions of Anatolia, re-
placing the Greek-Christian peasant population with Turkish groups of nomadic 
origin. Though sporadic movements occurred throughout the 11th to the 13th cen-
turies, the 14th century highlights the finalization of a major demographical shift 
in Anatolia that involved radical changes of socio-cultural significance.  
The transition from the early to the late Middle Period, as seen in the context 
of successive Turkish migrations to Anatolia, can be regarded as a revolutionary 
phase in two important ways. At one level, the complex process of hybridization 
of Arabic, Persian and Turkish cultural elements from the end of the High Ca-
liphate to the establishment of the Ilkhânâte era in Iran in the 13th century, repre-
sents a new period of intense civilizational hybridization, and a new stage of the 
Turko-Persian ecumene. (Canfield 1991: xiv). The Turko-Persian Islamicate cul-
ture that had crystallized in eastern Iranian margin in the 11th century, and was 
later exported to cultural zones of south Asian India, was a product of intercivili-
zational encounters and open to further developments of that sort. In the particu-
lar case of Turkization of Anatolia from the 11th to the 14th centuries, the regional 
mixture of agrarian, nomadic tribal and urban settings was particularly favorable 
to cultural blending.18 Accordingly, the fusion of Arabic-scriptural, Byzantine-
 
17  Though non-nomadic Turkish settlers were already living in Khurâsân, Khwarazm 
and Transoxania by the time of Arab conquest in the seventh and eighth centuries, 
the most expansive southward migration of the Turks, as settlers and pastoralists, 
occurred mainly in the 11th century, which changed the ethnic composition of the 
Middle East.  
18  Although Claude Cahen has argued that it is obviously impossible to give any fig-
ure for the Turkish immigration into Asia Minor, evidence indicates a long-term 
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Greek, Turkish-nomadic and Persianate-lettered traditions of the Middle Period 
paved the way for the creation of new cultural complexes.  
At another level, this “mixed borderland civilization” also became a meeting 
ground of different religious traditions (Wittek 1996: 20). With regard to the in-
terdependent process of migration and encounter, the blending of steppe (instru-
mental) religious practices of the Turkish nomads with the world (soteriological) 
religions of Iran-Semitic and Byzantine-Greek societies represents the crystalli-
zation of new cultural milieus, where nomadic and settled civilizations had to 
some extent been amalgamated;19 this leveling of cultural and religious capacities 
opened the way for the breakdown of civilizational frontiers between steppe and 
sown. With the Islamization of Turks and the Turkization of Islam, shamanist 
ritual practices, performances to attain a trance state in order to communicate 
with the world of spirits for the purpose of fertility, healing, protection and ag-
gression, were creatively fused with Islamic eschatology and the soteriological 
practices of divine guidance to pass reckoning on judgment day towards salva-
tion.  
From the 11th century onwards, the most original expression of this cross-
fertilization between shamanistic and soteriological traditions was the emergence 
of Anatolian Sufism. In its distinct shamanistic form, Darvish Islam or “Islami-
cized shaman” (Bâbâ Islam) marked a dominant aspect of the daily life of the 
Turkish nomadic population, and indeed the main factor for the conversion of ru-
ral Asian Minor to Islam.20 The strong popularity of spiritual leaders called 
Bâbâs (whence the name Bâbâis for their followers) reflected the widespread 
tendency of combining certain elements of Shi’i, Sunni, Persianiate ethos of 
chivalry (javânmardî) and Christian beliefs with shamanistic practices, in which 
Bâbâ Islamist groups like the Bektâshî Darvishism best attests (Köprülü 1978: 
123).21 As H.R. Roemer writes, the period marked an age of religious configura-
 
process of conversion of the natives to Islam with the migration of Turkish Muslims 
to the region from the 11th to the 13th centuries (Cahen: 1968: 143; Levtzion 1979: 
52-67). 
19  The difference between instrumental and soteriological religions is primarily based 
on their experiential orientation towards the supernatural: whereas the former type 
represents the belief in salvation manifested in practices directed towards appeasing 
the supernatural with the aim of redemption, the later is directed towards making 
specific things happen in the world through magical practices of shamanism and 
spirit-possession. In this sense, instrumental religions are not based on faith, but 
rather on the notions of efficacy of spiritual experience to control the supernatural 
(Gellner 2001: 69-72).  
20  As Kortepeter notes, the notion of “Islamized shaman” was also synonymous with 
the Turkish term of “bagiji” or sorcerer, which could imply the supernatural ability 
to illicit magic involving the use of medicines in order to harm others (Kortepeter 
1991: 19) 
21  The warrior ethos of Javânmardî was an ideal life, involving chivalry spirit based 
on physical masculine strength. Such ethos, originating from the pre-Islamic Per-
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tions, in which a “popular religiosity became widespread […] These included a 
marked willingness to believe in miracles, a cult of saint with the growth of much 
frequented places of pilgrimage, and even the veneration of ‘Alî, the cousin and 
son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad […]” (Jackson/Lockhart 1968, 6: 192). 
Correspondingly, the popularization of Shi´i saintly figures, like ‘Alî as a source 
of mystical veneration by various Islamic sects, especially the Sûfî-Sunni orders, 
generated what has been called by C. Cahen as the “Shi´itization of Sunnism.”22  
Although by the 11th century Sufîsm had already played a considerable role 
in the development of the Islamic faith, leading up to al-Ghazali’s legitimation of 
Sufîsm with his greatest work The Revivification of the Religious Sciences in the 
12th century, this variegated mystical movement experienced a growth of popu-
larity with the rise of Bâbâ Islam. The fusion of Sûfîesque Shi´isectarianism and 
millenarian movements in the later Middle Period can in part be credited to this 
process of religious hybridity, whereby Shi’i, Sunni and Sûfî practices and creeds 
intermingled in close proximity and at times overlapped in the shifting spaces of 
everyday interaction.23 But with the emergence of the Turkish Sûfî-brotherhood 
orders – the so-called “ghâzî” warriors” – such movements gave a political ex-
pression to this civilizational fusion. It was at this stage that Sufîsm began to be 
transformed from loose associations into organized religious orders (tariqa) with 
their own distinctive cultural practices, forming spiritual brotherhoods in the 
form of popular mass movements whose leaders where some of the greatest po-
litical and religious reformers of Islam.  
The origins of these brotherhood associations traces back to the 8th century 
small ascetic brotherhoods on the island of Abadan in the Persian Gulf (Ayoub 
2004: 153) and, later in the 10th century, to the urban-based “pure brethren” of 
the Qaramati movement. The Qarmati brotherhoods played a great role in the de-
velopment of the Islamic guilds in the 10th century, and the futuvvat associations 
that were revived under the reign of Caliph An-Nâsî in the late 12th and early 13th 
centuries, as a consequence of the expansion of trade and revival of towns under 
the Saljuq rule (Lewis 1937: 20-37).24 In the early Middle Periods, these rela-
 
sianiate culture, was later incorporated into the futuvvat fraternal circles of Middle 
Period Islamic history (Babayan 2002: 168-69).  
22  Quoting C. Cahen in Arjomand’s Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam (Arjomand 
1984: 67).  
23  For the best exposition of Sûfî history of later Middle Period, see Arjomand (1981). 
It is important to note, however, that Sûfîsm and Islamic messianic movements (es-
pecially in its Shi’i form of Mahdîsm) existed in earlier periods of Islamic history, 
and that they were not essentially inclusive of each other. The histories of Abbâsîd 
and the Isma’ilî (Fâtimîd) revolutions in the 8th and the 10th centuries, for instance, 
are replete with apocalyptic and messianic beliefs in the Mahdî that “spread widely 
beyond other extremist Shiite groups” (Amanat & Bernhardson 2002: 114).  
24  Although they were consolidated under An-Nâsî, according to Arnakis however, the 
futuvvat associations first appeared in the 9th century in the form of “volunteer war-
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tively autonomous movements, in the form of popular militia and volunteer Sûfî-
guild associations, played a crucial role in the local governance of eastern Islam-
dom, which reached maturity as a political and social force from the 11th to the 
14th centuries.25 With their own Sûfî mystical ceremonies and chivalric ritual 
practices, the futuvvat associations combined ethical codes of egalitarianism, in 
the Persianate form of Javânmardî and the Mazdakî notions of piety, with non-
egalitarian charismatic elitist ethos of master (pîr)-disciple and patron-client rela-
tions.26 Ties of blood and kinship affiliations were less important than competi-
tion for the sacred status of leadership in the clubs, manifested in the paradoxical 
notion of “first among equals,” which reflected the brotherhood spiritual charac-
ter of the associations.  
Especially in the later Middle Period, 1200-1501, after the Mongol invasion, 
culminating in the conquest of Baghdad in 1258 and the disintegration of the 
´Abbâsid Caliphate, the futuvvat associations began to merge with the Anatolian-
Sûfî orders, a process that during the 14th century spread further into the Islam-
dom with the increasing intermingling of rural and urban relations as a conse-
quence of migration and nomadic incursions (Lewis, 1937: 27-28).27 The blend-
ing between futuvvat and the Anatolian-Sûfî orders created the akhîyat al-fityân 
or akhî movements, which tended to fuse the horseback warrior culture of Cen-
tral Asia with the sedentary Iran-Semitic Messianic traditions. Recruited mainly 
among the craftsmen, and composed of associations of young men organized as 
guilds in Anatolia in the 13th and 14th century, the akhîs shared the basic rules of 
futuvvat (Cook 1970: 16-17). Built around the warrior ethos of steppe regions 
and the Qura `nic notion of justice, the brotherhoods lived by a strict code of 
masculine honor, an ethic of bravery, embedded in a culture of reference for 
spiritual sacred persons (shaman) and belief in the potential to unite the mundane 
 
rior guilds” (Arkakis 1953: 232-47). The literal meaning of the term “futuvvat” is 
youthfulness and by implication chivalry (Keyvani 1982: 25). But the term is also 
associated with the Middle Persian word of javânmardî or chivalry (Kâshifî 1983: 
9).  
25  As Hodgson notes, by the end of the Middle Periods, the futuvvat had become the 
mystical expression of urbanite guild associations with their own political and reli-
gious authority (Hodgson 1974, 1: 130-131).  
26  The Mazdakîs were a Zoroastrian gnostic movement that emerged as a sectarian 
movement in sixth century pre-Islamic Persia. They advocated radical egalitarian 
values with strong this-worldly inclinations. The precise influence of the late 
Sâssâniân tradition of javânmardî and Mazdakîs on the futuvvat, which also in-
cluded similar youthful masculinist ritual practices and ethical ideals, is unclear. For 
a good description of the Mazdakî movement, see Babayan (2002: 170, 265-271).  
27  It is important to note that such process appears to have already occurred with the 
first wave of Turkish migration to Anatolia and Iran-Mesopotamian regions. The 
emergence of the Qalândarî-e movement in eastern Khurâsân and western parts of 
central Asia in the 10th century serves as a good example in the rise of Sûfî-
brotherhoods in the early Middle Period (Karamustafa 1994).  
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with the supernatural world through ritual, ceremony and, above all, war. 
Throughout Islamdom, the brotherhood orders began to organize themselves with 
a hierarchy, evolving around the charismatic leader, his deputies (khalifâh) and 
ordinary followers (murîds). With relative autonomy, they constituted a counter 
political culture that created its own political conception of Islamic justice, con-
travention of the sharî´a, distinctive ceremonies (i.e. dance-trance rituals of zîkr), 
clothing, public spaces (takkiyah) and incorporation of various “heterodoxical” 
beliefs and doctrines, based on what Karamustafa calls “an uncompromising 
antinomianism” (Karamustafa 1994: 17). 
The emergence of the Sûfî-brotherhoods in the 14th century identifies a fasci-
nating example of this civilizational experimentation, a process that led to the 
formation of new political orders with the establishment of the Ottoman and Sa-
favi Empires from the 14th to the early 16th centuries, reshaping the political cul-
tural landscape of Islamdom. But, with the emergence of the Turko-Persian 
Islamicate cultures, this new historical configuration also created new ways of re-
flexivity and modes of communcation, marking a new Axial condition that gen-
erated new types of eschatological, cosmological and symbolic realities in ver-
nacular hybrid terms. The Middle Period Islamic Axiality, in this regard, ideniti-
fies an integral part of the transcultural age, in which through encounter, emerg-
ing societies reformulated new expressions to defining self and other, knowledge 
and reality by transcending pre-existing social and cultural boundaries, and inte-
grating new institutional arrangements in transcendental terms.  
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Chapter 3 
Identity Formation in World Religions: 
A Comparative Analysis of Christianity 
and Islam 
 
ARPAD SZAKOLCZAI 
 
 
Introduct ion 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse, comparatively, the processes through which 
the authenticity of the religious founders, extending both to their personality and 
message, was established in the two main world religions, focusing on the earli-
est period. Questions of identity formation include the sources of the personal 
identity of the founding figures, their identification as prophet or saviour, and the 
way in which the identities of believers and their opponents were characterised 
and formed in the respective sacred books. 
In terms of a theoretical background the paper relies on the works of Max 
Weber on charisma, and Alessandro Pizzorno on identity formation, emphasising 
the role of processes of recognition in the formation of identity. Pizzorno’s ideas 
will be complemented in two ways: by Victor Turner’s studies on liminality and 
performative experiences, and René Girard’s ideas on the mimetics of desire. 
 
 
Theoret ical  background 
 
1. Max Weber: prophetic charisma 
 
The identity of the prophet, or the ‘founder of religion’ in general,1 is a problem 
ridden with difficulties. Max Weber has the unique merit of placing the question 
of prophecy and prophetic religions, beyond any overall evolutionary scheme or 
 
1  Any attempt at a comparative study of Christianity and Islam, and especially their 
founders, is rendered difficult by a problem that is not merely terminological: while 
Mohammed is identified as a prophet by his followers, Jesus is considered much 
more; so the claim that Christianity is a ‘prophetic religion’ already implies a parti-
san position that is not compatible with the methodological considerations outlined 
above. As a result, I will have to use the technical term ‘founder of a world relig-
ion.’ 
SZAKOLCZAI: IDENTITY FORMATION IN WORLD RELIGIONS  |  69 
simplistic contrast between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ societies, at the centre of 
historical sociology and social theory, and developed the concept of charisma 
first of all to analyse this problem. Weber considered prophecy as the clearest ex-
ample of charisma, and while defining charisma in terms of personal characteris-
tics as a ‘gift of grace,’ he also emphasised that prophets need to be recognised, 
connecting identity formation to processes of recognition. 
However, in spite of its pioneering achievements, Weber’s work on charisma 
has a series of shortcoming. First of all, Weber never tackled satisfactorily the 
exact relationship between charisma as a pure gift, a strictly personal quality, and 
as a result of a process of recognition. This is a serious shortcoming, as highly 
charismatic persons, even geniuses possessing clearly extraordinary gifts, might 
go unrecognised under certain conditions, as it happened with the great ‘mad-
men’ of the 19th century, like Hölderlin, van Gogh or Nietzsche. Second, con-
cerning the special case of religious charisma, prophets or saviour declare them-
selves, with considerable effect, as mediators of divine will or messages, not 
simply possessors of unique personal qualities, whether recognised or not. Fi-
nally, while Weber’s concept starts with extraordinary situations and the singular 
ability to resolve them, the founding of a religion requires different qualities: a 
stable, durable identity which is recognised generally as an authentic carrier of 
divine will. 
It is here the work of Alessandro Pizzorno, focusing on the manner in which 
identities are recognised, compliments Weber’s approach. 
 
2. Alessandro Pizzorno: identity and recognition 
 
The term ‘recognition’ is increasingly used in contemporary social theory, mostly 
through the works of Charles Taylor (1994) and Axel Honneth (1995). Piz-
zorno’s approach, however, while compatible with them, was developed earlier 
and goes much further (see Pizzorno 1986, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 2000). Fol-
lowing Levinas and the early Jena work of Hegel, Taylor and Honneth restrict 
their attention to the importance of the emotional and moral reconfirmation pro-
vided by the recognition of the other, emphasising mutuality, reciprocity, rights, 
symmetry, and the development of a legalistic moral philosophy. Pizzorno, how-
ever, argues that processes of recognition not only reconfirm but form and trans-
form identities, both personal and collective.2 
Recognising the other in this sense is not restricted to the granting of a posi-
tive emotional evaluation or acknowledgement. Illustrating Pizzorno’s point 
through the theoretical framework of Michel Foucault on the three axes of ex-
periences one can argue that processes of recognition involve knowledge, power 
 
2  As a particularly pertinent example, he evokes the recognition of states, a central 
element of the system of international relations after the treaty of Westphalia. 
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and ethics at the same time (Foucault 1984, 1986). At the cognitive level recogni-
tion implies not simply the knowledge of something, close to familiarity, but the 
identification of an object as belonging to a certain class, or of an unknown phe-
nomenon as being identical to something already familiar. However, the entire 
Kantian object-subject logic is bypassed by Pizzorno when he introduces the He-
gelian dialectic of the master and the slave (or rather serf). Casting a novel eye on 
this idea worn out by Marx and conflict theory approaches, Pizzorno reads the 
confrontation as a struggle for recognition. A search for recognition between two 
subjects always has the aspect of a testing. According to Pizzorno, the ‘slave’ for 
Hegel is by no means in a hopeless position, justifying the need for an all or 
nothing revolution. Quite on the contrary, Hegel’s aim is to show that even in 
such an extreme situation of inequality, the specifically social logic of recogni-
tion by itself will lead to an eventual turning of the sides. 
This is because the identity of a person can only be acquired if it is recog-
nised by other human beings. Approaches arguing for the eternal fixity of per-
sonal identity simply fail to notice, taking for granted, the subtle processes of 
recognition that contribute to establishing a stable identity. Thus, of course much 
of our identity is acquired in family; and there is no reason to take up an extreme 
social constructionist position denying the importance of purely biological fac-
tors. But the family is also a main source of emotional recognition. However, as 
blood relationships and emotional recognition normally coincide in a family, the 
latter’s formative impact on identity often goes unacknowledged. Similarly, ra-
tional choice approaches simply take for granted the subtle processes of peer 
pressure that is exerted on the preferences a person has, extending even to his or 
her identity, and which are especially strong in certain ‘liminal’ moments and 
situations.  
While the term recognition is central for Pizzorno’s sociology, for a better 
understanding of the processes of recognition we need to make a subsequent step, 
moving from ‘recognition’ to ‘circles’ of recognition. Given their ‘mutual recog-
nition,’ human beings ‘have received an identity, and they may count on being 
recognised by some circles of others. These circles make recognition durable 
and, hence, trust rational. Individual interests grow out of different positions in 
the networks and circles of recognition’ (Pizzorno 1991: 219). This is why Piz-
zorno’s work is foundational for a properly social theory; and why his theoretical 
considerations end on an ultimately both refreshing and reassuring note: ‘A too 
fierce self-reliance can be scary or pretentious. The principle of autonomy of self, 
if it is not meant to operate temporarily, cannot stand alone and not be a sham. 
Behind “autonomy” some other self recognizing me is necessary. I now know 
that beyond every decision of my current self, “some other kind of otherness” 
must be sought’ (Pizzorno 1986: 372). 
At this point Pizzorno’s ideas can be complemented by ideas from two other 
contemporary social thinkers, Victor Turner and René Girard. 
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3. Victor Turner: liminality and performative experiences 
 
Turner’s work focuses on the experiential side of the processes of identity forma-
tion and transformation (Turner 1967, 1969). The most important part of his 
work is based upon Arnold van Gennep’s classic study on rites of passage (van 
Gennep 1960). The most paradigmatic examples are initiation rites, which guide 
individuals (and their families) through the major moments of transition in the 
human life cycle, like birth, puberty, marriage, or dying. These rites follow a 
strict sequential order, starting with the rites of separation in the stage of prepara-
tion, consisting of various deprivations, endurance tests and ascetic exercises; 
followed by the actual ritual performance in which the candidates are tested; and 
concluded by the rites of re-aggregation that celebrate the successful performance 
and the return to normality and order. In order to characterise the fluid, malleable 
character of the ritual, created by the artificial suspension of the normal condi-
tions of everyday life, van Gennep and Turner came up with the concept ‘liminal-
ity,’ which by now gained a very wide use in the social and human sciences. 
Much of Turner’s later work is devoted to the broader significance of the 
concept of liminality. Two of these directions are of particular importance for 
this paper. The first concerns the link between rituals and experiences. Rituals are 
not simply formal ceremonies, but require involvement and participation; but this 
is because they themselves are based on experiences. Rituals for Turner have a 
preventive character; they are deployed to ease transitions, or to prevent the out-
breaks of conflict and crisis. However, exactly because of this evocation and in-
citement of emotions such rituals are dangerous, and can be performed solely un-
der the guidance of special ‘masters of ceremonies.’  
In some of his last writings Turner recognised basic affinities between his 
approach and the work of Wilhelm Dilthey on events and experience (Turner 
1985a, 1985b). In most of his studies Turner emphasised the creative, transfor-
mative potential of liminality, and the sense of community (called communitas) 
created between those who have jointly underwent such rites. 
Second, the term liminality can be used in general to characterise fluid, tran-
sitory conditions. The collapse of the taken for granted order in real-world condi-
tions creates a genuine betwixt and between situation, one which is not under the 
control of ‘masters of ceremonies,’ thus – in Weberian language – requires the 
emergence of a charismatic leader. Here Turner’s work can be used to better un-
derstand the dynamics of major crisis moments in world history, including the 
concept of ‘charisma,’ and its contrast with its opposite, the Trickster (Horváth 
2000; Radin 1972). 
In real-world large-scale liminal situations historical events are experienced 
at the same time by a large number of individuals; thus, the approach can help to 
study jointly the formation of personal and collective identities. 
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4. René Girard: the mimetics of desire and rival brothers 
 
If Turner often celebrated liminality, Girard called attention to its dangers (see 
Girard 1976, 1977, 1987, 1989). If Turner emphasised the preventive aspect of 
rituals, for Girard they rather only staged, without fully understanding, the origi-
nal events of a sacrificial crisis. According to Girard, situations of crisis in small-
scale communities easily degenerate into full-scale violence, due to the imitative 
aspect of human nature, and such an escalation of violence can only be stopped 
by the eventual identification and sacrifice of an innocent victim, or scapegoat. 
Human culture is founded on such mechanisms of scape-goating, repeated in 
rituals of sacrifice. 
There are two aspects of Girard’s framework that will be important for this 
paper. First, Girard calls attention to the crucial role distinctions play in social 
life, both at the level of social relations, and concerning the ability of individuals 
to make such distinctions and thus prevent descent, through imitation and mi-
metic rivalry, into a full-scale sacrificial crisis. Without social distinctions, and 
without individuals who have a good sense of judgment and are able to discrimi-
nate, society is always on the brink of descending into a liminal crisis. Second, in 
this context the anxiety created by the birth of twins in any small-scale society 
becomes intelligible. Due to their indistinguishable identity, twins threaten the 
delicate balance of social order. On a more general scale the problem is reflected 
in myths about fraternal rivalries; and for Girard it is by no means accidental or 
irrelevant that foundation stories very often involve rival brothers, of which one 
has to die for a successful foundation of the city.3 
 
5. The spiral as a model of change 
 
Finally, the paper will make use of the metaphor of the spiral, particularly suit-
able for a properly social analysis of processes of historical change. The meaning 
of the term ‘social’ is taken from Mauss (2002) and Simmel (1971), in distinction 
to both Durkheim and Marx. 
The model of the spiral is different from non-social models of evolution or 
linear growth, whether taken from biology or from termo-dynamics; and from the 
anti-social models of conflict. Conflict models are anti-social in the sense that 
society, or community substance in any meaningful sense, is dissolved in the 
moment conflict breaks out, and cannot be re-established unless it ends. Conflicts 
of course do happen, and the study of the rhythm in which conflicts break out 
and escalate is central for understanding historical processes; but to explain soci-
ety, and processes of social change, through conflicts as the purported ‘engine’ of 
 
3  See for e.g. Cain and Abel, Romulus and Remus, Joseph and his brothers, or Eteo-
cles and Polyneikes. 
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social change, thus in some way ‘beneficial,’ is not simply untenable, but deeply 
nihilistic in its outcome. 
Though rarely if at all theorised explicitly, the metaphor of spiral does sur-
face occasionally in explanations of socio-historical dynamics. It is present in 
milestone works of arts, written at crucial historical junctures. Thus, it is central 
for two of the most important poems of the 20th century: ‘The Second Coming’ 
by William Butler Yates,4 and ‘I Live in Expanding Rings’ by Rainer Maria 
Rilke.5 The former was written in January 1919, thus just after WWI, while the 
latter in 1905, or at the moment when the clouds leading to the storm of WWI 
started to gather. The metaphor of the storm, by the way, is also central for Tho-
mas Mann’s The Magic Mountain, also written during and around WWI. At a 
different but similarly liminal moment, the Renaissance, Leonardo da Vinci also 
came to a similar conclusion, when he ‘had come to identify every action in na-
ture as occurring along spiral lines’ (Pedretti 1973: 15). 
The metaphor was also used, and in some crucial junctures of their works, by 
major contemporary social theorists. Thus, in Volume 1 of his History of Sexual-
ity Michel Foucault talks about the ‘perpetual spirals of power and pleasure’ 
(Foucault 1980: 45; emphasis in original); while Norbert Elias introduces the ar-
gument of his most important methodological book Involvement and Detachment 
through Poe’s short story about fishermen in the maelstrom (Elias 1987: 45-6). 
Examples could be continued from various analyses of phenomena like panic, 
terrorism, the stock market, or the logic of expectations in general. 
One might argue that such a model is not specifically social either, as models 
taken from medical epidemics or chaos theory perfectly capture the spiralling 
character of events. However, by combining experience-events and processes of 
recognition it is possible to formulate a specifically social model of spiralling 
processes. While epidemiology or meteorology provide us with important meta-
phors for illustrative purposes, there the outburst gathers momentum solely due 
to an originally random encounter of particles, or a purely physical interaction 
between viruses and their hosts. In human history, such ‘storms’ also start with 
humble beginnings; however, here we have to study the exact manner in which 
such minute beginnings establish themselves through the unique interaction of 
human experiences that are always strictly personal; and processes of recognition 
that contribute to the formation of personal and collective identities, and that are 
always social. 
This paper will apply these considerations for analysing, in so far as it is pos-
sible, the very first instances in the rise of Christianity and Islam. 
 
4  ‘Turning and turning in the widening gyre/The falcon cannot hear the fal-
coner;/Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;/Mere anarchy is loosed upon the 
world.’ 
5  ‘Round God, the old tower, my gyres I perform,/and I’ve gyred there centuries 
long;/and don’t know whether I’m falcon or storm/or, maybe, a mighty song.’ 
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The comparat ive analysis  
 
1. Prelude 
 
A methodological note 
 
There are two guiding methodological principles in this paper that need to be 
pointed out explicitly, being particularly important for the study of religion: the 
paper is comparative and non-judgmental. The first is rather obvious, follows 
from the basic principles of scholarly analysis, and distances itself from the claim 
that a specific tradition, whether religious, cultural, national or political, can only 
be understood from the ‘inside.’ The second may be more controversial, as by 
this I mean the principle, fundamental for any serious study of religion, that tran-
scendental experiences are accepted as possible. This is not equal to indiscrimi-
nate credulity, only recognises the limits of scientific knowledge and the legiti-
macy of non-scientific traditions which can be genuinely serious, with their own 
principles of verification; and in this regard it is fully compatible with the basic 
principles of Kant’s thought, not to mention the founding figures of academic 
reasoning, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. What it clearly repudiates, however, is 
the tradition identified by Jonathan Israel (2000) as the ‘radical Enlightenment,’ 
and which he traces back to Spinoza. Science must overcome its hubris and re-
learn to be humble. 
 
Historical context: liminal conditions 
 
Temporal and spatial liminal conditions exerted a huge impact on the rise of axial 
age systems of thought.6 The rise of Christianity, however, took place in a place 
and time that cannot be defined as liminal. This is already indicated by the fact 
that it is situated outside the time horizon of the axial age, even in the broad 
sense of Jaspers. More particularly, Jesus lived at a rather stable and peaceful 
moment both concerning the Roman Empire in general: the rule of Augustus, the 
high moment of Rome, and the still relatively stable period under Tiberius; and 
the case of Palestine in particular: well after the Maccabean revolts of BC 167-4 
and the Roman invasion of BC 63, and well before the Jewish wars and the Fall 
of Jerusalem and the destruction of the Temple in AD 70. In fact, it was exactly 
due the relative – though always delicate – calmness of the situation that Jesus 
was considered as a threat to the peace that led to his condemnation and death. 
One could even situate some of his most startling claims – ‘Think not that I am 
come to send peace on Earth; I came not to send peace but a sword’ (Mt 10: 34) – 
 
6  For details, see my ‘Ecumenic Empires, Global Ages and Prophetic Religions,’ in 
the same volume. 
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in this particular context. Jesus did not arise out of a liminal moment – he rather 
created liminality. 
In stark contrast, Islam emerged at a particularly liminal moment, and at a 
specifically liminal location. The moment was the on-dragging war between the 
two main powers near the Arabian peninsula, the Eastern Roman and the Sas-
sanide Persian empires. Warfare intensified since the middle of the 6th century, 
with disastrous consequences: ‘In Muhammad’s lifetime they waged the most 
destructive of all the wars waged against one another in all their centuries of 
fighting, and at his death both empires were financially and politically exhausted’ 
(Hodgson 1974: 145). They were therefore ripe to be overrun – and Mecca, due 
to its liminal location, was in an ideal position to make use of this opportunity. 
This was because it was not only situated at the intersection point of the main 
caravan routes (Guzzetti 2004: 20), a central advantage for any trading commu-
nity; but also because of its equidistance from the three main centres of power 
surrounding Arabia: Syria in the West, Yemen in the South, and the Persian Em-
pire in the North-East (Hodgson 1974: 158). The rise of Islam, in a certain way, 
only realised this ripe opportunity. 
 
2. Personal identity 
 
Personal identity is first of all based on family connections, the genealogical 
lineage in which one is a descendent, and which on its turn is continued by one’s 
own descendants. In the case of Jesus this elementary fact of human existence 
was broken, and in both directions. The Messiah was expected to come from the 
house of king David; but Jesus is not a descendent of king David. The Gospel of 
Matthew makes the point clearly, though obliquely, and thus it is often misunder-
stood. It seems as if its long genealogical lineage was composed in order to make 
Jesus appear as the descendant of David (Mt 1). However, the next chapter 
makes it clear that Joseph was not the father.  
This poses the question whether the long genealogical story serves a purpose. 
The answer is that it indeed offers a lesson: instead of identifying a direct lineage 
of Jesus, it heralds his coming by the times in which he was born, by dividing the 
long lineage into three phases of fourteen generations (Mt 1: 17). Genealogy or 
direct blood descent is thus replaced by generation or the question of context, 
which will have its consequences for matters of recognition as well. 
Furthermore, the birth of Jesus is accompanied by a number of further stories 
that break radically with expectations concerning a prophet or a saviour. These 
are exclusively contained in the Gospel of Luke – for the simple and good reason 
that after the ironic take on genealogical lineage Matthew declines any interest in 
actual birth and childhood stories. The birth is taken place not only out of home 
(Nazareth), in Bethlehem, but even outside the house, in the stable. Jesus fur-
thermore receives no education worthy of telling, and we do not even know of 
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any special experience or vision that he would have had, marking his calling as a 
prophet. 
This break is further emphasised in episodes where Jesus would explicitly re-
ject belonging to the lineage of Abraham and David. Thus, he claims that he is 
lord of David rather than his son (Lk 20: 41-4); even declaring, to much conster-
nation, that ‘Before Abraham was, I am’ (Jn 8: 58). These claims are significant 
because they go against ‘natural’ expectations: one would expect an emphasis on 
such descent, especially in the case of a people, like the ancient Hebrews, where 
such descents were held in particularly high regard. 
The situation is very different in the case of Muhammad, which is especially 
significant in light of the fact that his biographers consciously took the Gospels 
as models for their storylines. Muhammad was born into a leading family of 
Mecca, even though its relatively less prestigious side, and his father died before 
birth and he became an orphan at the age of six. On the opposite end, although – 
strangely – he had no surviving sons, and even most of his daughters died with-
out heirs, claims about his blood descendents would play a major part in the his-
tory of Islam, just as similar genealogical lineages would be central for his main 
disciples and followers.7 
 
3. The identity of the religious founder 
 
Matters of personal identity, however, only became relevant due to the identifica-
tion of these persons as founders of world religions. Here questions of experi-
ences and recognition play a particularly crucial role. A prophet is not born; he or 
she must be recognised as a prophet (Weber 1978: 242). Such recognition of 
course become closely entangled with later ideological fabrications, and stories 
about the announcing of prophets are especially dubious. Still, the manner in 
which such announcements were construed can be revealing, especially in a 
comparative analysis. Related stories can also contain elements of truth that can 
be established with some degree of certainty. Finally, especially important and 
revealing is the exact dynamics and sequential order of personal experiences and 
acts of recognition.8 
 
7  The contrast can be perceived realising that the exact equivalent of the Ismaili myth 
of the ‘true Imam’ (Lewis 1967: 26-8) is the Da Vinci Code. 
8  While the terms ‘identity’ and ‘recognition’ are concepts taken from contemporary 
‘Western’ social theory, it is not anachronistic to apply them for the distant past, 
and neither do they imply acceptance of the Christian tradition as a starting point. 
Quite on the contrary, these concepts have a general applicability for the problem of 
how a new type of non-traditional religion or spirituality establishes itself, through 
converting people, be it Christianity, Islam or Buddhism. Furthermore, the idea that 
contemporary theories of identity formation are inherently rooted in the Christian 
tradition, or that the New Testament somehow ‘anticipates’ these developments, 
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Concerning the New Testament the first point to notice is that each of the 
Gospels starts prominently by questions of recognition; and that the manner in 
which this is done goes way beyond the mere assertion of the status of Jesus, or 
even the simple story-telling of acts of recognition. There are two particularly 
important aspects of these acts: the relationship between two prophets and the 
delicate balance between positive and negative acts of recognition. The Gospels 
place a particular emphasis on the recognition of Jesus by St John Baptist, a his-
torical figure with disciples on his own, lending further weight to the claim. 
Thus, there is a direct personal testimony beyond miraculous signs announcing or 
accompanying recognition. Second, this is underlined by a subtle play with re-
fusals. This first applies to the Baptist, who declines the honour, thus increasing 
the force of his recognising the other, the real one. But in the Gospel of John this 
will be applied to the entire age that failed to recognise Jesus; and this age is 
identified by the same word ‘generation.’ Jesus is not a descendant of the lineage 
of David, rather came at the proper ‘generational’ moment; but it is exactly this 
generation that fails to recognise his true, non-genealogical identity (see also Mt 
11: 16-9; 12: 34, 39; 17: 17). 
Even the question of family background is revisited in this context, closing 
another circle. It is not only the entire ‘generation’ that fails to recognise Jesus; 
even more intriguingly, he would be rejected (not recognised as a ‘prophet’) by 
exactly those who were closest to him: ‘no prophet is accepted in his own coun-
try’ (Lk 4: 24).9 This is further reinforced and closed from the other end: far from 
relying first of all on his own kin, Jesus repudiates blood relationships as being 
secondary to spiritual ties (Mt 12: 46-9), just as he would identify ‘second birth,’ 
spiritual birth or conversion to be more important than physical birth (Jn 3: 3-8) 
Thus, positively, the Gospels start by acts of recognition; and negatively, they 
simply do not contain anything concerning the experiences of Jesus: sources of 
his call or mission; formal learning, or even endurance tests in the form of hard-
ships and sufferings. The early tribulations told by Luke are all related to his 
birth and infancy, endured by his parents, thus could not have left a trace on his 
being.  
There were a few visionary experiences referred to in the Bible; allusions to 
the future tribulations. They are often connected to acts of recognition. The se-
quential order of experience and recognition, however, is singular, even perplex-
ing, the exact opposite of what one would expect on the basis of Dilthey’s or 
Turner’s theories. The starting point is not an experience, followed by the at-
tempts to make sense of it, recognising its exact meaning; quite on the contrary, 
 
thus that there is some kind of partisan affinity between the religious text and con-
temporary theorising, outside truth, is simply not tenable. 
9  The passage in Matthew is even more striking for the purposes of the paper: ‘A 
prophet is not without honour, save in his own country, and in his own house’ (Mt 
13: 57). 
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it is the recognition that is followed by a specific type of experience; even further 
– and in this sense very close to Turner’s framework – this experience has the 
specific character of a trial or testing. 
It is well worth examining a few cases in some detail. 
As a first example, let’s take the scene of baptism. The three main elements 
of the episode, the recognition by the Baptist (Mt 3: 14-5), the visionary experi-
ence with the voice in the Sky and the bird descending from above (Mt 3: 16-7), 
and the fasting in the desert and the temptation by the devil, including the travel 
to the Temple and the invitation to throw himself down (Mt 4: 1-11), are told in a 
reverse order, compared to the standard narrative of rites of passage. The story is 
supposed to start with a rite of preparation, the fasting in the desert; crowned by 
the visionary experience, the rewarding of the ascetic for his labours; and end 
with the recognition of the authentic quality of the vision by a ‘master of cere-
mony,’ the widely recognised prophet of the desert. Still, the initiation ceremony 
worked, as Jesus starts his preaching mission after this episode, paradoxically 
concluded by an ascetic rite of preparation (Mt 4: 17). 
This is by no means an isolated case. Let’s take another important scene of 
recognition, when Peter would identify Jesus as ‘the Christ, the Son of the living 
God’ (Mt 16: 16). The following verses, containing Peter’s ‘reward,’ the founda-
tional narrative of the papacy is famously missing from the other Gospels;10 
however, all three synoptic Gospels agree that this recognition is followed by the 
first time Jesus announced his own sufferings. The same sequence is repeated in 
the next chapter, where the Transfiguration is followed by the healing of the sick 
child, and then with the second announcement of sufferings. 
Such an emphatic reversal of the experience-recognition sequence must serve 
a purpose. This can be explained in the following way. The purpose of the post-
recognition trial is not to prepare for a performance-experience or to reaffirm its 
content, acknowledging the genuine morality or even sanctity of the person, as 
there is no trace of such experiences in the Gospels. It serves rather to counter-
balance the act of recognition that has just happened. Instead of celebrating and 
thus further confirming this recognition, which might lead to excessive self-
confidence and hubris, the events are followed rather by a real tribulation, or al-
lusions to such a trial, in order to prevent emotional loosening and self-
relaxation. A further reason can be that each of the three advanced warnings are 
immediately followed in the text, going further back in the sequence, by a ‘birth’: 
the resurrection. 
The situation is radically different for the case of Muhammad, where the ba-
sic facts of the accepted storyline can be arranged according to the standard se-
quential pattern, though revealing some unique peculiarities. 
 
10  This is not so surprising, given that Luke is connected to Paul, while Mark to those 
who remained in Jerusalem. 
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Muhammad had lived the life of a normal merchant until his mid-to-late 30s 
when he suddenly became preoccupied about living a life of truth and purity 
(Hodgson 1974: 158). The moment is quite typical, whether identified as a 
Dantean mid-age crisis, or the time in which the shamans or magicians usually 
receive their calls.11 In his exalted state Muhammad performs various ascetic ex-
ercises, goes to the desert, meditates in the cave. He is not alone in having such a 
troubled mind; given the liminal character of the time and place, it should not be 
surprising that there were several other prophets around engaged in similar ac-
tivities (Hodgson 1974: 160). For a time he finds no solace, his desperation is in-
creasing, and seriously considers jumping off the mountain. Suddenly, at this 
very moment, according to the historian at-Tabari (Guzzetti 2004: 46), in the 
‘night of destiny,’ something happens to him: he hears a voice and has a vision 
(K 93: 3-8).12  
Thus, eventually, the rite of preparation lead to a result; the experience ar-
rives. But he had gone through everything all by himself, and is terrified by this 
experience, which further propels him into a tremendous crisis (Guzzetti 2004: 
45). It is also accompanied by a series of apocalyptic visions, that belong to the 
oldest layers of the Koran (K 54: 1, 47-8; also 102: 1-8, 104: 1-9). He has doubts, 
not being so sure whether he is not just tormented by demons or ginns; he needs 
reassertion and recognition. But there is no ‘master of ceremony’ around; no 
other prophet who would willingly identify his experiences and recognise his 
status. Other prophets would enter the scene later, but only as his mortal rivals. 
Instead, he is consoled by his wife, but this is done not due to specific prophetic 
signs, rather to his general human qualities: as he is sincere and good, he just 
cannot be visited by demons. Some further recognition is given by a Christian, 
but even he is a cousin of his wife. Recognition therefore, in exact opposite to the 
Gospel story, started at the ‘most intimate level’ (Hodgson 1974: 167).13 
It also continued there, and for a long time. The first male person believing 
him was his ten years old cousin, Ali, followed by his adopted son, Zayd, a liber-
ated slave, and his future father-in-law and the first kaliph, Abu Bakr. For a gap 
of about three years the visions also stopped, and he only privately talked about 
his revelation. Thus, for a long period Muhammad was exactly a prophet in his 
own country, and even more, in his own house. 
 
11  Dante was about 35 years old when composing the Divine Comedy; about the sha-
man’s calling, similarly around the age of 37, see Turner (1975). 
12  The abbreviation ‘K’ will stand for the Koran. 
13  While, following the Weberian distinction between ethical and exemplary proph-
ecy, one might argue that in Muhammad’s case all that mattered was the recognition 
of the word of God, and not the person of the messenger, a strict separation along 
these lines is problematic. The entire question of believing in the Koran has only 
become possible because Muhammad as a person was first believed to have told the 
truth about Allah speaking to him. 
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This storyline must now be interpreted in light of the theoretical perspective 
outlined. While the relative perspectives of Turner and Pizzorno are quite differ-
ent, focusing respectively on performative experiences and the struggle for rec-
ognition, they both agree that an alteration of identity, which is certainly in-
volved in the calling of a prophet, can only be based on a genuine testing and 
trial. An initiation rite, or a passage from childhood to adulthood, for example, 
implies the leaving of the family, the world of the home, and the entry into the 
world at large: the broader community of the village or the tribe. It cannot be 
administered by family members; quite on the contrary, in most cases such rites 
can only be conducted by persons who do not even belong to the village. Simi-
larly, recognition in the sense of Pizzorno implies a challenge and measuring, 
close to the Biblical sense of mene tekel. As we have seen earlier, the world of 
the family hides the difference between the genetic and the recognitive aspects of 
identity, as children receive the strongest emotional recognition exactly from per-
sons to whom they are related by blood ties. 
Even once Muhammad had decided to go public, about three years after his 
first vision, for a long time he failed to secure recognition outside his family, and 
especially outside his hometown. A particularly important event in this context, 
especially in light of later developments, retaining significance up to our very 
day, is the famous episode of the ‘Satanic verses.’ In the fifth year of his preach-
ing, thus around 618, Muhammad went to Ca´aba and, surrounded by friends and 
foes, narrated them his first revelation (Guzzetti 2004: 78-9). Then, trying to use 
the occasion to secure further converts, he posed a question about the assessment 
of three main female deities of the region, and himself gave the answer: they are 
brave virgins, and their intercession is much appreciated by God. This was a 
clear concession towards paganism, but failed to bring success. In consequence 
the passage was edited out of the Koran, though transmitted by tradition. There 
are two aspects that I would like to emphasise about this story: the joint evoca-
tion of three virgin female goddesses, an image which clearly evokes the Three 
Graces; and their identification as intercessors or mediators of grace, a role com-
parable to the Virgin Mary. The editing out of this episode will result in the sys-
tematic ignoring of the qualities associated in other (among others, Greek and 
Christian) traditions with female deities or saints. 
The success of his external mission, however, only came after another, and in 
a way last, experience-recognition complex. 
This happened around 619, leading to the extension of his mission out of its 
local character. There is a quite general scholarly consensus about the exact se-
quence of events, with a number of striking elements. It starts with a new liminal 
crisis, this time related to purely this-worldly experiences of sufferings, as within 
a short time both Muhammad’s wife and stepfather have died (Hodgson 1974: 
171). While loss of close relatives is always taxing, especially when taking place 
together, in the case of Muhammad such grievances were exacerbated by the 
unique character of the loss. Khadijah and Abu-Talib were not just close rela-
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tives, but were the two emotionally closest family members for Muhammad; fur-
thermore, the two persons on whom his material existence relied upon; and fi-
nally, even his major sources of recognition as prophet. Thus, apart from the 
emotional hardship caused, and the liminal situation of mourning, the two deaths 
also forced him to look for new sources of support, trying to move outside 
Mecca.  
He visited the nearby oasis of Ta´if, but the mission proved to be a failure 
(Hodgson 1974: 171), though one Christian slave there evidently believed in him 
(Cook 1986: 310). On the way home, however, he encountered a few ginns 
(sprites), and managed to convert them (K 72: 1-2). Thus, while men repudiated 
him, the spirits brought him comfort. This is an extremely strange, even disturb-
ing account, with no parallels in the New Testament. Recognition to Jesus was 
never given by spirits; quite on the contrary, it was very often the driving away 
of demons that led to his recognition. Another contrast can be given from the life 
of St Francis, the ‘second Christ’ and a crucial comparative reference point. 
Whenever turned away by man, according to his biographers Francis preached to 
birds or even the fish; never to spirits. 
The next episode in the storyline only renders this aspect even more perplex-
ing. As, after meeting the sprites, he also had a new vision that would be ‘given a 
central place in Muhammad’s legend’ (Hodgson 1974: 171). This vision seems to 
consist of two parts: in the first part he was ravished to the Temple (K 17: 1; usu-
ally identified as Jerusalem); in the second, to the throne of God, or the 7th 
Heaven (K 53: 13-18). 
Once back to home, after such taxing and peculiar experiences, he needed 
further recognition, both in the sense of confirmation and consolation by human 
beings, and this he obtained in two different ways. The first came still from the 
small circle of relative and friends. Becoming a widow, he took two new wives, 
one being Aishia, the daughter of one of his most faithful disciples, Abu Bakr. 
Aishia was only six years old then, the only one of his wives who was a virgin, 
and though Muhammad did not immediately go to her, he did so about three 
years later – which makes it coincide with another taxing, liminal experience, the 
flight to Medina – and which still leaves much room for perplexity about this en-
tire affair. 
The second type of recognition, finally, came from the outside. A few Mus-
lim converts left already earlier to Medina, a town in which there were three im-
portant Jewish clans, and they managed to make some further converts. Between 
619 and 622 occasionally, and in increasing numbers, these converts came to 
visit Muhammad, and this convinced him that, especially given the increasingly 
hostile atmosphere in his native town, he needed to move there. 
The pattern of the sequence is again very clear. The intensification of Mu-
hammad’s mission is stimulated through liminal experiences of suffering and un-
certainty. He is looking for human recognition and sources of support, but is 
turned away; and at this very moment, while on the road – another typical liminal 
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situation – he is visited by spirits and visions. Human recognition and consolation 
only comes later, on the basis of them, and still in a predominantly local setting. 
 
4. Who is recognising? 
 
The missions of Jesus and Muhammad differed not only in the exact sequences 
of experiences and recognition, but also in the behaviour of the different types of 
persons involved in these acts. 
 
Prophets 
 
Recognition of a prophet by another prophet carries additional weight. In the case 
of Christianity, in all Gospels the charisma of Jesus is first recognised by St John 
Baptist. Even further, the Gospel of Luke makes Jesus and St John Baptist rela-
tives. Irrespective of the veracity of kinship, the story actually reinforces the 
weight of the recognition. From the perspective Girard’s the mimetic theory the 
Baptist has two strong reasons not to give such recognition: as he is both a rival 
brother and a rival prophet. In the case of Muhammad, however, the various 
prophets of the region would become rivals, and the contestation will only end by 
the complete submission or death of the rivals (Guzzetti 2004: 169-71). 
 
Women 
 
In the case of Muhammad, as we have seen, one woman played an extremely im-
portant, pioneering role in recognising his mission: his wife, Khadijah. The other 
significant women in his life, mostly his later wives, however, had no such roles 
to play: they only provided sources of support and pleasure. This was much re-
lated to the fact that after his move to Medina the defence and proliferation of Is-
lam shifted from questions of recognition to the use of physical force, or from re-
ligion to politics. 
In the case of Jesus the role played by women in the recognition and prolif-
eration of his mission is widely considered as negligible. After all, the famous 
genealogy in the opening chapter of Matthew is purely male; he was recognised 
by the male prophet St John Baptist; and all his disciples were male. Yet, a more 
careful reading, with the help of the theoretical perspective exposed and used 
above, leads to a quite significant shift of perspective. 
The Gospels start with an act of recognition and submission by a woman, be-
fore Jesus is even born. This, of course, is the famous episode of Mary’s concep-
tion by the Holy Spirit. Two points are relevant in this episode for our purposes. 
First, recognition not only marks the starting point of the mission of Jesus, but 
his very existence. According to the Biblical narrative Jesus could only come into 
the world if the Spirit was recognised by Mary; and if she willingly gave her as-
sent to conceive a child from the Spirit. Free, unforced submission and an un-
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spoilt, childlike innocence capable of recognising is the real starting point of the 
Biblical narrative, after the ironical male genealogy. 
Second, the normal sequential order between experience and recognition is re-
versed even here. In practically any narrative about the birth of a famous person, 
recognition follows the actual events. A child is born, and somebody – the mid-
wife, a prophet or a sage – makes some pronouncements about the unusual quali-
ties and future heroics of the newborn. Here, however, recognition is presented as 
the condition of possibility of birth; and this recognition is given not simply by a 
close family member but the mother herself, or exactly the person who, in any 
other narrative, after the childbirth, is disqualified from making such claims. 
In concluding this episode I would like to stress that from the perspective of 
recognition and identity the significance of the female gender in the New Testa-
ment narrative must be reassessed. Far from being secondary, overshadowed by 
male prophets and disciples, this recognition by Mary is the condition of possibil-
ity of the entire narrative. The quantitative preponderance of males and the few 
references to Mary are irrelevant from this perspective; even further, it can be 
explained by the fact that after the birth, the logic of the narrative required the 
underplaying of such blood lines. The aim of the narrative was not to replace pa-
triarchal genealogy with matriarchal genealogy. 
Still, even though all his disciples were male – and for various reasons had to 
be – Jesus was also followed, or recognised, by females as well, and some of 
these recognitions carried exceptional significance. I do not have in mind the 
general reference to female followers (see Lk 8: 1-3), rather two singular epi-
sodes: the case of the Phonician and the Samaritan women (Mt 15: 21-8, Mk 7: 
24-30; Jn 4: 5-30). The particular significance of the first encounter is widely 
recognised, though interestingly enough the episode can be interpreted in two 
radically different manners. On the one hand, this is one of the cases in which Je-
sus makes the claim that his mission is restricted to ‘the lost sheep of the house 
of Israel’ (Mt 15: 24). It is thus central, together with related passages like Mt 
(10: 5-8), for the claims of Géza Vermes (2004: 328-9) about the purely Jewish 
character of the original mission of Jesus. 
The passage, however, can be read in the exact opposite manner. For this, we 
first need to recognised that this episode, the meeting of the Canaanite woman in 
Tyre, is the first case in Matthew when Jesus leaves the land of Israel. He fur-
thermore does so in a very particular context. Tyre, together with neighbouring 
Sidon, is already mentioned in Mt (11: 20-1), where Jesus was reproaching the 
cities of Israel that they failed to repent though he was working miracles there. 
Further on, and still alongside the same dynamics of failing recognition, a series 
of events take place: Jesus is not recognised at home (Mt 13: 53-8); St John Bap-
tist, who recognised his mission first, is beheaded (Mt 14: 1-12); Peter lacks faith 
(Mt 14: 30-1); and his conflicts with the Pharisees get more and more bitter (Mt 
15: 1-20). This is the context in which, for the first time, he leaves Israel and en-
ters the region of Tyre and Sidon. 
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It is by no means insignificant that the first contact Jesus has with the non-
Jewish world is actually the city of Tyre, as Tyre has a very special place in 
mythical history. Tyre is the home-place of Europa, daughter of Agenor, the 
Phonician king of Tyre. It is from the coast of Tyre that Europa was ravished by 
Zeus,14 and taken to Crete. In the text it is specifically emphasised that the 
woman was pagan, even Greek (Hellenic), or ‘Syrophenician by nation’ (Mk 7: 
26). It is therefore particularly significant that the first step of Jesus outside the 
boundaries of Israel can be connected with the continent, Europe, that would play 
a particularly significant role with the further spread of Christianity. 
From this perspective the otherwise perplexing aspects of the story become 
intelligible. After all, Jesus not simply went outside Israel but encountered, all 
alone, a woman in Tyre, the situation was therefore liminal in multiple ways. The 
fact that he ‘had’ to encounter a woman there can be understood by drawing par-
allels with the case of Mary and the annunciation. There, the emphasis was on 
breaking the genealogical lineage, underplaying the role of man and giving and 
exalted place, through a unique act of recognition, to a woman. Here, the prob-
lem is identical, the breaking of the exclusive character of the mission. Just as 
earlier, a woman is put to a test. There, she had to consent to carry the child of 
the Spirit. Here, she has to persist in her request that Jesus cure his child. In his 
attempt to prove the purely Jewish character of the entire mission of Jesus Ver-
mes simply fails to understand what is going on: that the character of the encoun-
ter is a testing.15 I need to remind again that the situation is highly liminal, the 
proper condition for testing: the first time the borderline of Israel is breeched by 
Jesus, and the first time he is talking after his mission has started, alone, without 
his disciples, to a woman. The woman, however, passed the test, in opposition to 
so many of the compatriots of Jesus who failed; so therefore the nature of the 
mission mutated. Vermes wants to fixate the mission of Jesus, and fails to realise 
that such fixity, in this case exclusivity, even if it existed before, in liminal condi-
tions becomes malleable. 
Finally, it is shortly after this allusion to the extension of the mission that Je-
sus asks, and receives, recognition by Peter in the famous scene (Mt 16: 15-9), 
and which would be interpreted as the foundation of the Church. The sequential 
order is the same in Mark; and it is important to underline here that exactly Mat-
thew and Mark are considered as the more traditional or ‘Jewish’ Gospels, in op-
position to the more ‘Greek’ Luke and John. 
What has been stated about the encounter with the Phonician woman is Tyre 
 
14  In many European languages rape, ecstatic-mystic rapture, and kidnap-
ping/ravishing have the same etymological root. 
15  About Vermes, see the following recently made claim, amazing in many ways: ‘As 
a former Catholic priest who has returned to his Jewish roots, he tends to see the 
events described without party political bias.’ See Peter Stanford, ‘The Jesus jig-
saw,’ in The Sunday Times, 20 March 2005, Culture, p. 41. 
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is fully confirmed by another major and quite unique Biblical episode, the en-
counter with the Samaritan woman in the city of Sychar (Jn 4: 5-30). This epi-
sode, in many of its details, is so stunning that its authenticity is often questioned. 
Following the excellent discussion of Michel Henry (2002), who calls attention 
to the exceptional significance of this passage, I will only focus on a few aspects 
of the episode. 
Henry starts by recognising the problematic, late character of the episode, but 
argues that the message it contains is supported by a series of passages in the 
Synoptic Gospels (Henry 2002: 64-6). Its significance is also undermined by as-
pects of physical and literary context. In the Gospel of John this is the first time 
Jesus leaves Israel, meeting all alone a woman who is also a foreigner, member 
of a hostile ethnic group, the Samaritans. The meeting furthermore takes place at 
Jacob’s well, obtained by the Patriarch on the occasion of a peculiar episode in 
the Book of Genesis, the rape of his daughter Dina (Gen 33: 19). Jesus asks the 
women to give him drink from the well, and it is in the ensuing conversation that 
one of the most striking words of the Gospel are uttered, with Jesus identifying 
himself as the Messiah: ‘I am who are speaking to you’ (Jn 4: 26) – a statement 
whose significance is only underlined by the abruptness of its uttering (Henry 
2002: 63-4). 
The passage directly evokes the famous tetragrammaton YHWH, or ‘I am 
that I am’ (Ex 3: 14). The self-definition, however, is altered, and in two signifi-
cant ways. Definition by being is changed to definition by speech (logos); and 
furthermore, the speech is addressed to a second person, this person being fe-
male, and non-Jewish. 
Due to this emphatic reference to words, the verbal context of the statement 
should be carefully revisited. While the self-revelation is about words, the pas-
sage is satiated with references to the most physical needs: Jesus asks for water; 
from a woman; and immediately after references are made to bread and eating 
(Jn 4: 30-4). All this serves to undermine the extraordinary revaluation the pas-
sage operates (Henry 2002: 66). Finally, the episode starts and ends with prob-
lems related to recognition: the conflicts with the Pharisees (Jn 2: 25, 3: 1, 4: 1), 
and one of the most famous declarations about the failure of recognition: ‘A 
prophet is not valued in his own country’ (Jn 4: 44) – a claim which, strikingly, is 
immediately qualified by the evangelist (4: 45).  
The significance of this episode is further underlined by broader issues of 
context: the episode serves as a conclusion to the long ‘recognitive’ part of the 
Gospel of John. The question of recognising the identity of Jesus is central for all 
four Gospels, discussed at the very beginning of each, taking up increasingly 
more and more space. It is dealt with by Mark in a few verses at the start (Mk 1: 
7-11), while in Matthew and Luke in their first two chapters. In John, this ex-
tends to four chapters, thus a significant part of the entire book. These four chap-
ters summarise and further elaborate the arguments of the previous evangelists. 
Mark starts in the middle, placing the emphasis on the Baptist. Matthew and 
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Luke take the storyline further, singling out for attention the break in the genea-
logical lineage and the importance of Mary. John takes the argument even fur-
ther, giving a particularly Greek twist. Each of the first three chapters focuses 
around a single concept, or phenomenon, that is specifically Greek. Chapter 1 is 
about logos, and it is this logos that is at the origins, thus replacing the genea-
logical-patriarchic lineages and the emphasis on blood or ‘seed;’ the logos that is 
associated with the Holy Spirit. It is this Greek-philosophical lineage that is car-
ried further in Chapter 3, with its emphasis on second birth, or conversion, an-
other central term of Greek philosophy, and another area in which Christian the-
ology would decisively rely on such philosophical sources, crowned by the work 
of St Augustine. Chapter 2 on the wedding in Cana and the transfiguration of wa-
ter into wine, seemingly breaks this smooth link between Chapters 1 and 3, and is 
often considered as being out of the narrative line. Its position, however, can be 
understood together with Chapter 4, to which it rhymes, and with which it closes 
the introductory-initiatory circle of recognition. Taken together Chapters 2 and 4 
are clearly Greek, though not so much philosophical as Minoan-Dionysian. 
 
Children 
 
The role played by children in recognising charisma is again radically different in 
the two cases. In the case of Jesus, they simply have no such role. Of course, 
children are extremely important for the message of the Gospel, and are often 
identified as favourite themes for Jesus, either in concrete physical reality when 
Jesus plays with them or indicates them as model for behaviour (Mt 19: 13-4, 21: 
16; Lk 18: 15-7); or, in a sense related to the latter, when he exhorts the listeners 
to be like children (Mt 11: 25, 18: 2-10; Mk 9: 36-7). But children never feature 
among his disciples, which is really as it should be, as children have no business 
of identifying a prophet as a prophet. The recognition of charisma is a matter for 
adults. 
It is all the more surprising then that children do play a fundamental role in 
the recognition of Muhammad as a prophet. This is even underlined in the most 
authoritative narratives, stating that his first male disciple was a child of mere ten 
years of age, and who was by the way his cousin. This is further reinforced by 
the fact that the first female person who recognised him was his wife Khadijah; 
and that upon her loss, and in another the context of liminal experience of suffer-
ing, it was again a child who would comfort him – this time Aishia who would 
become her wife at the age of six. It needs to be emphasised that such a confla-
tion of personal recognition by family members – and especially by children – is 
highly problematic if at stake is the recognition of the prophet as a prophet. Chil-
dren, of course, are extremely important sources of support, and do have a quite 
sharp sense of distinguishing good and bad persons. However, apart from their 
volatility and defencelessness, they simply cannot be relied upon in identifying 
the qualities of a prophet. 
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Disciples 
 
For Jesus, three instances will be stressed. First, disciples have a central role in 
recognising and identifying the charisma of Jesus. In this role they are not only 
outside the circle of family members or immediate personal acquaintances, but 
the distinction is explicitly emphasised. The contrast is so strong that one could 
even take offence of it, especially if Mary is pictured among those ‘rejected’ in 
this way (Mt 12: 46-50); but the scene only draws the implications of the very 
first chapters of Matthew, and is therefore a fundamental part of the message. 
Second, while Jesus is recognised and followed by the disciples as an un-
questioned master, elements of mutuality and reciprocity are introduced in the 
narrative. Occasionally this is explicit (see Jn 1: 35-41). More importantly, at 
least some of them are called by Jesus in some central episodes to share with him 
the experience and the burden (transfiguration at Mount Tabor, vigil at the Geth-
semane garden), while in others to follow his actions (Peter walking over the 
sea), though they usually fail, leading him to exhortation. The structure of these 
episodes, and the moral of the exhortations, is very specific. The disciples are not 
threatened by choice punishments for failing to evaluate his special qualities, or 
unique and distinct character; rather they are taken to task for not being like him. 
They are offered equal status, but fail to capture and maintain the opportunity. 
These are part of the failings identified at the start of John (1: 7-11). 
Finally, though only in John, the first disciples of Jesus are also identified as 
former disciples of St John Baptist. Whether the episode is authentic or not, the 
crucial point is the emphasis on mutual recognition, this time between prophets; 
instead of a rivalry, the earlier prophet is identified as bowing to the more recent 
one. Thus, from the recognition of disciples, we are back to our first point, the 
recognition of the heralding prophet with which our analysis, and the Gospels, 
start. The circle is closed. 
The case again could not be more different from Muhammad. The recruit-
ment of disciples, especially outside the closely-knit family circle, was very 
slow.16 Even after the move to Medina, stimulated by increasing number of peo-
ple coming from Medina converting to his prophecy, progress was slow. Its pace 
only increased once Muhammad started to organise raids on caravans, in order to 
support himself; and even then, after initial failures, the radical breakthrough 
happened when – in violation of the holy truce – his men attacked and defeated a 
caravan (Hodgson 1974: 175). In response to widespread initial outcry, Muham-
mad justified the blatant breach of agreements on the basis of a new revelation 
that ‘while violation of the truce was bad, persecution of the faith was worse and 
 
16  In contrast, in his recent book Vermes estimates that the entire preaching of Jesus 
was about six months’ long (Vermes 2002: 371). Whether it is true or not, the point 
concerns the possibility of making such a claim; and at any rate even the classical 
account is only talking about three years. 
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justified the violation’ (Hodgson 1974: 175). On this basis he then succeeded to 
recruit, for the first time, a larger raid force, and at the wells of Badr inflicted a 
huge defeat on Quraysh opponents of vastly superior numbers. This victory was 
considered to confirm divine support for Muhammad, and from now onwards the 
march of Islam was more or less unstoppable. The significance of events is 
shown by the fact that presence at Badr would be later considered as ‘a patent of 
nobility’ (Hodgson 1974: 176). 
Thus, in contradistinction to Jesus, the main external disciples of Muhammad 
were recruited not through the recognition of a prophet but of a successful raider; 
they were never offered an equal status, only unconditional submission to accept-
ing him as the one and only messenger of Allah; and they were not disciples of 
other prophets – these other prophets rather were forced to submit, or were sim-
ply murdered (Guzzetti 2004: 170). 
 
The image of the enemy 
 
In his theory of recognition Pizzorno emphasises the importance of rivalry and 
adversity. Contrary to the approach of Honneth, recognition is not necessarily 
identical with positive acknowledgement and emotional support; it might well be 
given by accepting the person as a rival, even as an enemy. From a different an-
gle, this approach can be supported by the theoretisation of labelling or stigmati-
sation offered by Goffman. In both approaches a central question is the exact bal-
ance between the identity of the self and the other. What is the exact dynamics of 
recognition? Is it a contest, an agonistic duel, in which the other provides a way 
to test oneself, to measure oneself against an opposition which is respected, and 
therefore ends by the acceptance of the other, which does not necessary imply 
full-scale victory, not to mention the annihilation of the opponent, being rather a 
re-confirmation of self-esteem; or is the other vilified and blamed, threatened 
with all kinds of punishments, torture and death, forcing a life-and-death strug-
gle? 
In the case of Jesus, exhortations against the unbelievers are rare, and not 
connected inherently to the message. They remain vague and general, blamed on 
inherent human weaknesses, and connected to not those who are actually physi-
cally present – as most of them, according to the narrative, are instantly con-
verted by his miracles – but rather to the weakness in maintaining and transmit-
ting faith, or what they have witnessed or heard. The contents of his speech, and 
the targets of his acts, are hardly ever the unbelievers or the unfaithful, those who 
fail to recognise him; they are only identified afterwards, and usually only for the 
disciples. Even when perhaps the strongest of such threats of punishments is is-
sued in instructing the disciples, they are only advised to ‘shake off the dust of 
[their] feet’ (Mt 10: 14); the punishment is left to God and the Day of Judgment. 
The punishment is therefore not physical violence, just a parting of ways, 
whether it is the leaving of the city, as advised in this passage, or the excommu-
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nication of the ‘sinners,’ as practised by the Church. This practice is a return to 
the very old communal practice of ban or exile,17 in opposition to the capital pun-
ishment characteristic of large-scale bureaucratic empires.18 
There is one crucial difference from this general practice; one case in which 
Jesus is going out of his way to attack and vilify a particular opponent: these are 
the Pharisees. This is a practice that at a first look seems strange, aggressive, in-
tolerant, even incantatory, highly incompatible with the mostly non-violent and 
non-conflictual message of the Gospels. Luckily, we can start our analysis with 
one of the most underused writings of Max Weber, who interprets the Pharisees 
as sect religiosity whose main character was a reaction against Hellenisation, es-
pecially the Sophists.19 
The Pharisees are neither prophets nor priests. They do not show or even pre-
tend the attributes of prophets, and are also different from the Sadducees, the 
high priests, who were their main opponents. They possess three distinct identify-
ing features. They are the pious purists, maintaining tradition in the strictest pos-
sible sense, and separating themselves, physically and morally, from those who 
do not live according to the letter of their strict moralising rules. The novelty in 
this respect is that they no longer do so only with respect to the Hellenes, but also 
the Jews (Weber 1952: 386-7).20 Second, they are mostly members of the literate 
intellectual elite, often referred to as the Scribes. Due to these two factors, and 
their joint hostility to both the high priests and the broad populace, they would 
build up structures alternative to the Synagogue, devaluing priestly rituals, as if 
transforming themselves into an alternative elite, waiting in the shadows to cap-
ture power. In fact, according to Weber, the true significance of the Pharisees 
would only become visible after the Fall of the Temple, when ‘all Judaism be-
came Pharisaic’ (ibid.: 391). Finally, because of their education and skills, in 
 
17  There is a close parallel here between punishment meted out by the Pygmies of the 
rainforest (Turnbull 1968), exile by ostracism in democratic Athens, and ban in an-
cient German or Roman legal practices (Agamben 1998). 
18  Inquisition is mostly a legacy of Spain, and therefore an often ignored consequence 
of the ‘multicultural’ situation of the peninsula, the joint presence of Christians, 
Muslims and Jews. Furthermore, the crucial issue in this case, just as with the end 
of the Renaissance in general, is the collapse of the separation between temporal 
and spiritual powers, the foundation of medieval European culture, and the ensuing 
power invested in secular authorities to further persecute religious heretics, after 
their excommunication. 
19  It is little short of a miracle that this text is available, one of the very few surviving 
manuscripts from Weber’s Nachlass, somehow escaping the ‘treatment’ of 
Marianne Weber. 
20  It is important to notice that up to the very last scene of the Gospels, the Passion, if 
occasionally Jesus uses the word ‘Jew,’ it always refers to the Pharisees. This is 
partly because only they spoke Hebrew (the populace used Aramaic); and partly an 
ironic take on their pretence of being the only ‘true’ Jews. 
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spite of their critical stance they had easy access to the central corridors of 
power.21 
The attacks by Jesus start with the excessive importance attributed by them to 
the law and ritual purity, but go much further and turn directly against their own 
character, reaching its highest pitch and coherence in Matthew 23. Though put-
ting excessive burden on common people (Mt 23: 4), they themselves often fail 
to live according to their own principles (see also Mt 7: 4). This is because they 
confuse the letter and the spirit of the law: being preoccupied with the former, 
lose the latter: ‘Ye fools and blind, for whether is greater, the gift, or the altar that 
sanctifieth the gift?’ (Mt 23: 19). This is why they are repeatedly identified as 
hypocrites, charged with the highest possible sin, the unique that cannot be for-
given: ‘whosoever speaketh a word against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven 
him; but whosoever speaketh against the Spirit, it shall not be forgiven him, nei-
ther in this world, neither in the world to come’ (Mt 12: 32). In the framework of 
this paper it is especially important to emphasise that this highest of charges is 
explicitly made not concerning offences committed against the person of Jesus. 
This already shows that these attacks cannot be identified as charges voiced 
against rivals. Jesus is not trying to out-perform the Pharisees in what they are 
doing, rather preaches something completely different. It is true that he attacks 
them exactly as false guides, offering a different kind of guidance; but does so 
not by using existing liminal conditions of confusion, rather by creating a liminal 
storm on its own in order to overtake spiritual leadership from the hands of a 
pseudo-elite that in a way tries to make use the best of both worlds, being com-
fortably inside power and still pretending outsider status, criticising everybody 
and not taking responsibility for anything. The attempt, by conventional meas-
ures, completely fails. Jesus only manages to bring together former enemies, like 
the Pharisees and the Sadducees who conspire in his death sentence, or Pilate and 
Herod (Lk 23: 12), and ends his life on the cross, derided as ‘king of the Jews.’ 
Yet, exactly in this way, through complete failure and dejection, somehow the 
momentum was generated for the rise of a new world religion.  
The situation again could not be more different in the case of Islam. First of 
all, since the earliest revelations (see Suras 102, 104) the Koran is exhorting in 
 
21  The unique characteristics of the Pharisees invite broader generalisation and con-
temporary comparison. They condense, in a genuinely archetypical sense, two types 
that would have a huge impact of the dynamics of the modern world: the Puritanic 
sects, already mentioned by Weber, and the educated elites of court societies (like 
18th-century France or Communist East-Central Europe) who stay close to the cen-
tres of power, enjoying all the privileges, though maybe having some frills out of 
mocking and criticising the dictatorial rules, while being convinced of their own 
special status and deeply despising the general populace, considered at best the pas-
sive targets of the enlightening mission. For some details in this regard, see Sza-
kolczai (2005). 
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the strongest possible sense against those who failed to believe in the prophet. In 
the original language these exhortations are delivered in an extremely powerful, 
poetic, incantatory language, where the content of the message, the evocation of 
strong choice punishment; the formal artistic devices used, the rhymes, repeti-
tions and alliterations; and the fact that this was hurled at a loud language against 
the opponents all contributed to intimidate or force the opponent into submission, 
and where such verbal violence could always easily turn into actual physical con-
flict. In fact, it is not an exaggeration to say that the message of the Koran oper-
ates at two levels: one is the actual call for a pious, pure, chaste, upright, moral 
life; and the other is the reinforcement of this message by the rewards and pun-
ishments to be meted out each according to what they deserve. The reference 
point is singular and always the same: the person of Muhammad as the unique 
voice of God and the revelations transmitted by him as the sole fountain of truth; 
and violence should be applied, as a duty, to those who fail. 
The contrasts are stark even related to the concrete example discussed. There 
were no Pharisees in early Islam, but the adjective ‘hypocrite’ is often used to 
translate the term munafiqun, denoting a group of Muhammad’s opponents who 
were supposedly particularly vicious (Hodgson 1974: 178). They are, however, 
not an established group pre-existing the preaching of Muhammad, with access 
to the official circles; rather those who have only superficially adhered to the new 
faith.22 Far from being a powerful group external to the prophet, challenged 
purely due to fundamental questions of religious and practical conduct, even 
character, they are a group of people who were forced to submit to the new faith, 
but trying to maintain a degree of independence under external conformity. The 
attacks on the hypocrites is therefore part of a powerful but extremely question-
able two-step strategy of oppression that would be used by many similar regimes 
to hammer opponents into full submission: the first step is physical conquest, the 
subduing of an entire population by force; while the second step is the gradual 
extermination of all inner sources of resistance, by requiring a genuine belief in 
the conquerors. It was this two-step strategy that, as shown by Goddard (2000: 
68-74), led to the gradual Islamisation and Arabisation of the entire near East and 
North Africa. 
With this point, however, the paper moved from the dynamics of experience 
and recognition, central for the early stages of the new religion, to the subsequent 
question of the dynamics of conversion and conquest, which is outside its proper 
theme, though to which it hopefully prepares the ground. The analysis suggests 
that even here, the radical contrast between Christianity and Islam can be clearly 
observed. While in the latter case conversion followed conquest, already in the 
life of the prophet, in the former case, for about three centuries after the death of 
 
22  A main sign of this hypocrisy was the failure to take part in warfare. I thank Stefan 
Leder for this comment. 
92  |  CRYSTALLIZATIONS 
Jesus, conversion took place without any coercive force; rather, on the contrary, 
in the face of mortal risks. The situation would change later; and given that this 
change happened almost 1700 years ago, it is all-too easy to forget the exact dy-
namics of emergence. 
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Chapter 4 
The Emergence of Islam as a Case of 
Cultural Crystallization: Historical and 
Comparative Reflections 
 
JOHANN P. ARNASON 
 
 
The concept of cultural crystallization (first introduced, if I am not mistaken, by 
Björn Wittrock) has been used in the context of comparative historical-
sociological research, most prominently in debates about the Axial Age and the 
civilizations that took off from it, but also in connection with the question 
whether comparable transformations occurred at other times and in other settings 
(see especially Wittrock 2005; also the discussion in Arnason/Eisenstadt/Witt-
rock 2005). Here I will not attempt to define it in precise and detailed terms; I 
will treat it as an orientative device, serving to link together several key themes. 
Most obviously, it refers to the formation of distinctive cultural orientations or 
premises, more precisely: clusters of such orientations, interconnected but often 
conducive to internal tensions and interpretive conflicts; innovative transforma-
tions of religious traditions are prime cases in point, but not the only ones. But 
the concept also implies an institutional dimension: a translation of cultural pat-
terns into institutional frameworks, not to be understood as standing above or 
outside social change, but as giving specific directions to it. Finally, the interplay 
of cultural and institutional factors involves specific relationships and more or 
less effective coalitions between intellectual and political elites; at the same time, 
traditions in the sense of enduring frameworks for discourse, interpretation and 
dispute take shape. 
 
 
Civi l izat ional  dimensions 
 
So far, I have outlined the idea of cultural crystallization at its most elementary 
level without any particular reference to civilizational analysis. What happens 
when we apply it to that field? Since any discussion of the civilizational dimen-
sion must start with the point that we are dealing with large-scale-units and long-
term trajectories, the first answer that suggests itself is that cultural crystalliza-
tion on the civilizational level – i.e. the formation of civilizations, or the trans-
formations radical enough for us to speak of a new civilization – enacts the 
model summed up above on a particularly large scale. But on closer inspection, 
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and if some note is taken of variations, it becomes possible to suggest differentia-
tions that will turn out to have some bearing on Islam in comparative perspective. 
Two considerations of this kind seem especially relevant.  
There is, first, a marked contrast between different patterns of the relationship 
between cultural orientations and institutional frameworks. There are cases where 
cultural orientations are articulated, elaborated and transformed within enduring 
civilizational complexes, whose institutional formations and power structures in 
particular evolve alongside the cultural and intellectual changes. China would 
seem to be the most obvious example. On the other hand, there are historical ex-
periences of the kind Talcott Parsons had in mind when he coined the concept of 
‘seedbed societies’ (which we may take to be an echo of the axial model). Here 
cultural orientations of a particularly innovative kind emerge in settings that do 
not allow full realization of their institutional potential, and the resulting cultural 
legacies are later appropriated by other societies on a broader scale. Parsons 
wanted to put both Ancient Greece and Ancient Israel into this category. It seems 
to fit the latter case much better: here the discrepancy between a cultural break-
through and a restricting social and geopolitical context is at its most marked. In 
the short run and in the original environment, the Jewish invention (or reorienta-
tion; here I will bypass the debate as to which concept is most adequate) of 
monotheism found a very limited institutional expression: after the destruction of 
the monarchy and an interlude in exile, it became the foundation for a small 
hierocratic community, later exposed to cultural and political pressures from Hel-
lenistic civilization, and to internal conflicts resulting from that; there seems to 
have been an enduring tension between the ongoing religious development and 
the power structure oscillating between theocratic and monarchic models. A 
more comprehensive and far-reaching institutional dynamic, generated by mono-
theism, could only unfold after further transformations of the religious premises 
in new socio-cultural settings. The Greek case is less clear-cut: here the distinc-
tive cultural orientations were inseparable from – indeed largely identical with – 
a very specific institutional context, the polis and the corresponding type of city-
state culture. But this civilizational complex was a particularly fragile and con-
flict-prone one, torn between rival and incompatible developmental paths (not 
just Athens and Sparta, but also Corinth and Syracuse, and perhaps other polis 
communities may be seen as representatives of such directions), and in the end, 
its self-destructive dynamics paved the way for absorption into more composite 
civilizational formations – first the perhaps mislabelled Hellenistic and then the 
Roman one – where cultural aspects of the Greek legacy had a much more forma-
tive impact than the strictly political ones. There is thus at least a grain of truth in 
Parsons’s thesis.  
But if, with these two examples in mind, we take another look at the Chinese 
case, the contrast may seem less stark than it appeared at first sight. The most in-
novative and also the most conflict-ridden period in the history of Chinese civili-
zation, the Age of the Warring States (roughly the third quarter of the last mil-
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lennium BCE), saw the emergence of sharply divergent intellectual currents as 
well as new strategies for state-building, some of which represented a more overt 
break with the traditions of an existing civilizational complex than others. The 
current – or rather the combination of currents – that won out was a rationalized 
version of traditionalism, centred on a restoration of sacred rulership and a re-
elaboration of the notions of intertwined cosmic and social orders that served to 
underpin and transfigure it. But for some time, the relationship between cultural 
orientations and institutional frameworks had been more uncertain and contested 
than at any other moment, before or after, in the history of Chinese civilization.  
To sum up, it might be more useful to conceptualize this issue in terms of a 
continuum of varying relationships, rather than a dichotomy of polar contrasts. 
The distinction I have in mind is perhaps best described as one between civiliza-
tional patterns and civilizational complexes, and the historical connections be-
tween them vary in significant ways. The embodiment of civilizational patterns 
in civilizational complexes takes more circuitous forms and involves more long-
drawn-out processes in some cases than others; conversely, some breakthroughs 
to new civilizational patterns occur in situations less favourable to implementa-
tion on the multiple levels of social life than others. 
The second issue to be considered has to do with intercivilizational relations 
and their role in the emergence of new civilizational formations. If we accept that 
recent work on global history has shown interactions and exchanges of all kinds, 
often over long distances, to have been a much more significant factor in the des-
tinies of human societies than earlier historians tended to assume, we must con-
clude that it has become implausible to think of any civilizational formation (in 
the sense of Hochkultur – I am using the concept in a sense that restricts it to his-
tory after the beginnings of civilization in the singular) in terms of complete iso-
lation. But the role of intercivilizational contacts is very much more salient and 
significant in some cases than others. It seems to have been least important – at 
any rate least evident – in the case of pre-Columbian American civilizations (the 
Meso-American and Andean complexes). As for the Eurasian or Afro-Eurasian 
macro-region, recent scholarship has thrown light on early contacts between 
China and more western regions. They were clearly more significant than earlier 
accounts had suggested. But it still seems legitimate to describe the early trajec-
tory of Chinese civilization as relatively isolated by comparison with other parts 
of Eurasia: there was, from very early on, a Mediterranean-Levantine-Iranian-
South Asian zone of intensified intercivilizational contacts. At the beginning, the 
Mesopotamian complex – clearly more central than any other – develops together 
with more derivative but not merely imitative peripheral formations around it. At 
a much later stage, the intertwined composite civilizations of Hellenism (Ass-
mann 2000: 277) argues, to my mind persuasively, that this is a bit of a misno-
mer) and the Roman Empire emerge out of a long history of intercivilizational 
encounters. One further implication of that development should be noted: the 
question of the relationship between civilizations and historical regions comes to 
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the fore. As civilizational unity becomes more problematic, regional unity be-
comes by the same token more salient.  
Let us now try to situate the emergence of Islam and Islamicate civilization (I 
prefer this term, coined by Marshall Hodgson, to ‘Islamic civilization’) within 
this twofold frame of reference. It happened at the very core (or, more precisely, 
through the interaction of a core and an inner periphery) of the above-mentioned 
zone of intensified contacts. And as I will try to show, it represents a specific 
version of the relationship between civilizational patterns and civilizational com-
plexes. 
A first glance at the historical record would suggest that we are dealing with 
a prime case of cultural crystallization – indeed of multiple crystallizations. At 
the religious level, a new – and, on its own terms, definitive – version of mono-
theistic prophecy crystallized through demarcation from the pre-existing ones. It 
seems clear that the radicalized monotheistic message was intended as an alterna-
tive to the troubles and schisms that Christology had produced within the Chris-
tian Church (Fowden [1993, 2005] has stressed this point); by the same token, it 
drew in some ways closer to Judaism, and perhaps especially to the Judeo-
Christian currents (how important that affinity was seems to be a matter of debate 
among scholars in the field); but notwithstanding the surviving elements of pri-
mordialism (S.N. Eisenstadt has drawn attention to this aspect), the message was 
not to be confined within ethnic boundaries. Second, this religious crystallization 
became the foundation for a new civilizational formation – whether we prefer the 
label ‘Islamic’ or ‘Islamicate,’ there is no denying the relatively rapid emergence 
of this new civilization, and its internal unity is so pronounced that it seems more 
apposite to speak of a civilizational synthesis than a composite civilization. 
Third, there is a geocultural side to the process that merits separate mention: as 
Hodgson noted, Islamicate civilization imposes for the first time a cultural unity 
on the Ancient Near East, or the ‘Nile-to-Oxus region,’ as he preferred to call it. 
The character of a whole region – the most central of the Old World – is thus re-
defined. Moreover, the civilizational patterns that established this new unity also 
proved uniquely capable of expansion into other parts of Afro-Eurasia. Islamicate 
civilization became the premodern globalizing civilization par excellence. Fi-
nally, this whole crystallizing process was, on the level of the self-understanding 
of the new civilization, condensed into a narrative that seems best described as 
sacred history. This point can be conceded to the sceptics that cast doubt on the 
traditional accounts of Islamic origins – without accepting all the conclusions 
that the more radical sceptics want to draw from it. It does not follow that this 
narrative results from a wholesale suppression of the record and the construction 
of an imaginary alternative; there is no a priori answer to questions about the re-
lationship of sacred history to historical experience. 
At this point, it may be useful to digress briefly and note a few theoretical 
and methodological problems with the line of argument proposed by the radical 
revisionists. First, they like to present their approach as a result of progressive 
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and logical radicalization of the critical stance that goes back to Goldziher and 
Schacht (this is, for example, apparent in one of the most recent exercises in this 
genre, Nevo and Koren 2003). But this divorce of critical logic from substantive 
issues will not do. There is, to borrow a formulation from Said Arjomand’s un-
published paper on theoretical issues in discussions about early Islam, no straight 
path from the ‘higher criticism’ pioneered by Goldziher and the ‘higher decon-
struction’ practiced by the radical revisionists. Second (as I have already hinted), 
their sweeping claims about the construction and closure of sacred history bring 
in strong and unexamined theoretical assumptions about cultural genres and their 
interrelations. Third, when developing an alternative account of Islamic origins, 
they seem to face a dilemma: They either leave the question of the historical 
background to the assumed large-scale rewriting of history unanswered, or – if 
they try to answer it – they come up with historical scenarios of such complexity 
that that it becomes increasingly difficult to accept their disappearance from cul-
tural memory (the latter would seem to apply to the Nevo-Koren version). 
However, we do not face a choice between traditionalism and radical revi-
sionism. Not only is there a large body of work produced by moderate revision-
ists; there are also meta-critiques of the revisionist critique, reacting against what 
they see as unwarranted scepticism about the traditional sources, but sufficiently 
responsive to issues raised by the revisionists to take the debate to a new level. A 
good example of this genre is Fred M. Donner’s study of early Islamic historiog-
raphy (Donner 1998). On the basis of detailed comparison of the Quran with 
other early sources (especially hadith records), he argues that the Quran must be 
accepted as an early and singular text, rather than a part of a broader ex post con-
struction of sacred history. This is obviously not the same line as that taken by 
one of the most respected Western translators of the Quran, who claims in a pref-
ace that “we have no reason to believe that the whole Quran contains a single 
verse that does not come from Muhammad” (Paret 2001 [1966]: 5). Donner’s ar-
gument has to do with the relative chronology rather than the authorship of the 
Quran: it seems clear that the acculturation of monotheism in Arabia was a pro-
ject pursued from many quarters, and it does not seem inconceivable that the 
canonized text incorporated borrowings from rival prophets who were at the 
same time portrayed as precursors or rebels. But given the nature and limits of 
the evidence, it is very unlikely that such questions will ever be settled, and it is 
more important to assess the evidence for prophetic innovation and authority 
prior to conquest on an imperial scale. Donner also analyzes the early Islamic 
transition from ahistorical piety to historical consciousness, and concludes that 
the overall picture is more nuanced than either traditionalists or radical revision-
ists would have it: On the one hand, memories and records of the crucial early 
decades became a battlefield for rival factions and interpretations, rather than a 
tabula rasa for orthodox constructs; on the other hand, agreement on key themes 
and central events among otherwise conflicting camps is significant enough to 
provide some footholds for historical inquiry. A critical history, as distinct from a 
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wholesale rejection of the tradition, is possible, but the results so far are piece-
meal and provisional.  
Another illustration of the metacritical approach is Garth Fowden’s study of 
the ruins of Qusayr Amra, seen as a key to the court culture of the Umayyad pe-
riod (Fowden 2004). Here the stated intention is to confront the literary sources 
with other kinds of evidence (excavations, inscriptions and monuments), and the 
results suggest a complex cultural synthesis in the making: “In preferring an ef-
fective rearrangement of preexisting elements, sealed by a process of appropria-
tion to itself and denial to others, rather than some more thoroughgoing original-
ity, early Islam was conforming to a model of transition that is common enough 
in cultural history. Under the Umayyads it conditioned the ideology of kingship 
quite as much as the biography of the prophet” (ibid.: 307). The Umayyad phase 
of this formative process was more open to multiple options than the pattern that 
took shape after 750. In a more speculative vein, Fowden conjectures that “con-
gruities of Mediterranean and pre-Islamic Arab culture” (ibid.: 310) may have 
been of some importance for further acculturation in the wake of conquest. 
 
 
Excursus: Weber  and Eisenstadt  on Is lam 
 
Drawing on all this work, it may be possible to sketch a picture of the Islamic 
crystallization that will amplify – and in some respects modify – the one outlined 
above. But before moving in that direction, let us take a look at earlier Western 
approaches to the field. Although Western scholars could never take the tradi-
tionalist account at absolute face value (to do so would have amounted to conver-
sion), its indirect influence is evident in interpretations that stress the formation 
of Islam as a self-contained religious world-view and civilizational model in 
Arabia prior to the conquest of the Near East. The most extreme version of that 
view can be found in the work of the anthropologist most interested in the com-
parative analysis of civilizations, Alfred Kroeber (1952: 381): he refers to Islam 
as a civilization born in the head of one man, the prophet Muhammad, and goes 
on to suggest that something analogous might have happened if Nazi Germany 
had won the second world war, and Hitler thus been enabled to impose his vision 
of a new world order. Nobody else seems to have gone quite as far as that; but on 
an altogether different level, there are echoes of the traditionalist account in Max 
Weber’s comments on Islam; and given the importance of his work for compara-
tive civilizational analysis, a brief outline of basic assumptions may be useful.  
As is well known, Weber planned but did not write a comparative study of Is-
lam as a world religion and its impact on social life, with particular reference to 
its economic ethic and the preconditions for capitalist development. Recent at-
tempts to piece together Weber’s picture of Islam have shown that the problem is 
not simply due to an unfinished project. At a deeper level, Weber’s image of Is-
lam is internally fragmented, and this explains the absence of a comprehensive 
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civilizational profile comparable to his analyses of India and China. In his con-
cluding reflections on the two latter cultural areas and their place in world his-
tory, he draws a geocultural boundary that separates India and China from what 
he calls the Occidental-Near Asian (vorderasiatisch) world. Although this 
enlarged version of the West has something to do with geographical and ecologi-
cal settings, the most salient unifying factor is obviously the predominance of 
monotheistic religions that can be traced back to a common source. On this view, 
Islam should be included in the ‘greater West’ which Weber contrasts with East 
and South Asia. But when it comes to the comparative analysis of traditional 
domination and its structural variants, he describes Islamic feudalism as ‘Orien-
tal.’ This shift reflects an ambiguous view of Islamic religious orientations as 
such. Weber’s most focused analysis of early Islam begins with the claim that 
Muhammad’s retreat from Mecca to Medina changed the whole character of his 
religious vision: the eschatological religiosity of “pietistic urban conventicles” 
mutated into a “national Arabic warrior religion” (Weber 1968, 2: 624). When 
the community organized around this new message embarked on expansion and 
conquest, it was bound to move further away from its original stance. The com-
mitment to holy war was rooted in this-worldly aspirations to wealth, power and 
prestige; the other world was portrayed as a “soldier’s sensual paradise” (ibid.: 
625). Weber concludes that the very idea of salvation in the ethical sense is alien 
to this triumphant form of Islam, and that the foundations of its economic ethic 
are “purely feudal” (ibid.: 624). 
But why should this uninhibited warrior religion be compared (as Weber 
does in the last section of his Sociology of Religion) to the world religions that 
centre on ethical visions of salvation? Conquest alone would not be enough for 
Islam to constitute a world religion in the emphatic Weberian sense. Weber hints 
at an answer when he refers to elements of ethical religiosity in early Islam, but 
adds that they were overshadowed by the dominant warrior ethos (ibid.: 474). 
The marginalized ethical message seems more or less identical with the eschato-
logical religiosity that Muhammad abandoned when he left Mecca. This may be 
taken to show that Weber did not simply equate Islam with a warrior religion; it 
is less clear whether he saw the ethical potential as relevant to later develop-
ments, or identified any specific socio-cultural forces a representative of its spirit. 
Sufism does not qualify for that role: it was, in Weber’s opinion, of Indian origin 
and entered the Islamic world through Persia. It did not bring Islamic societies 
any closer to the distinctive urban religiosity of Judaism and Christianity;” for Is-
lam, the city had only political importance” (ibid.: 626) – but as a centre of pat-
rimonial rule, not as a site of collective autonomy. The implications are clear: for 
Weber, urban religiosity never became a serious rival to the dominant warrior 
version of Islam. In view of this background, Weber’s approach to Islamic feu-
dalism is easier to understand. There is in fact – if we follow Weber’s description 
– nothing distinctively Islamic about this institutional complex. Its only signifi-
cant connection with religious traditions is historical: the early and irreversible 
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empowerment of a military elite through a warrior religion. Military rulers and 
their governing associates respond to the omnipresent and self-perpetuating prob-
lems of patrimonial power structures – the intertwined dilemmas of centralization 
and decentralization – in distinctive ways. More precisely, mercenary armies and 
tax farming are the cornerstones of the particular kind of feudalism that develops 
under these conditions. It differs markedly from the complex “cosmos of rights 
and duties” (ibid., 3: 1070) characteristic of Occidental feudalism. Together with 
the structural features of Islamic law (an uncontested predominance of sacred 
law, obstructing rationalization of the secular component as such), the political 
structures based on this Oriental feudalism were – as Weber saw it – the most sa-
lient obstacles to capitalist development.  
Weber’s observations on later Islamic states – from Seljuks to Ottomans – 
have been analyzed in detail, and there is no need for further comments. For pre-
sent purposes, a brief glance at his much less explicit view of the earliest period 
may be more useful. In terms of the framework outlined above, this period repre-
sents the phase of crystallization. It might seem gratuitous to dwell on obsolete 
ideas, conclusively rejected by later scholarship. Weber was dependent on 
sources available at the time, and probably less familiar with the most advanced 
research than in the fields of Indian and Chinese studies. But his errors are in-
structive: they provide a particularly striking counterpoint to perspectives emerg-
ing from current debates. To begin with the question of religion and expansion, 
Weber does not deny that religious energies were mobilized for the purpose of 
conquest, but he insists on their complete subordination to the usual worldly 
goals of warfare (to use the language of his own formulation, this would be an 
extreme case of material interests absorbing ideal ones), and to make this view 
more plausible, the pre-conquest politicization that took place in Medina is con-
strued as a break with eschatological origins. In short, salvationist visions do not 
enter into Weber’s account of the early Islamic conquests. As for the results of 
the conquests, it comes as no surprise that he does not deal with the specific im-
perial formations of early Islam. This is in line with the the general neglect of 
empires as such in his sociology of domination: they vanish into the patrimonial 
night where all cows are black. His comments on the two early imperial dynas-
ties are more interesting. The Umayyads appear as representative of a feudal aris-
tocracy that acpitalized on the conquests, and the only ethical motive mentioned 
in connection with the Arab resistance to them is the “asceticism of the warriors’ 
camp” (ibid., 2: 627 – translation amended: the quoted text mistranslates Kriegs-
lager as “military caste”). The power struggles that accompanied the rise and fall 
of a dynasty were thus – on Weber’s view – essentially due to internal differen-
tiation of the warrior elite that had spearheaded the conquests. Neither the prob-
lem of reconciling a universal religion with ethnic privileges, nor the dynamic of 
adaptation to pre-existing cultural patterns in the conquered territories seem to 
count as explanatory factors. But when it comes to the Abbasids, external influ-
ences are as overwhelming as they are absent from references to the Umayyads. 
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For Weber, the Abbasid revolution is nothing less than a transplantation of “the 
caesaropapist principles of the Zoroastrian Sasanids […] into Islam in the name 
of a return to the sacred tradition.” (ibid., 2: 819) In retrospect, we can see the 
two extremes as pointers to a problem that Weber did not raise: the role of inter-
civilizational encounters in the phase of crystallization. 
S.N. Eisenstadt’s interpretation of Islam (Eisenstadt 1987), although very 
condensed, is more systematic than Weber’s, and the following discussion will 
not attempt to cover all its aspects. The main question to be considered is 
whether Eisenstadt’s critique of Weber leads to more adequate perspectives on 
the phase of crystallization. Eisenstadt begins with two critical observations on 
Weber’s civilizational analysis in general and his understanding of Islam in par-
ticular; in both cases, basic conceptual problems are aggravated by inherent diffi-
culties in theorizing Islam, as well as by shortcomings of Weber’s approach to 
that particular field. First, a levelling conception of premodern societies (most 
evident in general definitions of traditional action and traditional domination) 
prevents Weber from grasping the meaning of and impact of the radical cultural 
transformations which Eisenstadt first defined with reference to the Axial Age, 
and later in terms of axiality as a type of cultural framework for social life. To 
cut a long story short, the axial turn occurs in varying contexts at different mo-
ments, but the common pattern is a new way of distinguishing between higher 
and lower orders of reality and translating such distinctions into visions of social 
order. This is the background to the formation of world religions, and Islam may 
be seen as a late case of axial transformation, superimposed on the results of sev-
eral earlier ones (Greek, Judaic, Christian and Iranian). The axial perspective 
would thus be pre-eminently relevant to Islamic history; but as we have seen, 
Weber’s view of the conquests that created an Islamic world was very far re-
moved form such considerations. Second, Eisenstadt criticizes Weber for failing 
to distinguish between religion as one complex of social meanings and practices, 
and religion as an articulation of cultural premises for a whole civilizational pat-
tern (to use a more Durkheimian language, this point has to do with the differ-
ence between institutional and meta-institutional aspects of religion). Although 
the criticism applies to the whole project of comparative sociology of world re-
ligions, Eisenstadt stresses its particular importance for understanding Islam. As 
he argues, a comparison of the classical phase of expansion with some later ones 
will highlight the difference: in the first case, a dominant civilizational pattern 
was imposed on a whole region (which in due course became the Islamic heart-
land ), before mass conversion to Islam marginalized other religions, whereas – 
for example – the diffusion of Islam in Southeast Asia was more a matter of reli-
gious beliefs and practices spreading without transforming the whole civiliza-
tional pattern, and often taking syncretic forms through adaptation to indigenous 
traditions. This argument is convincing, and one might add that Eisenstadt’s 
point has an obvious bearing on some more specific aspects of the classical 
phase. Neither the historically marginal but intrinsically interesting attempts of 
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philosophers to develop alternative readings of revealed truths, nor the more 
massive Ismaili challenge to established Islam (briefly discussed below), can be 
properly understood without reference to the civilizational dimensions of relig-
ion.  
But there was yet another side to the phase of crystallization. The civiliza-
tional impact of an expanding religion was, at this stage, inseparable from impe-
rial power. The imperial formations of early Islam – those ruled by the Umayyad 
and Abbasid dynasties – were essential to the crystallizing process: their role ex-
emplifies the more general point that the civilizational potential of religious tradi-
tions and transformations is most effectively realized in conjunction with politi-
cal structures. However, Eisenstadt does not pursue this part of the question. Af-
ter hinting at a general affinity between axial cultural premises and imperial 
forms of power, he goes on to note that only “very few Islamic regimes – the 
Abbasids, the Fatimids, less so the Safavids, but most of all the Ottomans – de-
veloped imperial characteristics; and even so, they remained imperial regimes of 
the traditional kind” (ibid.: 344). This somewhat puzzling formulation calls for 
comment. In light of Eisenstadt’s objections to Weber, the term ‘traditional’ 
should probably be taken to denote the archaic patterns that precede axial 
changes, and thus to suggest an enduring tendency of Islamic empires to lag be-
hind their cultural-religious self-definitions. But apart from the omission of the 
Umayyads, the list obscures the fact that the empires in question related to the re-
ligious and civilizational context in different ways. The Abbasids were directly 
and decisively involved in the formative phase of a civilizational complex, and 
the Fatimids belong – as will be seen – to a later chapter of the same story, 
whereas the Safavids and the Ottomans rose to power in a very different histori-
cal environment. 
 
 
Beyond t radit ional ism and revis ionism 
 
To continue the argument signalled above, it seems that analyses of the more 
constructively revisionist kind, combined with other work, have now made it 
possible to distinguish between the intra- and extra-Arabian phases of crystalliza-
tion. To begin with the first phase, it seems clear that Patricia Crone’s re-
evaluation of the role of long-distance trade – and the corresponding impact of 
commercialization on Arabian society – has been widely accepted (cf. Crone 
1987; this was a much more disciplined kind of revisionism than Crone and Cook 
1977). To downgrade that factor is, by the same token, to shift attention to the in-
tertwining of political and religious ones. The intra-Arabian emergence of Islam 
was clearly a case of state formation, but of a peculiarly self-cancelling kind: it 
involved the mobilization of nomad warriors for expansion and conquest, but did 
not result in durable state structures within the peninsula. It took place in a 
broader geopolitical context: against the background of inter-imperial rivalry 
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(Roman vs. Iranian) that in the 6th century CE had affected the peninsula more 
deeply than before, and in response to a conjuncture that had left the two imperial 
centres more vulnerable to counter-challenge from the periphery than before. To 
stress these political aspects is not to reduce the religious factor to an epiphe-
nomenon of state formation. The whole record suggests that the religious muta-
tion had a history and a dynamic of its own, but any reconstruction of details is 
problematic. A cautious revisionist concludes that “we can only accept as an es-
tablished fact that a prophet, among others, preached Abrahamic monotheism in 
an Arabic milieu, in a social context marked by fragmentation, weak integration, 
and against organic polytheism” (Décobert 1991: 42). ‘Organic polytheism’ is a 
somewhat puzzling expression, and should not be taken as a reference to a pris-
tine archaic religious culture (among other things, G.W. Bowersock 1990 draws 
attention to Hellenistic influences reflected in restructurings of Arabian polythe-
ism). The culminating phase of the monotheistic turn also linked up with earlier 
moves in the same direction, and echoes of rivalries persisting on the eve of ex-
pansion are preserved in the record of false claimants to prophecy after Muham-
mad’s death. 
But perhaps the most interesting – and most recently recognized – aspect of 
the intra-Arabian crystallization is the role played by the South Arabian civiliza-
tion, centred in today’s Yemen. Jan Retsö has discussed this question in various 
recent writings (2003, 2005); the following remarks draw on his work. It is only 
in the most recent decades that we have become aware of the dimensions and the 
distinctive character of this civilization. In relation to the older centres of the 
Near East, it belonged to the category of peripheral formations, and it was a rela-
tive latecomer (it developed in the main after the crisis of the late Bronze Age); 
but it was more remote than the other peripheries, and therefore had a more inde-
pendent political history; furthermore, it was in closer contact with the Northeast 
African periphery of Egyptian civilization, and this became especially important 
after the Christianization of Northeast Africa. Enough is now known about the 
record of state formation in South Arabia to conclude that the last stages (the 
Himyarite kingdom in particular) represent an imperial turn; but this path was 
then blocked and the South Arabian region thrown into turmoil by the repercus-
sions of the Roman-Iranian conflict. Alongside the development of states with 
imperial aspirations, a monotheistic trend in South Arabian religion became more 
pronounced; although borrowings from (even conversion to) Judaism were obvi-
ously important, there does seem to have been an indigenous side to this devel-
opment. Last but not least (Retsö places particularly heavy emphasis on this 
point), there are significant traces of a Yemeni eschatological tradition.  
If we accept that this legacy was incorporated into emergent Islam, that is 
bound to affect our view of the whole problematic. At this point, the intra-
Arabian crystallization begins to look like a much more complex process: it 
could perhaps – in the context of the whole Near Eastern region – be described as 
an integration of three peripheries: the civilizational domain of South Arabia, the 
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townships of Northern and Western Arabia, and the more nomadic (perhaps re-
nomadized) periphery that covered much of the peninsula. Obviously, the iden-
tity that emerged from this process drew on older sources, but the background is 
difficult to trace. According to Retsö (this is perhaps the most controversial part 
of his argument), an original non-ethnic or trans-ethnic Arab identity, linked to 
specialized groups with military and religious tasks and seen as the guardians of 
a language endowed with sacral and poetic properties (distinct from everyday 
speech), was adapted to the new purposes of the Islamic community. Further dis-
cussion of this thesis must be left to specialists. But from an outsider’s point of 
view, it has at least the merit that it helps to account for what Goitein (1966: 7) 
calls the “miraculous linguistic process by which the Arab nation came into be-
ing.” 
Our understanding of the post-conquest crystallization – on a much enlarged 
regional scale – will depend on the view taken of the preparatory phase inside 
Arabia. For one thing – as Décobert (1991: 51-52) notes – , if we admit that there 
was, from the move to Medina onwards, a power structure with a fusion of po-
litical and religious authority at the top, it follows that the expansion must be 
seen as a conquest directed from a centre, rather than a “barbarian” invasion. Fur-
thermore, the pre-existence of this institutional structure means that here is, if not 
a fully-fledged civilizational model, at least a core (a politico-religious one) 
around which such a model can be constructed. This rules out the view of Islam 
as wholly made up of borrowings from conquered cultures.  
Décobert (ibid.: 47) sums up the approach pioneered by Goldziher and 
Schacht (and which he thinks the radical revisionists have abandoned) as an at-
tempt to “suivre les traces de l’élaboration islamique à partir d’un substrat arabe 
primitive, de superstrats (romains, chrétiens, judaïques …) et d’adstrats (hellénis-
tiques, rabbiniques …) étrangers.” The term ‘primitive’ is obviously not being 
used in the invidious sense: it does not rule out the development of the original 
religious-political nexus mentioned above. As for the distinction between ‘super-
strats’ and ‘adstrats,’ it is not clarified, but I would assume the former to refer to 
refer to cultural orientations of a more fundamental kind, the latter to more spe-
cific (and perhaps variable, from one part of the conquered region to others) in-
gredients of the Islamicate synthesis. But the most surprising aspect of this for-
mulation, with its heavy emphasis on Roman-Hellenistic-Judaic sources (three 
interpenetrating traditions) is the absence of the other imperial-civilizational do-
main: the Iranian one. As it happened, political conquest was more complete 
where – at the outset – religious and civilizational affinities were more limited 
(the Byzantine civilizational centre survived, the Iranian one did not); but in the 
long run, this also led to a more comprehensive incorporation of political tradi-
tions.  
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Post-conquest  crystal l izat ion 
 
There are no self-evident chronological markers for the phase of crystallization; 
the choice of dates depends on overall visions (pre-comprehension, to use the 
proper hermeneutical language) of the whole process, as well as on specific as-
sumptions about the course and meaning of events. As Donner (1998: 1) notes in 
his discussion of early Islamic historiography, traditional views – widely shared 
by Western historians – tended to focus on the half-century between 610 and 
660. From an intra-Islamic point of view, the prime importance of this period is 
beyond dispute: it encompasses Muhammad’s preaching of a new religion and 
the subsequent rise of an empire dominated by his followers, but also the internal 
conflicts that shaped Islamic cultural memory and defined the basic terms of later 
disputes between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. If the main emphasis is on the for-
mation of a new religion and on its foundational experience of discord, historians 
coming from outside the Islamic community can take a similar view, especially if 
they accept (as Donner does, on the basis of careful consideration of the evi-
dence) an early date for the Quranic text. When the focus shifts to the emergence 
of a whole civilizational pattern and the precondition for its global expansion, the 
chronological framework must also be modified. Marshall Hodgson’s reasons for 
dating the formative phase from the end of the 7th to the middle of the 10th cen-
tury are discussed in another paper in this volume; here I shall briefly summarize 
some arguments in favour of a different periodization. They emerge from new 
approaches and unfolding debates in recent scholarship.  
As noted above, we can speak of an initial intra-Arabic prelude to crystalliza-
tion, much more structured than Hodgson’s picture of a long transition would in-
dicate. On the cultural side, the intra-Arabian legacy now seems more important 
than earlier accounts had suggested – not least because of growing insight into 
the achievements and original characteristics of South Arabian civilization. On 
the political side, a 6th-century geopolitical upheaval, due to changing relations 
and power balances between the imperial states that surrounded the peninsula, 
was followed by new initiatives in state formation, of which the Islamic proto-
state in Medina proved to be the most decisive. It is unlikely to have been the 
only one of its kind, but the Islamic tradition preserved only a very selective re-
cord of the earliest beginnings. Following Donner’s analysis, several aspects of 
the Medinese polity may be distinguished. It invented a new form of sacral ruler-
ship, vested in a prophet; in fact, this was probably the most total fusion of reli-
gious and political authority that had yet been achieved anywhere. But the con-
solidation of this new and inherently expansive centre also entailed state-building 
strategies of a more conventional kind. Donner lists three crucial aspects of the 
process: “a more systematic approach to taxation than had hitherto prevailed in 
northern Arabia,” (1981: 69), the “extension of a centralized legal authority over 
those areas controlled by Muhammad and the umma,” (ibid.: 72) and “agents 
[…] appointed by Muhammad to oversee various tribal groups that had submitted 
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to Islamic rule” (ibid.: 73). Incipient processes of state formation are always con-
fronted with and at the same time dependent on tribal structures; the over-
dramatized image of statehood as involving an abrupt and total break with tribal 
institutions is misleading, but specific features and dynamics of the relationship 
vary widely. The early Islamic state imposed a particularly self-contained and 
demanding model of political community, defined as a community of believers 
submitting to an exclusive and universal god (if we want to describe this innova-
tion in terms of the axial model, it represents a more direct and thoroughgoing in-
fusion of the transcendent into the mundane than any other socio-cultural pattern 
of that kind). But this radically de-particularizing model was also capable of har-
nessing tribal identities and loyalties to its own purposes. How the two levels of 
collective identity interacted is still a matter of debate; it is, at any rate, clear that 
the conquering Islamic armies combined tribal and supra-tribal principles of or-
ganization in very efficient ways. On the other hand, the conditional accommoda-
tion of tribal values was to affect the subsequent history of the Islamic polity and 
community in a manner not envisaged at the beginning: through disputes over the 
succession to the prophet.  
The reconquest of Arabia after the rebellions and secessions following Mu-
hammad’s death marked a new stage. By reaffirming control over the peninsula 
at the very moment when an exceptionally difficult succession problem had to be 
solved, the emerging Islamic centre took a decisive step towards durable state-
hood. At the same time, the logic of its strategy led to further expansion. A uni-
fied peninsular state could not but interfere with the politically and territorially 
fluid power structures on the margins of neighbouring empires, all the more so 
since escalating warfare had destroyed the traditional mechanisms of control on 
the Byzantine as well as the Persian side. The forcibly reintegrated nomadic and 
semi-nomadic tribes (a disproportionately important minority of the population) 
were most easily kept in line through mobilization for conquest. The new reli-
gious revelation lent meaning and legitimacy to visions of indefinite expansion, 
and the combination of emphatic universalism with enhanced ethnic particular-
ism was a massive motivating force before it became a source of tensions and 
oppositional movements. In short, an open-ended imperial project was the most 
natural option for the post-prophetic Islamic state. Because of the strong and 
original religious component of the conquering movement, as well as the com-
plexity of cultural and political traditions indigenous to the conquered regions, 
the whole process resulted in the crystallization of new patterns on a civiliza-
tional scale.  
Scholarly work on the comparative analysis of civilizations has shown that 
the religious-political nexus (’le théologico-politique,’ as some French authors 
have called it) is a particularly rewarding starting-point for strategies of compari-
son. This seems to be eminently true of Islamicate civilization, where the excep-
tionally complex and contested issue of defining relations between religious and 
political authority became central to a broader configuration of formative trends. 
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The historical context of these developments is best understood in light of the 
problem of succession to prophetic rule. In Weberian terms, this was a case of 
transition from charismatic to traditional rulership, but complicated by several 
more specific factors. The charismatic centre was of quite unusual dimensions: a 
critical approach to the details of Muhammad’s biography does not necessarily 
cast doubt on the view of the Islamic state as a very close union of religious and 
political power. Those who succeeded to supreme authority had to claim legiti-
macy through conformity with the prophetic message, but aspirations to maintain 
the same level of authority were bound to encounter resistance from the defend-
ers of prophetic closure. The charismatic origin continued to command obedience 
in a profoundly altered situation, and to forbid imitation while tempting both rul-
ers and rebels to test the limits thus imposed. These dilemmas became more 
acute in conjunction with the rapid shift to imperial domination of a whole region 
and expansion beyond its borders. Moreover, the new imperial state inherited ter-
ritories, multi-ethnic societies and traditions from two older empires with whose 
legacies it had to come to terms. For a power structure based on a delicate and 
dynamic balance between settled and nomadic groups integrated through expan-
sion, this swift transition to empire was a particularly challenging task. As Don-
ner notes (ibid.: 273-278), the Arabian-Islamic state proved less viable than the 
larger formation which it had built up, and the political integration of Arabia 
went out of sight for a very long time to come. The empire eventually succumbed 
to a more long-drawn-out process of fragmentation, but a surviving shadow ver-
sion of the caliphate retained some symbolic weight, and later empire-builders 
could still unify important parts of the Islamic world. The Islamicate civiliza-
tional framework outlived its original political basis and maintained its continuity 
across political ruptures and reversals. 
In short, the Islamic invention – the Medinese paradigm of comprehensive 
sacral authority – faced problems of maintenance, extension and elaboration, and 
the solutions to them had ramifications that affected all domains of socio-cultural 
life. The following comments will centre on three successive aspects of the crys-
tallizing phase: the early caliphate, including the first Islamic dynasty (1); the 8th-
century upheaval traditionally known as the Abbasid revolution (2); and the Is-
maili movement, which may be seen as a failed but far from inconsequential 
counter-paradigm taking shape in opposition to the Abbasid settlement (3). This 
is a very selective approach, but the thematic foci are chosen with a view to their 
key significance in a broader context.  
1. It is now a commonplace among historians of Islam that the image of the 
four ‘rightly guided’ caliphs – from 632 to 661 – is a pious construct of much 
later origin, designed to smooth over succession disputes as well as controversies 
about the very meaning of the caliphate. In a sense, Western scholarship tended 
until recently to accept a secularized version of the same view: a broadly shared 
and continuous model of rulership after prophecy was taken for granted. More 
recent critical approaches to early Islamic history have undermined this assump-
110  |  CRYSTALLIZATIONS 
tion. There are, however, no signs of scholarly consensus on a new interpretation; 
reappraisals of the historical evidence have led to widely divergent conclusions. 
A comparison of the two most seminal works on the subject, by Crone and Hinds 
(1986) and by Wilfred Madelung (1997), may help to clarify the main points at 
issue. Crone and Hinds begin with a discussion of the caliphal title. Its ambiguity 
(it can mean both deputy and successor) made it adaptable to changing aims and 
circumstances, but could by the same token serve to disguise the meaning of such 
adjustments. Crone and Hinds show – this would seem to be the most uncontro-
versial part of their argument – that early and continuous use of the title khalifat 
allah, which can only mean ‘deputy of God,’ is well attested at least from Uth-
man onwards. They then go on to draw far-reaching conclusions. The original 
version of the caliphate, with its strong component of religious authority, now 
seems closer to Shi `ite conceptions of authority than to Sunni ones, and the for-
mer might in that sense have a better claim to represent an orthodox current. Far 
from having shifted to a more traditional form of kingship, the Umayyads con-
tinued to claim the emphatically religious and distinctively Islamic legitimacy 
inherent in the idea of ‘God’s caliph;’ this enabled them to assert jurisdiction 
over doctrinal as well as legal matters. The first Abbasids strove to maintain the 
same status, but in the longer run, they failed. As Crone and Hinds see it, both 
the historical shift towards a downgrading of caliphal authority in the religious 
sphere and the historiographical misrepresentation of the early caliphate reflect 
the growing strength of the ‘ulama, whose ability to translate religious expertise 
into social power thus resulted in a definitive curtailment of the political centre.  
According to Crone and Hinds, the early caliphate represented a uniquely 
radical form of theocracy (this Weberian term is used without any further discus-
sion of its conceptual underpinnings). There are no obvious links to earlier mod-
els: both the Byzantine and the Sasanian paradigms of kingship have been de-
scribed as caesaropapist, but neither of them unified political, legal and religious 
authority to the same degree as the Islamic alternative. Speculations about Sa-
maritan origins are, as the authors admit, wholly gratuitous. Although Crone and 
Hinds do not explicitly say so, their line of argument would suggest that the 
theocratic project of the conquerors was designed to surpass the less consistent 
institutional principles of the two empires with which they were confronted, and 
it is tempting to take this hypothesis one step further. An attempt to transcend ex-
isting models of sacral rulership might be seen as a logical continuation of the 
prophecy that had announced the most perfect form of monotheism and begun to 
harness it to the accumulation of political power. This Arabian innovation pre-
ceded expansion into the Fertile Crescent, and acknowledgement of this histori-
cal priority should perhaps be seen as the limit beyond which revisionism goes 
off the rails. More importantly, the reference to Islamic origins highlights another 
side of the transition to empire, not taken into account by Crone and Hinds but in 
my opinion easily linked to Madelung’s much more detailed reconstruction of the 
early caliphate and its vicissitudes. The earliest conquests beyond Arabia entailed 
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on the one hand a retreat from the Medinese model, both because of the absence 
of the prophet and due to the new problems posed by imperial rule and ongoing 
military expansion; on the other hand, the same process demanded both the con-
struction of an imperial self-image to counter those of the adversaries, and an ef-
fort to appropriate the imperial legacies on both sides of the Mesopotamian di-
vide. In this context, it is a plausible assumption that the institution of the caliph-
ate evolved through attempts to maintain a strong religio-political centre, dis-
puted redefinitions of its role, and conflicts between forces that articulated and 
legitimized their strategies in relation to this central issue. Such perspectives fit 
in with Madelung’s narrative: he stresses the unsettled character of the early ca-
liphate, the improvised succession arrangements, and the polarizing dynamic of 
elite rivalries. Ali’s brief and contested rule (656-661) is described as a counter-
caliphate,’ a reaction against the ascendancy of the Meccan aristocracy and its 
Quraysh core under Uthman. In that capacity, it was a logical choice for later 
constructions of heterodox genealogies, however anachronistic it may be to pro-
ject fully-fledged sectarian demarcations back into Islam’s first century. 
To sum up, the case for putting more religious authority back into our image 
of the early caliphate seems compatible with a more discontinuous and multilin-
ear story than the one proposed by Crone and Hinds. And if the institution that 
joined the religious to the political sphere was shaped by interpretive and practi-
cal conflicts, it was by the same token exposed to challenges from those who 
aimed at closer approximation to the ideal of prophetic rule (or, to put it another 
way, at minimizing the distance between God’s messenger and God’s deputy). 
That kind of opposition became most potent when the theocratic theme was 
combined with a stronger emphasis on the universalist message of the revelation 
and when the religious concerns were linked to socio-political protest against ex-
clusion and privilege. Such a constellation was clearly at hand when the Umay-
yad regime entered its terminal phase towards the middle of the 8th century.  
2. As we have seen, some interpretations have stressed the continuity of his-
torical patterns across the dynastic divide between Umayyads and Abbasids. In 
each case, the analysis of trends and events reflects specific views of the period 
as a whole. For Hodgson, long-term continuity is due to the irresistible logic of 
absolutism and its imperial apogee; for Crone and Hinds, the early Abbasid ca-
liphate represents an ambitious but ultimately unsuccessful effort to maintain the 
early Islamic model of rulership. Constructions of continuity have, however, not 
been the most typical way to make sense of the events in question. The rise of the 
Abbasids has frequently been seen as a revolution. Among non-Western exam-
ples of political transformation, it stands out as one of very few cases where 
Western scholars have been most willing to apply a concept of revolution derived 
from European experience. One author even refers to it as “one of the best organ-
ized revolutions in history;” (Sharon 1983: 16) another considers it “a most ap-
propriate example of the method by which a loosely conrolled revolutionary ap-
paratus is transformed into an established government of imperial capabilities” 
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(Lassner 1980: 7). More concrete parallels have been suggested. In a critical re-
view of the literature on the subject, R. Stephen Humphreys (1991: 109) argues 
that “many of the questions we ask about the Bolsheviks would be equally sig-
nificant in regard to the Abbasids.” This broad agreement on the revolutionary 
dimensions of dynastic change has not precluded dispute about the specific char-
acter of the revolution. Some basic features are uncontested. The Abbasid revolu-
tion was prepared by a clandestine organization which in due course launched an 
armed rebellion on the eastern periphery of the empire, overthrew the central 
government, and established a new geopolitical balance of power. The leaders 
and activists of the revolution shared a strong but ambiguous ideological orienta-
tion. On the one hand, supreme power was to be restored to closer kinsmen of the 
prophet, but this demand could still leave the field open to several contenders, 
and neither the timing nor the operative details of the Abbasid takeover have 
been easy to explain. On the other hand, the appeal to a broader community of 
believers marked a decisive step beyond the ethnic particularism of earlier Is-
lamic regimes. Taken together, the two aspects exemplify one of Eisenstadt’s ob-
servations about Islam: the fusion of a strong universalism with limited but cru-
cial primordialist elements. The practical meaning of this ideology in the context 
of a revolutionary transformation is a good deal more controversial.  
It seems clear that the debate on the Abbasid revolution has, most recently, 
taken a turn that revives traditional views against the revisionist positions de-
fended by later 20th -century scholars. The traditional interpretation was stated in 
classic terms by Julius Wellhausen (1973 [1927]: 558): “Under the guise of the 
international Islam, Iranianism triumphed over the Arabs.” Although Wellhausen 
was not very explicit about his underlying conceptual framework, this formula-
tion clearly suggests a vision of history as the realm of one Volksgeist in contest 
with another, with religion – universal or not – reduced to a ‘superstructural’ 
role. But other statements would seem to throw doubt on that assumption, and to 
imply a more autonomous role for religion. At the end of the book, Wellhausen 
contrasts the Abbasids with the dynasty they had overthrown: “While the Umaiy-
ids [sic] had essentially rested upon a nationality, they [the Abbasids] supported 
their government upon a guard and upon the religion. Their Khaliphate may be 
described as a Caesareopapy” (ibid.: 564). He also notes that the supposed tri-
umph of the Iranians, who were eventually ousted by the Turks, was more short-
lived than that of “international Islam.” All this points to the conclusion that the 
Abbasid revolution might have had less to do with one ethnic category replacing 
another than with a new relationship between religion and political power, as 
well as between religious and political community. The second thoughts thus in-
dicated were taken much further by later historians who found it difficult to lo-
cate the Iranian factor. Moshe Sharon, summing up his analysis of the Abbasid 
revolution with particular reference to the rebellion in Khurasan, stresses “the 
Arabism of its leadership and the Islamism of its ideas,” (Sharon 1983: 198) and 
although this opinion was never uncontested, it was shared by many other schol-
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ars in the field. Following its lead, the Abbasid revolution would be best under-
stood as a reactivation of the Arabic-Islamic nexus that had already given an im-
petus to conquest and empire-building.  
If the ‘Iranianist’ interpretation is regaining ground, this is less a matter of re-
turning to Wellhausen’s position than of revisiting the whole problematic from 
angle more conducive to adequate grasp of the civilizational questions at issue. 
Saleh Said Agha’s analysis of the “revolution that toppled the Umayyads,” 
(2003) by far the most detailed of its kind, goes beyond earlier scholarship in dis-
tinguishing between the activists of the revolutionary organization and the forces 
involved in the revolutionary process. On both levels, careful scrutiny of the 
sources confirms the preponderance of Iranians, but not of the same type: Islami-
cized clients (mâwalî) of Iranian (and other non-Arabic) origin were the back-
bone of the organization, whereas more recent converts were mobilized for revo-
lutionary action and gave it the character of a popular revolt. As Agha argues, 
historians have often disregarded ethnic stratification and conflict for no better 
reason than an a priori commitment to oversimplified modernist theories of na-
tionalism. Once the latter are subjected to due criticism, collective identities (in 
this case Arab and Iranian, allowing for internal differentiation on both sides) can 
be taken more seriously as a ubiquitous but context-dependent historical factor. 
They can in some constellations give rise to premodern nationalism, but circum-
stances can also channel them in more self-transcending directions. In the spe-
cific conditions of the early Islamic world, the problems posed by an increasingly 
explosive ethnic divide were susceptible to integrative and universalistic solu-
tions. Conversion was, as Agha puts it, a Trojan horse: the non-Arab converts 
could turn the “moralistic, egalitarian and inclusive aspects” (ibid.: 170) of Islam 
against an Arab establishment that was also vulnerable to accusations of having 
betrayed both the principles and the family of the prophet. But the Trojan horse 
was also a transforming factor for those who used it: their success made member-
ship in the universal community of believers more important than any pre-
Islamic identities. 
It is now widely accepted that the anti-Umayyad revolt in Khurasan, prepared 
by an organization first active in Kufa, was one of several movements that tore 
the Umayyad empire apart in the 740s. Some of them had distinctive regional 
and/or ethnic backgrounds. A Berber rebellion in North Africa, linked to Khari-
jite dissent, foreshadowed later upheavals in the region. Yemeni connections 
seem to have been important for a briefly successful Umayyad pretender. How-
ever, the movement that brought the Abbasids to power stands out – not just as 
the most successful one, but also as endowed with a transformative dynamic that 
can hardly be claimed for other cases. This explains the attractivity of the idea of 
the ‘Abbasid revolution.’ But if that interpretation is to be upheld, on more con-
clusive grounds, further specifications to the concept of revolution are needed. 
Said Arjomand (1994) defines the 8th-century transformation of the Islamic em-
pire as an ‘integrative revolution.’ In a general sense, this term refers to an 
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enlargement and restructuring of the political community; subtypes, including the 
‘constitutive revolution’ that brings statehood to previously stateless societies, 
can be distinguished on the basis of various criteria (cf. also Arjomand’s contri-
bution to this volume, as well as a forthcoming book). With regard to the 
Abbasid revolution, several interconnected aspects of an integrative dynamic 
may be noted. Arjomand’s main emphasis is on the integration of non-Arab Mus-
lims into the elites as well as the religio-political community at large (as he notes 
(Arjomand 1994: 20), “the Abbasid revolution was accompanied by massive 
conversions of the non-Muslim subject population to Islam”). In this respect, the 
Abbasids in power continued along the lines envisaged by the organizers of the 
revolution. But in the present context, the processes of intercivilizational integra-
tion are particularly noteworthy. Here, too, recent work has vindicated the Ira-
nianist approach, albeit in a modified sense. There was no abrupt or wholesale 
Iranianization of central state structures after 750; earlier accounts tended to ex-
aggerate the difference between the two dynastic regimes. Nor did the borrowing 
of Iranian techniques and traditions begin with the Abbasids. The Umayyads had 
already taken interest in Persian statecraft and relied on specialists trained in that 
tradition. Arjomand stresses “the permanent mark left on the Islamic civilization 
by Ibn al-Muqaffa and the generation of Persian secretaries that supplied strong 
elements of continuity between the two eras divided by the Abbasid revolution;” 
(ibid.: 36) as he also shows, with particular reference to Ibn al-Muqaffa, these in-
tercivilizational architects of a new order could develop projects that were only in 
part adaptable to the practical strategies of the rulers. But the trend was certainly 
accelerated by the integrative dynamic of the Abbasid revolution. The more in-
clusive definition of the community made for a more receptive attitude to cultural 
legacies of the region (at least during the formative phase), and the Iranian con-
nection was crucial in both respects – not least because of the transfer of the geo-
political centre to a former core domain of the Sasanian Empire. The concomitant 
changes to the style and symbolism of monarchic rule paved the way for the in-
corporation of an old and rich tradition of discourse on kingship. On the other 
hand, the revolutionary movement had drawn on Iranian traditions in a different 
way. Agha (2003: 212), drawing on Madelung and others, refers to “an Iranian 
para-Islamic continuum:” a whole counterculture of dissent, protest and revolt, 
with elusive but undoubtedly significant links to memories and surviving ele-
ments of Mazdakism. Translation into Islamic terms was not yet the only outlet 
open to traditions with an older pedigree in the region: the 8th-century upheaval 
was accompanied by millennial revivals within other religious communities (Ar-
jomand 1994: 21). The overall picture is unclear and the record very fragmented, 
but the appeal to a ‘continuum’ seems to have been essential to the successful re-
bellion in Khurasan. As the new regime consolidated its hold on power, it 
cracked down on erstwhile allies and agents, often with extreme brutality; some 
of the currents first mobilized and then suppressed entered into the making of 
new heterodoxies.  
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Finally, integrative developments in the aftermath of the revolution also had 
to do with the socio-cultural constitution of the Islamicate world. Marshall Hodg-
son’s seminal treatment of that problematic is discussed elsewhere in this vol-
ume, and the field will only be briefly revisited here. Four main aspects of the 
socio-cultural integrative process may be distinguished. The construction of an 
Islamic tradition in a strong and systematic sense through collected (and very of-
ten invented) reports on the founding phase and its protagonists, was in the main 
an achievement of the early Abbasid era. As Arjomand notes, this resulted in a 
distinctively Islamic link between revolution and tradition, and more specifically 
in the canonization of the Medinese paradigm as a model for radical political 
change, conceived as a return to pristine principles. The elaboration of Islamic 
law went hand in hand with the formation of tradition. Opinions differ on the im-
portance of the earliest decades and the Umayyad period for both hadith and law, 
but the crucial contributions of legal scholars during the ascendant phase of 
Abbasid rule are undisputed: this period saw both the systematization of law and 
the differentiation of approaches that found embodiment in schools of jurispru-
dence and their respective sub-traditions. Law and tradition, together with the in-
terpretation of the Quran, became the reserved domain and defining concern of 
the ‘ulama, who thus established themselves as a civilizational elite. Finally, the 
social constellation that prevailed during the later classical period – the 9th and 
10th centuries – fostered strong links between ‘ulama and merchants. S.D. Goitein 
(1966: 217-241, 242-254) saw the merchants as a ‘Muslim bourgeoisie,’ capable 
of social self-assertion and self-expression through an articulate economic ethic, 
but not of the kind of organization needed for the pursuit of political power. His 
terminology now seems somewhat anachronistic, but there is no doubt about the 
importance of the merchant-‘ulama nexus, It shaped the distinctive features of the 
public sphere in Islamicate societies, including those that insulated it from the 
exercise of political power. 
As Hodgson and other historians of the ‘High Caliphate’ have stressed, the 
internal structuring of Islamicate civilization was – in the first instance – com-
patible with openness towards other civilizations and creative appropriation of 
their achievements. This does not settle the question whether the internal logic of 
integration was in the longer run conducive to closure and detrimental to trans-
formative capacities. That issue opens up a vast field of inquiry, far beyond the 
formative period, and therefore beyond the scope of this paper. It may, however, 
be noted in passing that no answer to the question can justify a purely internalist 
reconstruction of Islamic history. The defining patterns that crystallized during 
the period discussed here affected all later developments, but only in conjunction 
with a complex set of external factors.  
In light of the broader implications and long-term consequences discussed 
above, the term ‘Abbasid revolution’ seems justified. It might still be objected 
that the description is less applicable to the revolutionary process as such. The 
subtitle of Agha’s book (2003), “neither Arab nor Abbasid,” sums up a complex 
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analysis of both issues. No further comment is needed on reasons for rejecting 
the Arabist interpretation; as for the other point, Agha argues – to my mind con-
vincingly – that the Abbasid takeover was engineered on the eve of final victory 
over the Umayyads, and thus later than most historians have wanted to admit; 
that it was a coup within the revolution; and that it imposed hereditary dynastic 
rule on a movement that had wanted to link succession within the family of the 
prophet to election by the community (without a clear delimitation of the latter). 
The dynamic of this takeover and the need to consolidate its results were obvi-
ously central to Abbasid policies in the aftermath of victory. But Agha’s interpre-
tation does not disconnect this factor from the broader context. In that regard, a 
brief comparison with a view from the other side may be useful. Jacob Lassner’s 
work on the formation of Abbasid rule (1980) has mostly been aligned with the 
Arabist position. As far as the preparatory phase is concerned, that seems to be 
true, but when it comes to the revolutionary process as such, Lassner is less in-
terested in ethnic backgrounds and cultural borrowings (as he sees it, specula-
tions on the latter will never get beyond vague conjectures) than in the internal 
logic of a power structure being adapted to specific goals. The Abbasid way of 
consolidating revolutionary power was, first and foremost, based on generalized 
and innovative use of the institution of clientage. Lassner takes this explanatory 
model very far: for him, the 9th- and 10th-century shift to massive use of slave sol-
diers was the “logical conclusion” (ibid.: 16) of Abbasid-style clientage. At this 
point, critical comments are in order. Arguments about intercultural borrowing 
may sometimes be unavoidably vague, but the notion of power-seeking strategies 
and their unintended consequences unfolding in a cultural vacuum is thoroughly 
implausible, and doubly so when applied to rival factions within a conquering 
elite with a very distinctive ethnic profile, operating in the kind of interciviliza-
tional environment characteristic of the 7th- and 8th-century Near East. An inter-
pretation which disregards that part of the picture is a priori unconvincing.  
To conclude, it should be noted that the debate on the Abbasid revolution 
goes beyond controversies about ethnic or social background and ideological 
content. Recent scholarship on states and social revolutions has shown a general 
tendency to take geopolitical conditions and dynamics more seriously. In the 
Abbasid case, that line of argument was to some extent anticipated by those who 
stressed changing power balances between provinces, but there is at least one at-
tempt to develop it in a broader context. Khalid Yahya Blankinship’s analysis of 
the Umayyad ‘jihâd state’ and its collapse draws attention to the Eurasian geopo-
litical setting that first facilitated rapid conquest and then proved fatal to a regime 
bent on further all-round expansion. In the first phase, the emerging Islamic em-
pire made huge gains at the expense of the Byzantine one and destroyed its Sa-
sanian rival; further offensives led to the conquest of Berber North Africa (where 
conversion seems to have played a greater role than elsewhere at this stage), the 
overthrow of a particularly fragile post-Roman regime in Visigothic Spain, and 
the establishment of a first foothold in India. Let us note in passing that this pat-
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tern of sustained expansion makes the absence of any serious action against the 
declining Axum empire rather puzzling. But a second round, beginning in the 
late 720s, brought the Umayyad state face to face with a whole series of much 
more resilient adversaries: the Franks in the west, a reinvigorated Byzantine Em-
pire, the Khazars in South Russia, the Turks in Central Asia, and the stronger In-
dian kingdoms east of the Indus. Efforts to overcome these new obstacles proved 
fruitless, and the strain was too much for the Umayyad regime. Blankinship thus 
agrees with Hodgson on a fundamental point: the Marwanid power structure had 
collapsed before the Abbasid revolution, and the Abbasid leadership was one of 
several contenders in the field. But his analysis leads to further claims. He under-
lines the impact of the great Berber revolt in the last stage of Marwanid rule, 
which caused “the breakup of Muslim political unity and the end of the universal 
jihad,” (Blankinship 1994: 203) he also suggests that “with the failure of the uni-
versal war jihâd, more emphasis began to be placed on the peaceful quest,” and 
that thus “the doors were opened for the already extant spiritual element of Islam 
to undergo a development which has greatly enhanced the attractiveness of Islam 
to non-Muslims” (1994: 4). 
3. According to Marshall Hodgson’s periodization of Islamic history, the 
classical phase ended in the middle of the 10th century. For present purposes, we 
do not need a precise date, and a strict chronological delimitation would in fact 
seem implausible. But there are good reasons to regard the crystallizing phase as 
continuing well into the 10th century, all the more so if we include the formation 
of the most ambitious and most widely active heterodoxy of the Islamic world: 
the Ismaili movement. Some historians (Western and Islamic) would question 
this categorization. As they see it, the term ‘heterodoxy’ prejudges a question 
that should still be open to debate: whether the Ismailis or their established ad-
versaries were closer in spirit to the original Islamic message. But in the given 
context, the concept of heterodoxy can be defined in less loaded terms. It can, in 
other words, be used to describe a movement centred on a far-flung clandestine 
organization, committed to religious ideas incompatible with the enforced stan-
dards of orthodoxy, and capable of translating religious dissent into strategies for 
revolt and conquest on several fronts. As Eisenstadt has argued in both theoreti-
cal and empirical contexts, the dynamics of interaction between orthodoxies and 
heterodoxies are a particularly promising theme for comparative civilizational 
analysis. In that regard, the Ismaili movement stands out as one of the most inter-
esting cases.  
The Ismaili movement was, as a recent history of Islamic political thought 
puts it, an attempt to “take over the Muslim world in the name of a new creed” 
(Crone 2004: 197). This happened at a stage when Islamic religious ideas were 
being institutionalized as civilizational premises in a more sustained fashion than 
before (cf. Eisenstadt’s distinction between the two aspects of religion). In that 
regard, the Ismaili project invites comparison not only with other major religious 
heterodoxies, but also with civilizational divisions in a more general sense. Inter-
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nal conflicts of interpretations are a recurrent civilizational phenomenon, but in 
some cases they go so deep that it seems appropriate to speak of civilizational 
schisms: radically different versions of shared cultural premises, with implica-
tions translating into alternative institutional patterns and historical trajectories. If 
this concept is to be applied for comparative purposes, we must allow for consid-
erable variation within its range of meaning. The institutional impact of cultural 
interpretations is less significant in some cases than others, and even when it 
reaches relatively high levels, the dynamic of the schism as such may be inflected 
or overlaid by other factors. It would be hard to find a more convincing example 
of civilizational schism than the 16th-century bifurcation of Western Christen-
dom. But the interplay and the divergent paths of the two reformations (one of 
them somewhat misleadingly known as the Reformation and the other as the 
Counter-Reformation) were complicated by a simultaneous civilizational muta-
tion that involved a broader spectrum of forces: the Western European transition 
to modernity. Earlier cases to be considered include the Indian trajectory during 
the Axial Age, which led to the separation of Buddhism from the evolving tradi-
tions that later crystallized into Hinduism, but views on the civilizational signifi-
cance of this schism will to some extent depend on the disputed question whether 
Buddhism was linked to an alternative conception of kingship. At any rate, the 
contest ended with the virtual disappearance of Buddhism from its original 
homeland, and its diffusion elsewhere took place in a different institutional envi-
ronment. Finally, it should be noted that civilizational schisms do not ipso facto 
take a religious form. It is tempting – and certainly not incompatible with classic 
accounts left by contemporaries – to see the conflict between Athens and Sparta 
as a schism within Hellenic civilization. In this case, the outcome was self-
destructive from the broader civilizational point of view: a fatal weakening vis-à-
vis neighbouring powers with imperial ambitions.  
The case for understanding the Ismaili movement as a civilizational schism 
can begin with its reinterpretation of the Islamic revelation. The Ismailis relativ-
ized the prophetic paradigm by inserting it into a more complex cyclical scheme 
where the last prophet is succeeded by a whole sequence of imams; the authority 
of the latter was more emphatically related to an esoteric spiritual meaning of the 
divine message, and this soteriological remodelling was linked to an eschatologi-
cal vision that brought the apocalypticism of early Islam back in a new setting. 
When taken to its extreme conclusion, the Ismaili conception of the imam – and 
especially of the Mahdi, the ultimate redeemer – tended to overshadow the 
prophet. Disagreement on that issue was one of the major causes of division 
within the movement. The most telling way to relativize the status of the prophet 
was to downgrade his role as a lawgiver. The esoteric core of Ismailism was, in 
general, conducive to antinomian tendencies, but their strength depended on cir-
cumstances; only two small-scale and short-lived attempts to abrogate the official 
version Islamic law are known (under the Qarmati regime in Bahrein in the 10th 
century and in an Ismaili stronghold in northwestern Iran in the 12th century).  
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The association of the imamate with esoteric knowledge was anchored in 
gnostic traditions and modes of thought. Islamic gnosticism was, however elu-
sively, affiliated to late antique gnosticism, and scholarly approaches to the for-
mer are bound to reflect interpretations of the latter. The most recent work (cf. 
especially Williams 1999 and Stroumsa 1992) tends to stress the heterogeneity of 
the gnostic field. A cluster of religious countercurrents responded to the prob-
lems and perceived shortcomings of both Judaism and Christianity; they over-
lapped in significant ways, but can hardly be reduced to a common denominator. 
However, no better term has so far been suggested for the complex of elective af-
finities that gave rise to the notion of gnosticism. On this view, the idea of a con-
tinuous gnostic tradition persisting within Islam becomes untenable. On the other 
hand, the sources do not seem to allow a reconstruction of specific links to par-
ticular traditions. As for the overall picture, B.S. Amoretti (1975: 488) suggests 
that an Islamic mould for Gnostic themes might have been constructed in a man-
ner somewhat analogous to the surpassing of the older monotheisms, with “the 
Quranic message itself viewed as deriving from and re-interpreting the Hellenis-
tic-Christian-Iranian gnostic culture of the age.” The Ismaili movement linked 
this re-interpreted gnostic heritage to political messianism based on two princi-
ples: an emphatic re-unification of religious and political authority through the 
imamate, and legitimation through a direct dynastic connection to the prophet. 
No more pronounced case of politicized gnosticism has ever been recorded (by 
comparison, the reconstruction of gnostic trends in modern politics depends on 
more complex and problematic assumptions). According to Patricia Crone, this 
“odd mixture testifies to the extraordinary impact of Muhammad’s career on the 
Middle East: even Gnostics came to see religious state formation and conquest to 
be the way out of their problems” (Crone 2004: 117). The suggestion is no less 
plausible because it comes from an author who had previously gone very far in-
deed in impugning the historicity of Muhammad’s career. But if the mixture 
helped to mobilize opposition to the Abbasid regime and its representatives 
throughout the Islamic world, it was (as Crone also shows) not a solid foundation 
for an alternative model.  
Bernard Lewis’s early work on the origins of Ismailism – one of the first at-
tempts to relate the movement to its historical context – stressed two aspects: the 
religious expression of a social protest movement, most strongly rooted among 
artisans, and the active interest in other religious traditions that could, at its most 
articulate, develop into a “strong strain of interconfessionalism, verging at times 
on complete rationalism” attitude (Lewis 1975 [1940]: 94). Later scholarship 
does not seem to have refuted these claims, but it has relativized them through 
stronger emphasis on other points. In its heyday, Ismailism appealed to individu-
als and groups with very diverse social and cultural backgrounds, and this broad 
basis highlights the unifying force of the religious message that held it together. 
There is evidence of unorthodox openness to traditions long established and still 
active in the region, but this stance was subordinate to the quest for a final per-
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fection of the revelation. Measured against the claims made on that basis, the po-
litical results were conclusively disappointing. The Ismailis were at first re-
markably successful in organizing a clandestine counter-community, on a civili-
zational scale and throughout the Islamic world. When they moved on to open 
revolt, it proved difficult to maintain the ideological bond between local power 
centres established in places separated by vast distances. Conquest on a larger 
scale, firstv in the Maghreb and then, much more significantly, in Egypt, was fol-
lowed by rapid adjustment to the existing mainstream techniques and frame-
works of state building. In fact, the Ismaili (Fatimid) regime in Egypt became a 
prime example of state power based on slave soldiers, with early signs of all the 
attendant problems of this institutional complex. Apart from the claim to repre-
sent a more legitimate succession to the prophet, and a more authentic union of 
religious and political authority than the Abbasid caliphate, there was next to 
nothing distinctively Ismaili about this state. This is not to deny that it played an 
important role in Islamic history. The Fatimid caliphate in Cairo was a major 
power in the Mediterranean region, and it was – after an interval of thousand 
years – the first fully independent state centred on Egypt. As such, it also laid the 
foundations for Egypt’s later cultural pre-eminence in the Islamic world. But this 
was not what the Ismaili activists had aimed at.  
On the intellectual level, some offshoots of the Ismaili movement may be 
seen as major landmarks of the dialogue between philosophy and religion within 
Islamicate civilization. The two cases most familiar to Western scholars are the 
10th-century “Brethren of Purity” in Basra and the 11th-century work of Nasir-e 
Khosraw (1990). But the long-term pattern of sectarian survival after political 
failure was a very different matter (for a comprehensive history of Ismailism 
from the beginnings to modern times, cf. Daftary 1990). Small communities, of-
ten in remote places, perpetuated Ismaili traditions but abandoned the political 
activism that had once been associated with them. If early Ismailism had the po-
tential to develop into a civilizational schism, it was contained during the deci-
sive phase and thoroughly neutralized in subsequent centuries.  
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Chapter 5 
Revolution in Early Islam: 
The Rise of Islam 
as a Constitutive Revolution 
 
SAÏD AMIR ARJOMAND 
 
 
We conceive of revolution in terms of its great social and political consequences. 
In a forthcoming comparative and historical study of revolutions, I contrast to the 
state-centered revolutions of modern times with another ideal-type of revolution 
which I call the ‘integrative’ revolution (see the Appendix). This ideal type of 
revolution – which is an aspect of all revolutions – expresses two simple ideas: 
revolutions 1) bring to power a previously excluded revolutionary elite, and 2) 
enlarge the social basis of the political regime. This makes integrative revolu-
tions not just political but also ‘social revolutions.’ Integrative revolution is in 
turn divided into three subtypes, the two sub-types I derive from Aristotle-Pareto 
and Ibn Khaldun are so labeled. The ‘constitutive’ type is my own invention, of-
fering the sharpest contrast to the state-centered or ‘Tocquevillian’ type in that it 
is the typical pattern of radical change in the political order through the enlarge-
ment of political community in ‘stateless societies,’ be they of 6th century BCE 
Greece or 7th century CE Arabia.  
In addition to this structural typology, we need to come to terms with the mo-
tives and goals of the revolutionaries as historical actors, and here I do what may 
be politically incorrect from the viewpoint of the theory community by using the 
term teleology, not in the strict Aristotelian sense but rather as a term denoting 
the directionality of revolution. Through teleology, I seek to capture the distinc-
tive direction of a revolution, its intended or intentionally prefigured conse-
quences. This ideal-typical characterization of revolutions as historical individu-
als is intended as a substitute for the putatively general or generic teleology of all 
revolutions as steps in the forward march of mankind in historical materialism 
and the popular 20th-century conception of revolution.  
The constitutive revolution of Sargon of Akkad had unified the city-temple-
states of Mesopotamia on the basis of the idea of universal monarchy. What 
Cleisthenes similarly achieved in Athens eighteen centuries later by means of 
democratic political reform, was done by Muhammad in the 7th century of the 
Common Era as a by-product of a religious revolution: the unification of the 
tribes of Arabia on the basis of Islam. In this essay I draw on the vast primary 
and secondary literature on the subject only for details that illuminate (a) the rise 
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of Islam as a ‘constitutive’ revolution, and (b) its teleology as set off by an 
apocalyptic vision and given its distinctive direction by a transcendental mono-
theism. 
 
 
The pre-condit ions of  a  consti tut ive revolut ion:  
The Arabian t r ibal  society on the periphery of  the 
two empires.  I ts  cultural  and re l ig ious unity and 
economic integrat ion 
 
In the 7th century, one can speak of an Arabian religion (din al´arab) whose be-
liefs and rituals were centred on a pantheon of interrelated tribal gods. These 
gods had their sanctuaries in the territory of a tribe, and were usually shared by 
allied tribes or those in the vicinity able to visit them. Such sharing of the divini-
ties, and participation in common fairs and festivals around their sanctuaries, 
made for religio-cultural unity (Chelhod 1955: 123-25). The sacred enclave was 
called hijr, where common rituals of initiation, pilgrimage to and circumambula-
tion of the sanctuary shrine with shaven heads were performed (Retsö 2002: 587, 
624). The most important divinities were Manât, the goddess of the tribes of 
Aws, Khazraj and Ghassân, the Lât, goddess of the Thaqif, and the ´Uzzâ, god-
dess of Muhammad’s tribe, the Quraysh, as well as the Kinâna, the Khuzâ`a and 
all of the Mudar confederacy.1 The three goddesses were considered the daugh-
ters of the paramount god, Allâh. Muhammad’s ancestor, Qusayy, had settled the 
Quraysh in the sacred enclave (haram) of Mecca just over a century before his 
birth. The custodianship (hijâba) of the House of Allâh, the Ka´ba, was secured 
for the Quraysh, and made them beneficiary of sacred immunity from attacks by 
other tribes (Peters 1994: 26, 69). Even though the custodial functions became 
divided among his descendants through the lines of Hâshim and ´Abd al-Dâr, 
Qusayy’s cultic reforms had a lasting effect, making him the “unifier” (mu-
jamma´) of the tribal union of the Quraysh on behalf of Allâh (Dostal 1991: 193-
98). Furthermore, Qusayy’s descendants succeeded in creating a supra-tribal col-
lective identity by founding or reconstructing a cultic union, the hums. Fabietti 
(1988: 32) considers this union a response “to the unreliability of a system based 
on the kinship model,” consisting in the superimposition on the tribal kinship 
system of a form of solidarity and cohesion based on religion (din), and Dostal 
(1991: 215-16) sees it as a response to the unsuccessful invasion of Mecca by 
Abraha, the Christian Ethiopian viceroy of Yemen in mid-6th-century CE. Be that 
as it may, the Quraysh linked their claim to be “the people (ahl) of Allah” to a 
 
1  The Arabian gods could be identified with those of the ecumenical pantheon of the 
antiquity. The ´Uzzâ, in particular, was already identified with Aphrodite at Petra in 
the 1st century CE (Bowersock 2003: 2). 
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covenant (´ahd) of their putative ancestor, Abraham, whose image, holding ar-
rows for the ritual of casting arrows in front of the idol Hubal, was only to be 
erased by Muhammad’s order (Rubin 1990: 104-107). 
The fact that the gods and their sanctuaries were usually shared by tribes 
made for a measure of religious and cultural unification. The religious unity of 
the Arab tribes of the Hijâz, Western Arabia, was thus periodically reaffirmed by 
their pilgrimages to the divine sanctuaries around Mecca. These gods offered 
their worshippers protection (Q. 8: 72), and could intercede on their behalf with 
the higher god, Allâh (Q. 10: 18; 30: 12) (Watt 1988: 32-33). Invaluable informa-
tion preserved in the pilgrimage formula of ritual invocation (talbiya) for the pre-
Islamic Arab tribes proves that the relationship between the supreme god, Allâh 
and the gods of the other tribes was conceived as partnership (shirk). Each tribe 
had its own invocation formula. That of the Nizâr was: “Here I am, O God, here I 
am; Thou hast no partners except such partners as Thou hast; Thou possessest 
him and all that is his [i.e., the partner’s]” (Kalbi 1924: 7; Kister 1980: 33, 50-
51), while Quraysh’s was cited in the Qur`ân (and became known as ‘the Satanic 
Verse’): “To the Lat and the ´Uzza, and Manât, the third and the other! Verily 
they are the high-flying cranes; and their intercession [with Allâh] is to be hoped 
for” (Kalbi: 19). The idol of the tribe of Khawlân, ´Umyânus, appears to have 
been associated with Allâh on a more equal footing, as the Khawlân were divid-
ing their cattle and harvest between the two (Kalbi: 43-44). The Qur`ân charac-
terizes the Arabian form of polytheism as ‘associationism’ (shirk), and its de-
scription of the Arabian tribes as “associationists” or believers in divine partner-
ship (mushrikun) is quite precise. They admitted the supreme authority of Allah 
but associated other tribal deities with him (Kister 1980: 48-49) Associationism 
was thus the linchpin of the religious unity of the segmented society of politically 
autonomous Arabian tribes.  
The polytheistic cult of idols that persisted beneath the Allâh-dominated as-
sociationism was deeply rooted in the social organization of tribal Arabia and 
cemented it. Not only each tribe, but each clan (batn) within it had its own idol. 
Lesser idols pertained to the lower echelons of social organization: noblemen of 
the clans had their own idols, and domestic idols symbolized and cemented the 
unity of the family (Kalbi 1924; Lecker 1993: 332, 342). This polytheistic tribal 
idolatry was hedged by a cult of vengeance (tha`r) with elaborate rituals than fos-
tered clan solidarity (Chelhod 1955: 101-104). Furthermore, their social ground-
ing gave the idols great political significance: in each clan, the idol was associ-
ated with its leader and with the clan assembly (majlis) (Lecker 1993: 342). 
The religious unification of Arabia was sustained by a modicum of linguistic 
unity. The tribes of the Hijaz were unified by one of the two lingue franche of the 
peninsula, the other being the language of the Northern and Central Arabian 
tribes. During the century preceding the rise of Islam, the organization of the lo-
cal trade by the Quraysh in the linguistically unified Hijaz had made for consid-
erable economic integration of Western Arabia. Trade fairs had grown in the pro-
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tected environs of the divine sanctuaries in Western Arabia, especially those 
around Mecca in conjunction with pilgrimage rites (Kister 1972: 76-77; Crone 
1987: 177-85). The Quraysh became traders under the leadership of Qusayy’s 
grandson, Hâshim, and played an important role in the growth of the caravan 
trade in the region. Meccan trade was “a trade conducted overwhelmingly with 
Arabs and generated by Arab […] needs” (Crone 1987: 149). The Quraysh were 
thus “the merchants of Arabs,” (Crone 1987: 153) and their trade acted as a force 
for economic unification of the Hijaz. Furthermore, it had important political im-
plications. The Quraysh created a military force consisting of mercenary Bedou-
ins and Ethiopians (ahâbish) to protect the caravans, which also enhanced its po-
litical predominance2 (Fahd 1989). Meccan trade was also based on pacts (ilâf) 
among the clans of the Quraysh and the Bedouin tribes, not only of mutual help 
and protection but also the guarding of caravan on a profit-sharing basis (Peters 
1994: 58-59, 68-69). The pacts amounted to a “Pax Meccana” in the Hijaz 
(Kister 1965: 120-21). The situation was, however, rife with tension and conflict. 
The disparate and heterogeneous coexistence of the commercial ethos of the city 
of Mecca, and the superimposition of religious unions on kingship ties did not 
always work smoothly. Rival religious and tribal cleavages could overlap, pro-
ducing intermittent conflict, as they did between Mecca and Tâ`if (Chelhod 1958: 
97, 113). This was inevitable as long as the religio-culturally unified and eco-
nomically integrated tribal society of Western Arabia remained segmented and 
without any central or otherwise unified political authority structure. 
Foreign political domination of Arabia is an important feature of the histori-
cal background of the rise of Islam. Arabia was on the periphery of three com-
pleting empires, the Persian, the Byzantine, and let us not forget, the Ethiopian.3 
The royal house of Himyar in southern Arabia had converted to Judaism in the 5th 
century. The Persians had conquered Southern Arabia toward the end of the 6th 
century, driving out the Ethiopians, and left a Persian colony, known as “the 
sons” (al-abnâ`) whose predominance had become truly tenuous by the time of 
the rise of Muhammad. Down to the end of the 6th century, the Persians also 
dominated much of north-eastern and northern-central Arabia, including Yathrib 
(the future Medina) through their Lakhmid Arab client state in the Hira (near the 
future Kufa).4 The Byzantines dominated north-western Arabia through their 
 
2  Some Ethiopian military presence is still found in Mecca during the 2nd Civil War, 
half a century after Muhammad’s death (Bashear 1997: 99-100). 
3  In the earlier centuries, the Ethiopian empire had been dominant in Southern Ara-
bia, but by the seventh century, it plays a subordinate role as an ally of the Byzan-
tines. 
4  The Sasanian empire was meanwhile undergoing the most serious crisis of its his-
tory. Military defeat by the Byzantines resulted in the deposition of Khosraw II by a 
praetorian coup in 628. Subsequent militarization of government produced a severe 
dynastic crisis in the Persian empire. Khosraw’s son, Shiruya, having killed all his 
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Ghassanid client tribal dynasty, and their influence in the south seems to have 
been growing through the Ethiopians (Hoyland 2001: 236-42). “And remember 
when you were few and abased in the land and were fearful that the people (al-
nâs) would snatch you away,” so the Qur`ân (8: 26) reminds the Arabs. ‘The 
people’ was taken by the earliest commentators to refer to the Persians (or the 
Persians and the Byzantines; Kister 1968. 143-44). The poet Qatâda affirms: “the 
Arabs were confined between the lions of Persia and Byzantium” (cited by Crone 
1987: 249). 
Persian authorities or their Lakhmid clients in Hira favoured the Jews of 
Yathrib for much of the 6th century. The Jewish tribes of Nadir and Qurayza 
dominated Yathrib (they were said to be its “kings”) as agents of the Persian em-
peror for whom they collected taxes. When the Nadir and the Qurayza lost this 
important fiscal function, which was given to an Arab from the Khazraj tribe 
about the beginning of the last quarter of the 6th century, their economic power 
declined (Kister 1968: 147; 1979: 330). The political status of the Jews declined 
more sharply. By the time of the migration of Muhammad in 622, though still 
considerably richer than the Arabs (Serjeant 1978: 3; Newby 1988: 17), the Jews 
of Yathrib were either the allies or clients of the Arab tribes of Aws and Khazraj. 
The Christians of Najran and southern Arabia were under Byzantine domination. 
It does not seem too unreasonable to conclude from our admittedly scanty evi-
dence that when Muhammad brought the Koran in Arabic, Judaism and the vari-
ous forms of Christianity were already hopelessly compromised by the strong 
identification with foreign domination, taxation and warfare” (Newby 1988: 47-
48). References in the Qur`ân (Kassis 1983: 274) to itself as the “Arabic Recita-
tion (Qur`ân)” (Q. 20: 113; 42: 7; 43: 3) and an “Arabic judgment” (Q. 13: 37), 
and to “Arabic tongue” (Q. 16: 103; 26: 195; 46: 12) effectively present Islam as 
an alternative to foreign religions5 (Watt 1956: 143). Muhammad thus began his 
prophetic career in Mecca as God’s messenger to the Arabs (Welch 1983: 196), 
“a people (qaum) to whom no warner came before thee” (Q. 32: 3). “And so We 
 
brothers, died in less than a year, and was succeeded by a minor son. In 630, the 
year of victory for Islam when Muhammad took Mecca, the commander of the pal-
ace guards opened the gates of the capital, Ctesiphon, to a usurper who was in turn 
killed by the spear of a guardsman shortly afterwards (Morony 1984: 92). Another 
minor was put on the throne but soon left it vacant for a woman, Khosraw II’s 
daughter, Bôrân, who failed to revive the glory of divine Sasanian kinship and was 
assassinated by a general. (Daryaee 1999). She was further to take the blame of sub-
sequent historians for the disintegration of the empire: “and with that – she being 
the ruler of Persia, their dominion weakened and their glory lapsed […]. The word 
spread throughout the world that the land of Persia did not have a king, and that 
they were seeking shelter at the gates of a woman” (Dinawari: 111). Severe political 
crisis in the Sasanian empire left the Persian agents in eastern Arabia and the Per-
sian colonists in the Yemen helplessly vulnerable to their local opponents and eager 
to court the rising power of Muhammad. 
5  The adjective ´arabi (Arabic) is aid to occur in the Qur`ân for the first time. 
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have revealed to thee an Arabic Recitation, that thou mayest warn the Mother of 
Cities and those who dwell about it […]” (Q. 42: 7). 
 
 
Transcendent  monotheism and 
apocalypt ic messianism 
 
The two or three empires for which Arabia was a common periphery were cen-
ters of two axial civilizations which were witnessing vigorous growth of univer-
salist religions of transcendence, or ‘world religions’ in Max Weber’s terms: 
Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Manichaeism crossing the two. The Arabian re-
ligion embedded in peninsular kinship and tribal institutions, as depicted above, 
had in fact not remained immune from ecumenical religious aspirations to tran-
scendence and universalism. Muhammad drew two critical components of Islam 
from the ecumenical culture of the late antiquity: apocalyptic messianism and 
transcendent monotheism. Both components are essential for understanding the 
rise of Islam as a revolution. Apocalyptic messianism supplied the key factor in 
the causation of the revolutionary break with embedded religion, the second in its 
long-term teleology or the subsequent evolution of Islam. In other words, the first 
explains the motivation of his revolution in Arabia, the second its global conse-
quences – the new empire and axial civilization it gave birth to. 
In the forthcoming book, I also present apocalyptic messianism as the contri-
bution of the Maccabean revolt to world history, a contribution made not by the 
winners of the revolution but by the losers who withdrew to the desert to form 
the Qumran community. Although the Qumran settlement was destroyed by the 
Roman army of Vespasian, the Messianism they has sustained in institutionalized 
form for two centuries survived them and was passed on to Christianity, Rabbini-
cal Judaism and Islam. The broader apocalyptic frame of Messianism was carried 
by them and by other sectarian groups through the intertestamental period, and 
was taken up by the Christians. The Enochic circles effected the other-worldly 
transposition of political Messianism in the Similitudes of Enoch (Enoch, 1, 37-
71), as did the Christians gradually after the destruction of the Temple in 70 CE. 
Other apocalyptic notions survived and coalesced with Messianism, notably that 
of the prophet of the end of time, which informs the apocalyptic reconstruction of 
Elijah as the returning prophet. The apocalyptic perspective of the Book of 
Daniel was especially privileged, as the Maccabean winners of the revolutionary 
power struggle had appropriated its ideas and effected its inclusion in the Old 
Testament canon. Centuries later, the apocalyptic world-view found a forceful 
statement in the early, Meccan, verses of the Koran on the coming of the Hour. 
These marked the inception of some two decades of revolutionary “absolute poli-
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tics”6 in the remote Arabian periphery of the empires that changed the course of 
world history. 
There can be little doubt that the apocalyptic notions of the Enochic circle 
were known to the Jews of Arabia in the 7th century, as was the Danielic tradi-
tion. The Book of Enoch has survived in Ethiopian. Its notions may well have 
penetrated Southern Arabia through their domination.7 It is certain that the 
Karaite Jews of the 9th century were called Sadduccees by their opponents, while 
considering themselves the Righteous (saddiqin) and the sons of Righteousness 
(sâdôq), that their missionaries called themselves the wise (maœkilim) in the 
Danielic tradition, and that they carried the religious tradition of the Essenes in 
the Islamic era8 (Erder 1994). It is also more than probable that the Essenes, or 
unorthodox Jewish sectarians influenced by them, were present in 7th-century 
Arabia (Erder 1990: 349-50). The religious leaders of these sectarians were evi-
dently not called Rabbis but ahbâr (haberim in Hebrew; Rabin 1957: 123); and 
incidentally, quite a number of them converted to Islam (Newby 1988: 86). Most 
apocalyptic notions of early Islam can be traced to Jewish sectarian sources, even 
though the central messianic idea of the paraclete came from Christianity. There 
may also have been some Manichaean influence, as we have record of an attempt 
to introduce it to Arabia through the teaching of Mazdak at the end of the 5th cen-
tury that left behind a number of “Mazdakites/Manichaeans (zanâdiqa) of 
Mecca” (Gil 1992: 19-33, 42). The Manicheans, too, had been receptive to the 
Enochic and Christian apocalyptic lore. 
The Enochic idea of the heavenly tablet (Enoch, 1, 90), as the archetype of all 
revealed books, is crucial in informing the Qur`ânic conception of revelation ac-
cording to which the heavenly archetype and eternal source of all revelation is 
“the preserved tablet” or “the Mother of Books.” The Koran (19: 57-58; 21: 85-
86) mentions Enoch twice as Idris, which is etymologically traceable to the 
Qumranic dôrçsh ha-Torah (Interpreter of the Law) (Erder 1990; Gill 1992: 34-
35), uses the epithet siddiq whose Zadokite connotation is evident, and alludes to 
 
6  As defined in Pizzorno 1994. 
7  The eighty-two early Muslim converts who took refuge in Ethiopia during the Mec-
can persecution may also have brought back some Enochic notions. Furthermore, 
we find twenty-two Christians from Ethiopia or Najran among other early converts 
(Life: 146-48, 179-80). 
8  Erder (1994: 197, 210-12) goes further and argues that the name ‘qârâ’im 
(Karaites)’ was derived from qeri’è ha-šem associated with “the Sons of Sâdôq” in 
the Damascus Covenant, which was, incidentally, found among the Geniza docu-
ments in Cairo and published as a Zadokitte work in 1910. What Erder calls the 
Karaites “Sadduccee dilemma” ceases to be dilemma if we adopt the most obvious 
interpretation of the evidence – namely that the Karaites and the Zadokites, both of 
whom rejected the Oral Law of the Rabbis, are the same group separated by a few 
centuries. In my forthcoming book, I emphasize the Zadokite/Sadduccee identity of 
the Qumran leaders. 
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his heavenly ascension (Q. 19: 57). There are traces of influence of the oldest 
section of the Book of Enoch, the Book of Watchers, in the Qur`ân (Crone un-
published), and Ezra, another major figure of the Enochic and Judaeo-Christian 
apocalyptic lore, is mentioned once in the Qur`ân in the diminutive form of 
´Uzayr. By the time of the Fourth Ezra and in the subsequent literature, Ezra the 
scribe had become Ezra the prophet. Ezra was identified with Enoch and appears 
as the key figure in the mystical speculations of the Jewish communities of Ara-
bia9 (Newby 1988: 60-61). At the beginning of Ezra IV, which circulated not 
only in Syriac but also in Arabic, Ezra is clearly presented as a Second Moses 
(Ezra, 4, 14: 1-6); and it is as the messianic “prophet like Moses” that he enters 
into Islam. The phrase occurs in a poem attributed to Muhammad’s uncle and 
protector, Abu Tâlib: “We have found Muhammad, a prophet like Moses, de-
scribed in the oldest books.”10 (Life: 160) 
The paraclete is referred to in Q. 61: 6, where Jesus son of Mary gives the 
children of Israel “good tidings of a messenger who shall come after me and 
whose name shall be more praised/Ahmad (ismuhu ahmadu).” The Koranic 
statement is a reasonable paraphrase of the promise of the coming of the para-
clete in Jn 16: 13-1411 (Life: 104; Arjomand 1998: 241-42). The paracletic term, 
ahmad, also occurs in the above-mentioned poem by Abu Tâlib. 
Daniel is not mentioned in the Koran. This is surprising in view of the evi-
dent influence of the Book of Daniel. The reference to Abraham as the friend of 
God (Dan. 3: 35), which also occurs in the Essene Damascus Covenant, is carried 
over to the Koran (4: 124). Gabriel and Michael, the two archangels who are in-
troduced to the Hebrew Bible in the Book of Daniel are both mentioned in the 
Koran. In fact, Gabriel’s role in hierophany and audition (Dan. 10: 4-11.1) be-
comes central; Gabriel is not only as the angel of revelation but is also seen by 
the Islamic tradition as Muhammad’s frequent counselor. Last but not least, the 
Danielic notion of setting the seal on prophecy (Dan. 9: 24), crucially influenced 
Muhammad’s idea of final prophecy. 
 
9  The assertion in the Qur`ân (9: 30) that “the Jews say ´Uzayr is the son of God as 
the Christians say the Messiah is the son of God” should be understood in this light, 
especially as we have Ibn Hazm’s gloss that the referent is the Sadduccee sect of the 
Yemen (cited in Erder 1990: 349). An interesting refutation of the divine status of 
the prophets in the apocalyptic lore is found in an inscription dated 786/170 that as-
serts that Muhammad, Jesus and ´Uzayr are just servants of God, like all other crea-
tures (Nevo and Koren 2003: 398). 
10  See also Ibn Ishâq: 353; Life: 240. 
11  The influence of the Gospel of John may have been reinforced through 
Manichaeism. Indeed, Biruni’s (1879: 190) statement is a striking presentation of 
the great Babylonian prophet, Mâni (d. 277) as the forerunner of Muhammad: “In 
his gospel […] he says that he is the paraclete announced by the Messiah, and that 
he is the seal of the prophets (i.e. the last of them).” Be that as it may, the Muslim 
tradition came to consider Ahmad (“more praised”) a variant of Muhammad and 
another name for the Prophet, and identified him with the paraclete. 
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There can be little doubt that the notion of Seal (khâtam) is apocalyptic, as is 
its Hebrew cognate, khotam.12 The basic tenet of primitive Islam, according to 
Casanova (1911: 8) was that “the time announced by Daniel and Jesus had come. 
Muhammad was the last prophet chosen by God to preside, at the end of time, 
over the universal resurrection and Last Judgement.” His argument for equating 
the expression “Seal of the Prophets” (khâtam al-nabiyyin) with “the prophet/ 
messenger of the end of time” (nabiy/rasul âkhir al-zamân) is persuasive (Casa-
nova 1911: 18, 207-13, 228). It should also be noted that the early traditions con-
sider the seal of prophecy a physical mark of prophecy between Muhammad’s 
shoulders, variously described as a dark mole or a lump the size of a pigeon’s 
egg (Life, 80; Ibn Sa´d 1: 106-7, 2: 131-32), or alternatively on his chest. Ac-
cording to one well-known tradition, the finality of Muhammad’s prophecy itself 
is apocalyptic: “I am Muhammad, and I am the Paraclete (ahmad), and I am the 
resurrector (hâshir) – the people are resurrected upon my steps – and I am the fi-
nal one – there is no prophet after me” (Mas´udi, 3: 7). An earlier variant in-
cludes “and the prophet of the malhama (tribulations of the end of time)” 
(Tabari, 9: 156n, 1066). The epithet “Prophet/Messenger of the malhama” is 
even more decisive, and is attested for Muhammad in several other early tradi-
tions as well (Ibn Sa´d, 1: 65; Casanova 1911: 49-53). Malhama, a loan word 
from the Hebrew milhâmâ (war), is the same as notion as the one we find in the 
apocalyptic War Rule and other texts from the Qumran13 (Rabin 1957: 118-19). 
Let us close with one last apocalyptic tradition which has Muhammad saying: “I 
was chosen prophet together with the Hour; it almost came ahead of me” (Cited, 
together with some other similar ones in Arjomand 1998: 246). 
In contrast to the apocalyptic beginning of Islam, which is largely ignored, its 
monotheism is obvious and generally acknowledged. We shall bring it to our 
analysis of the teleology of Muhammad’s revolution in Arabia. What needs to be 
emphasized at this point is that the Jewish and Christian communities of Arabia 
were not the only bearers of monotheism. There was a third group known as the 
Hanifiyya. Given the scanty references found to the Arab monotheism identified 
by the Qur`ân as the remnant of the religion of Abraham, the hanif, we can only 
speculate on their probable role in the transmission of the above-outlined apoca-
 
12  The Hebrew cognate khotam is the messianic signet-ring of Haggai 2:23, where 
Yahwe declares to Zerubbabel: “I shall take you […] and make you like a signet-
ring; for I have chosen you.” The apocalyptic connotation of the term is made ex-
plicit, and is, furthermore, applied to prophecy by Daniel who speaks of the time for 
setting the seal on prophecy (Dan. 9: 24) and is told by Gabriel to “keep the book 
sealed until the end of time” (Dan. 12: 1). 
13  Rabin (1957: 119) also traces the Qumranic origins of the Islamic apocalyptic terms 
hashr, mentioned above, and harj (Hebrew, heregh [slaughter]). 
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lyptic lore to Islam.14 We can, however, be certain that the religion of the hanif s 
was a form of monotheism associated with the belief in foundation of the Ka´ba 
by Abraham and the settlement in Mecca of his son Ishmael, with the ritual of 
hajj, and with the sacrifice of animals consecrated to the Ka´ba (Rubin 1990: 92, 
102; Bashear 2004). Their tabliya formula for the ritual of hajj, however, was 
significantly monotheistic, and unlike those of the other tribes mentioned above, 
did not identify any partners for God (Rubin 1990: 100; Bashear 2004: 5-6). Mu-
hammad very successful in identify with it and appropriating its core Abrahamic 
tenet and ritual for Islam. There remained, however, a group of hanifs who re-
fused to convert to Islam, and were led by the monk Abu ´Âmir, who had fought 
against the Muslims in the battle of Uhud, as an opposition group to Muhammad 
in Medina in the last years of the Prophet’s life (Watt 1956: 189-90; Gil 1987, 
1992). 
 
 
The new revelat ion and Is lam as submission to 
one universal ly-acknowledged God  
 
One day in the month of Ramadhan at the end of the first decade of the 7th cen-
tury, when in seclusion following the ancient custom of the Quraysh,15 Muham-
mad b. ´AbdAllâh, a trader with skins about forty years of age, received the call 
to prophecy. He was shaken until reassured by his wife’s cousin, Zayd b. ´Amr b. 
Nufayl, a hanif monotheist, who swore by the God who held his soul that “thou 
art the prophet of this people” (Life: 105-107). According to another report, Zayd 
had said: “I expect a prophet from the descendants of Ishmael […] who has the 
seal of prophethood between his shoulders. His name is Ahmad” (Tabari, 6: 64). 
The Qur`ân was later to confirm that God sends to the ‘gentiles’ of the ‘unscrip-
tured’ (ummiyyun) “a messenger, (one) of themselves, to recite to them His signs 
[…]” (Q. 62: 2; Watt 1988: 53). And Muhammad was indeed “the gentile 
prophet” (al-nabiyy al-ummi), whom they find written down with them in the To-
rah and the Gospel […]. Believe then in God, and in his messenger, the gentile 
prophet […]” (Q. 7: 156, 158). 
The attestation of messianic expectations among the Jews of Arabia in Mus-
lim traditions (Life: 197-98, 240; Ibn Sa´d, 1: 103-104) cannot be dismissed as an 
Islamic version of praeparatio evangelicorum, as it is corroborated by Jewish and 
Syriac sources (Lewis 1953; Cook & Crone 1977: ch. 1). It is worth noting that 
one particular tradition, doctored to suggest the Jews of Medina expected it to 
 
14  There is some indication that they expected a new prophet (Life: 98), and that one 
hanif, Umayya b. Abi’l-Salt of Tâ’if, claimed to be one (Rubin 1990: 90, 96; 1995: 
72-75). 
15  The custom of tahannuth: seclusion in mount Hirâ,’ followed by feeding the poor 
and ending with the circumambulation of the Ka´ba (Kister 1968). 
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become “the sacred enclave/place of migration (muhâjar) for a prophet from the 
Quraysh” retains the significant (and inconvenient) phrase “at the end of time (fi 
âkhir al-zamân)” (Ibn Ishâq: 13-14; Life: 7, translation misleading). Further-
more, it is clear from the Qur`ân that the acceptance of Muhammad messianic 
claim by the few converts among the “people of the book” was of great psycho-
logical importance to his early in his career. Two elements from the Judaeo-
Christian apocalyptic tradition thus stand out in Muhammad’s earliest messages: 
he was the gentile prophet sent to the people of Arabia, and he was the prophet of 
the end of time. 
In this Meccan period, as he encountered mounting opposition from his own 
oligarchic clan of Quraysh, Muhammad was repeatedly told in the Qur`ân to dis-
tance himself from them and to seek confirmation from the people to whom the 
Book or Knowledge has already been given (Rahman 1976: 11-12). In addition 
to reports of the acceptance of Muhammad as the prophet of the end of time by 
Jewish converts in his biography (Life: 240-41), the Qur`ân itself contains evi-
dence of the acceptance of Muhammad’s messianic claim in the course of the 
emotional experience of conversion: 
 
Say to them [i.e., to the recalcitrant Meccans], O Muhammad, ‘Whether you believe in 
[the Qur`ân] or not, those who have been given the Knowledge before it, when it is re-
cited to them, fall upon their faces in prostration. And they say, ‘Glory be to our Lord! 
Our Lord’s promise has been fulfilled.’ And they fall upon their faces weeping […] (Q. 
17: 107). 
 
There is ample evidence of apocalypticism in the early, Meccan, verses of the 
Qur`ân which speak of the coming of the Hour as the prelude to Resurrection: 
“The Hour has drawn near and the moon is split;” (Q. 54: 1) “The Hour is com-
ing, no doubt of it;” (Q. 22: 7; 40: 59[61]) “Haply the Hour is near;” (Q. 33: 63; 
42: 17[16]) and “surely the earthquake of the Hour is a mighty thing” (Q. 22: 1). 
The apocalyptic Hour is the earthly prelude to eschatology. It is the hour of ca-
lamity that precedes Resurrection.16 The appearance of the Beast (Q. 27: 82) and 
such cosmic cataclysms as the smoke (dukhân; Q. 44: 10), the rolling up (takwir; 
Q. 81) of the sun, the darkening of the stars and the movement of the mountains 
(Q. 81: 2-4), the splitting (infitâr; Q. 82) of the sky, the scattering of the stars and 
the swarming over of the seas (Q. 82: 2-4) are evidently the signs of the Day of 
Resurrection “when the tombs are overthrown” (Q. 82: 5). The Qur`ân also 
 
16  A number of mostly obscure catastrophic terms for the occurrence at the Hour are 
identified by the early commentators with the Day of Resurrection. These include 
âzifa (the imminent) (Q. 40:18, 53:58), wâqi´a (terror) (Q. 56; 69: 15), râjifa and 
râdifa (quake and second quake) (Q. 79: 6-7), âkhkha (blast) (Q. 80: 34-36), 
ghâshiya (enveloper) (Q. 88), zilzila and zalzâl (earthquake) (Q. 99; 99: 1) and 
qâri´a (clatterer) (Q. 69:4, 101; 101:1-3). 
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speaks (14: 49) of “the day the earth shall be transformed to other than the earth.” 
The mountains will be pulverized into dust (Q. 56: 4-6), or become like plucked 
tufts of wool (Q. 70: 9). A few signs of social disorder accompany cosmic cata-
clysms: “And when the Blast shall sound, upon the day when a man shall flee 
from his brother, his mother, his father, his consort, his sons” (Q. 80: 33-36). 
At the Hour, “the Trumpet (sur) shall be blown; that is the Day of the Threat 
[…]. And listen thou for the day when the caller shall call from a near place. On 
the day they hear the Cry (sayha) in truth, that is the day of coming forth” (Q. 50: 
19, 40-41). The Cry is not unprecedented; it is a portent of God’s physical de-
struction of the nations which had disowned their prophets in sacred history (Q. 
11: 67, 94). But the final day has no precedent. It is indeed “the day when the 
earth is split asunder about them as they hasten forth” (Q. 50: 43). “For the 
Trumpet shall be blown, and whosoever is in the heavens and whosoever is in the 
earth shall swoon, save whom God wills. Then it shall be blown again, and lo, 
they shall stand, beholding. And the earth shall shine with the light of its Lord 
[…]” (Q. 39: 69-70). This final transfiguration of the earth is presumably “the 
new creation” (Q. 14: 22). 
Muhammad also preached the absolute transcendence of Allâh as the One 
God who came to sublimate other divinities. Muhammad’s Lord (rabb) in the 
earliest verses of the Qur`ân (Watt 1988: 87-88), is identified with the Lord of 
All Being/the worlds (rabb al-´âlamin) “who sent Moses as his Messenger (Q. 7: 
61, 67, 104; 26: 16). This ecumenical “One God” or “the lord of all,” attested in 
Greek funerary inscriptions in Palestine from the 4th, 5th and 6th centuries was 
identified, much more frequently in the later verses, with Allâh as the Lord of the 
Ka´ba and God of Abraham, Moses and Jesus. It followed that the mission of the 
Messenger of the God of universe was also universal: 
 
We have not sent thee, save as a mercy to all being/the worlds (Q. 21: 107). 
 
Say: “O mankind (al-nâs) I am the Messenger of God to You all,17 of Him to whom be-
longs the kingdom of heavens and the earth. There is no god but He. (Q. 7: 158).  
 
Muhammad also assimilated the transcendent, universal god of southern Arabia, 
the Rahmân (Merciful One), to Allâh. The Rahmân is attested in late 4th-century 
Himyarite inscriptions as the “Lord of heaven and earth,” and in the mid-6th in-
scription recording the expedition of Abraha, the Ethiopian viceroy whose Chris-
tianity is attested in other sources, begins in the name of the Merciful One and 
“his Anointed One (messiah), king Arbaha” (cited in Hoyland 2001: 556). The 
 
17  Q. 34: 28 is more emphatic in this respect: “We have sent thee not except to all of 
the people (illa kâffatan li’l-nâs).” For a discussion of all these verses, see Welch 
49-51). 
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Rahmân was also known closer to Mecca in the Yamâma in central Arabia, and 
his angels were believed to be all female (Q. 43: 19). Muhammad appropriated 
him as an epithet of Allâh or one of his “most beautiful names” (Q. 17: 110) de-
spite the resistance of the Meccans, who professed “unbelief at the mention of the 
Rahmân.”18 (Q. 21: 36; also Q. 13: 30; Peters 1994: 48, 156-57; Kister 2002: 5-6) 
With less resistance, some lesser divinities would be transformed to God’s beau-
tiful names, others demoted to the rank of angels (Watt: 1988: 90-91) and a few 
discarded as mere names (Q. 53: 23). Just as Abraham had submitted, or surren-
dered himself to the Lord of all Being (Q. 2: 131), those who accepted Muham-
mad’s new revelation of monotheism and thereby became ‘Muslims’ were 
sternly required to worship the One God exclusively.  
Starting point was the predominant position of Allâh in the associationists’ 
pantheon, Muhammad considered anyone who rejected partners for God and de-
clared his/her exclusive belonging to Him had submitted to the Lord of all Being 
(Q. 40: 66) or “undergone Islam (aslama)” (the term ‘islâm’ soon assumed the 
congruent meaning of submission; Baneth 1971: 188-89). His message of tran-
scendental monotheism thus struck at the heart of associationism (shirk) – the so-
cial or embedded religion19 of segmented Arabia whose main beneficiary, his 
own tribe of Quraysh, began to persecute him and his followers.  
Muhammad began to look for a sacred enclave (hjr, muhajar, dâr al-hijra),20 
and began making discreet enquiries among visitors to the trade fairs at the di-
vine sanctuaries around Mecca. At that time, after just over a decade of preaching 
in Mecca, Muhammad had built a small community of the faithful numbering 
barely over a hundred. 
 
 
Mobil izat ion for  Holy Struggle ( j ihâd)  and 
the construct ion of  a  new community 
 
The evident demise of mediated Persian authority in Yathrib had aggravated the 
endemic violence typical of segmented “stateless societies,” setting its main 
tribes of Aws and Khazraj in unresolved deadly conflict. What was needed for its 
resolution was a holy judge-arbiter (hakam), the only native extra-tribal authority 
known in Arabia and one similar to the judges of the Old Testament. A number 
 
18  According to one report, a presumably early convert who had changed his name 
upon conversation to ´Abd al-Rahmân was asked by a Meccan friend to adopt a dif-
ferent name because “I don’t know al-Rahmân!” (Life: 302).  
19  ‘Social,” as conceived by W. Robertson Smith and E. Durkheim, and ‘embedded’ in 
contrast to world or transcendental religion, as conceived by M. Weber and S.N. 
Eisenstadt. 
20  See Serjeant (1982: 26-27) for the pre-Islamic attestation and meaning of the no-
tion. 
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of aldermen (naqibs) from Yathrib were in charge of the search for one, and met 
Muhammad at the trade fair. According to the earliest account of a meeting be-
tween Muhammad and the Yathribites in ´Aqaba by ´Urwa b. al-Zubair, the al-
dermen gave Muhammad the following pledge: “We are of you and you are of 
us, whoever comes to us of your companions, or you yourself if you come to us, 
we shall defend you (numni´ka) as we would defend ourselves” (Tabari 6: 136; 
Mèlaméde 1934). They probably also gave him an armed escort of 4 or 5 body-
guards who later migrated with Muhammad (Lecker 2000: 164-65). As the heav-
enly counterpart to the pledge of the ´Aqaba, Muhammad received permission to 
fight (Q. 22: 40-42), whereupon he ordered his companions to migrate from 
Mecca to the future Medina (Life: 213). The prophet thus chose his sacred en-
clave, and embarked on the “migration” [to a sacred enclave] (hijra) that was to 
mark the beginning of the Islamic era. Those who undertook hijra and joined him 
in the sacred enclave had the special status of Migrant (muhâjir). God’s permis-
sion to fight was probably first given to the Migrants “who have been expelled 
from their dwellings without any cause,” (Q. 22: 39) and then to all Muslims “to 
fight in the way of God” (Q. 2: 244).21 The coincidence of the two orders is not 
an accidental event in Muhammad’s biography but was essential to his struggle 
for this-worldly translation of the apocalyptic vision that began in Medina. This 
is proven by the striking association between migration (hijra) and the struggle 
(jihâd) “in the path of God” (Q. 8: 71-73; 9: 19-20) in the Qur`ân (Crone 1994: 
354-55).  
Migrating to the sacred enclave of Allah meant foregoing the protection of 
the partner-god and thus discarding associationism with monotheism (Watt 1988: 
20, 25). This was the condition sine qua non of Islam or submission to God: “To 
those who believed but did not make the hijra it is not for you (pl. to give ‘pro-
tection’ (wilâya) until they do make the hijra” (Q. 8: 72). Muhammad also had to 
derive his own authority exclusively from God. It is striking the very frequent 
references to Muhammad as the Messenger of God occur exclusively in the Me-
dinan verses of the Qur`ân (Welch 1983: 43).  
Upon his arrival, Muhammad found the inhabitants of Medina “a mixed lot, 
consisting of the believers united by the mission (da´wa) of the Messenger of 
God, the polytheists who worshiped idols, and the Jews who were the armored 
people of the forts and the allies (halifs) of the tribes of Aws and Khazraj, and 
wished to establish concord among all of them” (Report from Bayhaqi repro-
duced in Lecker 1995: 31) Muhammad’s emigrants were supporter by the Medi-
nan believers, and organized several raids against the caravans of the Quraysh, 
typically by a handful of Muslims, to sustain themselves from booty. 
Muhammad, the prophet of the end of time, did begin the conquest of Arabia 
 
21  Other – presumably somewhat later – verses promise paradise as a reward (Watt 
1956: 4-5). 
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as the Prophet of the malhama; his apocalyptic battle was no other than the battle 
of Badr in Ramadan of year 2/March 624 when God, according to the Qur`ân (3: 
123-25), sent down three thousand angels to fight alongside his army.22 Just as 
God had sent Michael to help in the great apocalyptic battle of the Book of 
Daniel, the Muslim tradition has Gabriel and Michael each lead a thousand an-
gelic troops to the right and the left of Muhammad (and archangel Isrâfil is added 
at the head of another thousand to reach the number given in the Qur`ân; Wâqidi, 
1: 57-71, 113; Ibn Sa´d, 3: 9), and considers the battle of Badr as “the day of re-
demption/deliverance (furqân)” mentioned in Q. 8: 41 as a parallel to Ex. 14: 13. 
With the help of the angelic host, Muhammad’s three hundred or so holy warri-
ors, who constituted almost the entire body of male Muslims at the time, defeated 
an army consisting of three times as many Meccans and their allies. The rich 
booty was distributed among the 313 or 314 holy warriors, three quarters of 
whom were Medinan converts23 (Wâqidi, 1: 23; Life: 336). 
The battle of Badr also sealed the institutionalization of holy warfare as the 
distinctive Islamic path of revolutionary struggle for the religion of God (din 
Allâh): “Fight them until there is no more persecution and religion, all of it, is 
God’s” (Q. 8: 39). In fact, Sura 8 of the Qur`ân (Anfâl), believed to have been 
revealed as divine commentary on the battle of Badr (Wâqidi, 1: 131-31), or a 
section thereof, was often read to the Muslim armies before battle during the 
Muslim conquests.  
Most of the Badr prisoners were ransomed to support the new Muslim com-
munity, but two anti-Muhammad pagan intellectuals were executed. The victory 
was also used by Muhammad to have two Medinan pagan intellectual opponents 
of Islam executed by their own converted clansmen (to avoid vengeance and 
payment of blood money)24 (Watt 1956: 178-79). A few months later (625/3), 
Muhammad besieged the fortification of the Jewish clan of Qaynuqâ´, whose 
strength is put at three hundred armored men and four hundred men without mail 
(Life: 363), until they surrendered unconditionally. Their Arab protector from the 
tribe of Khazraj, ´Abd Allâh b. Ubayy, who almost passed for a king before Mu-
hammad’s arrival (Life: 279), interceded for them. He reportedly felt confident 
enough to grab the Prophet by the neck until the latter said: “You can have 
them!” (Life: 363) The lives of the Jewish clan were spared, but they were ex-
propriated and expelled from the Medina settlement. This alarmed a half-Arab 
nobleman of the Jewish clan of Nadir, Ka´b b. al-Ashraf, who went to Mecca to 
 
22  According to ´Abdallâb b. ´Abbâs, the angels wore white turbans in the battle of 
Badr and red turbans a few years later at Hunayn (where they helped but without 
fighting; Life: 303-4). 
23  According to Wâqidi, their number was 313, 5 of whom were not present during the 
distribution of booty. 
24  They belonged to the Aws Manât, the majority of whose clans broke their idols and 
converted to Islam, changing its name to Aws Allâh (Watt 1956: 178-79). 
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confer with the Quraysh and began composing anti-Muslim satires. Muhammad 
sanctioned a conspiracy involving Ka´b’s half-brother to assassinate him and ab-
solved the conspirators from the sin of lying. After the assassination of Ka´b b. 
al-Ashraf, he reportedly added the injunction, “Kill any Jew that falls into you 
power,” whereupon an Arab wantonly murdered his Jewish ally. The murder of 
Ka´b b. al-Ashraf “cast terror among the Jews, and there was not a Jew in Me-
dina who did not fear for him life” (Life: 367-69). At this point some Jewish 
leaders approached Muhammad, and he seized the opportunity to conclude a pact 
with them that reaffirmed the status of the Jews as members of the unified com-
munity of Medina but also obligated them to pay the war tax (Serjeant 1978: 32). 
The pact, which was kept by ´Ali b. Abi Tâlib (Lecker 1995: 26), formed the nu-
cleus of what modern scholars have referred to as “the constitution of Medina” 
(CM; Wellhausen 1975; Humphreys 1991: 92-98). 
While proselytizing and winning new converts who would accept his pro-
phetic authority on the basis of the new revelation, Muhammad wasted no time 
consolidating his authority as a judge-arbiter (hakam) according to Arabian cus-
tomary law, which included legislative authority (Serjeant 1978: 1-2). In doing 
so, he needed divine succor, and the phrase “obey God and His messenger” ap-
pears some forty times in the Qur`ân in Verses that are mostly dated to his first 
three years in Medina (Watt 1956: 233). In this series of pacts, which were cor-
rectly executed, “Muhammad the Prophet (al-nabi)” (CM: A.1) secured recogni-
tion of his authority as the judge-arbiter to whom all disputes were to be referred 
on behalf of Allâh (CM: B.4). One of the later Clauses reiterates the requirement 
of referring disputes “to Allâh and to Muhammad, the Messenger of Allâh” (CM; 
F4). The potentially expansive quality of this authority is evident. Those subject 
to this authority are constituted “a unified community (umma wâhida) set apart 
from [other] people” (CM: A.2a). The Qur`ân (21: 92) duly sanctioned the new 
social compact for the believers: “This community of yours is a unified commu-
nity, and I am your Lord, so worship me.”25 Although the unified community was 
religiously plural and “a rather loose heterogeneous political entity,” comprising 
not only the Muslims but also non-Muslim clans. As the Muslims were its soul, 
“the more the new faith grew, the more the umma overshadowed the clans” 
(Wellhausen 1975: 131). 
Medina was still tribally organized, with each clan “in charge of the man-
agement of its affairs,” joint payment of blood-monies and collective responsibil-
ity for ransoming its prisoners (CM: A.2c-j). The Migrants of Quraysh were con-
stituted into a clan alongside those of the Aws and the Khazraj. Individuals who 
would lose the protection of their tribes by joining the united community were 
 
25  Serjeant (1978: 5-7) sees Q. 3: 101-103 as a further reference to the new social pact. 
The term “umma wâhida” occurs eight times in the Qur`ân. See Rubin 1985: 134-38 
for citations.  
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compensated according to the customary blood-money and ransom rates (CM: 
A.3a); and the Jews joining it were assured parity (CM: A.8). All covenanters 
with Muhammad (mu`minin)26 were declared to be under the security (dhimma) 
of God, which the least of them could extend on behalf of all (as any member of 
a clan could pledge protection on its behalf; CM: A.7) A covenanter was, on the 
other hand, forbidden to kill another in retaliation for an infidel (among his 
kinsmen; CM: A.6); and the united community was given collective responsibil-
ity for the punishment of crimes against its members and for treason (CM: A.5). 
The inner part of Medina was declared a sacred (harâm) for the covenanters 
(CM: F, H; Denny 1977: 45), just as Abraham had reportedly declared Mecca a 
sacred area (Rubin 1985: 11). A pact of tolerance allowed the Jewish covenanters 
of the united community to have their religion, as the Muslims had theirs, as long 
as they paid the war levy (nafaqa) alongside the other covenanters and refrained 
from treason (CM: E.3-3b, G; Rubin 1985: 12). 
This last clause points to the crucial fact that, from the moment of constitu-
tion of a new community, Muhammad was also making constitutional provisions 
for the (revolutionary) struggle in the path of God. That a levy was imposed on 
the covenanters and their Jewish affiliates for the purpose is a minor aspect of 
this development. The general peace and security of God eliminated the legiti-
macy of the use of violence by politically autonomous segments of the Arabian 
tribal society. The monopoly of the legitimate use of violence was in principle 
invested in the united community, thereby laying the foundation for a unified 
structure of authority – a state – devoted to the realization of the final end of the 
prophetic mission: 
 
The covenanters shall make peace only in unity. No covenanter shall make peace apart 
from other covenanters in fighting (qitâl) in the path of God – and that only as a just and 
equitable decision by them. And all raiding parties shall fight with us one after another. 
And the covenanters shall execute retaliation on behalf of one another with respect to 
their blood shed in the path of God (CM: A.9-11, my translation). 
 
The Migrants had been aided by the Medinan hosts – the ‘Helpers’ (ansâr), with 
whom Muhammad had instituted artificial kinship by a pact of Brotherhood. The 
Helpers had provided their emigrant ‘brothers’ with land and palm trees (Life: 
231-35).  
The next battle, ´Uhud, in March 625/3,27 went badly for the Muslims. The 
Helpers, who bore the brunt of casualties found the support of their Muslim 
brethren more burdensome. ´Abd Allâh b. Ubayy openly criticized Muhammad 
 
26  I am following Serjeant’s (1978: 12-15) suggestion that the term ‘mu`minin,’ which 
later acquired the meaning of the ‘faithful,’ originally meant parties to/beneficiaries 
of the covenant (amân). 
27  I follow the chronology of Jones (1957), which is basically al-Wâqidi’s. 
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for following the hot-headed youths against his own better judgment and Ibn 
Ubayy’s advice and thereby bringing disaster to the Medinan Helpers, seventy of 
whom were killed. The power struggle between ´Abd Allâh b. ´Ubayy and Mu-
hammad intensified as the tension between his Jewish clients and the Prophet in-
creased. No longer trusting the Jews of Medina, Muhammad asked his secretary, 
Zayd b. Thabit to learn Hebrew and the Jewish script in 625/4, which the latter 
reported did in 17 days of intensive study (Abbott 1967: 247, 257). Some five 
months after the battle of Uhud Muhammad decided to expel Ibn Ubayy’s other 
Jewish allies, the Banu al-Nadir, and sent them an ultimatum. Ibn Ubayy encour-
aged the Jewish clan to resist, saying to them, according a common in Qur`ân in-
terpretation, “Surely, if you are expelled, we shall go out with you, and if you are 
attacked in war, we shall help you.” This is immediately denied by the Book: 
“God testifieth that they are lying” (Q. 59: 11). Following two serious set-backs 
which cost the lives of nearly 50 missionaries sent by Muhammad to the nomads, 
he accused Banu al-Nadir of conspiracy to kill him, and attacked their oasis, de-
stroying their palm trees. The Nadir were one of the two former “kings” or fiscal 
agents of the Persian empire. They surrendered in August 625/4, on the condition 
that they would keep their movable property, except for arms, and were deported, 
some to Syria others to Khaybar. Two of them reportedly “became Muslims in 
order to retain their property.” The rest packed their belongings on camels and 
left “with such pomp and splendor as had never been seen in any tribe in their 
days.” Their land was distributed among the Migrants. The Medinan Helpers 
were excluded, presumably because they did not need land, except for two who 
pleaded poverty (Life: 437-38). 
The Nadir exiles from the Jewish settlement of Khaybar approached the 
Meccan pagans in the hope of being restored to Medina, and Muhammad dis-
patched a team including a converted son of a Jewish woman of Khaybar to as-
sassinate their leader, Abu Rafi´ Sallâm b. Abi’l-Huqayq, most probably in 626/5 
(Watt 1956: 30-31; Newby 1971: 217-20). Meanwhile, Ibn Ubayy persisted in 
his opposition, and over a year or so later, spread scandalous rumors about Mu-
hammad’s young wife, ´Âyisha. Muhammad summoned a meeting of Ibn 
Ubayy’s fellow Khazraj tribesmen to strip him from tribal protection from pun-
ishment but did not succeed. But soon thereafter, Ibn Ubayy ceased his opposi-
tion and Muhammad himself eventually performed his funeral rites (Watt 1956: 
185-87). 
As the mobilization for holy struggle continued and the number of holy war-
riors increased from some 300 in 624 (Badr) to 3000, with thirty-six horsemen in 
627, the war levy and booty from raids on the Quraysh caravans became inade-
quate and there was an evident need for additional fiscal prey (tu´ma) (Kister 
1986: 88-89). According to some reports, the other kingly Jewish clan, Banu 
Qurayza had also first joined Banu al-Nadir in the summer of 625/4 but had 
come to terms with Muhammad, concluding a pact of peaceful coexistence (mu-
wâda´a; Kister 1986: 82-85). Coexistence, however, turned out to be neither easy 
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nor peaceful, and the Quryaza, the strongest of the Jewish clans of Medina, be-
came Muhammad’s most lucrative fiscal prey in 627/5, immediately after the bat-
tle of the Trench. Perhaps as a vestige of their former status as the agents of Per-
sia, the Qurayza possessed a large number of weapons in their storehouses, and 
lent the Muslims tools to dig a tend around Medina when was besieged by the 
Quraysh and its allied tribes. However, the Qurayza also established contacts 
with the Quraysh through instigators from the Nadir exiles. After some inconclu-
sive fighting, the Quraysh and their allied lifted the siege and left in disarray. 
Muhammad at once laid siege to the fortification of the Qurayza two miles from 
Medina. The Qurayza surrendered unconditionally after two or three weeks, even 
though one companion of the Prophet had indicated by a gesture that their lives 
would not be spared. The number of Muhammad’s holy warriorsnow exceeded 
three thousand. He confiscated the 1500 swords and shields, 300 coats of arm 
and 200 spears from Banu Qurayza for them. Insisting on observance of the legal 
formality of arbitration by a man from the protecting Arab tribe of Aws, Mu-
hammad Sa´d b. Mu´âdh, a man who had previously managed the assassination 
of Ka´b b. al-Ashraf and was severely wounded during the siege, to decide the 
judicial murder of the Jewish captives. Some 400 men constituting the entire 
male population were executed by the Migrants, except for six by their three Me-
dinan Arab confederate clans so as to avoid vengeance and payment of blood 
mone (Watt 1956: 214-16). The Qurayza women and children, numbering about 
one thousand, taken captive and sold into slavery. The procceds went to his new 
treasury, while Muhammad made grants on their land and palm trees to the Mi-
grants who were to give back the tree given to them by the Medinan Helper 
(Kister 1986: 90-96). Medina was thus cleared by the Jewish clans and Muham-
mad became the undisputed ruler of the united community he had set up in it. 
Political success did not lessen Muhammad’s sense of living at the end of 
time and preparing for the Last Judgment. For this reason, he insisted that his 
mosque be built, in accordance with Gabriel’s instructions, as a “booth like the 
booth of Moses thy brother,” (Kister 1962: 154) and without a roof. When the 
palm branches were replaced by bricks as its wall about the time of the battle of 
the Trench, he refused to add a roof and retained the Mosaic form appropriate for 
the end of time. Nevertheless, success also sharpened the Prophet’s political 
pragmatism. After the battle of the Trench, Muhammad married the widowed 
Muslim daughter his distant cousin Abu Sufiyân, the leader of the pagan 
Quraysh, who gradually ceased to take part in its military operations, and was 
conspicuously absent during the negotiations for the treaty of al-Hudaybiyya in 
March 628/6 between Muhammad and the Quraysh. Some three months later, 
Muhammad attacked the rich Jewish settlement of Khaybar, rewarding some 
1600 Muslims who had pledge their steadfastness in anxious moment before the 
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truce of Hudaybiyya with booty and land.28 Despite its disadvantages, notably the 
undertaking to return Muslim refugees to the Quraysh the latter did not capitalize 
(Görke 2000), the truce of Hudaybiyya enabled Muhammad to take part in a pil-
grimage and thus paved the way for the taking of Mecca in January 630/8, and to 
realize his dream of the believers “entering the Holy Mosque in security, God 
willing, with your heads shaven, not fearing” (Q. 48: 27). The importance of ap-
propriating the hajj for clearing Islam of the suspicion of foreignness and making 
it firmly Arabian cannot be overemphasized. Muhammad marched into Mecca 
with some 10,000 armed men (as compared to the 3,000 he could muster three 
years earlier). Abu Sufiyân visited his camp secretly and arranged for a general 
amnesty. Within a month of the conquest of Mecca, Muhammad added some two 
thousand men to his army and defeated a coalition of the old opponents of the 
Quraysh in Hunayn at the end of the same month. The wholesale conversion of 
the old Quraysh oligarchy took place rapidly, with the “winning of [their] hearts” 
with generous distribution of the booty from Hunayn, which caused considerable 
resentment among old Muslims, especially the Medinan helpers who reportedly 
got nothing (Life: 594-97). Muhammad was now the most powerful man in Ara-
bia, and its close and distant tribes hastened to send him “delegations’ to join him 
as confederates (Ibn Sa´d, I, 2: 38-86). In the last months of 630/9, he was able to 
send an army of 30,000 to Tabuk. 
From the viewpoint of the teleology of Muhammad’s revolution, this unifica-
tion of Arabian was an incidental result of the triumph of the religion of God. 
Muhammad undertook the breaking of the idols of the Ka´ba himself, beginning 
with the destruction of Hubal, the red amber statue in human form in whose 
name Abu Sufiyân had led the pagan Meccans in ´Uhud, their most successful 
battle against Muhammad, with the cry: “Allâh is greater and more glorious!” He 
sent ´Ali b. Abi Talib, Mughira b. Shu´ba and Khâlid b. al-Walid to destroy, re-
spectively, the three goddesses, Manât, the Lât and the ´Uzza. The tribes of 
Khath´am and Bâhila fiercely defended their idol, Dhu’l-Khalsa, and one hun-
dred of them were killed before the idol was destroyed (Kalbi: 15-17, 25-28, 36). 
The destruction of the idols meant the liquidation of the social organization of 
tribal Arabia, and above all, of autonomous tribal political leadership (Lecker 
1993: 343). What was left to complete the unfolding of the religious telos of Mu-
hammad’s revolution was the destruction of a handful of rival Arabian monothe-
istic prophet, the most important and powerful being Musaylima of Yamâma, the 
prophet of al-Rahmân, the area close to Mecca (around present-day Riad). This 
was done by his successor, Abu Bakr 632-634 (Kister 2002). 
 
28  The division of booty and fiscal levies imposed on the Khaybar were formally re-
corded, and served as the legal model for treaties with the Jewish colonies of Fadak, 
which followed immediately, and with those of Wadi al-Qurâ’ and Taymâ’ later, all 
of which stipulated payment of regular levies to the Muslim state (Life: 521-23; 
Watt 1956: 218).  
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The destruction of the old, segmentary political order was thus complete. The 
construction of a new political community and government, has barely begun, 
however. As we shall see, these task, especially the second – namely the con-
struction of a new authority structure and government, remained incomplete at 
Muhammad’s death. The unfolding of the teleology of the revolution thus con-
tinued under his successors. 
 
 
The unif icat ion of  Arabia ,  and the emergence of  
a  composite  Musl im pol ity 
 
The idea of the umma as a community designated for salvation through a prophet 
is already strongly present in the Meccan verses of the Qur`ân (Denny 1977: 44, 
52). Such a community, however, could not be constituted in Arabia without a 
revolution as we have defined the term: it required a radical transformation of the 
politically segmented tribal society and the structure of authority that held them 
apart. Although the Meccan converts had been individuals, Medina witnessed the 
phenomenon of acceptance of Islam by whole clans (Watt 1956: 170-71). The 
constitutive revolution began with Muhammad’s migration to Medina. Muham-
mad had taken cognizance of the existing kinship and tribal solidarities and 
sought to harness them for the propagation of his religious mission. His mission-
aries to Medina had been sent to the Banu al-Najjâr clan of and Khazraj, clan of 
his maternal grandmother (Life: 199; Mélamêde 1934: 48), and himself resided 
with them when he migrated, and built his mosque in their quarter (Tabari, 8: 
xvii, 4-5). But the decade of struggle and warfare in the path of God had set sons 
against fathers and kinsman against kinsman. The cult of vengeance was trans-
formed into holy warfare. The believers were “each other’s avengers of blood on 
the war path of God, but tribal law and family sentiment are wholly ignored” 
(Wolf 1951: 147). Membership in the new community of believers displaced, de-
sacralized and subordinated the old ties of kinship: “Verily, they who have be-
lieved and fled their homes and spent their substance for the cause of God, and 
they who have taken in the Prophet and been helpful to him, shall be near of kin 
to the other” (Q. 8: 73). 
Muhammad’s tribal policy was an aspect of creating a society and polity on a 
religious foundation around the belief in one God and Muhammad as His mes-
senger. Arabian tribes could put themselves under the protection of God and His 
messenger without professing Islam. In this way, Muhammad created an inter-
tribal security system, a Pax Islamica, around the growing polity in Medina. Pax 
Islamica had a religious kernel: it was a system based on ‘the security of God and 
his messenger.’ As he grew stronger, he demanded Islam from prospective allies 
brought under God’s protection, but continued to make purely political alliances 
with distant and powerful tribes which came to submit to Pax Islamica on the ba-
sis of the Arab norms of tribal alliance (Watt 1956: 144-46). In the year 626/5, he 
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made a special arrangement with 400 men from the Muzayna tribe, granting them 
the status of “emigrants” (muhajirun) within their own territories – which meant 
they would not have to join the jihâd, thereby making an exception to coupling of 
hijra with jihâd as a condition of Islam (Madelung 1986: 231-32). The umma 
was not a suitable term to apply to this confederate polity, and as Watt (1956: 
247) points out, it no longer appears in the Qur`ân or the treaties. 
The reason was the radical change in the basis of Muhammad’s domination 
in Arabia. Khâlid b. al-Walid and ´Amr b. ´Âs, two important tribal leaders of the 
Quraysh, who were late converts like Abu Sufyân, had already joined Muham-
mad in Mecca during the summer before the fall of Mecca, and taken part with 
3,000 men in the campaign of Mu´ta in September and October of 629/8. Only 
700 of the 12,000 men who fought in Hunayn, the decisive battle for unification 
of Arabia under Muhammad, were Migrants (Watt 1956: 53-59). Although their 
number had multiplied almost tenfold since the battle of Badr six years earlier, 
these early Muslims or members of Muhammad’s charismatic religious move-
ment were now a small minority in his armed forces. 
Muhammad, however, did not live long enough to settle the constitution of 
the new polity. Nor did he have the time to lay down the constitution of its gov-
ernment. This contrast sharply with Muhammad’s regulation of warfare, which 
formed the basis of the Muslim conquests or what we might call “the export of 
the Islamic revolution” that resulted from the mobilization of the Arab tribes. 
One curious consequence of this failure is that, by the middle of the 7th century, 
the Muslim state appears as a huge army accompanied by the most rudimentary 
civil bureaucracy” (Donner 1993: 312). 
 
 
Succession to charismat ic  leadership and 
the consequences of  Muhammad’s const i tut ive 
revolut ion in Arabia  
 
The social background of the first Muslims who comprised the core of Muham-
mad’s charismatic movement was very different from those of either the Quraysh 
oligarchs or the tribesmen of Arabia who pledged allegiance to Muhammad in 
his last years. The first Muslims were individual converts. They included 6 or 7 
slaves, 5 women, 4 lowly brothers and one man (Bilâl) freed by Abu Bakr. One 
of the slaves was of foreign (Ethiopian) tongue and a Christian, and was said to 
teach Muhammad the Qur`ân by his detractors. Of the 82 who migrated to 
Ethiopia from Meccan persecution, 5 were freedmen or clients (mawâli), the rest 
were from Meccan clans and included some of Muhammad’s cousins (Life: 143-
48, 179-80; Ibn Sa´d, 3/1: 282-83). The Migrants who fought in the battle of 
Badr included 11 slaves and freedmen (Watt 1956: 344). Abu Bakr and ´Umar 
were merchants who, unlike Muhammad himself and his cousin ´Ali and his son-
in-law ´Uthmân, did not belong to the tribal elite. The first change in the recruit-
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ment pattern was conversion by clan is reported in Medina a little before the 
Prophet’s migration, when, following their above-mentioned leader, Sa´d B. 
Mu´adh, “every man and woman among the Banu ´Adbu’l-Ashhal joined Islam” 
(Life: 201). Conversion by clans in Medina and among the northern Arabs con-
tinued under Muhammad. The second major change came after the conquest of 
Mecca and the battle of Hunayn, when tribes of southern Arabia and other region 
pledged allegiance to Muhammad. As the wars immediately following the death 
of the Prophet demonstrated, quite a few of these tribes did not acknowledge 
Muhammad’s prophecy and did not convert to Islam, some of them professed Is-
lam but did not want to pay taxes to the nascent Islamic state, and yet others were 
followers of rival ‘false prophets’ (Kister 2002: 13-26). 
With the change in the composition of Muhammad’s polity came a corre-
sponding change in the pattern of motivation. As in any socioreligious move-
ment, Muhammad had always had to overcome the typical dilemma of ‘mixed 
motivation’ by offering his followers rewards in both this and the other world.29 
According to Ibn Ishâq (Life: 395), this mixture of rewards in both worlds had 
been reinforced after the disastrous battle of Uhud: “And he who desires the re-
ward of this world We will give him it; and he who desires the reward of the next 
world We will give him it and We shall reward the thankful” (Q. 3: 145). 
Now the mix of motives had to be made considerably this-worldly for the 
tribesmen who had joined the original holy warriors. Furthermore, the holy war-
rior/migrants had been maintained on booty from the tribes, but as Pax Islamica 
expanded, and the confiscation of Jewish settlements was completed, northward 
expansion was the only remaining outlet for raids and booty (Watt 1956: 145). 
Here we have the crucial factor behind the export of revolution from Arabia, 
which also explains why, contrary to a widespread misperception, it was not ac-
companied by the mass conversion of the conquered populations.  
The biggest unsettled questions at the time of the Prophet’s death were those 
of legitimate rulership and organization of the state. The absence of reference to 
the form of government and political leadership in the Qur`ân is truly astonish-
ing. Donner explains it as a consequence of Muhammad’s apocalyptic expecta-
tion of the Day of Judgment, which would obviate the need for laying down 
norms of government. This forced his successors “to develop a theory of political 
legitimacy with almost no Qur`ânic basis” (Donner 1998: 45). Madelung (1997: 
16-17), by contrast, argues that Muhammad saw the precedent of the rulership of 
the families of the earlier prophets mentioned in the Qur`ân as applying to his 
 
29  Sa´d b. Khaythama had insisted on drawing lots with his father because only one of 
them could participate in the battle of Badr, saying he would have let his father go 
had it not been for the promise of going to heaven (Waqidi, 1: 20). By contrast, a 
holy warrior evidently not so impressed by the latter promise during the battle of the 
Trench complained that “Muhammad used to promise that we would eat the treas-
ures of Khosraw and Caesar [the Persian and Roman emperors]” (Life: 454). 
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family as well, seeing a Hashimite monarchy as the obvious solution to the prob-
lem of succession after his death. Although Madelung may be right in arguing 
that this hierocratic principle of kinship to the Prophet was closest to Muham-
mad’s intention of transforming his prophetic charisma to the charisma of his 
lineage by establishing a House of Muhammad on the biblical model of the 
House of David and the House of ´Imrân (Moses’) for him umma, three other 
principles were also imperfectly adumbrated in the sayings and deeds, which had 
a potential for further logical development and corresponding institutionalization. 
The most important of these was the principle of seniority or precedence (sâbiqa) 
in Islam. There was also the entirely principle of consensus (rida wa´l-jamâ´a). 
The weakest in terms of Prophetic endorsement was the surviving pre-Islamic 
principle nobility and leadership (sharaf wa’l-riyâsa) (Sharon 1984). This last 
principle was, however, favored by the Quraysh oligarchy of late converts whose 
hearts Muhammad had won at the finalstage of unification of Arabia. 
As Muhammad’s male offspring had predeceased him, Madelung (1997: 253) 
follows the Shi´a in seeing his famous designation of his son-in-law and cousin, 
´Ali at Ghadir Khumm – “´Ali is the patron (mawlâ) of whomever I am a patron 
of” – as his succession appointment, and points out that the oath of allegiance to 
´Ali as the fourth caliph matched this formula. The position argued by Madelung 
became the principle of Hâshimite legitimism when ´Ali’s son succeeded his as 
the Caliph after his assassination with the proclamation, “I am al-Hasan, the son 
of Muhammad,” and was so addressed by the leading member of the Hâshimite 
clan, ´Abd Allâh b. ´Abbas somewhat later during his brief tenure of the caliph-
ate (Madelung 1997: 311, 313). Paradoxically, however, the hierocratic model 
found relatively little support in the revolutionary power struggle after Muham-
mad’s death, and was only developed much later by the Shi´ite sects into the doc-
trine of Imamate. ´Ali, its main beneficiary, in fact gave his pledge of allegiance 
to Abu Bakr and ´Umar, and it was his precedence in Islam that primarily assured 
his succession as the fourth Caliph, though he also claimed consensus as the ba-
sis of his legitimacy in the civil war with Mu´âwiya (Sharon 1984: 130-32). The 
latter, greatly reinforcing the policy of the third Caliph, ´Uthman, subordinated 
the principle of precedence in Islam to that of nobility and leadership, and was 
accused by later generations of thus turning the Caliphate into kingship (mulk) 
with the establishment of the Umayyad dynasty.  
Immediately after the death of the Prophet, Abu Bakr and ´Umar were clearly 
apprehensive of the hierocratic principle, which would result in the caliphate and 
prophethood being reunited in the same family, meaning that the Banu Hâshim’ 
would have the monopoly of both (Lammens 1910: 16-17; Madelung 1997: 22). 
Abu Bakr and ´Umar were of very modest origins, and must have counted on the 
support of “the disinherited” (mustad´afun) who, as we have seen, were numer-
ous among the early converts. They broke into a meeting of the Ansâr and 
pushed them into accepting Abu Bakr as the khalifa (successor) of the Messenger 
of God, and made an alliance with the obscure Fihrite on the margin of Quraysh, 
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Abu ´Ubayda b. al-Jarrah, who was ´Umar’s friend and was later designated as 
his successor but was killed in battle, to create the ‘triumvirate’ that took power 
after the death of the Prophet (Lammens 1910) and the ´Umayyads. Later, after 
succeeding Abu Bakr to the Caliphate, ´Umar ordered the murder of the leader of 
the Medinan Helpers, Sa´d b. ´Ubâda (Lammens 1910: 116-17, 142). Like the 
Hâshimites, the Ansâr “tried to restore their faded fortune by backing” ´Ali, and 
when he lost the First Civil War, they were no longer part of the political elite 
(Donner 1981: 274). The Hashimite clan had the satisfaction of burying Mu-
hammad and excluding Abu Bakr and his daughter ´Âyisha from attending his 
funeral.  
Abu Bakr, seconded by ´Umar and supported by the early Muslims claimed 
legitimacy on the basis of their precedence in Islam and developed the idea of the 
successorship (khilâfat) of the Prophet. They thus instituted the Caliphate and 
fought the Arab tribes which refused to accept that the Prophet had founded a 
state authorized to receive taxes as well as those how followed rival Arabian 
prophets in what became known anachronistically as the wars of apostasy 
(ridda). When readmitting the defeated ‘apostate’ tribes, Abu Bakr, the first Ca-
liph, and ´Umar, his successor, exacted from their members, upon (re)conversion 
to Islam, the pledge to obey “whomever God had invested with authority” (wallâ 
Allâh `l-amr) (Kister 1994: 100-101). 
Like the Hâshimites, the old oligarchy of late converts opposed ´Umar’s ca-
liphate with the appeal to “O, House of Qusayy,” and gained ascendancy under 
the third caliph, ´Uthmân. After persuading ´Ali’s son, al-Hasan to abdicate the 
Caliphate, Mu´âwiya greatly reinforced ´Uthman’s policy and subordinated the 
principle of precedence in Islam to that of nobility and leadership, and was ac-
cused by later generations of thus turning the Caliphate into kingship (mulk) with 
the establishment of the Umayyad dynasty. 
In contrast to his lack of attention to the normative regulation of the political 
order, Muhammad did institute a system of religious pluralism as a part of the re-
alistic modification of the Meccan apocalyptic vision. The gentile prophet of the 
Meccan period, devoted to the restoration of the primal religion of Abraham 
whose “recitation” (Qur`ân) consisted of the communication of the Enochic 
“preserved tablet,” becomes “the Messenger of God” in the Medinan Verses, and 
the Torah and the Gospel are explicitly recognized as holy scriptures: “For each 
of you [i.e., Jews, Christians, Muslims] We have appointed a path and a way, and 
if God had so willed, He would have made you but one community […]” (Q. 5: 
48). The Qur`ân (3: 64) also came up with the formula for integrating the Jews as 
anti-associationist monotheists into the united community: “Say: ‘O People of 
the Book, come to a word (which is) fair between us and you, (to wit) that we 
serve no one but God, that we associate nothing with Him, and that none of us 
take others as Lords beside God” (Emphasis added). 
This accommodative pluralism was endorsed by divine revelation: “There is 
no compulsion in religion (lâ ikrâh fi’l-din)” (Q. 2: 256). According to one im-
150  |  CROSSROADS AND TURNING POINTS 
portant tradition, this verse was revealed on the occasion of the Prophet’s deci-
sion to accept poll tax from the Magians (Zoroastrians) rather than requiring their 
forced conversion. This gave the Zoroastrians the same de facto status as the 
“people of the Book” (ahl al-kitâb). This decision provoked the indignation of a 
group of Muslims, including ´Abd Allâh b. Ubayy, who criticized the Muham-
mad for granting the Zoroastrians the privilege he had denied the Arab polythe-
ists and were called the ‘hypocrites’ (munâfiqun) on account of this opposition. 
Muhammad remained adamant, however, and reaffirmed that the Arab polythe-
ists would be fought until they professed Islam (Kister 1994: 89-91). 
The Islamicization of Arabia was completed ´Umar, the second Caliph, who 
completed the wars of ‘apostasy’ and eradicated polytheism and the religion of 
the prophet of al-Rahmân and other rival prophets among the Arabs. He also ex-
propriated and expelled the Jews of Khaybar and the Christians of Najran. He le-
gitimated this final revolutionary step with a tradition of the Prophet saying dur-
ing his terminal illness that “two faiths will not live together in the land of the 
Arabs (variant, Hijâz).” (Kister 1994: 94-95). 
There is no evidence, however, that ´Umar or anyone else used the term 
umma to refer to the unified Islamic Arabia, nor, a fortiori, to the vast political 
society unified by the Muslim state after the conquests. The notion of umma re-
verted to it original meaning of a community designated for salvation through a 
Prophet (Denny: 44, 52). Competing proselytizing religious communities were 
the striking feature of the religious situation in late antiquity and Muhammad 
conceived his own umma or community of believers in the same line, albeit as 
the best of them (Q. 3: 110) and their (golden) mean (Q. 2: 143). The Qur`ân also 
links the notion of religious community with the “people of the Book” (Q. 2: 63, 
65; 5: 69-70; 22: 18). According to the earliest Qur`ân commentaries, the umma 
of Muhammad consisted of the Muslims not contaminated by a pre-Islamic birth” 
(Bashear 1997: 44). The Muslim umma was thus completely distinct from the so-
ciety ruled by the Caliphate, which comprised other religious communities of the 
peoples of the Book. This enabled Muhammad’s successors to turn the de facto 
recognition of different religious communities in the late Sasanian empire into 
the pluralistic system of autonomous “protected” religious communities that was 
distinctively Islamic and eventually developed into the Ottoman millet system 
(Fowden 2001: 97-98). The notion of a political community subject to a ruler en-
tered Islam much later and with the reception of the Persian political lore. It was 
the ancient idea of the subjects as the flock (ra´iyya) of their ruler who was to 
govern them with justice (Arjomand 2003). 
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Appendix:  A typology of  revolut ions from 
revolut ion in world history 
 
Type I: Integrative Revolution 
 
Integrative Revolution is subdivided it into three of our ideal types or models, 
Types I. 1-3 , which are designed to cover the range of variation in the relation 
between revolution and the enlargement of the political community: 1) the revo-
lutionary construction of an integrated political community from segmentary 
tribal societies or self-contained city-states; 2) the opening of oligarchies in the 
course of expansion of city-states into empires; and 3) the integration through the 
invasion of the center from a mobilized political island in the periphery. A fourth 
model will represent the better explored relationship between centralization of 
power and revolution, and constitute our second type of revolution (Type II). 
 
(i) Integrative Revolution 1 (I.1): Constitutive Revolution. 
 
Radical change in the political order may result from the incongruence between 
cultural and political integration. This can arise in a culturally unified society 
where the structure of authority remains segmented – confined to tribes or city-
states. The larger society is culturally unified while political authority is seg-
mented, except under martial emergency, and political integration remains either 
intermittent, in the form of ad hoc confederations of tribes and city-states, or 
weak, based solely on networks of personal ties among patrons and clients across 
the segments (Balandier 1985: 318-322). Such societies, including the “segmen-
tary states” that are found to be prone to rebellions (Fallers 1968: 80), can be re-
structured through revolution. The type of revolution that belongs to these socie-
ties is an integrative revolution that constitutes a new political order by institu-
tionalizing central political authority and unifying the segments into a more inte-
grated political community. Its ideal type will accordingly be called ‘Constitutive 
Revolution.’ The first revolution in world history, the Akkadian revolution, be-
longs to this Constitutive type, as does the rise of Islam. 
 
(ii) Integrative Revolution 2 (I.2): Aristotelian-Paretan Revolution. 
 
Aristotle’s idea of integrative revolution in oligarchies can serve as the starting 
point for our second model. According to Aristotle, oligarchies and aristocracies 
are prone to revolution because of those they exclude from the political society. 
Impoverished members of the governing class become revolutionary leaders; the 
regime is undermined by persons who are wealthy but excluded from office; and 
sedition arises when the circle of government is too narrow and “the masses of a 
people consists of men animated by the conviction that they are as good as their 
masters in quality” (Politics). From these considerations it would follow that the 
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type of revolution to which oligarchies and aristocracies are prone is what we 
shall call integrative revolution, revolution that enlarges the political community, 
broadens the franchise and/or other political rights, notably access to power. 
Among the moderns, Pareto’s theory of revolution comes closest to Aris-
totle’s idea. Put simply, his theory is as follows: If access to the political class, 
the ruling elite, is blocked to energetic and resolute individuals – lions – from the 
lower classes, and if the ruling elite becomes weak and incapable of stern repres-
sion because of an increase in the proportion of foxes over lions in its composi-
tion, a revolution is likely to occur (Pareto 1968[1917-19]: 2227). In this situa-
tion, socially upwardly mobile individuals who are excluded from power develop 
into a revolutionary counter-elite that eventually seizes power and makes history 
the graveyard of yet another aristocracy (Pareto 1968[1917-19]: pp. 1304-1305, 
2053-2057). 
 
(iii) Integrative Revolution 3 (I.3): Khaldunian Revolution. 
 
Integrative revolutions can begin at the center, or they can begin in the periphery. 
The latter constitute a distinct type which students of contemporary revolutions 
have often misconstrued as “peasant revolution.” Huntington (1968) called it 
simply “the Eastern type” of revolution. Medieval Islam offers us the possibility 
of a better understanding of this type of integrative revolution which I propose to 
call Khaldunian and put forward as our third structural ideal type of integrative 
revolution. 
Ibn Khaldun, as we have seen, offers as a structural pre-condition of dynastic 
change, the endemic translocation of ruling authority and group solidarity be-
tween the periphery and the center in a dual social structure. He also paves the 
way for a theoretical move from dynastic change to revolution by considering the 
superimposition of new religiously (or ideologically) based solidarity upon exist-
ing, tribal group solidarity (´asabiyya). 
The essentials of the Khaldunian type of revolution are the following. It be-
gins in the periphery with a militarized solidary group that is united on the basis 
of a religious cause. The key factor for explaining the failure of the regime and 
the success of the insurgents is differential solidarity. The urban base of the re-
gime lacks social cohesion while the already strong group solidarity of the insur-
gents is strengthened by a unifying religious cause. The revolutionaries progress 
gradually with a series of attacks on governmental forces. The end comes after a 
long time with the military defeat of the dynasty and the capture of its capital and 
other major cities. 
 
Type II: Tocquevillian Revolution 
 
Huntington’s “Western” type of revolution, which I will call the Tocquevillian 
ideal type, is the one most familiar to us. In this modern type of revolution, a cen-
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tralized state is already in place. In fact, revolution takes the form of the disinte-
gration of the authority of the state and the collapse of the established political 
order at the center. As we shall see, most Integrative Revolutions have centraliza-
tion as a consequence of the termination of revolutionary power struggle. What is 
distinctive of our Type II of revolution is that centralization also appears as a 
cause of revolution. The notion of the state, however, needs to be modified to the 
structure of domination or authority structure, especially if we wish to apply it to 
pre-modern revolutions.  
 
Historically-specific Ideal-types of Teleology of Revolution. 
 
The distinctive direction of a revolution as shaped by its intended or intentionally 
prefigured consequences will be called its teleology. Teleology can also be mod-
eled by highlighting the distinctive features of each case. This ideal-typical char-
acterization of consequences of revolutions as historical individuals is intended 
as a substitute for the putatively general or generic teleology of all revolutions as 
steps in the forward march of mankind in historical materialism and the popular 
20th-century conception of revolution. 
 
 
Abbreviat ions 
 
Life: A. Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad. A translation of Ibn Ishaq’s Sirat 
Rasul Allah, Oxford University Press, 1955 (Page references to the original Ara-
bic text of Ibn Ishâq’s Sira are given on the margin of Guillaume’s translation). 
CM: Constitution of Medina (References are to the paragraphs of Documents 
A-H as edited in Serjeant 1978) 
Tabari: Tabari al-Tabari, Muhammad b. Jarir, 1879-1901/1985-2000, Ta’rikh 
al-rusul va’l-muluk, ed. by M.J. de Goeje, 15 Vols. (Leiden, 1879-1901); anno-
tated English translation: The History of al-Tabari, Albany, 38 vols., NY 1985-
2002: SUNY Press. References are to the English translation. Page references to 
the original Arabic text are given on the margin of this translation. 
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Chapter 6 
´Abdallah b. Salam: Egypt,  
Late Antiquity and Islamic Sainthood 
 
GEORG STAUTH 
 
 
1.  “Egypt”  –  The Arabs and Ear ly Is lam 
 
The general interest with Islam among those who theorised its position with re-
spect to the genealogy of modernity lies with the so called “classical heritage.” 
This question which Franz Rosenthal (1992) pursued in greater detail was inher-
ited from the German or German educated Orientalists like Ignaz Goldziher and 
C.H. Becker, H.H. Schaeder and later of course in America from G.E. von 
Grunebaum. Rosenthal speaks of “Fortleben” (survival) which rather seeks for 
continuities then for Islamic reconstructions based on classical ideas. 
If one focuses on the importance of the aura of inherited religious narratives 
and metaphors of thought, one would ask, how far Mecca and Medina were re-
lated in their cultural worlds to the higher civilisations which surrounded the 
Arabian Peninsula. This includes the question, how far Muhammad and Early Is-
lamic religious discourse were influenced by the religious ideas which were 
prevalent in the Hellenistic world, Gnosticism, Christianism and Judaism and 
Greek and Roman Philosophy and science. Both ways, Greek and Roman and at 
the utmost some Persian influence are considered to be predominant. So in both 
perspectives continuities, whether religious or philosophic, are traced as the 
dominant sources of later Islamic discourse. 
A third dimension has recently shaped much of our perspective on Islam, this 
is the one on the originality of Muhammad’s revelation and the type of striking 
effects this brought in breaking with all types of prevalent cultural constructions. 
There is more and more convincing ground that the language of revelation in a 
lost time and location had in itself a stunning revolutionary effect (Ammann 
2001). It should be noted, indeed, that this later view comes close to the self-
perceived idea of Arabs, acknowledging “that their race did not share in philoso-
phy, although they surpassed other nations in rhetoric and poetry” (El-Elwany 
1957: 1).  
As is with all religions, the myth seems to have been the important ideologi-
cal motive, not logic or philosophy. The predominant myths in Central Arabia, if 
not deriving from bare Arab Tribal History, depended largely on Ancient Juda-
ism and Pharaonism. 
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This is where I would maintain that “Egypt” figures as a sort of hidden inner 
pattern of constructions in Early Islamic narrations, re-phrasing something which 
was since long a subject of Christian dogmatic discourse, namely in that – in con-
trast to Jewish, Greek and Roman perceptions – the Christians, and perhaps here 
lies the specific importance of the Alexandrian school, engaged in a strong dia-
logue, if not in a sometimes latent state of heretic prosecution,1 with old Egyptian 
culture.  
The first wave of Islamic conquests (632-641) of Palestine, Syria and Egypt 
secured the domination over largely Hellenised areas (Rosenthal 1992: 2). It is 
generally assumed that the Arabs being separated from the dominated popula-
tions in language and religion, largely opposed, or neglected any knowledge of 
predominant local cultural traits, imposing their own language and religion as the 
ruling pattern. They only later fell at hand to the pre-eminence of the achieve-
ments of the higher civilisation (ibid.).  
That Egypt was also a very important place at the roots of Hellenism is not 
only due to Alexander’s conquests and his foundation of Alexandria. Many 
Greek scholars had travelled to Egypt, students of Pythagoras living there and 
Plato spending some time among them before going to Sicily and then returning 
to Athens (Rosenthal 1992: 28). Egypt was the must of great Greek scholars to 
visit Egypt (ibid.). 
The more general problem, however, which relates to Early Islam, is the one 
of the rise of monotheism and the problem in which relation the prophetic revela-
tions of Muhammad stand with the monotheistic forerunners, Judaism and Chris-
tianity. We may argue, that, if not for the immediate preaching of Muhammad, 
then for the later evolving dogmatic discourse, Islam was dependent on these 
prevalent religions. “Egypt” was of great importance for any evolving monothe-
istic discourse. Certainly, if we place the birth of Islam fully in a “native North-
Arabian prophetic tradition,” a “native monotheistic tradition,” then it will be 
impossible to think of any cross-culture-contact discourse in relation to “Egypt,” 
as appears from Gibb (1978: 26-7).  
In fact, Gibb’s general idea was, that Muhammad out of a certain resentment 
as a prophet with his antecedents Moses and Jesus, “went back behind both to the 
figure of Abraham ‘the Hanif’” (ibid.: 31). Here, I wish to put some doubt on 
Gibb’s perception that “Islam appeared, not as a new religion, but as a revival of 
pure Abrahamic monotheism, purified at once of the accretions of Judaism and 
Christianity and superseding them as the final revelation” (ibid.: 32). 
 
 
 
1  I should admit that Karlheinz Deschner’s “Kriminalgeschichte” and specifically his 
Chapters on Kyrill and Schenute of Alexandria remain stimulating and revealing in 
this respect (Deschner 1988: 156-212).  
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2.   The quest ion of  Egypt  in Late Ant iquity and 
the r ise of  Is lam 
 
There is general agreement that in the rise of Europe and the West – as Brague 
(2002: 27) takes it from Paul Valéry – Rome, Greece and Christianity were made 
the basic sources of European self-understanding. Whether in this view “Israel,” 
the “sub-basement in the Old Testament,” includes Egypt remains doubtful. In 
focussing the case of an Egyptian saint, I wish, here, to raise some very hypo-
thetical questions with respect to “Egypt” and its cultural and political influence 
in Late antiquity, including the question of its possible effects on Early Islamic 
religious and social developments.  
There is rising awareness of the modern intricacies of Egypt’s impact on Ju-
daism and Christianity (cf. Assmann 1997; Said 2003). However, when it comes 
to Islam, and specifically to the first 200 years of Islamic developments, Egypt’s 
impact on Islamic history appears to be less than a black spot on the cultural 
landscape. This is partly due to the fact that the mainstream literature – after the 
futûh, the Arab conquest – is primarily concerned with the emerging sectarian 
tendencies in Islam and with the historiography of the related political clashes or 
with the – often very closely related – issue of tradition and theology and its 
sources. Since the scene for these clashes was largely limited to the Arab core re-
gions on the peninsula as well as in Palestine, Syria and Iraq, the “Egyptian” af-
fairs and their potential influences were beyond the mainstream interest, naturally 
because, obviously, also there was a limited amount of sources.  
There are recently – perhaps not just recently, however, recently with greater 
vigour – some new perspectives opened on the subject. I do hope, as my point is 
related to the modern significance of a Jewish convert in early Islam and a wit-
ness of Mohammad as a Prophet, to raise some questions with respect to posi-
tioning of Islam and ‘Egypt’ in an axial age perspective and monotheist break-
throughs.  
First of all, certainly, the issue of Egypt widens the perspective into a much 
broader area of interest, namely, the question of the comparative or even interac-
tive narration of a shared idea of the golden, however, now darkened and sup-
pressed arch-culture of the Nile. It is not possible to follow this up here, however 
we should note, that Alexandrian philosophy and theology in the third and fourth 
century, indeed, became strongly involved in finding solutions to the immediacy 
of the old world of Egyptian Gods. New sublime constructions of symbols and 
ideas were developed. However, in terms of lifestyle, health, marketing, and so-
lutions to everydayness by way of “sacred tourism,” the old ritual places seem to 
have been alive in the 6th and 7th century as much as they have been before.  
With respect to Early Islam, the question of break and continuity was recently 
again put in terms of “radical singularity” and “total alterity” (Cheddadi 2004). 
However, as “Islamwissenschft” before, Cheddadi understands this only with re-
spect to role and development of “scripture” in Early Islam. However, we know 
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too little about the interactive process of emerging ideas and the changes and 
continuities in religious instincts, style of life and mentality. In general, this idea 
of the totally other and new was always linked to Muhammad’s revelation and 
his personal abilities in life and the simplicity of his message of men of all ranks 
and colours standing equal judgement in front of an un-attainable God. 
On the other hand, certainly, the perspective on “singularity” and “alterity” 
always included the question, to what does all this refer, to whom does it speak, 
what does it deny, from where does it depart? From this angle, it seems to me, 
that there is an alternative to absolute break and abrupt change in that the ideas of 
origin gained the power of an umbrella not only through political and military 
strength, but rather gradually took shape in being exposed to a dialogical process 
with and within the cultures in the occupied territories over a period of 150 years. 
To be sure, the issue of “Egypt” at that time – if ever – had not ended.  
The idea of the retarded fixation of scripture and Islamic style never fully and 
never materially engaged with what Christianity, what Judaism, what Hellenism 
meant in terms of material life and life perspectives and cultural instincts of peo-
ple in the 7th and 8th century. 
This later question of popular instincts, psychology and life-perspective emerges as 
a very important one, it is a question which goes far beyond “text” and the problematic 
of what we have to treat as more or less authentic sources of Islam. The cultic practice, 
the local mediatic relation to cults, and what the situation was in the different pre-
existing religions in treating cultic necessities, seems to me similarly important. It is in-
teresting to mention in this context of preludes to Islam that Peter Brown’s and Ian 
Wood’s discussions on the dramatic changes in Christian imagination in the late 6th cen-
tury could be taken as evidence of the development of strong inner tensions related to 
rituals and their perception in popular mass contexts (Brown 1999; Wood 1999). This is 
in fact immanent with respect to the current problem of positioning Islam in the more 
general framework of developments leading to the modern processes of nation state 
formation, national culture and return to religion.  
Certainly, Freud’s Moses instigated a lively debate, reminding us of the im-
portance of Pharaonic Egypt with respect to Judaism and Christianity. However, 
that monotheism should be a one way path to rationality, initiating the lead to the 
steady decline of superstition, has since long been doubted. The issue of “Egypt” 
poses a much deeper question on the effects of pre-existing local traditions. If we 
consider that the focus on Early Islam has been shifted, from the pure question of 
authenticity of sources to the question of culture contact and dialogue, then the 
question of “Egypt” becomes even more important. The event of Islam has to be 
related to these questions within the broader – if you wish – the global context of 
late antiquity. 
Considering what Nock (1972) has called “Later Egyptian Piety” there the 
recurrent topic is, that Egypt in terms of culture, religion and spiritual life re-
mained, despite the influx of Hellenism and Christianity, a world apart in Late 
antiquity. This peculiarity of “Egypt” as a culture undergoing strong, externally 
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imposed changes and foreign impingements, with continuous resistance and 
without any comparable depth of internal transformation, is a point well taken 
(cf. Fowden 1986). However, this dimension could also be reversed. The per-
plexity of this inner resistance, could also be made a point of cultural force influ-
encing the spiritual, ritual and symbolic attitudes of the world outside. In this re-
spect, I can only propose to take the works of Alfred Hermann more serious and 
specifically his point on the long continuities of the described “Culture of the 
Nile” (cf. Hermann 1960; 1959; n.d.). The narratives of this Nil-culture are still 
waiting to be fully recognised with respect to the developments of Hellenism, of 
Christianity, and of Islam. My point is that “Egypt” can hardly be understood as 
a world apart without effect, a world of a coherent long term internal cultural 
production without change and effecting change to the world outside. 
Certainly, if one argues that the arrival of Islam has constituted a marking ef-
fect for the eastern Mediterranean region as a whole, the question remains what 
the position of Egypt is in this transformation process. What has Egypt contributed 
to the development of Islam, dogma, ritual, and learning? Egypt, certainly, has to 
be focussed as a main issue specifically in relation to the birth of monotheism 
and the early Christian theology. However, the emergence of Islam is a different 
story, and it is difficult to understand this event purely within the framework of 
the political and intellectual constellations of Late Antiquity. Extending the in-
fluence of Hellenism further to the South and the East could be counted just as 
another expression of the mode to frame out new sources of modernity and/or of 
Islam. However, my concern is a different one, I wish to stress the dialogical pat-
terns in the construction of monotheism, the dialogue with pre-existent Egypt and 
perceptions of order, in which monotheism and Islam became engaged and 
played the dominant role in later power and state formation in the region. 
 
 
3.  The ‘ longue durée’  of  Egyptian saints  
 
It should be noted that ‘late antique Egypt’ is a field of highly specialised histori-
cal and archaeological research which is difficult to approach from the site of the 
non-specialist, the transposition of themes and results from one field to another, 
therefore, seems a very complicated affair. Perhaps we can gain a more solid 
ground on struggles over continuities and breaks in the literature on “pilgrim-
ages” and on the early ascetics, the “saintly fathers of the desert.”  
It is true, my questions arise from a background of struggles which were con-
stitutive to the “Protestant notion of distinguishing and even polarizing an inte-
rior ‘spirituality’ from the exterior devotions and images of traditional piety” 
(Frankfurter 1998: 5). However, these are perhaps questions that were probably 
firstly raised in a radical missionary, converting in other words modern sense by 
early Muslims. 
In looking to the different historical and dialogical conditions of the relation 
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between absolute monotheism and personal interiority, Egypt seems to have been 
preserved in the religious mind as the power of the past, combining broader con-
cepts of Goddess with strong local ritual and symbolic practices on the one hand, 
and on the other hand as a direct constraint to the conceptual construction of per-
sonal piety and the idea of an abstract transcendence in early Christianity. 
This is certainly true with respect to the development of theology and theo-
logical discourse and the foundation of philosophical “heresies” which then more 
or less became part of the cultural constructions and church development. Thus 
the fundamental structures of Early Christianity in Egypt have been aptly de-
scribed as “the constant and vital interplay between Christianity as emerging 
from the cosmopolitan religiosity proper to the Hellenistic city of Alexandria and 
Christianity as bound to the spiritual landscape of the Nile valley (Kannengiesser 
1986: 212).  
Guy Stroumsa (2005) showed that Clemens of Alexandria was not only a 
theological enemy of the Egyptian cults, but also a spiritual integrator and in a 
real modern sense an ethnographer of old cultic practices. This perspective, cer-
tainly with respect to early Islam, presumes a new tenuous field of understand-
ing: Early Christianity was as late as into its 4th century largely build on a 
diaological basis of coexistence with the old Egyptian religion, local cults and 
symbolic worlds. 
One becomes even more assured of a potentially hidden role of “Egypt” in 
this double-sided construction of monotheism, including the event of Islam, in 
considering Dominic Montserrat’s observations of the “pilgrimage to the shrine 
of SS Cyrus and John at Menouthis in late antiquity” (1986: 256-279). These are 
specifically revealing the local tensions specifically about saintly places, the 
shrines of the saints, showing “that the status and development of the shrine is 
closely tied up with religious controversies that troubled Egypt between the early 
fifth and the mid-seventh century CE” and that “the shrine certainly survived the 
depredations of the Persians in around 618 CE and seems to have been function-
ing after Egypt became Muslim”(ibid.: 259). Montserrat speaks of the “coexis-
tence of the pagan and Christian” interpretation of the “divine place” of 
Menouthis until the mid-seventh century. However, Montserrat makes also clear, 
that the veneration at Menouthis, northeast of Alexandria, and specifically its 
form, interpretation and administration was strongly linked to the political and 
theological discourse in Alexandria, now however about two hundred years after 
Clemens. 
This tendency that a certain revival of old Egyptian cults could be observed 
even after six hundred years of spread of Christianism, could be affirmed if one 
looks to evidence gathered by Volokhine, namely showing that coptic shrines 
were often deplaced back to old places of veneration for either Isis or Osiris in 
the 6th and 7th century and that there seems to have operated a sort of “Zeitgeist” 
of re-inventing the powers of ancient gods within a framework of Christendom. 
These movements, obviously, were related to the emerging theological debates, 
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secterian struggles and ascetic communities. It is within this framework, that we 
can today gain some ground for understanding the Egyptian continuities Cer-
tainly, “Egypt” did not end after the destruction of the Serapeum in Alexandria in 
391. Volokhine argues that the motivation for a reinspiration of old places of 
temples through Christian pilgrimage was based on functional grounds with re-
spect to aspirations of good health, marketing, and everyday needs. There was a 
reinvention of oracles in Christian terms even in the 7th and 8th century which 
only, according to Volokhine was ended with the advent of Islam (Volokhine 
1998: 96)2  
There are two questions unanswered with respect to this evidence: First, it 
seems that there remains something incomplete in Monosyphism which the 
teaching of Muhammad attempts to come to grips with. Could one say that the 
early Muslims stand in direct connection with the idea of Monosyphist rejections 
of cult sublimation, or, more directly that Early Islam poses a sort of solution to 
the Monosyphist struggles in ending the cultic reality of late antiquity. Second, 
and directly related to the first question, one could ask how far the Christian 
theological discourse – with “Egypt” as its subject – had influenced the theologi-
cal discourse in Early Islam. Is Early Islam the main event of the definite end of 
“Egypt” in late antiquity? 
A different angle could be traced. With the Muslim conquest of Egypt, the 
fact is that while the Alexandrian Christians were involved in highly sophisti-
cated religious, theological and factional political quarrels, the Muslims ad-
vanced their forces. If Alfred Butler, in an early attempt of simultaneous reading 
of Byzantine and Arabic sources is right, the fall of Byzantine rule in Egypt 
given its enormous structural and military superiority was largely due to an ir-
resolvable struggle between Egyptian Coptic and Byzantine theological schools, 
the later holding worldly power, the earlier maintaining old beliefs and practices. 
According to Butler, there was, however, no Coptic betrayal, but internal ideo-
logical confusion that caused the final defeat in front of the Muslims. In the pe-
riod of the last ten years before the Arab intrusion of Egypt Cyrus, Governor and 
Patriarch of Egypt, al-Muqauqas, persecuted perniciously the Copts of Egypt. 
This persecution was directed against both, the continuity of the practice of ven-
 
2  Volokhine writes here: “La motivation qui préside aux déplacements vers les tem-
ples concerne des soucis courants, et non pas une quête des salut : la santé, la bonne 
marche des affaires, le quotidien. Dans cette mesure, le développement des oracles, 
le recours aux dieux sauveurs, sont significatifs. Comme le remarquait J. Cerny, la 
teneur des pétitions écrites en grec adressées aux oracles correspond aux demendes 
égyptiennes; de même, les papyrus coptes du VIIe ou du VIIIe siècle confirment 
que la pratique de l’oracle ne disparaît pas avec le paganisme. On s’adressait à Sé-
rapis, à Sobek: on s’adresse à présent au dieu chrétien. L’Islam seul mettra fin à des 
millénaires de pratique. De même, on ne verra pas forcement de césure entre 
l’époque paienne et chrétienne en ce qui concerne les habitudes de déplacements 
vers les sanctuaires.” 
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eration at local Egyptian cultic places as much as of the anti-Chalaedonian theo-
logical Elite (Butler 1978: 168-206). It should be said – and very strikingly so it 
was – that on the side of the Muslims no word of religion or religious quarrel can 
be traced, (certainly apart of one all embracing word: Allahu akbar) in negotia-
tions with the patriarchal powers. Here, it is very interesting to see, the absence 
of religious language in formulating the treaties of surrender first of Babylon and 
then of Alexandria (Butler 1978: 256-274, 318-327). There is this anecdote of the 
encounter and negotiations of Cyrus, the Archbishop and ´Ubâdah b. as-Sâmit, a 
powerful Negro who was earlier in close relation to Muhammad and later quite 
involved in the religious party-struggle between Mu´awiya, first “Meccan Calif,” 
and the Ansâr, the Medinan followers of Muhammad (van Ess 2001: 248-259). 
´Ubâdah is far from indulging on religious terms. Religious is, if anything far 
from theology, the simplicity of expression of this black Muslim confronting the 
Alexandrian Archbishop who refused to negotiate with a black man: “There are a 
thousand blacks, as black as myself, among our companions. I and they would be 
ready each to meet and fight a hundred enemies together. We live only to fight 
for God, and to follow His will. We care not for wealth, so long as we have 
wherewithal to stay our hunger and to clothe our bodies. This world is not to us, 
the next world is all” (Butler 1978: 257).  
Can we say that perhaps the one-dimensional simplicity in advertising their 
religion in these early times of conquest, in fact, delivered the basis on which 
both the Christian parties could see a way for themselves to view the future? Was 
this future, indeed, a sort of continuation of the theological debate on the back of 
the simplicity and clarity of the original Islamic message? 
The point of Early Islam confronting Egypt and the Egyptian Christians, 
leave aside the philosophically inclined Jewish community in Alexandria, seems 
to be one of military straightforwardness and theological simplicity. Certainly, 
Fowden’s idea, that “Islam offered not just an umbrella political regime which 
protected all those who acknowledged a revealed scripture, but also a strictly 
monotheist doctrine of God which gave renewed energy to discussions seemingly 
stalled for ever in the hardened ruts of the Christianological controversies” 
(Fowden 2005: 10), is well taken. Perhaps from here we can understand, that 
“Egypt” in Early Islam seems to have been reduced to the practices related to the 
Qisas al-Anbiyâ, the wide spread popular practice of narratives of the prophets 
and old Egyptian topics, while only in medieval Islam and from there on, pil-
grimages and the veneration of local saints took a fully new shape in Islamic 
terms.  
Taking these dimensions into account, we will be able to view the case of a 
Jewish man, who was conversant with Jewish myths and legends of the prophets, 
and an important witness for Muhammad to stand in their tradition. Conversing 
to Islam he became a pillar of orthodox monotheism, and possibly through his 
imaginative and magic stories being made part of the Islamic Tradition, he also 
entered into the broad field of practices related to popular story telling, even after 
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the taste for popular legends of the prophets had faded. He now survives in the 
memory of people as a strongly venerated saint in the district of Mansura in the 
north-eastern Nile Delta.  
 
 
4.   ́ Abdal lah b.  Salam:  
the ear ly Jewish convert  and Egypt ian saint   
 
The case that I wish to develop in the following pages stands in a mediating posi-
tion between “Late Antiquity” and Islam: ´Abdallah b. Salam is the first Jewish 
companion to the Prophet Muhammad, he was a well educated Jew with deep 
genealogical traits in a clan of priests and scholars, he converted to Islam in 622 
AD when Muhammad arrived in Medina. He later was an advisor to the Caliphs 
Umar, Uthman and Mu´awiya and is considered a pillar of early orthodoxy. Sec-
ond the way in which he is venerated today and since an unknown number of 
centuries is important. He has his main places of veneration at sites with relics of 
the Pharaonic past. There, his sainthood seems to have been constructed and re-
constructed in relation with his testifying Islamic monotheism as against per-
forming non-Islamic traditions. However, his legends – obviously transmitted by 
way of local Sufi channels – also entail references to Pharaonic and Jewish mate-
rial. We should note that he was probably the first Jewish convert to Islam in 
Medina.  
This case is significant with respect to how Islam in a perspective of long du-
ration has dealt with the non-Islamic. This implies the specific story of the im-
pact of monotheism on local beliefs, the construction and maintenance of sacred 
places and the ambivalent treatment of local beliefs by the orthodoxy and in re-
cent years by often insurgent reformist Salafi-groups.  
 
4.1 Topography and essence 
 
A critical description of historical and symbolic arrangements of the saint neces-
sitates a view on the geography and topography of his places3.  
In general, saintly places are the places of the dead. The ambiguity of genea-
logical nearness to the sites of the Ancients is quite common practice in both Is-
lam and Christianity. Christians have often built the churches for their patrons on 
grave yards and cult places of the Romans, similarly the Muslim Saints in the 
Nile Delta are often very close to the Pharaonic places or places of Egyptian an-
tiquity in general. The religious theory of saintly places dating back to Ernest 
 
3  More detailed description of three places in the Mansura-region are presented in 
Stauth (2005), Ägyptische Heilige Orte I: Konstruktionen, Inszenierungen und 
Landschaften der Heiligen im Nildelta: ´Abdallah b. Salam. Bielefeld: transcript. 
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Renan, therefore, strongly claimed that humanity prayed always at the same 
places. We may say so, that there is nothing special about ´Abdallah b. Salam 
having his place close or on top of a Tell, as the Egyptians call those red and 
brown mounds of ruins of antiquity, rising up from the dark or green regularly 
inundated moulds of Delta agricultural land. However, remaining in the – poten-
tially misleading – first glance perspective of geography and Topography, here, 
the question turns to the fact that ´Abdallah b. Salam who is the most prominent 
figure among early Jewish converts to Islam, has not only one, but many places 
in this region which was a region of Jewish settlement and in the Late Dynastic 
Period had witnessed many invasions of “Asian” people. In the larger context of 
the Nile Delta today huge metropolitan cities, relating to times before the Hyksos 
and settling Jews, have been found (the admirable work of Edgar Pusch and his 
crew in Qantîr seems to find too little support by his colleagues in this respect). It 
is astonishing that in other regions no places of ´Abdallah are to be found. Here, 
in the the Daqahliyya province with the city of Mansura as its centre the saying 
goes that ´Abdallah has more than 3, some say 13, some 39, some 40 places. As I 
said, it potentially misleading to give this local fixation an over-essential mean-
ing with respect to history. However, ´Abdallah, connected with Early Islam, the 
latest of the revealed monotheistic religions, and with Judaism, the first of the re-
ligions of monotheism, puts him in a very ambiguous historical place which re-
minds us that the idea of the one God rose as an idea which became influential in 
various cultic and ethnic communities and even nations and, indeed, this region 
was one of culture contact since the early days of human history.  
However, from what follows it will become clear, that any attempt to explain 
the local importance of ´Abdallah from the angle of continuity of Jewish settle-
ment will fail. There is strong evidence that ´Abdallah’ was, first, perhaps in the 
18th century, a place of a tribal leader who was buried near the Tell. Gradually, 
perhaps in the course of intensive veneration there emerged the need of official 
orthodox recognition and the place was named and venerated as the one of 
´Abdallah b. Salam, the pillar of Orthodoxy in Early Islam. His Jewish origin 
was potentially later linked with the Tell in local legends among the Fellaheen 
who also called and still call the Tell today: “Tell” or “qasr bint al-yahudi” (cas-
tle of the daughter of the Jew). However, putting ´Abdallah b. Salam, the Jew 
and the Muslim saint, and his location, into the one-dimensional essentialist track 
of a functional and mono-causal explanation, would be misleading again. And I 
have described in greater detail that nothing is definite with respect to the local 
arrangements, religious functions and symbolic productions of this saint and in 
his relation to the collective memory and religious history of monotheism. Nev-
ertheless, the case itself symbolises the very type of constructions and antago-
nisms which are historically linked with the local presence of Islam and its need 
of strengthening of monotheism as places, practises, and ideas of the Ancient 
past. At the same time for today it is important to note, that against and within 
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modernist streams of Islam, the place turns to be continuously rearranged and
adapted among local people and followers of ´Abdallah.  
Beyond the essentialism of topography, ´Abdallah b. Salam (d. 43 H.) is a 
Jewish and later Islamic scholar who converted to Islam at Muhammad’s arrival 
in Medina. He has many saintly places in Daqahliyya, the region of the Egyptian 
provincial capital al-Mansura in the eastern part of the Nile Delta. These places 
are considered to be his tombs, although in fact nobody – perhaps except the 
children of the village – would belief in the saint to be really buried here. A saint 
has his place (maqam), indeed, and venerating him here, does not necessarily 
mean the testified physical presence of his dead body or of any of his relicts. This 
does not challenge the idea of his immediate presence at the place and the ven-
eration of one saint at different places is quite normal practice (Goldziher 1968: 
71; Franke 2004). ´Abdallah b. Salam’s case, however, is significant in that he 
has many Maqams just in one specific region with amble prove that he never 
physically has been in Egypt. He is extraordinary with his Maqams being distrib-
uted in this specific north-eastern part of the Nile Delta. The case seems to be 
unparalleled in the literature, because he is a historical figure of the early days of 
Islam in Medina, Jerusalem and southern Syria, however, his fantastic presence 
as a saint is reserved to this specific region in the eastern Delta.  
Goldziher took Ka´b al-Ahbar, a contemporary of ´Abdallah b. Salam and a 
Jewish convert like him, to whom Egyptians have given a place of veneration in 
Cairo. He considered him as an example for this Egyptian habit to venerate an 
“absent” saint (cf. Muh. Stud. II, 336-343). This “Egyptian habit,” however, does 
not help to answer our question: Why is ´Abdallah b. Salam, one of the first Jew-
ish converts to Islam venerated in this specific province of Egypt, why is he ven-
erated at so many places in this province, and why – to our knowledge – is he not 
venerated at any other place in rural or urban Egypt? Here, the question of the 
“place” of the saint quickly turns into the many questions related to Egypt, Islam, 
monotheism and the construction of modernity. Certainly, the starting question is 
how the local conditions of “memory” relate to the historical and symbolic forms 
of constructing the Saintly. However, in a much broader sense, I think, this case 
certainly includes the question about the prophetic traditions and early dialogue 
in the construction of monotheism and its significance for cross-civilsational dia-
logue today.  
 
4.2 ´Abdallah b. Salam – the historical figure  
 
This observation with ´Abdallah b. Salam’s places reveals that the appearance of 
historical relics is linked to the fight of Islamic monotheism against continuities 
or survivals or reinventions of the Ancients. This is also the present function of 
this saint and his shrines. Islamology knows generally nothing about his role as a 
contemporary local saint in Egypt. Islamology presents ´Abdallah through the 
eyes of history and literary books confirming his factual existence in Islamic 
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sources, mainly the maghazi- and hadith-Literature. A sort of change in paradigm 
can be noted, however, in a recent study by Josef van Ess, who actually visited 
the place of his scholar/saint, the Maqam of Mu´adh b. Gabal in El-Ekseir near 
al-Hamma in Jordan (van Ess 2001: 365) and took note of a place of the same 
person in Cairo (ibid.: 376). As will be noted in greater detail below, this is an as-
tonishing exception of an Islamic philologist’s modern recognition of a compan-
ion of the Prophet as a contemporary saint (van Ess 2001: 359-380). Certainly, 
van Ess here opens a new landscape for the study of the modern significance of 
early Islamic history. My own contention is sociological, i.e. limited and simple 
and to a great extent reductionist: ´Abdallah b. Salam b. al- Harith the person and 
modern saint will be presented here only in terms of a short summary of his biog-
raphy: His original name in the time before his conversion was al- Husayn from 
the Banu Qaynuqa´. He died in 43 H. (664) in Medina. His fame is linked to his 
“Questions to the Prophet,” provoking answers by the Prophet which – as re-
ported were so convincing for him that he converted to Islam. It is also reported 
that the Islamic tradition gives him great importance, because ´Abdallah be-
longed to a group of a few Jews who converted and stood with the Prophet and 
while many of them charged Muhammad with ignorance of the old testament 
versions of his time, it seems to have been ´Abdallah who may have acknowl-
edged the fact to which Ilse Lichtenstaedter points, namely that Muhammad “in 
the early times of his mission […] was not telling Biblical stories; he was dipping 
deep into the reservoir of Ancient Near Eastern myth from which those Biblical 
stories themselves had originally arisen” (Lichtenstaeder 1976: 38). It was, obvi-
ously, ´Abdallah the specialist of “ancient myth” who identified Muhammad as a 
specialist in this very field. Not the factual, i.e. textual, but the mythological 
knowledge led to the recognition of Muhammad as the true and announced 
Prophet in the line of the ancient Near Eastern religious tradition.  
Taking these terms of understanding, ´Abdallah’s questions where only to be 
answered by a Jewish Prophet. As Horowitz tells us, the contents of the Hadiths 
which figure under ´Abdallah’s name in the early Islamic source books and spe-
cifically the story of Buluqya, which al-Tha´labi, a well recognized traditioner, 
traces back to ´Abdallah b. Salam, are mostly originating from Jewish sources 
and even if ´Abdallah is not the author, the stories derive from the circles of Jew-
ish converts (Horovitz EI/1, I: 32 ). There always seems to have been a certain 
uneasiness about ´Abdallah’s Jewish descent, certainly among his Muslim con-
temporaries. However, Horovitz believes that it were traditions that were circu-
lated later in which Muhammad affirms ´Abdallah as one of those who have a se-
cure place in paradise or in which is stated that certain verses of the Qur`an relate 
to ´Abdallah b. Salam. Fuat Sezgin maintains that the “Questions” of ´Abdallah 
were later expanded to whole books and other writings which seem to paraphrase 
the stories which are contained in the Hadith-source books. “He was one of the 
first converts and had great knowledge of the Jewisch tradition of the world his-
tory and the early Prophets etc. (Sezgin 1967, I: 304). The Masa`il were later 
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translated into Latin and circulated as Doctrina Mahumet and Theologia Maho-
metis in late medieval Europe (Bobzin 1995: 50, 332; Kritzeck 1964: 89-96). Ac-
cording to the sources ´Abdallah was accompanying ´Umar the second Caliph in 
his raids to Jabiya and Jerusalem. Possibly this relates also to his function as a 
potential missionary of Jews and we may suspect that his “Kitab Masa`il Sidi 
´Abdallah” (Sezgin ibid.) points into this direction. In the following struggles for 
the Caliphat ´Abdallah b. Salam stood firm with ´Uthman, the third Calif. There 
are reports that he was present when ´Uthman was murdered, however, could not 
prevent the murder. Later he was a follower of the Caliph Mu´awiya. Perhaps his 
later importance in Sufi circles derives from his mythological stories about the 
old traditions of the Prophets and Muhammads own prophecy, the qissas an-
nabawi, which often combine old Jewish themes with old Pharaonic materials 
(Horovitz 1901). As said above many such stories – like the one of Buluqya – 
also appear in the oldest maghazi- and hadith-books, Qur`an-commentaries and 
world histories (Sezgin 1967,I: 304). Brockelmann refers to the Kitab fi `Azamat 
allah wa mahluqatih of Abu Muh. `Aal. B. M. Ja`far b. Haiyan b. ash-Shaikh al-
Isphahani (d. 979), who “in the introduction refers to ´Al. B. as-Sallam his using 
the writings of Daniel, which he took from the tables of Adam preserved in Ser-
endib (Ceylon; Berlin 6159)” (Brockelmann 1942, I: 209). ´Abdallah’s main 
sources in tradition seem to have been such famous authorities like Abu Hurayra 
und Anas b. Malik (EI/2, I: 52). 
This is in short a summary of textual biography of ´Abdallah b. Salam. There 
is no reference to his veneration as an Egyptian saint. However, it should be 
noted that his Maqams, which we visited, assemble – in different forms and with 
different ways of giving importance – a variety of writings taken from religious 
sources. It would need a very specific analysis to work out in detail these textual 
representations, and I certainly do encourage the specialists in early Islamic phi-
lology to do so. In the following, I will only refer to them in as much they are of 
interest for the questions which I am developing here.  
 
 
5.   ́ Abdal lah b.  Salam with a  view on his  
pre- Is lamic stor ies and legends 
 
A new “reality” of the historical existence of ´Abdallah b. Salam seems to 
emerge if we leave the today existing Maqams and the local entourage and enter 
– with some sociological restraint indeed – into the world of texts. In fact, we 
have no clear cut understanding of the historical figure: Was he a religious 
scholar, a specialist in religious mythology, a politico-religious convert and then 
a missionary? As we showed it is not unusual to have one and the same saint at 
various places and even at places where he in historical reality never could have 
been. However, what makes this saint so unusual is the very different character 
of his local functioning: a variety of “appearances” in one and the same region of 
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the Delta: we may call this a very normal phenomenon of “translocality.” How-
ever, once we turn to the realm of texts we may state that the question what 
makes this saint so important and meaningful in this local context gains quite a 
different turn. ´Abdallah never was in Egypt and so he had no immediate impact 
on the Arab Conquest of Egypt, the Futuh. However, even if the signs for his his-
torical physical presence are nil, we may uphold the question of a potential inner 
historical relationship of ´Abdallah b. Salam to his places in Mendes/Manzala. 
This is merely hypothetical, and we take ´Abdallah’s local fictionality only as a 
point of strategic interest, delimiting our textual investigations  
First, there are his miracle-stories and legends which are of interest: As men-
tioned above, ‘Abdallah b. Salam has a name as author of such stories in the 
early Islamic literary history and it is important to know that such stories of the 
old prophets and wonders played and until today play an important role in both 
the local Sufi culture and the popular tradition (Horovitz 1901; Sezgin 1967, I, 
304). In his little note on the story of Buluqya, Horowitz refers to a story of 
´Abdallah b. Salam in ath-Tha´labi’s qisas al-anbiya (Horowitz 1901: 519; ath-
Tha´labi 1325/1907-8). The early schools of interpretation of Qur`an, responding 
to questions about historical events which were only vaguely referd to in the 
Qur`an were often influenced by recent converts who with their knowledge of the 
Torah were able to answer them. Thus the early Christian or Jewish converts of-
ten functioned to explain certain contradictions in naming the event in the history 
of the early Prophets for example. This is also clearly a reference to the fact that 
so many biblical and pseudo-biblical material was assembled in the Hadith, nar-
ratives of the old religious history with a quite often irrational, miraculous and 
fictional character. These narratives were often refused by orthodox authorities 
and modern reformists (Jansen 1980: 27).  
The story of Buluqiya belongs to this genre which combines in metaphor and 
content the myths of pre-Islamic history with the stories of miracles of the 
Prophets and historical facts. Certainly, the stories also had a certain effect in re-
ligious propaganda since they were aimed at a foundational genealogy of the 
Prophet Muhammad in the line of the old prophets of the Thorah. The story of 
Buluqiya is a fantastic story which assembles historical and geographical names, 
however, in a way that remains vague and unrealistic, where factual details turn 
out to be of a purely metaphorical nature. We may – in line with our modest so-
ciological interests – refer to the story here, only based on Horowitz’ presenta-
tion. Perhaps, we can trace out, here, three separate dimensions of “reality” as 
represented in the story’s mythological and metaphorical return to the past:  
1. Jews in Egypt: The story mentions a certain “King of the Banu Isra`il in 
Egypt.” This is not to reflect in the very sense of “reality” the Jewish presence in 
Egypt. However, as much as the “real” history of this presence takes a very fic-
tional character, we may only refer to it in a very “loose” way: The story of Jew-
ish settlement always relates to the sons of Jacob in the land of Goshen which 
only recently is re-identifies with Pithom or Patoumos, today Tell Maskhuta 
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(Retsö 2003: 250 f.) in the southeast of the Delta (Wadi Tumalat). In what arche-
ologists have attempted to trace as this presence of the Jews remains – when it 
comes to “real” places – very vague (Hoffmeier 1996: 107-134; Bietak 1986). 
Adding to the confusion would be to take the story of Ka´b al-Ahbar, (transmit-
ted through ath-Tha´labi/Qisa´i) as “real” which – as local peasants in the Fay-
yum until today do locate the treasure of Salomon in the lake of Qarun – speaks 
of the treasure in the “lake” and as reported thus refers to the fact that the Fay-
yum was always as the settlement of the descendents of Josef resembling a 
wrong but nevertheless until today in Egypt vital Jewish tradition story, that the 
land Goshen was located in the Fayyum (Wolfensohn 1933: 81). 
2. Torah and Muhammad: The Buluqya-story of ´Abdallah b. Salam also refers 
to a “book” in which the appearence of the Propheten Muhammad was announced 
and his personality was described: the Torah. This is obviously referring to similar 
traditions as transmitted in Ibn Hishams Sira (live story) of the Prophet: ´Abdallah 
b. Salam is reported to state to the Jews of Medina: “You know, that Muhammed 
is the messanger of God, you find his name written in the Taurat and dedscribed” 
(Ibn Hisham 1860: 353/2002: 240). Interestingly enough, we find today this 
Hadith being part of the collection of sources on ´Abdallah b. Salam at his mauso-
leum in the village Kafr al-Amir ´Abdallah b. Salam south of Mansura. 
3. Myths and metaphors of Pharaonic Egypt: The story refers metaphorically 
to the thematic of an old Egyptian fairy tale of the “shipwrecked seaman” which 
is also present in Flinders-Petrie’s “Egyptian Tales” (1st series, pp. 88) to which 
Horovitz (1901: 519) refers. This includes an old thematic of the queen of the 
snakes which embraces the movement of jinn and snakes with reference to an-
cient Egypt. Miracles and the powers of magic are often related to some types of 
references to old Egyptian cultic metaphors and the secrets of the temples in later 
medieval literature (e.g. U. Sezgin 1994: 12-17). According to Fuat Sezgin there 
also exists a manuscript (Paris 2954, pp. 113-116) including some magics and 
amulettes of ´Aballah b. Salam (Sezgin 1967: 304). Mohamad el-Gawhary 
(1968: 51-54) mentions that specifically the early Jewish converts like Ka´b al-
Ahbar and ´Abdallah b. Salam were often refered to in the works of al-Buni (st. 
622 H./1225 AD.) when dealing with the names of God used in magic. We may 
wonder whether the metaphor used in the following Hadith of ´Abdallah b. 
Salam concerning the arrival of the Prophet in Medina engages with another 
metaphoric allusion: “a man came with the message of his arrival when I was 
working in the top of a palm tree and my aunt Khalida bt. Al-Harith was sitting 
below” (Ibn Hisham 1860: 353/2002: 241). The layer of later reference to 
´Abdallah b. Salam in Islamic literature referring to Pharaonic culture seems to 
explain also his popularity when it comes to jinn and magic. In nucleus we may 
see here also a different dimension namely the powerful missionary who is able to 
deal with such practices, a function which could relate directly to his official posi-
tion in orthodox Islam since his participation in the conquest of Palestine and 
Syria. 
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6.   Ear ly Is lamic knowledge:  
translat ing bibl ical  legends and Qur´anic myths 
 
Obviously this later point of the missionary, discursive and psychological power 
of this saint and his potentially significant role as “translator” and “accountant” 
of the old Jewish and the Pharaonic myths and legends in the context of the 
“birth” of Islam and Islamic theology is significant with respect to his image as a 
pillar of orthodox wisdom. As much as Pharaonic stories, metaphors and histo-
ries flourished still in medieval times, as much, however, they were also subject 
to suppression by religiously inclined people (Haarmann1978: 371). Neverthe-
less, the orthodox tradition gave ´Abdallah b. Salam a great intellectual and spiri-
tual position as one of the al-´urwa al-wuthqa, the category of steadly trustful be-
lievers (Dhahabi, Tadhkirat, I, 26, see also Ibn Sa´d II, pp. 352). ´Abdallah has 
put his weight on serious religious ground and his position among the early 
commentators of Qur`an seems unquestioned:  
“Unter den bevorzugten Belehrungsquellen des Ibn ‘Abbas finden wir viel- 
fach die jüdischen Konvertiten Ka´b al-Ahbar (Ibn Sa´d VII/1, 161, 15 ff.) und 
´Abdallah b. Salam, sowie im allgemeinen Ahl al-Kitab, also Leuten aus Klassen, 
vor deren Mitteilungen sonst auch in Sprüchen, die auf Ibn `Abbas selbst zurück-
geführt sind, gewarnt wird. Nicht mit Unrecht warnt Loth vor der jüdisch ge-
färbten Schule des Ibn al-´Abbas” (Goldziher 1952: 67). 
(Among the favorable sources of learning of Ibn ´Abbas we often find the 
Jewish converts Ka´b al-Ahbar (Ibn Sa´d VII/1, 161, 15 pp.) and ´Abdallah b. 
Salam, as well as in general traditions from Ahl al-Kitab, people of such strata, 
the traditions of which even with respect to those which are transmitted from Ibn 
´Abbas were otherwise doubted. Loth does not unjustly refer to the Jewish fla-
voured school of Ibn ´Abbas.) 
Another respected commentator of the school of Ibn al-´Abbas is Mujahid b. 
Jabr, who often quotes ´Abdallah b. Salam as the witness for the Qur`anic verse: 
“wa shahida shahidun min bani isra`il `ala mithlihi”: qala Mujahid: ismuhu 
´Abdallah b. Salam (Ibn Sa´d (1985, II: 353, see also adh-Dhahabi, Tadhkirat al-
Huffaz, I, 26). Mujahid was well respected among the orthodoxy “weil er sich 
von den Ahl al-Kitab belehren ließ” (because he was informed by the Ahl al-
Kitab” (Ibn Sa´d V, 344; Wolfensohn 1933: 37). 
Another Hadith refers to ´Abdallah b. Salam as a very eager convert, it goes 
back to ´Abdallah b. ´Umar: ´Abdallah b. Salam insisted – against his own for-
mer brothers in the Jewish religion – that the tradition of stoning goes back to the 
real text of the Torah to be considered as Law, this insisting then lead to the 
death of a young couple punished for adultary. ´Abdallah b. Salam through this 
episode belongs to the history of introducing of stoning as Punishment in Islam 
(cf. Ibn Hisham 2002: 241 ff.; Mingana n.d.). It is quite symptomatic that this 
episode – as a quick view to the respective pages of the internet shows – plays an 
important role in inter-religious discourse until today.  
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A subtle background for the otherwise orthodox refuse to fully acknowledge 
the Jewish converts (e.g. van Ess 2001: 79) seems to refer to the general hostility 
of the Jews towards the new Prophet: “l’ostilitá degli Ebrei,” because Muham-
mad was not a Jew “fosse generata dall’invidia, perché Dio non aveva preferito 
di mandare un Profeta ebraico. L’opposizione degli Ebrei sia un travisamento dei 
fatti e che il motivo fondamentale fosse invece sopratutto politico” (Caetani 
1905, I: 413, fn 1). 
Similar reactions are vital until today in modern Egyptian interpretations of the 
Qur`an most notably by Rashid Rida, who opposed the “Isra`iliyat,” the Hadiths 
originating from early converts and speeks of false traditions which were fabri-
cated to undermine Islam (vgl. Jansen 1980: 27). The Isra`iliyat, the “traditions and 
reports that contain elements of the legendary and religious literature of the Jews,” 
as Juynboll (1969: 121) tells us, found always a very ambiguous reception among 
orthodox scholars. However, it should be noted that despite the motive of Queen of 
the Snake in the Buluqya-story for example, ´Abdallah b. Salam was well praised 
by Rashid Rida (Juynboll 1969: 129). This is astonishing, because otherwise it is 
known that “Rida contended that all the stories woven around the snake were for-
geries and belonged to the isra`iliyat” (Juynboll 1969: 122).  
We can also learn from Ibn Khaldun how definite the refutation of the 
Isra`iliat where generally by the Orthodoxy. However, it seems that all this had 
not affected the well-settled position of ´Abdallah b. Salam as a figure of vigour 
and belief in early Islam. In Ibn Khaldun´s Muqaddima we find him being hon-
oured as one of the refuters of Ali´s Khalifa and as one of the trustees of the 
Umayyads (Ibn Khaldun 1958, I: 439). However, Ibn Khaldun warned of the tra-
ditions of the biblical interpretations of the Qur`an because they “clung to the (in-
formation) they possessed, such as information about the beginning of creation 
and the information of the type of forecasts and predictions” (Ibn Khaldun 1958, 
III: 445). Nevertheless, they could also be considered “as people of rank in (their) 
religion and religious group” (Ibn Khaldun 1958, III: 446). Ilse Lichtstadter 
seems to give us a sound explanation for the interpretative role of the early con-
verts: Muhammad “was dipping deep into the reservoir of ancient Hear eastern 
myth from which those Biblical stories themselves had originally arisen. Thus, 
these variants represent several parallel streams of myth and legend independ-
ently from this ancient well of Near Eastern mythology, gradually becoming 
“history.” They were identical in their underlying symbolic meaning but not in 
the way they were remembered and told in the various cultural and religious en-
vironments” (1976: 38). The new religion, therefore, had its own necessities to 
explain the differences between knowledge of text and knowledge of myth. In 
fact, there was the need to close the gap due to the historical break with traditions 
and myth. However, at the same time there arose the necessity to stabilize the 
sense for cultural continuity and to mobilize it in a missionary sense, or even of 
instrumentalizing the images and symbols of continuity for the religious meta-
phoric and mentality of the masses.  
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Wolfensohn clearly shows that the prophetic stories, deriving from the 
Isra`iliyat were – in opposition to their refutation by the orthodoxy – already in 
the first century Hijra – a mass phenomenon. The popular story tellors (qas, pl. 
qussas), and re-interpretors, wanderers between mosques and public places at-
tracted masses of people listening to the Qisas the mixed legends of the Qur`an 
and the Bible, explaining the textual discrepancies between both (Goldziher 
1969, II: pp. 161). In the event of the recitation in front of a huge audience men 
and women were applauding the Qas intervening with questions and statements 
or just raising their hands as they do it until today when listening to poets and 
singers. The ability of quick response to questions and of inventing of “real” de-
tails was part of their profession. Certainly, confronting “the people” they were 
regarded as the real “scholars” and often better repuded as their rivals the schol-
ars of profession ond of disciplinary studies (Goldziher 1969: II, 167). Certainly, 
the Isra`iliat took a special part in these legends on biblical figures (Wolfensohn 
1933: 62 ).  
Ka´b al-Ahbar is a convert who is often mentioned together with ´Abdallah b. 
Salam and who like him was a follower of ´Umar, of ´Uthman and Mu´awiya, 
and who has never travelled to Egypt. He functioned , like ´Abdallah as a coun-
cillor and a visionary, however, unlike ´Abdallah his Maqams in Egypt are ac-
knowledged in the literature, for example in Lane’s Manners and Customs of 
Modern Egyptians (quote from Wolfensohn 1933: 32). 
Wolfensohn explains the veneration olf Ka´b in Egypt that his name is related 
to the Jusuf-Legends in the later collections and that these legends have their 
places in Egypt, therefore finding great interest among the people there (Wolfen-
sohn, 1933: 33). He also points to Ali Bascha Mubarak (al-Hitat al-Taufiqiyya, 
II: 96) and his mentioning of a Cairean mosque were other saints are burried in 
the Sajida Zainab quarter, the Shari´a ‘l-Nasiriyya street and also entering from 
the small Harat al-Sayis” (ibid.). 
 
 
7.  Between ear ly Is lamic pol i t ics  and mission  
 
As we have seen, despite all critique against the Isra`iliyat and the Qussas, 
´Abdallah b. Salam remains a trustworthy pillar of the Orthodoxy and his tradi-
tions are officially presented at his Maqam, specifically in the one near Tell 
Thmuis in Kafr al-Amir. This fact needs further explanation. Possibly, we may 
ask, whether in all the textual arrangements there is potentially beyond the all 
magic, metaphors and legends, quite separately a dimension of the missionary, 
discursive and psychological power of these early Jewish converts in Islam and 
specifically of ´Abdallah b. Salam. The most critical authors against all early Is-
lamic sources could give us here an interesting turn in understanding the specific 
climate of the struggle of ideas in the early time of Islamic conquest of Palestine 
and Syria. Patricia Crone and Michael Cook in “Hagarism” (1977) develop their 
176  |  CROSSROADS AND TURNING POINTS 
critique from the stand against Islam as the late-comer of the prophetic religions 
as “an unusual, and for a number of related reasons a peculiar historical event” 
(1977: VII). By way of abolishing the maghazi- and hadith-literature from the 
horizon of “real” sources, Crone und Cook are implementing a small number of 
non-Islamic sources to develop a diverse picture of the early history of Islamic 
expansion. This finds our interest, because they include some important points on 
the psychology of religious propaganda and the potential role of the Jewish con-
verts in it. The point is that Jewish Messianism played a role in the expansion of 
Islam in the times of the Calif ´Umar and that this idea contributed to the later 
reworking of the life history of Muhammad and his entourage in Medina. With 
this point Crone and Cook, however, remain mainly interested in the critique of 
the authenticity claims of the Islamic sources. They contribute little to further our 
understanding of the coincidence of Messianism, religious intellectualism and 
scholarship in early Islam. There is, as they claim, the “messianic aspect of the 
conquest of Palestine” and the respective “warmth of the Jewish reaction to the 
Arab conquest” (Crone/Cook 1977: 6). However, to merely discuss the metaphor 
of the Jewish idea of “´Umar al-Faruq” representing the picture of “the one who 
will come,” in terms of a regressive imagery of reworking the sources in the 8th 
century, is a mere methodological question and out of tune with Islamic self-
definition in early Islam.  
The question for us is, whether the “Jews who mix with the Saracens” 
(Crone/Cook 1977: 6) played an important role in the dialogue between the con-
quering Arabs and the local populations and in which way this dialogue opened 
new fields of spiritual and ritual orientation. ´Abdallah b. Salam is reported to 
have accompanied the Caliph ´Umar at his raid to Jerusalem and that he later on 
was close to ´Uthman and Mu´awiya. The report that in 35 H. an Egyptian mili-
tary unit came to Medina to support ´Uthman – it came too late – gives some 
space for speculation with respect to a possible link to Egypt and its political and 
theological elite.  
There are more speculations: Wolfensohn knows that Ka´b al-Ahbar had al-
ready left Medina at the time of the murder of ´Uthman and there were other in-
fluential persons who did not want to engage in the struggle over the Caliph-ship 
and left the town. Ibn ´Abbas for example, who was in Mecca. ´Amr b. al-´As 
was in Palestine; only ´Abdallah b. Salam seems to have stood on the side of the 
Caliph when the rebels came to murder him (Tab, Ann. I, 3017 cf. Wolfenson 
1933: 31). Such reports show the local differences in influence of individual 
leaders and their different spheres of influence. It is interesting here to know, that 
the Medinese community of Jews had close “rapporti spirituali e forse anche 
commerciali con le communità ebraiche della Palestina e della Babilonia” (Caet-
ani 1905,I: 414).  
Furthermore ´Abdallah b. Salam seems to have explained individual names 
of biblical and qur`anic places in Jerusalem in terms of their significance for the 
new religion:  
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“In fact, eschatological descriptions assign a special role to the Temple 
Mount, the Valley of Hinnom and the Mount of Olives. According to ´Abdallah 
ibn Salam, a Jew from Medina who embraced Islam after Mohammed´s arrival in 
that city, the sirat – the narrow bridge over the valley on Hinnom which all crea-
tures must cross on Judgement Day – extends between the Mount of Olives and 
the Temple-area” (e.g. Muslim Iman III, 20/21; Hirschberg 1951/2: 342-3). 
We could believe that such stories and reports belong to a type that was re-
cently categorized as “lenkendes historisches Erzählen” (directing historical nar-
rative) which is recently discovered among Arabists and Philologists as playing a 
major part in the cultural constructions of early Islam (e.g. van Ess 2001). Stefan 
Leder’s study on the narrative of Abu Sufyan’s questioning by Heraklios (2001: 
1-42; 4) gives us an excellent account of the type of such narratives. However, all 
this is far beyond explaining why there exists a type of symbolic “networking” of 
´Abdallah b. Salam in the Eastern Nile-delta today and in the past. This is not to 
be explained with the few examples of “thematics” and traditions. However, the 
very local presence of today seems to have some significance with respect to 
monotheism and the past. It is this point that perhaps is another layer of his ven-
eration, namely, that the typology of his functioning could also tell us something 
about his role in history.  
 
 
8.  The modern funct ioning of  the Maqams  
 
There is not one generally applied pattern of local saints in Egypt. Perhaps, how-
ever, one could attempt – for the sake of clarity and with a view on “history” and 
“continuity” – to construct a variety of ideal types based on clusters of different 
external and internal factors constituting the vitality of their contemporary ven-
eration. Could one speak in this context of a certain ranking of the saints? And, 
certainly, if the construction of sainthood is about hierarchy and order, then, how 
do saints relate back to local social order?  
To start with, the Maqams of the members of the Prophet’s family, the ahl al-
bayt, all seem to be located in Cairo, the metropolis: Al-Husayn, Sayyida Zay-
nab, Sayyida Nafisa etc. However, the mere fact of their belonging to the ahl al-
bayt would not automatically give them the very high rank in estimation and 
popularity. This is a similar pattern also to be observed with the Maqams of the 
Sahaba, the companions of the Prophet.  
In the case of the great scholar and founder of one of the most important or-
thodox legal schools Imam al-Shafi´i (150-204 H./767-819 AD) who has his 
tomb in the City of the Death, the great southern cemetery, it is perhaps his role 
and influence in Egypt and the Islamic world as a scholar and not belonging to 
the Sa´ada or even to the Sahaba, that counts for his great popularity. However, it 
should also be noted that not every Tomb of a great scholar of early Islam is 
given a similar significance and veneration as a saint. 
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Of immediate interest in the view of the masses are the tombs of the Egyptian 
saints and spring offs of the Sufi movement: Sayyid Ahmad al-Badawi (596-675 
H./1200-1276 AD) in Tanta and Ibrahim al-Desuqi in Desuq (633-676 H./1236-
1277 AD; (Goldziher 1969, II: 338 pp.; Mayeur-Jaouen 1994; Hallenberg 1997). 
They represent the Egyptian half in the “clan” of the four great figures – the four 
poles – of Sufism besides the Iraqian al-Jilani (470-561 H./1077-1165 AD) und 
al-Rifa´i (512-578 H./1118-1182 AD). However, rural Egypt has its own land-
scape of saints of all strands: martyrs of the Futuh, the time of Islamic conquest 
of Egypt, others belonging to the Sa´ada, martyrs in the struggle against the cru-
saders, local Sufi shaykhs, however often only small men, ‘symbols’ of the rajul 
salih, the ‘true’ man, who with some very general name only signify their his-
torical anonymity, a category which was already referred to by Goldziher (1969, 
II: 384).  
This variety of types of saints clearly shows that there is no short cut pattern 
in the veneration of local saints, and that even over periods of time tombs and 
places changed their local or even regional importance by changing the name of 
the saint. It is also clear that the intensity of veneration and the popularity of a 
saint does not depend exclusively on religious factors. There is a certain affinity 
of saints with Pharaonic places, however this affinity is not exclusive and in the 
last instance not decisive. We also should keep in mind that this affinity does not 
relate to the Sabakheen and the search for treasures and gold in the mounds and 
Pharaonic Tells, as some crude reading of some archaeological reports would 
suggest. “Low” saints in the religious hagiography can have nevertheless a high 
esteem and popularity (and later attract a certain “high” religious interest), how-
ever, the contrary is perhaps more decisive. It is therefore most important to state, 
that the question , why a certain tomb is at a certain place, why this tomb is then 
turned into a Maqam, then a mosque added, and finally perhaps turned into reli-
gious centre of regional importance, is in most cases very difficult to answer. The 
question of the functioning of gaining a definite place in the Pantheon of Egyp-
tian saints is therefore oblivious. This question towards the authenticity of a saint 
or his pseudo-character as a historical figure belonging to “his” historical place, 
remains buried in the process of local practice and arrangements and the related 
potentials and powers of emerging scenarios of an emerging convergence of local 
interests related to the creative material and symbolic worlds of “memory” in re-
ligion, family, village and the state. The creativity there often depends on the po-
tentials of “bricolage” immanent in these factors at the moment of their appear-
ance and potential coincidence. Definitely, as the “archaeological” dimension 
clearly shows “bricolage” needs an interplay of both the internal perspective of 
local players and the external perspective of observing outsiders.  
With respect to the social function of the Maqams, Catherine Mayeur-Jaouen 
(2004) points to three factors at work which all include the secular dimension in 
the construction of the saint. First, she draws on the importance of the institution 
of the rizaq ihbasiyya (a rural type of waqf), the religious donation, functioning 
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to administer and maintain the Maqam, with small-scale family networks from 
Maqam to Maqam from village to village. Thus, the extreme orientation to the 
saint is part of a process of embedding the communities into a landscape struc-
tured by trade and pilgrimage over centuries. Second and often related to the first 
factor, there is the florishing of local Sufi-Tariqas. This is a factor for maintain-
ing the patterns of the saint’s succession and with it of village identity. We may 
add the building of a Zawiya near the Maqam, serving as a place for Sufi medita-
tion and practice, which also contributes to the ritual importance of a place at-
tracting the ziyarat, mawalid, and nudhur etc. Third the mythological function of 
a saint, relating him to the state and to official religious schools which support 
the financial and structural setting of a Maqam and its strategic function within 
the collective memory in the local and national context.  
Perhaps there are some further important factors in operation. The state and 
the official religious institutions, namely local or national schools of the al-
Azhar, are – if not immediately present – always a sort of an absent centre in all 
matters of public religious events. In the local vernacular for example the mulid 
(mawlid), the feast of the shaykh is a standard expression for chaos and confu-
sion. Samuli Schielke (2004: 180, fn. 6) most interestingly observed how this is 
expressed with the metaphor “mulid wi-sahbu ghayib” (a mawlid without its 
master, i.e. the saint). I think it is important to note the ambiguity of this meta-
phor with respect to “disorder,” it is the absence of the shaykh/saint, not the ab-
sence of hukuma (government) which creates disorder, despite however, that the 
Maqams, once they are actively venerated, are registered, and thus administered 
and controlled. Maqams are often the very place of interaction between govern-
ment and local interests. As with respect to ´Abdallah’s shrine near Tell Thmuis, 
the “text” representation of the saint is part of this interplay, not to speak of ar-
chitecture, location and the organisation of attention of the Maqam. In this inter-
play there is a steadily changing pattern of codification and recognition of the 
“sacredness” of the saint and his place. Certainly, what Schielke has observed, 
shows a changing pattern of obsession about formal ritual and control of public 
space which relates to the arrangements of the mawalid (pl.) of the major saints.  
There is one further significant element in the construction and maintenance 
of saints and their Maqams which lies in the nature of what Egyptian writers like 
Ali Fahmy call “din sha´abi” which incorporates more than popular beliefs but 
rather a whole system of knowledge and mentalities linking the metaphysical 
problem of deepest everydayness to the place and the shrine. In addition this in-
cludes, of course, the flourishing of local markets and the growth of the atten-
dance of the saint, linking his success ambitiously to his transcendental powers. 
Thus, “din sha´abi” is much responsible for the flourishing of such saints in the 
Delta like al-Badawi (Tanta), al-Disuqi (Disuq) and Sidi Shibl (Shuhada), and the 
respective steady growth of the towns and markets which they maintain. It is 
within these fields that we have to re-consider the role of the saint in constructing 
and spiritually incorporating certain historical locations and spatial arrangements 
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with respect to specific historical events. Furthermore, there relates a certain 
metaphorical empowerment of speech and action to the saint as representing a 
sort of eternal continuity of early Islamic history in style. Examples of this are 
well found in scriptural expressions of early Islam (cf. Leder 2001; van Ess 
2001) and with no less importance in medieval Islam with a much stronger pres-
ence of expressions of the Pharaonic period (Sezgin 1994, 2001, 2002/3; Haar-
mann 1990, 1995). 
As with respect to din sha´abi today these constructions follow a similar dia-
logical principle, namely, the popular narrative of the saint re-instituting his 
miracles by way of linking his own fate to everyday feelings and judgements of 
the people. Thus the popular narrative of the saint embodies an understanding of 
everydayness linked to the transcendental world which includes an immense pool 
of transmitted oral and written stories and legends of the saint. The vitality of lo-
cal spirit among the impoverished peasant population and their psychology of 
immediacy of world encounter and fantasy develops a pattern of cultural memory 
beyond modern ethics of authenticity in “text,” “descent” and “loacality.” The 
empowering of the saint in the immediacy of “his” event can be directly linked to 
the empowering of the local “Islamic” way of life of the attending masses. 
There is no doubt about this immanent secular power of the saint and his 
metaphysical rank. This is his direct linkage to the understanding of chaos or or-
der. Furthermore, there is a clear cut economic sense related to his cult and the 
place of his veneration. This is not only a matter of the closeness of the bazaar as 
in the case of great saints like Sayyidna Husayn or Sayyida Zaynab in metropoli-
tan Cairo, it emerges deeply on the barns around the Maqams in any little village. 
 
 
9.  The histor ical  psychology of  the place 
 
Islamologists – as mentioned above – consider the veneration of saints as contra-
dicting dogma and scriptural tradition. As much there is ‘dogma’ of the light of 
divine revelation as in the “Light Verse” (XXIV, 35) related to this-worldly spiri-
tuality, however, there is also no doubt about the pure secular nature of the 
Prophet himself as a human actor. Ignaz Goldziher made it quite clear that puri-
tan Sunnis and ‘enlightened’ sceptics opposed strongly the idea of sainthood in 
Islam. He insists on the “influence of inherited instincts of the believers” (1969, 
II: 277) and on a variety of “psychological factors” (ibid.: 286) as being respon-
sible for the cultic continuity from pre-Islamic periods. He quotes a formula of 
Ernest Renan, that humanity always from its beginning preached at the same 
place (ibid., II: 334/303), as a good example explaining this local continuities of 
the sacred. Certainly, as we have mentioned above, the Eastern Delta of the Nile 
being as John Holloday noticed “an important culture contact zone between Asia 
and Egypt” (Holloday 1982: 9), is overloaded with such “transhistorical” places 
of prayer. Would this aspect of transhistoricality contribute to explain the very 
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specific presence of ´Abdallah b. Salam in this region? Goldziher also already 
explained to us the unworried practice of the popular tradition to place the tomb 
of one and the same person at different places. (Goldziher 1987: 336-40). So, cer-
tainly, that we have a multiplicity of Maqams may not be irritating. However, 
certainly it remains of significance that we have so many Maqams of ´Abdallah 
b. Salam in one region, and that there is no evidence of other places and shrines 
of his in Egypt, nor in the rest of the Muslim world. 
The ambiguity of the place is further revealed in looking at the historical sig-
nificance of three different locations of the tombs of ´Abdallah b. Salam. The 
Egyptian cultural geographers of the 19th century already pointed to the astonish-
ing vicinity of Islamic saints and Pharaonic places. Ali Mubarak Pasha for exam-
ple in his al-Khittat al-tawfiqiyya al-jadida mentions – as Goldziher made it a 
point – mentions the fact of a tomb of Osiris which was turned into a zawiya al-
maslub (Goldziher 1968, II: 384). At the Tell of Thmuis, south of Mansura, we 
are told by archaeologists, that there have been relicts from the 4th century B.C. 
and from the late 9th century AD relicts of Islamic ceramics (EAAE 1999: 663). 
This could be taken as indicating the hights of the cultural activity at the place in 
the time of nearly one and a half Millenium before and after Christ. Amélineau 
(1893: 500 pp.) seems to have found this as a Coptic place in Daqahliyya, how-
ever with obviously diminishing importance over time, it has been ultimately de-
stroyed in the times of the Turkish conquest. De Meulenaere (1976) collects re-
ports which date back to the 18th century AD of western travellers and archaeolo-
gists in Mendes and Thmuis. The Qubba of ´Abdallah b. Salam was always there, 
a place of shelter and peace – and sometimes for the storage of relicts found on 
the tell. The official Egyptian geography of 1945 categorizes Kafr al-Amir 
´Abdallah as one of the bilad al-qadima – old villages – of the destrict of Sinbi-
lawin. It is stated that its original name was Bani ´Abdallah in the Ottoman Pe-
riod and that in 1228 H. it was first named as Kafr al-Amir ´Abdallah (Ramzi 
1945, II/1: 194). If this is reality, then the story of 1869 by Daninos Pasha on his 
visit at “tell Tmay (village d’Abdallah-ben Salam)” mentioning a certain Salem 
as a local leader and as his helper and guide could well fit (de Meulenaere 1976: 
92). What, however, has this Salem to do with ´Abdallah b. Salam. Could it be 
that a local clan of Salams, representatives of which until today lead as Khalifs in 
the Zaffa (the Friday procession) of the Mawlid at the Maqam of ´Abdallahb. 
Salam today? Are all this fictive allusions? Maybe! 
On the other hand we are told that among the people of the village, ´anda al-
´amma, the place is named Kafr Ibn Salam and that this is meant to be al-´Amir, 
namely ´Abdallah b. Salam, the ashab al-nabi , compagnion of the Prophet. The 
Maqam is his and they do the pilgrimage for him in great belief (yazurunahu 
da`iman). However, the story ends with a laconic: Only God knows the truth (wa 
allahu `a´lam bil-haqiqa) (Ramzi 1945, II/1: 194-5). The Tell is mentioned here 
in relation to Tumai al-`Imdid the village south east and as part of the twin town 
Mendes (ibid. 187-9; see also al-Rub´: 197). And certainly asserting Goldziher, 
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the “psychology of the people” could have easily mixed up both, speaking for 
each place as the “Tell bint al-yahudi,” and in their believe a town of a Jewish 
Queen which was justly destroyed. Does this have something to do with the Jew-
ish convert to Islam as a religious witness and protector abolishing the shubahat 
of the people on the Tell? Is this something new in the age of fundamentalism or 
rather a sort of repetition of collective memory of the strength of Islam in earlier 
periods? 
A second place, in the small village Barq al-´Izz very near to Mansura, the 
situation is completely different. The village has a short mentioning in the “Qa-
mus al-jugrafya” of Ramzi. The village was originally called “Barbansaqa” or 
(coptic) “Birqinqis” (see also Halm 1982: 710) oder “Bir Bansaqa” oder “Bir 
Bansafa.” Its popular name was “Birqinqis,” 1228 H. it was officially registered 
as Barq Naqs. By the initiative of alocal Shaykh it was renamed in 1930 “Barq 
al-`Izz” (Lightning of Glory; Ramzi 1994, II, 1: 218). This is the short mention-
ing of the place – no knowledge of the Maqam of our ´Abdallah, nothing about 
the reasons behind changing the name. Similarly, at a third place situated in the 
Lake Manzala near Matariyya, although the Maqam of ´Abdallah stands on a 
Tell, there is no real history of the place. Ramzi again is primarily concerned 
with the name of places and their historically official registration (although he 
sometimes goes back to the Geography of Antiquity), here we only read of two 
places put together as Matariyya in 1903. The Maqam of ´Abdallah is not men-
tioned, not the Tell of the Gezira (ibid.: 209). Whether there is something like the 
“islamized” Coptic saint like the one on the Island of “Tuna” (vgl. Mayeur-
Jaouen 1994: 98, fn 70; 258, 262) is not known among the local fishermen. The 
English traveller Hamilton has at the beginning of the 19th century found a Tell 
by this name. However, not seen any Maqam. Later on Burton does not find the 
Tell near Matariayya, however the fishermen bring him there and remember the 
place in high estime (de Meulenaere 1976: 51, 74). 
 
 
10.  Some conclusive remarks 
 
The local arrangements of the places of the Islamic saint ´Abdallah b. Salam – 
and his Maqams in the region of Mansura in one way or another show signs of 
ongoing and obviously very intensive antagonisms – seem to bear the signs of a 
inner Islamic struggle over orthodox, and then Salafite or heterodox and popular 
Sufi orientations with respect to an ‘inner religious good,’ namely, the diverse 
forms of treatment of the continuity of pre-Islamic and Pharaonic culture in Is-
lamic terms. The momentums and ritual potentials of the old world have been ab-
sorbed and reworked and re-activated. It is always the shrine, the Maqam, which 
is the place of reworking. The places symbolically express this struggle over con-
tinuity and monotheistic purity and break with history. The potential regression 
into pagan practices and Polytheism is counteracted first by the construction of 
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the Maqam, the place of the saint and its public recognition. This is at the same 
time a place of memory of the past, where symbolic, ritual and scriptural per-
formances of past and the saint entail divergent arrangements with respect to 
functional interests, communal traditions or for religious purity. The shrines are 
places for observing of the past. However, specifically in the last 30 years with 
the emergence of Salafite purism on the local scene, the places turn into arenas of 
a steady fight over ritual and Islamic form of veneration. This discourse of Is-
lamic purity and popular memory, originated in the far a way metropoles, how-
ever, they are now fought sometimes at the most remote and marginal places, 
turning the local shrine into a place of cultural reconstruction under conditions of 
strong marginality. The modern re-arrangement of the shrines of ´Abdallah b. 
Salam took place in this time. However, the current re-arrangements are only re-
phrasing discourses and symbolic expressions which were already active in for-
mer times.  
The great Mulid as it is performed in the village near Tell Thmuis is powerful 
and the strong tradition here helped the modern reconstruction of the shrine. In 
the collection of texts locally assembled texts, the saint is presented as the 
scholar of Early Islam par excellence. However, in the sacred procession (zaffa) 
he figures as an incarnative part of a spiritual feast longing close to the presence 
of God (resembling the Kyrios of the old times). Furthermore, there remains, the 
magic figure, the mythical sailor in heaven and between the worlds, symbolizing 
the presence of an “alien,” an “absent” people, in his tales, which are part pf 
popular literature. All this is ambiguous, tenuous and culturally productive. De-
spite these contradictions, there is continuity in the overpowering imagination 
and symbolic representation of the “physical” presence which is expressed in the 
metaphorical details of the presented “reality” of the sacred. This multi-polar 
form of the presence of the sacred subject then is the real focus of the perspectiv-
ism which is necessary for understanding the sacred as a momentum and a condi-
tion of the local world and its immediate recognition.  
Methodologically, therefore the different directions of this presence are to be 
made subject of multiple layers of observation: Text, time, locus, symbol and 
form. Only in this multiplicity we may be able to understand the actuality of the 
phenomenon of the “sacred” as it has become part of the modern world.  
Constructions of sainthood and the specific meaning of it acquires at one spe-
cific place and in one specific region the dialog and co-operation of Egyptolo-
gists, specialists in Islamic Studies and Ethnologists, as Haarmann (1990: 57) has 
already suggested for at least the first two of the named disciplines. It would, 
however, be too short cut to interpret the need for such a dialog purely in terms 
of the more recent attempts of Egyptians to cope with both, their “Islamic” and 
their “Pharaonic identity” as a national task. It is also the ambiguous “religious” 
continuity of the place which contributes to give the religious Islamic reconstruc-
tion a turn in which the Maqam distinguishes itself against a seemingly secular 
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world of the past: a distinction which in many ways rephrases the historical 
struggles related to the emergence of monotheism and modern religion.  
I am proposing with this paper a sociological perspective which, focusing on 
processes of reconstruction of the Sacred, combines the different disciplinary 
fields of tackling the relationship between the Saint and his place. The various 
disciplinary perceptions of the Sacred today cannot be administered separately, 
rather we have to include them as part and parcel of the modern event of the Sa-
cred at its place. The place itself evolves as a discursive field in which essential 
elements of it turn out to be made present and exchanged. The place combines 
the history of “origin” with its own significance as well as with the various his-
torical layers of conditions, actions and intensions and of its symbolic design. 
The Maqam thus reassures fictional realities of the saint: his live story, the au-
thored texts of the saint, the hagiographic texts, the forms of their authentication. 
As already mentioned by Goldziher, the multiplicity of places and appearances of 
one and the same saint is a common feature of Islamc saints. In deed, I am pro-
posing a multiple lecture of all this which relates to diverse layers of inner ex-
perience of the saint through the eyes of modern venerators as much as to the his-
tory of the factual verification of his existence. There is something factual in at-
tempting to make “present” someone who is “absent”: the relationship between 
time and symbol, ideas and events, forms of embodiment, metaphor, image and 
magic.  
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Chapter 7 
Story, Wisdom and Spirituality: 
Yemen as the Hub between the 
Persian, Arabic and Biblical Traditions 
 
RAIF GEORGES KHOURY 
 
 
The Yemen, al-Yaman in Arabic, is associated with many images and evocations 
which inspire dreams: Arabia felix, which incorporates the meaning of the coun-
try’s name in Arabic; this is clearly expressed by the verb yamana, yamina and 
yamuna (to be happy etc.) in its triple form. Yaman, yamna and yamn also refer 
to the right side or right hand which has a preferential position in the ancient and 
particularly biblical cultures, to which the Arab-Islamic culture belongs as their 
continuation; one only needs to think of the Last Judgement, Yaum al-ba´th (“day 
of waking from the graves”) which consolidates this image. Yqt, the author of 
the classical encyclopaedia of the Muslim world Mu´djam al-buldn, explores 
such interpretations before dealing with the geographical and other information 
about the country.1 Much has, moreover, been published about this country, in 
particular in relation to the division of the country in the early 1960s and after its 
reunification in the early 1990s. A series of studies by Joseph Chelhod, published 
in Paris around 20 years ago, on this subject are particularly worthy of mention.2  
The fact that the Yemen has been repeatedly subject to neglect is a question 
related to the development of Islamic history and culture, whose heyday is asso-
ciated with the Umayyad and, in particular, the Abbasid dynasties. Many studies 
have now been published which demonstrate the importance of the first Islamic 
generation of the Ist/7th and 2nd/8th centuries of Islam/AD within this process. The 
question arises here as to where the drive – both military and spiritual – for the 
gradual conquest of the country originated. I stress the significance of this coun-
try – otherwise virtually neglected in the specialist literature – which consisted of 
diverse regions in early Islam with a merging of influences originating from all 
of the important orientations of that period. I would not like people to come to 
the conclusion that the Yemen was important in early Islam because I have com-
 
1  Yqt, Mu´djam al-buldn, V, 447 ff.  
2  Chelhod, Joseph et al. (1984-985), 3 Vols: L’Arabie du Sud, histoire et civilisation. 
1: Le peuple yéménite et ses racines. 2: La société yéménite de l’Hégire aux idéolo-
gies modernes. 3: Cultures et institutions du Yémen.  
KHOURY: STORY, WISDOM AND SPIRITUALITY  |  191 
piled monographs on scholars such as Wahb Ibn Munabbih,3 ´Abd Allh Ibn 
Lah´a4 and others; on no account would this be correct! The Yemen increasingly 
appears to me as a country, in which the roots of many early Islamic movements 
lie which, however, were gradually replaced by other undoubtedly more solid 
movements. Nonetheless, the personalities and lasting influences, without which 
it is impossible to explain subsequent developments, should not simply be set 
aside.5 
In the first volume of his study, Chelhod stresses the inadequacy of the in-
formation that is generally conveyed, for example, on the actual contributions of 
the Yemenis to Islamic military expansion. He makes the following comments in 
this regard: 
 
“Les chroniqueurs et les historiens arabes reconnaissent généralement que les Yémé-
nites avaient contribué efficacement au succès des armées arabes. Nous estimons, quant 
à nous, qu’ils sont bien en deçà de la vérité et que la part des Yéménites dans la con-
quête arabe fut prépondérante. Il ne serait pas exagéré de dire que sans leur concours, 
l’Empire arabe n’aurait pas du tout été aussi loin, ni édifié aussi rapidement.”6  
 
(“The Arab chroniclers and historians generally acknowledge that the Yemenis made an 
effective contribution to the success of the Arab armies. We ourselves estimate that they 
are here on the side of truth and that the Yemenis played a predominant role in the Arab 
conquest. It would not be exaggerating to say that without their support, the Arab Em-
pire would not at all have got so far or been established so quickly.”) 
 
I would like to examine more here than these ideas of an acknowledged expert on 
southern Arabia. I would like to stress the significance of this area in connection 
with the role of story, wisdom and spirituality in Islamic culture and present fur-
ther important arguments as proof of this.7 Unfortunately, the article about 
Yemen in the Encyclopaedia of Islam does not fulfil the task of providing a com-
prehensive account of the country,8 as newly acquired insights are inadequately 
represented or not included at all. However, these are dependent on the analysis 
of the oldest sources on the Yemen which were introduced into circulation di-
 
3  See Khoury, R.G. (1972) “Wahb B. Munabbih.”  
4  See Khoury, R.G. (1986) “Abd Allh Ibn Lah´a. Juge et grand maître de l’Ecole 
Egyptienne.” 
5  On the question of the enchantment and disenchantment of the world, see Gauchet, 
Marcel (1985) “Le désenchantement du monde.“ 
6  Chelhod, Joseph (1984), L’Arabie du Sud, histoire et civilisation, Vol. 1: Le peuple 
yéménite et ses racines, p. 41; see also the paragraph titled “Le Yémen et la con-
quête arabe.“ 
7  Many of my contributions have substantiated this belief for many years and are re-
ferred to or quoted in detail in this paper. 
8  On this, see Encyclopaedia of Islam (1960), in the following written as EI2, XI, pp. 
269-280 (A. Grohmann/W.C. Brice et al.). 
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rectly or indirectly by Yemeni authors, starting, of course, with Wahb Ibn Mun-
abbih who undoubtedly represents a key figure in this context. 
 
 
I .  The history of  pre- Is lam and ear ly Islam 
 
The meaning of Arabia felix emerges reveals itself most clearly here, as the 
books on these early Arab centuries were written by Yemenis and in association 
with the Yemen. Like every historical beginning in the past, this history, if one 
can call it that, was a vision of the world, which incorporated simultaneously his-
tory and fiction as emerges clearly in the anthology “Story-telling in the frame-
work of non-fictional Arabic literature,” edited by S. Leder.9 In my contribution 
to this anthology, I highlighted both of these sides, inter alia by highlighting the 
problem of orality.10 Everything was initially passed on orally before later being 
recorded in writing, ne varietur, as noted by R. Blachère.11 Thus, everything 
bears the hallmark of orality whose ideal form of transmission was story-telling. 
Story-telling was a common genre in the old oriental cultures and displays simi-
lar traits there to those it displays in Islam. In Islam it is associated with the old-
est books about Arabia which bear witness to early events in the lives of the 
tribes who lived there. It is known that from the second half of the 2nd/8th century 
the Islamic period was the first to begin to summarize, expand and systematically 
record these accounts in writing with new material from the newly-emerged Is-
lamic Empire. Poetry was the dominant form here and accompanied the entire 
culture with its omnipotent presence. Everything in cultural development was in-
fluenced by it, and above all history. 
Some key terms are of extreme significance here, particularly as the entire Is-
lamic culture, its great development and precipitous rise, is a culture of words.12 
By way of introduction to the topic, let us now look at some of the terms which 
have been in use since the beginning of the Arab-Islamic culture and which lead 
us to the core of the subject under discussion here: 
1. Adab is the oldest substantiated expression which was common from at 
least the 2nd/8th century and on which it would be possible to hold long lectures 
without ever exhausting the rich history of its development.13 The experts associ-
ate this term with education and educational literature because it is intended to be 
 
9  See Leder, Stefan, ed. (1998) “Story-telling in the framework of non-fictional Ara-
bic literature.“ 
10  Khoury, R.G. (1998) “Geschichte oder Fiktion. Zur erzählerischen Gattung der äl-
testen Bücher über Arabien,” in: Leder (1998), pp. 370-387.  
11  Blachère, Régis (1952) “Histoire de la littérature arabe,” I: 86 pp., 117 pp. 
12  These include terms such as: Adab, Tahdhb, Tathqf, Thaqfa etc., which are 
briefly presented above. 
13  See EI2, I, pp. 175. 
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used in the creation of literature that is defined in this way, thus primarily spirit 
and character, so that this genre best represents the entire Arabian culture. A very 
distinguished literature emerged around this word which originally also had a 
special meaning (see below), but was increasingly transferred to what is known 
as educational literature, which spread as early as the 8th century and was repre-
sented by Arabized Persian authors. The most famous of these was ´Abd Allh 
Ibn al-Muqaffa´ (720-756 AD),14 the author of the oldest collection of animal fa-
bles in Islam, Kalla wa-Dimna. He wrote many books which featured the word 
Adab in their titles: Al-Adab al-kabr (“The Big Adab Work”), al-Adab as-saghr 
(“The Small Adab Work”). It was the same Ibn al Muqaffa´ who addressed a 
treatise to the caliph of his time in a concealed form, in which presented to the Is-
lamic leader and his followers the norms of truly educated rule and the good be-
haviour towards the subjects; the treatise was entitled Rislat f l-sahba15 
(“Treatise on the Companions of the Caliph”). As we can see, this important con-
cept found its point of entry into Arabian-Islamic society through the mediation 
of the non-Arabs who came to Arabia and whose role in the area of the education 
of the Islamic authorities was truly considerable. The initiated path was signifi-
cantly extended and systematically classified in the 3rd/9th century. 
Th Husayn (1889-1973), the Egyptian scholar and most renowned critic of 
modern Arabic literature referred to the history of the development of this con-
cept for the first time in the modern era in one of his first books, F l-adab al-
djhil (On Pre-Islamic Literature),16 before analysing the purely philological 
categories of thought.17 He repeatedly examines the history of this term in a way 
that is not possible to demonstrate here. 
After Ibn al-Muqaffa´, the concept of adab became a key one, in particular in 
the general education of Islamic scholars as demonstrated in detail by the authors 
of the 3rd/9th century, such as al-Djhiã (777-869) and Ibn Qutayba (828-889), 
who also professed their commitment to a humanist education which became a 
matter of course in the Islamic Middle Ages. Thus, as he too adopted this credo, 
the aforementioned T. Husayn could state that: Al-adabu huwa l-akhdhu min 
kulli shay`in bi-tarafin
18 (“Literature consists in taking something from every 
corner [of a discipline]”). Felix Arabia! Nowadays, the term is used to define the 
literature but retains however its meaning of ‘education,’ ‘good manners’ etc. in 
the everyday life of the Arabs. 
2. A second concept soon emerged: to the present day, Thaqfa is the techni-
 
14  See EI2, III, p. 883 ff. 
15  Kurd ´Al, M. (ed. 1913, 3. 1946 edition); also in the author’s collected works, Ab 
l-Nasr, ´Umar (published in 1966); French translation with commentary and de-
tailed glossary by Charles Pellat (1976). 
16  Husayn, Th (1968) F l-adab al-djhil Kairo. 
17  Loc. cit., p. 37 ff. 
18  Loc. cit., p. 19, 16. 
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cal term for culture in the Arabian world. However, this word also developed 
from a purely material meaning, i.e. from the verb thaqafa/thaqqafa, to smooth 
or polish stones etc. Reference can be made here again to the ancient Arabian and 
early Islamic worlds, in which proper names with professional connotations or 
similar were derived from this verbal stem, as demonstrated in many instances by 
names of individuals from the early Islamic period. 
3. A third concept with the same original meaning as Thaqfa is Tahdhb 
from hadhdhaba, i.e. smooth, polish etc. (initially stones and material substances 
like the previous verb); it was soon used as a basis for major works on the re-
finement of character, i.e. about education. The most famous of these is the work 
of the philosopher and historian Miskawayh (932-1030 AD): Tahdhb al-akhlq 
(i.e. “Education or the Education of Characters”).19 
4. Another term is Hadra, used by the greatest historian of Islam, Ibn 
Khaldn (1332-1406)20 in the sense of civilization, i.e. hadara, to be present or 
settled, hence in the meaning of an urban way of life and all that is associated 
with it in contrast to Bedouinism. Also Madaniyya or Tamaddun are used in the 
same sense and express precisely the same view of urban life and lifestyle, but 
are derived from the term Madna or town which is of Aramaic origin. Both 
terms refer in different ways to the way of life that emerges in the town, the ex-
posure to urban concentration; however, whereas the former refers to the concen-
tration itself, i.e. the agglomeration, the second refers to the commitment to a 
ruler (also religious leader as Diyna, i.e. religious devotion, means religion it-
self, as is the case for the other word Dn for this last term). 
Nowadays, Hadra and Thaqfa are almost identical, the first refers more 
frequently to historical-cultural representation in association with the past, 
whereas the second, Thaqfa, best corresponds to our contemporary require-
ments. Given that I repeatedly refer here to earlier periods in Islamic culture, I 
will keep this last term in mind, but also intend the visions these earlier periods 
had in association with the term culture, even if these terms appear to differ to us 
today. In particular as the term culture, which is derived from the Latin col-
ere/cultum in the sense of to build on, reside in, maintain, actually leads more in 
the direction of the aforementioned historian, Ibn Khaldn, who refers to ´umrn, 
i.e. of residing, building on and hence of civilization in urban life. We can see 
that behind all of these common terms with their various nuances, one common 
 
19  Arkoun, Mohamed (1982) “L’Humanisme arabe au IXe/Xe siècle. Miskawayh, phi-
losophe et historien.” The full title of the work analyzed by Arkoun is: Tahdhb al-
akhlq wa-tathr al-a´rq, see pp. 115, in which the first part refers to the “die 
Kunstfertigkeit der Bildung der Charaktere” (sin´at tahdb al-akhlq), an expres-
sion from the ethical literature, according to Arkoun, which was very common. Ya-
hy Ibn ´Ad is supposed to have already used this title, see Ras`il al-bulagh`, ed. 
Kurd ´Al; Arkoun, 115, note 3. 
20  See EI2, III, p. 825 ff.  
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link is important: i.e. the concept of building, processing, cultivating. The path 
from here to the dominating social and political systems is an easy one.  
This was vocabulary which provided a basis for the development of the clas-
sical literature of Islam, however in the case of the story-telling tradition, an 
older vocabulary existed which was associated with story-telling, reporting etc., 
e.g. Khabar (pl. Akhb r) (report), Qissa (pl. Qisas), Had th (history, story) – and 
derived from these: the participle form Q ss (pl. Quss s) (storyteller) and Mu-
haddith (narrator, traditionary, story-teller). The first two of these terms are 
found in the oldest books about Yemen in pre-Islamic times and assume a special 
place in this context, as nothing original has come down to us from the old Ara-
bian literature apart from the poetry and a few fragments, which in their original 
form cannot be of prime significance for the entire literary production of the gen-
eration of early Islamic scholars. The works in question are: 
1. Kit b al-T dj n by Ibn Hish m, author of the official S ra of the Prophet 
Muhammad21 
2. Akhb r ´Ab d (or) ´Ubayd Ibn Sharya al-Djurhum  al-Yaman .22 
The book by Ibn Hish m would be unimaginable without the main source, 
which was provided to him by a small document on the same topic by Wahb Ibn 
Munabbih: Kit b al-Mul k al-mutawwadja min Himyar wa-akhb rihim wa-
qisasihim wa-qub rihim wa-ash´ rihim (“Book of the Crowned Kings of 
Himyar, their Histories and Stories and their Tombs and Poems”).23 In the trans-
mission of Asad Ibn M s  (132-212/750-827) this book was adopted and ex-
panded from the aforementioned version after a grandson of Ibn Munabbih.24 
The work of Ibn Sharya is particularly interesting and enables many observa-
tions concerning not only the book itself, but also the person of the narrator and 
the monarch who features in it, i.e. Mu´ wiya, the founder of the Umayyad Dy-
nasty. The fact that the title betrays certain external similarities with the work by 
Ibn Munabbih, which was based on Ibn Hish m’s “Kit b al-T dj n” should not 
 
21  The oldest surviving parts of the S ra or Magh z  (both names were interchange-
able) go back to Ibn Munabbih and are found on a few papyrus sheets as is the case 
with most documents from the first century of Islam/7th century AD; on this, see 
Khoury, R.G. (1972) “Wahb B. Munabbih,” Arabic text. Based on this old version 
on papyrus, it would appear that the later versions increased significantly in terms 
of scope; the first of these which had an official character is that of Ibn Hish m (8th 
to early 9th century), the main parts of which were recently translated into French by 
Wahib Atallah: “Ibn Hichâm. La biographie du prophète Mahomet. Texte traduit et 
annoté par Wahib Atallah.” Paris, Fayard 2004. 
22  Kit b al-T dj n f  mul k himyar and Akhb r ´Ubayd (or ´Ab d) Ibn Sharya al-
Djurhum  f  akhb r al-Yaman wa-ash´ rih  wa-ans bih  first appeared together in 
Haidarabad in 1347/1928; new edition, San´ ` 1978, with a foreword and notes by 
´Abd al-´Az z al-Maq lih, professor at the University of Haidarabad also author, 
poet (and politician for some years now). 
23  See Khoury, R.G. (1972) “Wahb B. Munabbih,” p. 286 ff. 
24  On Asad, see Khoury, R.G. (1976) “Asad B. M s ,” Kit b az-Zuhd.  
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be dismissed out of hand; however there are some fundamental differences which 
concern, in particular, the content and structure of the work. Ibn Hishm’s text is 
longer and more biblical in its roots; in other words, unlike ´Ubayd Ibn Sharya, 
as the author of Biblical history in Islam, Wahb Ibn Munabbih, the author of the 
core material, is concerned with highlighting the close relations between Yemen 
and the Biblical world so as to present them to the northern Arabians. Firstly, 
Wahb’s pride in his homeland and the Himyarites expressed in a different way 
than in the work of his compatriot Ibn Sharya. Thus, the motive for the writing of 
his work appears to lie less in the quest for the wonderful, which may nonethe-
less have had a role to play in the endeavour, than in the pride of the Himyarites 
of whom he was one through his mother, and also on behalf of the pious Muslim 
to portray the people mentioned in the Qur’an and above all to associate them 
with the history of the Biblical prophets and to refer to their particular place in 
the proximity of Allah. The Himyarites are compared with al-sirdj al-mud` f l-
laylati l-zalm` (“shining lamp in the dark nights”); God defends them against 
and elevates them above man.25  
Overall, the Qur’an plays a key role for Wahb because it represented an ulti-
mate objective with a unique value. Although both wanted to be a Muhaddith, of 
the two, in his reports and commentaries in the sense of the traditional Islamic 
Hadth, Ibn Sharya was less religious in nature; thus, F. Krenkow was unable to 
find his name among the Hadth transmitters.26 In terms of the knowledge re-
quired of him at Mu´wiya’s court, ´Ubayd did not need any profound knowl-
edge of the Islamic tradition and the Qur’an quotes peppered throughout his Ak-
hbr had more to do with added zest than real substance. This explains the enor-
mous difference between the beginnings of the two texts: Wahb’s text starts with 
holy writs which are associated with individual Biblical personalities, from 
Adam to the Prophet of Islam. As opposed to this, Ibn Sharya’s Akhbr are intro-
duced with the history of the summoning of the story-teller by the caliph on the 
suggestion of ´Amr Ibn al-´As (died 43/663, or 42/662),27 with a unique descrip-
tion of the powers of the ruler, his habits and the nocturnal stories taking place, 
about which more will be said below. Of course, both authors remain very Yem-
eni in their love of their homeland and the pride they take in it, but in completely 
different ways. These differences are historically and culturally informative; the 
start of Ibn Sharya’s text provides astonishing information about the education 
and erudition of these early times, thus I will now discuss it briefly. 
After the introductory Basmala and Hamdala, the narrator, who is called al-
Barq, takes over the Hadth, which he quotes based on ´Ubayd Ibn Sharya. We 
 
25  Ibn Hishm (1978) “Kitb al-Tdjn,” p. 64. 
26  Krenkow, F. (1928) “The Two Oldest Books on Arabic Folklore.” In: Islamic Cul-
ture 2, p. 55 ff., 204 ff. 
27  On this, see Khoury, R.G. (1986) “´Abd Allh Ibn Lah´a,” p. 91-93. 
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shall see that the word Hadth has no religious meaning here in the sense of the 
Islamic tradition, but that of the traditional, old-Arabian and early Islamic (and 
later) narration, the Qissa, which emerged later, in particular in association with 
the Biblical story or Qisas al-anbiy`. It is evidenced for the first time in the title 
of the book Kitb Bad` al-khalq wa-qisas al-anbiy` by ´Umra Ibn Wathma Ibn 
Ms Ibn al-Furt al-Fris (died 289/902) which this son transmitted after his fa-
ther Wathma (died 237/851).28 The use of the word Hadth in ´Ubayd’s book 
should be noted here. It could be assumed that this is a normal experience of 
Hadth transmission; it undoubtedly involves Akhbr, i.e. reports, which are not 
religious in nature, but more secular, pagan and simply old-Arabian, thus the 
word Hadth should be understood here in the sense of Qissa. Another, older – 
actually the oldest known example – of the same word in the sense of Qissa is 
the heading of the story of David, the oldest known one in Islam which is found 
in the Heidelberg papyrus of Wahb Ibn Munabbih and literally states: Bismi (A) 
llhi l-Rahmni l-Rahmi. Hadthu Dwda (“In the name of the Compassionate 
and Good God. The Story of David”).29 
I believe that I have demonstrated clearly enough that this version of the pa-
pyrus is based on a much older original papyrus, which definitely originated in 
the 2nd/8th century (the second half of this century at the latest) in association with 
the version of the above-mentioned father Wathma al-Fris.30 Concretely, this 
means that the two texts were recorded in written form in an epoch when the 
word Hadth was used to refer to all kinds of narratives and also in the sense of 
the secular Khabar, i.e. report, or profane Qissa, i.e. story. This is no longer the 
case with the oldest collection of Biblical stories by Wathma and his ´Umra af-
ter him: the reason for this is simple, as with the second half of the 2nd/8th century 
material that was previously handed down orally was increasingly recorded in 
written form as highlighted by al-Dhahab31 and some Islamic historians after 
 
28  S. Khoury, R.G. (1978) “Les légendes prophétiques dans l’Islam depuis le Ier jus-
qu’au IIIe siècle de l’Hégrie…”  
29  Khoury, R.G. (1972) “Wahb B. Munabbih, Geschichte Davids,” p. 34, line 2. 
30  Khoury, R.G. (1978) “Les légendes prophétiques dans l’Islam,” p. 158 ff., in par-
ticular p. 163-165; ibid. (1986) “´Abd Allh Ibn Lah´a (97-174/715-790). Juge et 
grand maître de l’Ecole Egyptienne,” p. 27 ff. 
31  Khoury, R.G. (1986) “´Abd Allh Ibn Lah´a,” p. 26 ff., 31 f., where this passage of 
the Dhahab is analysed; idem, (1994) “L’apport de la papyrologie dans la transmis-
sion et codification des premières versions des Mille et Une Nuits,” p. 21-33; idem 
(1993) “Kalif, Geschichte und Dichtung: Der jemenitische Erzähler ´Abd Ibn Šarya 
am Hofe Mu´wiyas,” p. 204-218; idem (1997) “Les grands centres de conservation 
et de transmission des manuscrits arabes aux premier et deuxième siècles de 
l’Hégire,” p. 215-226; idem (1998) “Geschichte oder Fiktion. Zur erzählerischen 
Gattung der ältesten Bücher über Arabien,” p. 370-387; idem (2000) “Die Erzähl-
tradition im Islam, Islam – eine andere Welt?” p. 23-40; idem (2004) “L’apport 
spécialement important de la papyrologie dans la transmission et la codification des 
plus anciennes versions des Mille et Une Nuits et d’autres livres des deux premiers 
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him. Thus, taking the new situation described by al-Dhahab and others into ac-
count, these authors no longer use the term Hadth as the title of their joint work: 
a systematic transition and above all codification of an increasingly wider science 
automatically required a more specific terminology for many genres, whose 
names had become too general and undifferentiated in an empire which had 
grown in size and in which writing had become a necessary instrument of socie-
tal intercourse, which al-Qalqashand aptly and succinctly characterizes as fol-
lows: Al-kitbatau ussu l-mulki wa-´imdu l-mamlakati32 (“Writing is the foun-
dation stone of government and the mainstay of the empire”). 
Hence the need for specialization and structure based on areas and genres, to 
which al-Dhahab’s texts refers. Therefore everything which is still titled and 
formulated like the aforementioned papyruses is older than the version of the 
book by ´Umra and his father Wathma and must originate from the time of the 
Heidelberg papyruses, which more or less originate from the collection of the 
Egyptian judge ´Abd Allh Ibn Lah´a (97-174/715-790). It must not be forgotten 
that the latter collected many originals and copies of originals in his unique pri-
vate library and used to make them available to Egyptian students and guests and 
to all of the transmitters of the Heidelberg papyruses and, of course, to the 
aforementioned Wathma, whose text transmitters, to whom his son refers, were 
Egyptians and students of the same Egyptian judge, Ibn Lah´a. This Wathma 
adopted from the direct students of the judge in Fustt (old Cairo) the material 
for his histories of the prophets but had to take into account the new scientific 
development, the systematic reception and written recording of the scientific 
texts.33 
Let us now return to the text by ´Ubayd Ibn Sharya. In accordance with the 
above-quoted formula, the report opens with precise information on the years of 
government of Caliph Mu´wiya: ten years as “emir” under each of the three last 
orthodox Caliphs ´Umar and ´Uthmn – ´Al is not mentioned by name – and 
then twenty further years as Amr al-mu`minn (“Prince of the Faithful”). What is 
interesting is that his authority and some of his habits and innovations are de-
scribed in this way: 
His authority was significant as wa-dnat lahu l-mashriqu wa-l-maghribu 
(“the east and the west were under his rule ”). For this, he had “reached the high 
 
siècles islamiques,” p. 70 ff. Also Al-Djbir, M. (1984) “Takwn al-´aql al-´arab,” 
p. 61 ff., this book was not available to me at the time; I was only familiar with the 
opinion of al-Djbir through the criticism made of him by Tarbsh, Georges 
(1998) “Ishkliyyt al-aql al-´arab,” 11 ff.  
32  On this, see al-Qalqashand “Subh al-a´sh,” I, 37, 11; see also this entire page on 
which the author presents everything that was said about the importance of writing. 
33  On this, see Khoury, R.G. (1997) “L’importance des plus vieux manuscrits arabes 
historiques sur papyrus, conservés à Heidelberg, pour l’histoire de la langue arabe et 
de la culture des premiers siècles islamiques,” p. 11-18. 
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honour of kingship … was the first to become king (in Islam), claimed a ruler’s 
lodge and leaned on his head when he prostrated himself in prayer and collected 
the monies.”34 This is a noteworthy passage which earns attention in the refer-
ence works on the period of government of the caliph due to the age of the text, 
as reference is often made to al-Dhahab, who quotes Mu´wiya’s famous com-
ment: An awwalu malikin (f- l-Islmi) (“I am the first King of Islam”).35  
Only after this does the narrator lead us to one of the greatest joys of the aged 
ruler which revives a typical old-Arabian tradition, lends it a unique dimension 
and is represented as follows: 
Wa-knat afdala ladhdhtihi f khiri ´umrihi al-musmaratu wa-ahdthu 
man mad (“His preferred delight at the end of his life was the nocturnal conver-
sations and tales of early people ”).36 This clearly demonstrates the personal in-
terest of the Umayyads – starting with their founder – for history, tradition and, 
of course, for the hence indispensable poetry, as can be observed below.37 
It is relatively easy to establish the period in the life of Mu´wiya, in which 
these nights, which in their general scope function as forerunners of the Tales 
from 1001 Nights, occurred with ´Ubayd as court story-teller: the reference to 
Mu´wiya’s ally, ´Amr Ibn al-´s, which always occurs when a caliph to be paid 
tribute to is mentioned,38 is helpful here, as this conqueror of Egypt remained 
loyal to Mu´wiya to the end. And, thus, he speaks in Ibn Sharya’s book after all 
the aforementioned information about Mu´wiya had already been stated, to give 
the latter advice to select this Yemeni for this task at the court in Damascus. The 
narrator is referred to as follows here: Min baqya man mad fa-innahu adraka 
mulka l-Djhiliyyati wa-huwa a´lamu man baqiya l-yauma f ahdthi l-´Arabi 
wa-ansbih, wa-ausafuhu li-m marra ´alayhi min tasrfi l-dahri39 (“[He is] of 
the people left over from before, as he experienced the kings of the old Arabian 
era and is the most experienced of those who remain in the stories of the Arabs 
and their genealogies, the most capable in representing the ups and downs of fate 
that befell him”). 
This description was suitable to satisfy the wish of the caliph, particularly as 
it originated from his particularly close emir. ´Amr was not only the conqueror of 
 
34  ´Ubayd Ibn Sharya (1347/928, n. Ed. 1978) “Akhbr,” p. 312, 4 ff. 
35  See, for example, EI2, VII, p. 263 , 2 ff., and other authors who often quote a state-
ment by al-Dhahab (1986) “Siyar a´lm al-nubal`,” III, p. 119 ff., 131 and, above 
all, 157 where he says: “an awwalu l-mulki” etc. 
36  ´Ubayd Ibn Sharya (1978) “Akhbr,” 312, 7-8. 
37  See also, what Abbott, Nabia (1957) periovulsy highlighted on these characteristics, 
“Studies in Arabic Literary Papyri, I, Historical Texts,” p. 14 ff. 
38  See, for example, Abbott, Nabia (1972) “Studies Studies in Arabic Literary Papyri, 
III. Language and Literature.” Document 3: “A Speech of ´Amr Ibn al-´s and De-
scription of the Ideal Maiden,” p. 43-78, the Arabic text is eleven lines long.  
39  ´Ubayd Ibn Sharya (1347/1928, n. Ed. 1978) “Akhbr,” p. 312, 8-10. 
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Egypt, but also its first governor; he was deposed by ´Uthm n40 because he 
wanted to rule all of Egypt against the will of this caliph, but was then recon-
firmed in this role for his lifetime by Mu´ wiya. However, he died in 63/663 or a 
year earlier.4  However, if ´Amr turned to Mu´ wiya in connection with the ad-
vice about the story-teller, it must have been between 660, the date of the seizure 
of power by the ruler, and 663, the year of the death of Ibn al-´ s; in the text, the 
caliph speaks with ´Ubayd in the presence of the ´Amr, thus, this account must 
be taken seriously.42 The text does not report of any kind of hesitancy on the part 
of the caliph as he sent for the Yemeni story-teller immediately and expressed “a 
great longing” (shiddat shauq), to meet him at his house having had him brought 
to him “in a sedan” (f  mahmalin) and “after (a journey) of many days” (ba´da 
ayy min kath ratin); these references are intended to convey the sense of a par-
ticular honour and the length of the journey involved.43 The external framework 
comes with the description of the person of the guest at the end: Fa-dakhala 
´alayhi shaykhun kab ru l-sinni sah hu l-badani th bitu l-´aqli muntabihun 
dharibu l-lis ni ka-annahu l-djada´u
44 (“A venerable old man came to him with a 
healthy body and confident mind, observant and with a sharp tongue as though 
he were a younger man”).  
In summary, what we have here is a very old man who is counted among the 
long-lived (al-mu´ammar n) by al-Sidjist n  (died 250/864) and about whose 
longevity fabulous information is provided.45 To the question of Mu´ wiya re-
garding the advanced age which the narrator puts at 50 years, the Caliph replies: 
Fa-q la la-hu Mu´ wiya wa-m  adrakta q la adraktu yauman f  athari 
yaumin wa-laylatan f  athari laylatin (“What have you experienced; and he an-
swered: I have lived day by day and night by night”). A series of wise observa-
tions and sayings follow further questions which he linked with a few verses 
about a burial which he described as a strange experience. Y q t ends his study 
on ´Ubayd here with the information of the index of books (Fihrist) by Ibn al-
Nad m, who provided more or less the same account of this encounter with the 
caliph, although we also learn from him that the author of the Akhb r lived up to 
the days of the Umayyads – Caliph ´Abd al-Malik Ibn Marw n (685-705) – and 
 
40  On Caliph ´Uthm n, see my article in: EI2 (2000: pp. 946-949), which takes all of 
the circumstances of his period of rule into account in the light of Ibn Lah ´a’s Hei-
delberg papyrus. 
4   On this point, see Khoury, R.G. ( 986) “´Abd All h Ibn Lah ´a,” p. 9 -93.  
42  ´Ubayd Ibn Sharya ( 978) “Akhb r,” p. 3 3, . 
43  Loc. cit., p. 3 3, - 2. 
44  Loc. cit., p. 3 2-3 3. 
45  al-Sidjist ni, Sahl Ibn Muhammad Ibn ´Uthm n Ab  H tim “Kit b al-Mu´amm-
ar n,” p. 40-43. 
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left two books behind: Kit b al-Amth l (“Book of Proverbs”) and Kit b al-Mul k 
wa-akhb r al-m d n (“Book about the Kings and Reports of the Early Ones”).46  
Of course, ´Ubayd’s account of the text is more detailed, the later information 
however acts as another guarantee of the age of such information.  
What the caliph expected from his guest in terms of a programme is simple 
and clearly formulated in one sentence: Inn  aradtu ttikh dhaka mu`addiban l  
wa-sam ran wa-muqawwiman. Wa-an  b ´ithun il  ahlika wa-anquluhum il  
djiw r  wa-kun l  sam ran f  layl  wa-waz ran f  amr .47 (“I wanted you as a story-
teller for me, as a nocturnal story-teller and advisor. And I will send for your 
family and bring them to me. Be an evening story-teller for me in my nights and 
a vizier in my affairs”). 
Together with the other sources quoted, this reference demonstrates the ex-
tent of Mu´ wiya’s interest in education, the word Mu`addib is used in the text, 
which he associates with pleasant conversation; we can see here how old the 
aforementioned concept of Adab is, which entered common usage with Ibn al-
Muqaffa´ in the Islamic culture of the 2nd/8th century.48 The caliph makes no se-
cret of the fact that the presence of the story-teller in his surroundings gives him 
great joy which is expressed not least by the warm reception the guest receives at 
his court: 
 
Fa-anzalahu f  qurbihi wa-akhdamahu … wa-wassa´a ´alayhi wa-altafahu – fa-idh  
k na dh lika f  waqti l-samari fahwa sam ruhu f  kh ssatihi min ahli baytihi.
49 
 (“And he had him accommodated and looked after near to him … and he was generous 
and friendly to him – as soon as the time for nocturnal conversation came, [´Ubayd] was 
his nocturnal conversation partner in his private circle among the people of his house”). 
 
From then on the caliph’s relationship with the story-teller assumed different di-
mensions which are no longer purely historical in nature, but also cultural as the 
nocturnal conversations and the poetry closely associated with them predomi-
nated. Thus it is appropriate to analyse the other events in this book from this 
perspective. The same applies for the Kit b al-T dj n, whose content is far more 
religious and biblical in nature. Thus, all of these questions regarding the content 
will now be examined from the perspective of wisdom and spirituality. 
 
 
 
 
46  Y q t, (1928) Irsh d ,V, p. 12 (the report on the story-teller is on pages 10 to 13 
with some small additions); the author follows here the information provided in Ibn 
al-Nad m’s Fihrist, ed. by Fluegel, p. 89-90. 
47  ´Ubayd Ibn Sharya (1978) “Akhb r,” 313, 1-3. 
48  On this point, see above on Adab and the author referred to there. 
49  ´Ubayd Ibn Sharya (1978) “Akhb r,” p. 313, 5-7. 
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I I .  The wisdom and spir i tual i ty of  abibl ical  and 
prophet ic  yemeni ta les in Early Is lam 
 
Such books represent a summary of the experience of earlier peoples who should 
all be considered in the context of the Semitic tradition of wisdom, a tradition 
which reached its apotheosis in the biblical world in particular in such religious 
stories of the pious, virtuous and heroes of their nations. Thus the stories about 
the Prophet belong to the above-described stories which were widely dissemi-
nated in Islam from an early stage and provided Qur’an commentaries on the var-
ied figures, as stories and explanations. Some typically Arabian figures which en-
joyed great adulation in Arabia prior to Mohammed, were assimilated into the 
Judaeo-Christian repertoire; one example of this can be found in the above-
mentioned Heidelberg Arabian papyrus on the Story of David while another 
represents the life of the founder of the religion which for reasons of adulation 
was not dealt with in these actual collections but separately under Sra (path 
through life, life story) or Maghz (campaigns) (which more or less represents 
the same thing).50 All of the book collections referred to want ultimately to report 
on the past which was a shared biblical asset and which there was a desire to 
closely correlate with the Arabian past. We can see how important an author was 
who dealt with all of these text types and correlated the old Arabian, i.e. Yemeni, 
biblical and Islamic past, initially in orally transmitted versions which were 
transferred to written form gradually, but at an early stage. The case of the library 
of the above-mentioned Egyptian judge and what remains to be said about Ibn 
Sharya’s book confirms all of these views.  
To re-enact this step by step, I shall start with Ibn Hishm’s book, Kitb al-
Tdjn, whose content is primarily traced back to Wahb Ibn Munabbih.51 Wahb 
opens die speech by specifying the number of books he had read and which he 
distributed among eleven prophets, starting with Adam and ending with the 
Prophet of Islam. In the meantime, it may be assumed that an Arabic bible was 
known in early Islam – even if its parts were not equally disseminated or only 
some of them which quote Islamic authors – as was also the Thora and some pas-
sages from the gospels. This availability cannot be disputed after detailed consid-
eration of the information which goes back to the transmitters of the first hour. 
These transmitters are the main authorities, to whom Ibn Munabbih refers and 
whose material was recorded in writing in the circle of this family and in Egypt: 
 
50  On the publication of both texts, see Khoury, R.G. (1972) “Wahb Ibn Munabbih,“I, 
p. 33 ff., 117 ff.; on all other figures, see, for example, Khoury, R.G. (1978) “Les 
légendes prophétiques dans l’Islam” (in Arabic).  
51  At the beginning of the text, this author is almost the only authority, to whom Ibn 
Hishm refers, sometimes several times on individual pages; the frequency of these 
references decreases after the first third of the book; on this point, see. loc. cit., p. 2 
ff. 
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Ka´b al-Ahbr (died 32/632 or 34/654) and ´Abd Allh Ibn Salm (died 
43/663).52 Wahb, who unlike the other two was not a convert from Judaism to Is-
lam (he was born a Muslim), but was mistakenly viewed as such by Ibn al-Nadm 
and also by Ibn Khaldn after him, used their experience and tradition and ex-
panded them to become the main source of biblical stories in Islam for subse-
quent generations up to Ibn Qutayba (828-889).53 One of my doctoral students 
presented a detailed doctoral thesis on this author and the bible which corrobo-
rates the extreme significance of the Old and New Testaments for the Islamic 
generations.54 Thus, it is not surprising to find in this classical author’s work pri-
ority being given to Ibn Munabbih, who is credited with having most experience 
with biblical material in the numerous quotes and not only in his prophetic and 
Israeli stories,55 but also because he is also credited with the translation of part of 
the bible: Kitb Zabr Dwd (the Psalms of David) which confirms his reputa-
tion as a guarantee of the biblical wisdom and spirituality. This must finally be 
taken into account so that this early Islamic material, which was later considered 
as purely Islamic without any mention of sources and – even worse – contested, 
is taken seriously not only in the East but also here in the West. 
It should not come as a shock to establish on closer examination of this mate-
rial that the treatment of these biblical sources did not (always) correspond to the 
norms of systematic transmission as more or less literal quotes were replaced by 
quotes that were looser and more Islamic in form.56 Thus, Wahb became the 
model for the subsequent generations, but also persona non grata for many histo-
rians, including Ibn Khaldn (1332-1406), who viewed him as djuhhl al-
mu`arrikhn (“one of the ignorant historians”): this Islamic historian speaks of 
the Muslims of the Israelites (Muslimat Ban Isr`l) and cites the two aforemen-
tioned and Wahb by name in connection with the Qur’an commentaries; in these 
commentaries he highlights the fact that there are things which were transmitted 
after then, of which some elements should be retained and others discarded. He 
explains this with reference to the ignorance of the Arabians on these parts of old 
biblical history, on the one hand, and the presence – among the early Islamic 
scholars – of Jews (and Christians), on the other, who knew more about it and 
were therefore repeatedly called on. His openness in this regard is startling be-
 
52  On Ka´b, see F. Sezgin (1967) “Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums,“I, p. 304 f.; 
EI2, IV, p. 316 f.; on Ibn Salm, see F. Sezgin, loc. cit., p. 304; EI2, I, p. 52. 
53  On this author, see EI2, III, p. 844-847 (Gérard Lecomte), idem (1965) “Ibn Qu-
tayba. L’homme et l’œuvre.“ 
54  Karoui, Said (1998) “Die Rezeption der Bibel im Werke des Ibn Qutayba,” Heidel-
berg/Tunis. 
55  On this point, see Khoury, R.G. (1972) “Wahb B. Munabbih,” pp. 222-240, 246, 
257. 
56  On this point, see Khoury, R.G. (1989) “Quelques réflexions sur la première ou les 
premières Bibles arabes,” p. 549-561. And Karoui, Said (1998) (see bibliography) 
with further bibliographical references. 
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cause he explains this circumstance as follows: the Arabians had no books and 
no science, the character of the nomad and illiterate dominated among them;57 
for this reason people turned to the people of the writings (Jews and Christians) 
on all questions regarding Creation and the secrets of existence. However, these 
scholars who were well-versed in the bible were also residents of the desert: all 
they knew about these questions was what was widely known in their milieu 
which was far removed from the major scholarly centres of their faiths. When 
they converted to Islam, most of these scholars who originated from Yemen did 
not give up their religious and cultural tradition and continued to explain it to the 
Islamic scholars, however in their own way. Thus numerous accounts of Creation 
and the stories or histories of the Prophets were adopted and can now be found 
not only in purely historical works, but also in the early Qur’anic commentaries; 
al-Tabar ’s Qu’ran commentary is full of them and, to the delight of interested re-
searchers, often accompanied by Isn d. These unique collections of reports from 
the first centuries of Islam are so valuable that they should be classified and ana-
lysed in greater detail.58 Thus the true motives for the availability of this Judaeo-
Christian literature in this form were ignorance, on the one hand, and more 
knowledge and respect, on the other. These are surely also the reasons why cer-
tain parts of the bible and biblical stories were more widely disseminated in the 
desert (Thora, Psalms, Gospel of St Matthew etc.), while others were hardly 
known or completely unknown.  
It should not be forgotten here that, in such an environment, change did not 
always only originate from the desire to please the rulers under the religious and 
political imperatives of apologism; to this was also added simple uncertainty be-
cause people had blind trust in scholars in these early intellectually underdevel-
oped environments. The role of the scholars was almost equivalent to that of the 
poets and oracle men of old Arabia who had to provide answers for everything, 
irrespective of whether they had understood it (correctly) or not. This mentality 
can still be observed today in certain areas. Based on this, it is possible to imag-
ine just how much was ascribed to such a scholar who, in the person of Wahb, 
represented a major cosmopolitan personality for his epoch and the first genera-
tions of Islam. Not only did this Yemeni-Islamic dimension, which was very 
closely associated with the biblical tradition, live on in him, but also something 
of his Persian past, as his grandfather had come to Yemen in 570 AD with the 
conquering Persian army. Thus, he belonged to the Abn `, a name given to the 
 
57  On Ibn Khald n’s views of this Muslimat Ban  Isr ` l (the Islamic scholars of the 
sons of Israel), see Khoury, R.G. ( 987) “Ibn Khald n et quelques savants des deux 
premiers siècles islamiques,” p. 92-204. 
58  Al-Tabar  took them very seriously, just like Ibn Qutayba who was one of his most 
important sources in this area. See Khoury, R.G. ( 972) “Wahb B. Munabbih;” on 
al-Tabar  and his commentary, see Gilliot, Claude ( 990) “Exégèse, langue et 
théologie en Islam. L’exégèse coranique de Tabarî .”  
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Persians and their descendants, who settled in Yemen after its conquest by the 
Sassanid rulers.59 As a result his work is all the more interesting as it betrays a 
Persian character which includes the experience of this ancient people who are 
repeatedly referred to in connection with the work of Ibn Munabbih. Thus, it is 
possible to establish that concepts like education and wisdom permeate the two 
above-analysed works on Yemen: in Ibn Sharya’s book, the desire for political 
education is clearly perceptible and in the case of Wahb, in Ibn Hish m’s book, 
the focus is on the area of wisdom and its proverbs which cannot always be dis-
sociated from the general biblical tradition.  
Seen in this light, Ibn Munabbih emerges as a scholar to whom early Islamic 
history has much to thank for key stimuli which lend it its world-history dimen-
sions: 
First, the old-Arabian history, that of the Yemenis, from the beginning of 
their existence to the end of the Himyarite dynasty, which Kit b al-T dj n pre-
served on several occasions. To reinforce this in religious terms, the history of 
the Prophets was added, and this is clearly demonstrated not only the Story of 
David on papyrus but also the most important elements of the collection of 
Wath ma and his son ´Um ra in Bad` al-khalq wa-qisas al-anbiy `. 
To this old pre-Islamic and biblical-Islamic past is added a purely Islamic 
one, i.e. the focus on the life of the Islamic prophet Mohammed to whom Ibn 
Munabbih devoted the oldest surviving Magh z , a title which was interchange-
able with the S ra. Whereas in Kit b al-Mul k al-mutawwadja … , which pro-
vided the basis for Ibn Hish m’s book and aimed to provide indisputable proof of 
the link between the old-Arabian and Yemeni history and biblical history, the 
Magh z  crown these efforts with an Islamic high, i.e. the seal of the biblical tra-
dition. However, this is not all that we know about Wahb as there is even men-
tion of a book of his about the first caliph T r kh al-khulaf ` or Fut h, whose 
traces are not as clear, however, as clear as the previously mentioned works. It is 
surprising, that it was he and not Ibn Ish q, his student and teacher of Ibn 
Hish m, who was responsible for the extension of the historical dimensions by 
converting the purely Arabian and Islamic perspectives into a worldly one. 
Thus his services were immense in terms linking Islamic history, with respect 
to its spirituality, with the oriental and, above all, biblical past, a tradition which 
became even stronger after him and gained ground in the ascetic and mystical 
spirituality in Islam. Several books ascribed to him and numerous statements and 
paragraphs which are closely associated with them can be cited here. The titles are: 
Hikmat Wahb (The Wisdom of Wahb)  
Hikmat Luqm n (The Wisdom of Luqm n)  
Mau´iza l-Wahb (A Sermon by Wahb)60 
 
59  On the Abn `, see EI2, I, 02; Khoury, R.G. ( 972) “Wahb B. Munabbih,” p. 9, 89 ff. 
60  On the titles of these works, see Khoury, R.G., op. cit, p. 206 f., 263-272.  
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In addition, the aforementioned titles Kit b Zab r D w d6  (Psalms of David), 
one Tafs r Wahb (Wahb’s Qu’ran commentary) and Kit b al-Qadar (Book on 
Freedom of Will) should not be forgotten here. 
He is reputed to have written or transmitted this last work, from which he ret-
rospectively distanced himself, but which probably cost him his life.62 We know 
that the Umayyad power ideology was increasingly involved in combating the 
enemies of its usurpation of power and had to stand up for the associated free-
dom-based discussions which received particular input from those surrounding 
freedom of will; for this reason, not only Ghayl n al-Dimashq  (died after 724)63 
but also Wahb had to die in 728 or 732, thus approximately at the same time, the 
first as Christ on the Cross and the second by corporal punishment in San´ `. The 
traditions which were added to these and can be traced back to Ibn Munabbih are 
fully enveloped in a biblical atmosphere and promote such liberal opinions. 
These and other moral characteristics of Ibn Munabbih increasingly irritated the 
tyrannical governor of Yemen, Y suf Ibn ´Umar al-Thaqaf  (died 745 AD),64 
who was enslaved to the Umayyads, thus he welcomed the death of the scholar.65  
In this context, it must be stressed that of the early Islamic scholars, Wahb 
became a particularly important source on wisdom, wise proverbs and spiritual-
ity, thus many later authors repeatedly quoted him; thus, it is possible to find sen-
tences like the following: F  ba´di l-hikmati (in a wisdom) and qara`tu f  l-
hikmati (I read in the wisdom) etc. which can be traced back to one of the above-
mentioned titles, in particular that on David and on Luqm n. It is not possible to 
differentiate between Hikma and Mau´iza in the assembled literature referring to 
him: the style and content of such statements are largely reminiscent of the genre 
of publications by Cheikho and Krarup,66 that is of a common heritage of devo-
tional messages relating to way of life. It appears to be clear that Wahb used all 
available oral and written sources and disseminated them in an adapted form. In 
relation to Luqm n, whose legend assumes an honorary position in the oldest 
surviving collection of historical terms, the book of the above mentioned 
Wath ma and ´Um ra al-F ris ,67 Wahb was one of the most important authorities 
on all matters concerning spirituality and the Psalms. Based on some statements, 
it would appear that a Madjallat Luqm n (which more or less means Sah fa/leaf) 
 
6   Khoury, R.G., op. cit, 258-263. 
62  Op. cit., 270-272. 
63  On Ghayl n, see van Ess, Josef ( 970) “Les Qadarites et la ¹ahl niyya de Yaz d,” p. 
269-286. 
64  He was one of the relatives of the famous Governor of Iraq and Hedja, al-Hadjdj dj 
Ibn Y suf (died 7 4) who belonged to the same tribe. 
65  On the death of Wahb, see Khoury, R.G. ( 972) “Wahb B. Munabbih,” p. 97- 98. 
66  On this point, see Cheikho, Louis ( 9 0) “Quelques légendes islamiques apocry-
phes,” p. 33-56; Khoury, R.G. ( 972) “Wahb B. Munabbih,” p. 266 ff. 
67  On this, see Khoury, R.G. ( 978) “Les légendes prophétiques dans l’Islam” (in 
Arabic), p. 80-222. 
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was circulating at the time of the Prophet Mohammed: Suwayd Ibn S mit from the 
al-Aus tribe, who was viewed as K mil (a perfect person) and like Wahb was 
known for the knowledge of the books, is reputed to have said to the Prophet, who 
had offered him conversion to the new religion, that he had Madjallat Luqm n, 
and read it to him on his request whereupon Mohammed recommended the Qu’ran 
to him as better.68 Ibn Qutayba provides further witness in referring to Ibn Munab-
bih and informing us that this Madjalla was in circulation in the st/7th century: 
 
Qara`tu f  Hikmatihi nahwan min ´asharati l fi b bin, lam yasma´i l-n su kal man 
ahsana minhu thumma nazartu fa-ra`aytu l-n sa qad adkhal hu f  kal mihim wa-
sta´ n  bihi f  khutabihim wa-ras `ilihim wa-wasal  bihi bal ghatahum
69 
(“I read in his wisdom around 0,000 chapters, whereby people had never before heard 
a more beautiful speech; then Iooked and found that people had introduced them into 
their speech, had used them to assist them in their addresses and included them in their 
letters”). 
 
This testimony is clear, even without Isn d; for al-Tabar  also tells the story of 
the aforementioned Suwayd, this time with a full Isn d. What is interesting about 
this report is the fact that the Madjalla is expressly held as identical with the 
 
Hikma: Fa-q la lahu Suwayd fa-la´alla lladh  ma´aka mithlu lladh  ma´  fa-q la lahu 
Ras lu ll hi […] wa-m  lladh  ma´aka q la Madjallatu Luqm n ya´n  Hikmata Lu-
qm n
70
 
(“Suwayd then said to him [the Prophet]: Is what you have like that which I have? 
God’s envoy replied to him: And what have you? He said: the sheet by Luqm n, i.e. 
The Wisdom of Luqm n”). 
 
Wahb’ declaration appears to carry weight and highlights the significance of the 
material which has been put into circulation and is traced back to Luqm n. As 
southern Arabian, he belongs to the ´ d tribe and was honoured as a hero and 
sage thus the Qur’an dedicated surah 3  to him7 : without closer description of 
the person, reference is made in verse 2 of a Hikma by him which enabled Allah 
‘to come to him’ and some good advice is mentioned which Luqm n had given 
to his own son.72 Based on what has been presented up to now on Wahb in con-
nection with the material ascribed to Luqm n, it is obvious that this Hikma is 
probably the piece introduced into circulation by Wahb which D. Gutas men-
 
68  Abbott, Nabia ( 967) “Studies in Arabic Literary Papyri, II, Qur` nic Commentary 
and Tradition,” p. 5, 2 ff. 
69  Ibn Qutayba ( 960) “al-Ma´ rif” , p. 55, 8 ff. 
70  Al-Tabar , ( 879) “Annales = T r kh al-rusul wa-l-mul k,” ed. by de Goeje, I, p. 
207, 2 ff. 
7   On him, see Enzyklopädie des Islam ( 9 3-38), here EI, III, 39.  
72  Qur’an, 3 , 2 ff. 
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tioned in “Classical Arabic Wisdom Literature,” in which my book about Wahb 
Ibn Munabbih is quoted extensively without, however, referring to the numerous 
pages on Luqm n in the book by Wath ma and his son, which represents the old-
est known collection of material.73 
During and after his time, Wahb Ibn Munabbih was viewed, particularly in 
Yemeni history, as the “scholar of the world” who is supposed to have read all 
disclosed and undisclosed writings by his predecessors. He undoubtedly made a 
far from small contribution to the formation of several wisdoms from the biblical 
and old-Arabian periods, because the majority of the reports on Prophets and 
sages of this world go back to him, including, of course, about Luqm n Ibn ´ d, 
who succeeded his brother Shadd d Ibn ´ d on the throne of the Himyarites, in 
particular the story of the seven vultures with the events that accompanied his 
age and his death.74 It was also Ibn Munabbih, who according to the famous Ibn 
´Abb s made Luqm n into a Prophet, however not without adding ghayr mursal 
(’not dispatched’): “Islamic history loves to sanctify the pious and wise of the 
past as prophets,” particularly as the Qur’an ‘had sanctified Luqm n as the wise 
proverb poet, thus everything that was held as pious and reasonable could be im-
puted to him .”75 Based on this, it may be understood that Wahb did not even 
hesitate to describe the prayer of his Yemeni prophet in the following way: 
 
Q la Wahb wa-k na Luqm n Ibn ´ d yad´  qabla kulli sal tin wa-yaq lu 
All humma y  rabba l-bih ri l-khudr 
Wa-l-ardi dh ti l-nabti ba´da l-qatr 
As`aluka ´umran fauqa kulli ´umr
76
 
(“Wahb said: And Luqm n Ibn ´ d used to call God before each prayer and say: 
O God, O Lord of the green seas, 
And of the earth which has plants after the rain, 
I ask you for an age above every age”). 
 
Thus – according to Ibn Hish m and Ibn Qutayba – Ibn Munabbih was probably 
familiar with Luqm n’s transmission of the legend. Wahb had already earned the 
reputation of Hak m (wise man) during his time; thus, why should he not have 
adopted proverbs and warnings from the Hukam `, who had lived before him – 
and without indicating his sources as was common in his time. What Wahb did 
not do, was completed by his successors and subsequent transmitters. However, 
 
73  Gutas, D. ( 98 ) “Arabic wisdom literature: nature and scope” p. 50-54, 57-58 (the 
entire article: p. 50-86); see Khoury, R.G. ( 978) “Les légendes prophétiques dans 
l’Islam” (in Arabic), p. 80-222. My book was published in 978 thus it could not 
be used on time. 
74  Ibn Hish m, ( 978) Kit b al-T dj n, p. 69 ff. 
75  B. Heller, Luqm n, EI , III, p. 39. 
76  Ibn Hish m, ( 978) Kit b al-T dj n, p. 70, 5 ff. 
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the quotes that bear Wahb’s name always remained within the Qur’anic concept 
of Luqm n’s legend; Ibn Munabbih, the Yemeni, had done everything to com-
pletely integrate the pre-Islamic history of his homeland with the biblical tradi-
tion: his entire oeuvre prophesies these efforts at every turn and this became very 
clear, particularly in connection with Kit b al-T dj n. His preoccupation with the 
biblical stories to which the aforementioned story of David belongs, gave him a 
solid basis on which to establish such cross-connections in a convincing way. 
The two figures, i.e. the biblical figure of David and the old-Arabian figure of 
Luqm n, gave him inter alia the possibility of discovering a leitmotif in the ori-
ental wisdom and spirituality and to present it to the Islamic and non-Islamic 
public. Thus, this applies not only for David, but also for Luqm n; in this way he 
could follow the path taken by the Qur’an, and in this way the ice was broken: 
“Once Muhammad had sanctified Luqm n as wise proverb poet, everything that 
was held as pious and reasonable could be imputed to him.”77 
When we examine some places which Ibn Munabbih introduces with Lu-
qm n’s name, we gain the impression that they belong to the same literary genre 
as the quotes supposedly ascribed to David which are usually introduced with the 
formula y  D w d or f  Hikmati D w d, in Luqm n with q la Luqm n, or f  
Mau´iãati/f  Hikmati Luqm n, to make the generally quoted more or less authen-
tic material appear more plausible. 
 
 
I I I .  Narrat ive tradit ion and poet ic  wisdom in Is lam  
 
Unlike the work of Ibn Hish m, we have precise information on the coming into 
being of the book of ´Ubayd, as it can be traced back to the wish of Caliph 
Mu´ wiya. The beginning of the book presents us with all of the circumstances 
that gave rise to Ibn Sharya coming to Damascus as presented above. What is 
important here is that the habits of the caliph and what gave him particular joy 
are presented. It is described as follows in the text: Wa-k nat afdala ladhdh tihi 
f  khiri ´umrihi al-mus maratu wa-ah d thu man mad
78 (“His preferred joy at 
the end of his life were the conversations and tales of earlier people”).  
Here we have a very old confirmation of Mu´ wiya’s interest in the poetry, 
genealogy and history (Ash´ r, Ans b and Akhb r) of the Arabians which nu-
merous works would later confirm (such as those of al-Dj hiã ). ´Amr Ibn al-´ s79 
is supposed to have proposed this very elderly and highly respected story teller 
who is introduced as follows by the conqueror of Egypt and best ally of the ca-
 
77  B. Heller, Luqm n, EI, III, p. 39. 
78  Ahb r ´Ubayd, ( 347/ 928, n. Ed. 978) , p. 3 2, 7-8. 
79  On ´Amr Ibn al-´ s, his importance for Islam and Egypt, see Khoury, R.G. ( 986) 
“´Abd All h Ibn Lah ´a,” p. 9 -93. 
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liph: he is “one of those left over from the early people as he experienced the 
kings of the old Arabian time and is the most experienced of those left behind to-
day in the tales of the Arabians and their genealogies, the most skilled in the 
presentation of the ups and downs of fate that have befallen him.”80 No descrip-
tion could have been more suited to satisfying the expectations of the caliph and 
his joy in the quest for knowledge, particularly as the recommendation came 
from ´Amr. From the beginning, the story and joy in listening, which would have 
been impossible to satisfy through dry reports alone, are intertwined: thus, the 
imaginary was something that was taken for granted in these times and we there-
fore rediscover the same traits of the enchantment of the world, without which 
the religious-cultural dimension would be unimaginable. 
Further on we read:  
 
Wa-k na yuqassiru ´alayhi laylahu wa-yudhhibu ´anhu hum mahu wa-ans hu ´al  kulli 
sam rin k na qablahu wa-lam yakhtur ´al  b lihi shay`un qattu ill  wadjada ´indahu 
f hi shay`an wa-farahan wa-marahan
8  
(“It was ´Ubayd who shortened the nights for Mu´ wiya, drove away his worries and 
made him forget (them) more than any other nocturnal entertainer who had been there 
before; nothing ever came into his mind for which ´Ubayd did not manage to find some-
thing and also joy and mirth”).  
 
The text contains informative pages which document the caliph’s great interest in 
the material and the history of its written recording. It continues as follows: K na 
yuhaddithuhu waq `i´a l-´arabi wa-ash´ rah  wa-akhb rah  (“´Ubayd used to 
tell the caliph of the events of the Arabians, their poetry and news”). This ends, 
however, with the order to undertake the written documentation: Amara ahla d -
w nihi wa-kutt bahu an yuwaqqi´ hu wa-yudawwin hu
82 (“Mu´ wiya ordered 
his Diw n officials to record it and write it down in books”), whereby Ibn al-
Nad m adds: Wa-yansub hu il  ´Ubayd Ibn Sharya83 (“and that it should be as-
cribed to the ´U. Ibn Sh”). 
Thus, here we have the entire framework which not only introduces this text but 
clarifies its historical and cultural dimensions, irrespective of whether this informa-
tion corresponds to the historical reality fully or only in part. We are also dealing 
with material here which, like the biblical stories, was under the spell of the past of 
the higher powers: a historically-based folk literature, without which such a past is 
unimaginable and which should be carefully considered as a literary memorial.84 In 
 
80  Idem op. cit., p. 3 2, 8- 0. 
8   Idem op. cit., p. 3 3, 7-9. 
82  Idem op. cit., p. 3 3, 9- 0. 
83  Ibn al-Nad m ( 87 ) ”Fihrist,” 90. 
84  On the significance of this literature for the research and reconstruction not only of 
early Islamic but also of Jewish and Christian circumstances, see the extremely im-
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each case, in such books by Wahb Ibn Munabbih, Ibn Hish m and Ibn Sharya we 
have the oldest accounts of old Arabia which came into circulation from the begin-
ning of the Umayyad period, initially orally and were recorded in writing at an early 
stage, at least in part. Somehow, with his strictly biblically-oriented structure Kit b 
al-T dj n represents a bridge to the content of ´Ubayd’s Akhb r which is more nar-
rative and substantiates and illustrates vividly the genre of the Adab and conversa-
tion sessions at the court of the Arabian-Islamic rulers and in addition to this the 
early interest of the Umayyads, at this point already Mu´ wiya, in education and en-
tertainment. All of this was intended to express the pride of the Himyarites, above all 
Wahb, who was Himyarite through his mother and wanted to connect the 
Himyarites with the biblical past.85 The quest for the wonderful was also a shared 
objective although the atmosphere of the reporting in Ibn Sharya’s work is more 
Arabian because he constantly draws on the main element of old-Arabian culture, 
i.e. the poetry. This is almost the main sustaining motif,86 as it includes almost half 
of the text and also has a completely different dimension in the narration and repre-
sentational value of the events: for both the teller and the caliph it is above all proof 
of the veracity of the statements. Mu´ wiya expresses this constantly by asking 
´Ubayd for proof from the poetry as, for example, in the following passages: 
Q la Mu´ wiya: Sa`altuka a-l  shaddadta had thaka bi-ba´di m  q l  mina 
l-shi´ri wa-lau thal thati aby tin
87 (“Mu´ wiya said: I ask you can you not 
strengthen your story from that which they expressed in poetry, and if only in 
three verses”). And he asked about other events: Fa-hal q la f h  sh´irun (“Was 
something said about poetry”). However, as soon as verses were there, the caliph 
expressed his satisfaction to him and as a showed this by making such affirma-
tive statements as: Qulta l-saw ba … wa-inna kal maka tayyibun wa-shif `un li-
m  f  l-sadri
88 (“You said the right thing … your speech is soothing and salvation 
for what is in the breast”). And elsewhere the caliph says: sadaqta y  ´Ubayd wa-
dji`ta bi-l-burh ni l-w dihi (“You told the truth, ´Ubayd, and presented clear 
proof ”); La-qad dji`ta bi-l-burh ni f  had thika (“You have brought the proof for 
your speech”), Li-ll hi darruka fa-qad dji`ta bi-l-burh ni89 (“How excellent you 
are, you have brought the proof”). 
Many other passages demonstrate the caliph’s hunger for confirmation of the 
events described, in particular through poetry. The book contains an often forgot-
ten and misunderstood statement on the role of poetry in the historical represen-
tation of the old Arabians; it is put in Mu´ wiya’s mouth who says: 
 
portant book by Schwarzbaum, Haim ( 982) “Biblical and Extra-Biblical Legends 
in Islamic Folkliterature,” Walldorf/Hessen.  
85  On this point, see Khoury, R.G. ( 972) “Wahb B. Munabbih,” p. 287 ff. 
86  Khoury, R.G. ( 993) “Kalif, Geschichte und Dichtung,” p. 2 7 ff.  
87  Ibn Sharya (s. Ibn Hish m) ( 978) “Ahb r ´Ubayd,” p. 3 8, 6. 
88  Idem op. cit., p. 323, 3-7. 
89  Idem op. cit., p. 327, 8; 330, 2; 349, 4. 
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Wa-qad ´alimtu anna l-shi´ra d w nu l-´arabi wa-l-dal lu ´al  ah dith  wa-af´ lih  wa-
l-h kimu baynahum f  l-Dj hiliyyati wa-qad sami´tu Ras la ll hi sall  ll hu ´alayhi wa-
lihi wa-sallama yaq lu (inna mina l-shi´ri la-hikaman)
90
 
(“I already knew that the poetry of the Arabians’ D w n was the proof of their reports 
and their deeds and the umpire between them in the Dj hiliyya; I also heard God’s en-
voy – God bless him and his house and grant him salvation – say: ‘Truly, (a lot of) wis-
dom comes from poetry’”). 
 
It is not possible to state this any clearer: the extreme importance of poetry 
for old Arabia is highlighted here for all areas; at the same time, however, poetry 
in Islam was to be completely rehabilitated – following the turbulent statements 
of the Qur’an against it and the poets, and the statement which is normally as-
cribed to Ab  ´Amr Ibn al-´Al ` (689-770 AD) goes back to the highest authority 
in Islam. The particularly positive nature of the statement is highlighted first 
through the affirmative tone and then also by l m al-ta`k d the last word (la-
hikaman), which is even used in the plural to lend it greater strength. In my view, 
this precludes any restrictive interpretation, instead it is a very positive statement 
in support of the value of poetry which – from a religious perspective – cannot be 
an inferior societal product, in particular as it means so much for the old Arabi-
ans and contains their wisdom. Such a strong tradition is not allowed to disappear 
or be disparaged – in any case not if you are called Mu´wiya. The following gen-
erations, irrespective of the ruling family from which they originated, were sup-
posed to observe this and give the poetic element a powerful place in their culture 
so that poetry became the best intrinsic product of this culture and presented all 
areas of its achievement in a masterful way. 
 
 
IV.  Old vivid narrat ive tradit ions in  Ear ly Is lam before 
the 1001 Nights 
 
Such verifiable accounts of the early Arabian-Islamic history and culture consti-
tute a lively tradition for the subsequent generations of Islam: poetry became for 
them an indispensable element of their history and culture, thus one should al-
ways speak of “Poetry and Truth.” Poetry was supposed to infuse reality with a 
certain zest. All of the story tellers recognised this at an early stage thus they 
spread an Arabian-Islamic literature which was intended to catch on; for this rea-
son they sought not only to educate – like the dry methods of the legal scholars – 
but to associate edification with amusement. These narrators were also story tell-
ers; at that time it was impossible not to be. They delighted the spirit of high-
ranking authors such as al-Dj hiã in particular through their “facilité d’élocution 
 
90  Idem op. cit., p. 352, 2- 5. 
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et le charme de leur langage”9  (i.e. “facility of delivery and the charm of their 
language”) as Pellat puts it so succinctly. This last circumstance played an ex-
tremely important role in the spread of such stories about the past of Arabia, the 
bible etc. and the poetry helped them enormously. Thus, the story-tellers of these 
pre-Islamic and early Islamic periods were real champions of religious zeal and 
local patriotism which would guarantee their region, tribe etc. an influential place 
within the Islamic community in the context of the conflicts between northern 
and southern Arabia. This was also visible in the variety of the tribes, which eve-
ryone declares to have been the first of the Arabian tribes to have accepted Islam, 
in the different S ra versions which survived in separate form or in large general 
historical works.92 
These story tellers in particular were successful transmitters of a literature 
which was highly valued as it embodied the literary spirit of the early genera-
tions, which in its popular erudition combined “the aims of entertainment” with 
those of “edification” Tory Andréa aptly describes the work of the best of them 
as follows: “A particular class of professional story-tellers, the Quss s, enter-
tained its audience alternatively with secular fairy tales, biblical legends and glo-
rious stories of the Prophets of Islam.”93 Thus, it is most regrettable that this kind 
of literature finds little respect to the present day – particularly in the West – as it 
is omnipresent in most typically Arabian and Semitic genres and its transmitters 
were highly respected and particularly eloquent personalities. There are various 
reasons why with time this designation came to be associated with an increasing 
lack of respect which Pellat highlights: the main reason undoubtedly lies in the 
desire of the Islamic leadership not to lend any official approbation to foreign 
material which could be found in the speeches and reports of the story-tellers and 
originated from both the Judaeo-Christian and Iranian repertoires. However, 
every expert knows that the measures against such Quss s remained more or less 
unsuccessful as these story tellers who, were driven out of the mosques, contin-
ued to enjoy much adulation among the masses, more than the drier Fuqah ` (le-
gal scholars), in particular as they were confident speakers and included some 
highly educated individuals who could even fascinate al-Dj hiz who was not eas-
ily satisfied. 
This, in particular, must have played a very important role in the spreading of 
more or less historical reports on the Arabian past, in particular when these re-
ports could be combined with suitable poems which lent the narration a particular 
stamp of authority. The early Islamic story-tellers “were firstly champions of re-
 
9   Pellat, Charles ( 953) “Le milieu Basrien et la formation de Gahiz,” p. 0 ; EI2, 
IV, 733/763 ff. 
92  On this point, see Khoury, R.G. ( 983) “Les sources islamiques de la ‘Sîra’ avant 
Ibn Hishâm (mort 2 3/834) et leur valeur historique,” p. 7-29. 
93  Andrae, Tor ( 9 8) “Die Person Mohammeds in Lehre und Glauben seiner Ge-
meinde,” p. 26, 7 ff. 
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ligious fervour before the Islamic armies, like poets in the old days […] Thus, 
they naturally became popular exegetes of the Qor` n and public homilists who 
became story-tellers for religious purposes.”94 That this profession was compared 
with that of the poet in the old days would come as no surprise to connoisseurs of 
the old-Arabian scene as the poet was the primary reference for all that con-
cerned this past and poetry was seen “from time immemorial as the high point” 
of the culture of the Arabians and represented “for a long time virtually the only 
form of expression of artistic creation among the Arabians.95 It is impossible to 
understand the writing of poetry and telling of stories in Islam without bearing in 
mind their roots in old Arabia, however with the special religious emphasis that 
Islam introduced – in particular if one considers old Arabic literature in general 
which displays little or no religious content. 
All of the official measures adopted to replace the story-tellers remained, 
therefore, unsuccessful as the latter, who had been banished from the mosques 
out of fear that they would undermine the religious contribution of Islam, contin-
ued their work outside of the mosques and, above all, continued to enthuse the 
masses. With them survived the authority of all kinds of stories of a fashionable 
nature, in particular collections such as that of the 00  Nights, whose original 
material can be connected with the story-telling evenings of the Arabs, i.e. long 
before the adoption of Persian material in this area. In conclusion, I will now 
briefly summarize some contributions I have made in recent years on the signifi-
cance of Arabic papyrology, i.e. of the Heidelberg texts and their specialized lan-
guage, in the clarification, transmission and codification of this work:96  
. The nocturnal art of story telling among the Arabs is confirmed early on. 
We have already seen its specialized language in the texts of Ibn Sharya, docu-
mented at least since Mu´ wiya although the genre is much older. Mu´ wiya lit-
erally said to his guest: 
 
Inn  aradtu ittikh dhaka mu`addiban l  wa-sam ran wa-muqawwiman … Wa-kun l  
sam ran f  layl  wa-waz ran f  amr  
(“I wanted you as a story-teller for me, as a nocturnal story-teller and advisor … Be a 
nocturnal story-teller in my nights and a vizier in my affairs”). 
 
This is the framework of what became the beginning and end of entertain-
ment and education at the time of the subsequent caliphs. 
2. A precedent was also set in other collections for entertainment and edifica-
 
94  Macdonald, D.B., EI, II, p. 20. 
95  On this point, see Wagner, E. ( 987) “Grundzüge der klassischen arabischen Dich-
tung, I, Die altarabische Dichtung,” p.  ff. 
96  Khoury, R.G. ( 994) “L’apport de la papyrologie dans la transmission et codifica-
tion des premières versions des Mille et Une Nuits,” p. 2 -33 ; ibid. (2004) 
“L’apport spécialement important de la papyrologie …,” p. 8  ff. 
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tion, like the 00  Nights, whose parts also betray early-Arabian characteristics 
and undoubtedly bear the Umayyad hallmark: as the oldest version of the book, 
which assumed its final form much later, we have, of course, the fragment on pa-
per published by Nabia Abbott in 949,97 which must surely date to earlier than 
266/879. The fragment is on two sheets, which contain pages 3 and 4 of the short 
text of 00  Nights. Everything else is completely linked with a legal witness 
statement; Abbott notes that the witness Ahmad Ibn Mahf z scribbles the date of 
the statements several times and writes: “Fifteen separate entries of the legal 
formula exclusive of the several scattered phrases of the same. Seven of these en-
tries provided a complete date, four of which are still preserved in full.”98 Lucid 
words which clearly prove that this is the date of the statements but never that of 
a literary text: the documents on papyrus and paper in the framework of papyrol-
ogy show it clearly. The date 266 H is, therefore, “a terminus ante quem for the 
earlier date of the Alf Lailah.”  
3. Another papyrus fragment published by Nabia Abbott in 972 is of key 
importance due to its unknown connection to 00  Nights and confirms just one 
early-Arabian characteristic of this work: what is involved here is the fragment 
on the portrait of the “ideal maiden” (Al-dj riya l-mith liyya).99 It is unimportant 
here whether or not it is possible to establish on closer examination a link be-
tween these few lines here and some passages of the great portrait of Tawaddud 
or other figures in the 00  Nights, the genre and type of description of an “ideal 
maiden” was already highly Arabian in nature there too. In the papyrus we have 
two small parts, each of which consists of a few lines: ´Amr Ibn al-´ s opens the 
speech in the first part to draw the attention of the Umma to the fundamental role 
of the caliph in their lives (this can only have been Mu´ wiya, particularly as we 
know how important an ally of the conqueror of Egypt ´Amr was for his caliph). 
The aforementioned portrait can be found in the second part, from line 7 on. The 
linking of the papyrus with the name of ´Amr Ibn al-´ s is a guarantee of its age, 
in particular as we could establish above in Ibn Sharya’s text the role of the gov-
ernor in the coming into being of the tales at the court of Mu´ wiya. However, 
the papyrus does not originate from the time of the caliph, as it was transmitted 
by Ya´q b Ibn ´At ` Ibn Ab  Rab h (died 55/77 ), whom Abbott was unable to 
identify and hence chronologically locate with accuracy. For this reason, she 
wrote: “Ya´q b may or may not have long survived his aged scholarly father, 
´At ` b. Ab  Rab h who died in 4/732.” Due to the uncertainty regarding the 
dating of this papyrus she added: “Nevertheless, the papyrus could as well be 
 
97  Abbott, Nabia ( 949) “A ninth-century fragment of the ‘Thousand Nights.’ New 
light on the early history of the Arabian Nights,” pp. 29- 64. 
98  Idem op. cit. p. 4 b, 43a. 
99  Idem ( 972) “Studies in Arabic Literary Papyri III. Language and Literature, Do-
kument 3: A Speech of ´Amr Ibn al-´ s and Description of the Ideal Maiden,” p. 
43-78.  
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from Ya´q b’s hand as from that of a younger second – century transmitter.” 00 
However, Ya´q b died in 55 H. – i.e. in the beginning of the Abbasid period 
and his material goes back to the period of the conqueror of Egypt where the ori-
gin of the – at least orally circulating – material should be sought and betrays an 
old, early-Islamic tradition in terms of the type of narration.  
4. This fragment on the “ideal maiden” dates, therefore, from the middle or 
beginning of the second half of the 2nd/8th century and not from the last quarter of 
this century; at most from the last years of Ya´q b and its roots go back much 
further. The first aforementioned fragment on the 00  Nights must also be dated 
earlier as 266 should be viewed not as its date but as that of the witness state-
ments. Thus, both fragments can only be considered in connection with the ter-
minology which occurs in the title of the Heidelberg story of David on papyrus 
and reads: Had th D w d, dating from the year 229/844. It was, however, the 
version of an older original as I have proven on several occasions. Also the ver-
sion of the Akhb r by ´Ubayd Ibn Sharya. All of them used the word Had th for 
the fashionable story in the title or title area, whose use in the title of such story 
books disappeared with the first half of the III/9th century and were reserved for 
the purely Islamic tradition. 0  The Kit b Bad` al-khalq wa-qisas al-anbiy ` 
transmitted by ´Um ra Ibn Wath ma al-F ris  (died 289/902) after his father 
Wath ma Ibn M s  Ibn al-Fur t al-F ris , the actual author of the work, provides 
us with the best proof of this: Wath ma died in the year 237/85 , i.e. seven to 
eight years after the date of the Heidelberg Story of David from which he copied 
word for word. His work could no longer bear the title Had th, because a more 
specific terminology was required for many genres in the course of the system-
atic transition and, above all, codification of a science that had become vast; an 
ever increasing realism in which the written form had become a necessary in-
strument of traffic automatically required a specialization as already stressed in 
detail above. Hence the emergence of this order based on areas, genres. As a re-
sult, everything that is titled and formulated like the papyruses is older than the 
version of Wath ma al-F ris ’s book and must date back to the period of the Hei-
delberg papyruses which more or less originate from the collection of the Egyp-
tian judge ´Abd All h Ibn Lah ´a (97- 74/7 5-790) who collected originals and 
copies of originals in his unique private library and used to make them available 
to Egyptian students and guests, who included all transmitters of the Heidelberg 
papyruses and Wath ma himself. The latter received the material at least from the 
immediate students of the judge in Fust t (old Cairo) and had to take into account 
the development, systematic reception and written recording of the sciences. 
 
 
00  Idem op. cit. p. 78, 3- 5; on this point, see Khoury, R.G. ( 994) “L’apport de la 
papyrologie,” p. 29 ff. 
0   Khoury, R.G., op. cit. 30-33. 
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Chapter 8 
Islam and the Axial Age 
 
JOSEF VAN ESS 
 
 
Karl  Jaspers and his  theory 
 
Historiography is the attempt of the human mind to put order into contingency. 
We discover causalities in the flow of time and elevate certain events to symbolic 
value. If we are audacious enough we elaborate general – or, to use the new ex-
pression: global – theories. They seem to thrive especially well in societies or pe-
riods which have lost their inherited orientation. In Germany, the 1920s were full 
of them and again the years after 1945. Now we get them cheaper from the 
United States: Huntington, Fukuyama. My experience with them goes back to the 
late fourties of the last century. But I went to school then, and I was not particu-
larly impressed. I belonged to what was called shortly afterwards the “sceptical 
generation.” 
These theories – and I shall specify them in due course – have, as it seems, 
one thing in common: they read history backwards. They are teleological, 
“Heilsgeschichte” in disguise. Sure, they also differ a lot, the reason being that 
they are always children of their time, reflecting the mood of their period. Some-
times they are pessimistic, especially after a war which was lost; their authors 
then tend to ruminate about some sort of “Untergang,” and the public gladly ab-
sorbs this. In such a case, the prevailing mood is one of remorse, and the main 
question asked is: “How could we do this to ourselves?” In Germany this was 
called “Kulturkritik.” At other moments, the same theories are brimmingly opti-
mistic: “How come we are so wonderful? Why is it that the ‘modern subject’ is 
so singular?” This attitude is, of course, as naïve as is the former one. But to be 
just: it is not so much encountered with those who invent the theories but rather 
with those who elaborate on them later on, during the process of reception. It is a 
secondary phenomenon. For it may happen that theories come back after one or 
two generations and find themselves surrounded by a completely new mental en-
vironment. Marxism in Western Germany during the late sixties was a good ex-
ample, strangely out of focus and void of any contact with the feelings of the so-
cial class it had originally been intended for. “Weberism” is perhaps another one: 
the phenomenon of an author who never managed to get a book out and fell from 
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one nervous crisis into the other1, but then, after his death, was monopolized by a 
steadily growing “school” who developed his ideas into a “system” and his notes 
into a Scripture. Jaspers’s “Axial Age” may be a third one: conceived in 1949, 
but short-lived and then out of sight for at least one generation until it came back 
in form of conferences and specialized articles in the recent past. 
In this case, however, I am not so sure. I never looked at the “Axial Age” 
very closely, and the Suhrkamp publication of 1987-1992 which revivified its 
memory by-passed me completely2. Younger events of the same kind, the work-
shop held at Jerusalem which dealt with Islam (2002)3 and a volume of assorted 
articles published in the periodical “Medieval Encounters” (2004)4, seem to keep 
aloof from the magic word itself as much as possible5. At the Essen conference 
(2005) Shmuel Eisenstadt told me that “Axial Age” is no longer considered to be 
of prime importance and has been replaced by “axial syndromes.” This termino-
logical shift would not sadden me; any stepping down from capital letters to 
normal down-to-earth language makes me feel more comfortable. 
This has, of course, something to do with the fact that I am an Islamicist. Is-
lam does not fit into most of these general theories. They are all Europocentred, 
and even where one of their authors thinks that the Occident is about to perish 
(“Der Untergang des Abendlandes”) he reserves for the Orient nothing else but 
Aladin’s wonder-lamp (“the magic civilization”)6. Frequently, Islam is not taken 
into consideration at all, in Eric Voegelin’s Order and History, for instance (a 
book which, in Germany, is just being rediscovered)7, in Alexander Rüstow’s 
 
1  This formulation is, I admit, somewhat flippant and, what is worse, not entirely true. 
According to the German academic system, Weber had had to submit two studies 
(“books”) in order to get his professorship: his PhD thesis and a “Habilitations-
schrift.“ 
2  Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. (ed.) Kulturen der Achsenzeit, 1 (1987) and 2, part 1-3 
(1992), Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, with articles on Islam by Lapidus, Gellner, Lazarus-
Yafeh, and Levtzion. The preceding volume in English: Eisenstadt (1986) The ori-
gins and diversity of axial age civilizations, Albany: State University of New York 
Press, has different contents and contains only one contribution on Islam, a short es-
say written by M.A. Cook (pp. 476-483) which was not taken over into the German 
publication. However, Cook still appears among the authors of Schluchter 1987 (be-
low n. 16). 
3  Hoexter, Miriam/Eisenstadt, Shmuel N./Levtzion, Nehemia (eds.), The Public 
Sphere in Muslim Societies. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
4  Arnason, Johann P./Wittrock, Björn (eds.) Eurasian Transformations, Tenth to 
Thirteenth Century. Medieval Encounter 10 (Special Issue), Leiden: Brill. 
5  I had not yet the chance of looking at the last publication by Arnason, Jo-
hann/Eisenstadt, Shmuel N./Wittrock/Björn, Axial Civilizations and World History, 
Leiden, Brill 2005. 
6  For Oswald Spengler cf. now. Radtke, Bernd (forthcoming), “Spengler und der Is-
lam. Nachdenkliches und Persönliches.” In: Der Islam. 
7  Voegelin (2000 ff. [1956 ff.]) The Collected Works, Baton Rouge/London: Louisi-
ana State University Press, Vol. 14-18. 
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Ortsbestimmung der Gegenwart (which, interestingly, is mainly a fruit of 
Rüstow’s Turkish exile after 1933)8, or in Alfred Weber’s Abschied von der 
bisherigen Geschichte which, written at Heidelberg9, both locally and temporally 
comes closest to Jaspers’s Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte10. If con-
sciously intended such abstention is nothing objectionable at all, for history is 
always contemporary history, to quote Benedetto Croce11, and historiography 
therefore nothing else but position-finding concerning the present age (“Ortsbes-
timmung der Gegenwart”). We use to understand ourselves as the product of a 
rectilinear development in which the “before” counts a lot whereas the “besides” 
is bound to be neglected. Alfred Weber therefore started with a chapter on the 
“Sonderheit des Abendlandes,” the singularity of the Occident. Even when the 
topic is actually pursued beyond the borders of Western civilization we rather 
expect to hear something about Ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia (the “forerun-
ners” of the Greeks) than about historical phenomena of the East which were si-
multaneous with the West, whether Islamic or Indian, Chinese etc. Encounters 
were “crusades” more frequently than “dialogues.” 
I have to admit that the Islamic world is complicated. Max Weber was still 
not able to find his way through it; what he read in some hurry was not of suffi-
cient quality, and the original sources were not accessible to him12. When, later 
on, Leon Festinger took a similar initiative and started with the first volume of 
what was destined to become a universal history13 he convoked a few medieval-
ists and islamicists to a conference at Toledo in order to get a clearer concept of 
how to go on14, but then he died prematurely before he could pursue his project. 
Only rarely did Islamic scholars pay attention to such enterprises. Carl Heinrich 
Becker, who had been Max Weber’s colleague at Heidelberg until 1909, briefly 
 
8  Rüstow, Alexander (1950 ff.) Ortsbestimmung der Gegenwart, eine universal-
geschichtliche Kulturkritik, 1-3, Erlenbach-Zurich: Rentsch. The only hint at an 
Oriental experience seems to crop up in chapter 17 of volume II: “Untergang der 
Antike: Barbarisierung des Westens, Byzantinisierung des Ostens.” Rüstow’s son 
Dankwart became a Turkologist who taught in the United States. 
9  Weber, Alfred (1946) Abschied von der bisherigen Geschichte. Überwindung des 
Nihilismus?, Hamburg: Claaßen und Goverts. The (first) preface was signed Febru-
ary 1945, at a moment when the war was more or less over at Heidelberg, but when 
Dresden was still about to be bombed. 
10  Jaspers (1949), Munich: Piper. 
11  History as the Story of Liberty (1941), p. 19. 
12  Cf. now the remarks bei Radtke, Bernd (2005) Neue kritische Gänge. Zu Stand und 
Aufgaben der Sufikforschung, Utrecht: M. Th. Houtsma Stichting, pp. 251 ff.  
13  Festinger, Leon (1983) The Human Legacy, New York: Columbia University Press. 
The book is subdivided into the chapters “The Narrow Path of Evolution” and “The 
March to ‘Civilization’.” 
14  In 1987, if I remember correctly; on the Islamic side, Ira Lapidus and myself had 
been invited. Festinger did not seem to care so much about Greek Antiquity. 
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commented upon Oswald Spengler15, and Bertold Spuler jotted down a few re-
marks about Arnold Toynbee16. But there was not much to come afterwards, at 
least not in Germany. Jörg Kraemer, in his inaugural lecture for his professorship 
at Erlangen, spoke about the “problem of Islamic cultural history” (1959), but 
left out Jaspers as well as Max Weber completely17. When Wolfgang Schluchter 
wanted to reopen the discussion about Weber’s ideas concerning the world of Is-
lam18 the majority of the contributors to his volume (the most notable exception 
being Maxime Rodinson) had to be taken from the English-speaking world 
where, at that moment, Weber was studied with great enthusiasm19. German “ori-
entalism” had then long since passed on to the agenda. 
In certain respects, however, Jaspers’s Vom Ursprung und Sinn der Ge-
schichte was a different case. The reception was less complex. Right from the 
beginning, the book presented itself in its final and accomplished form; a com-
plete English translation appeared in 196820, and in 1984 (?) even a Persian one 
was produced21. As in the case of Max Weber (and later on in the ill-fated human 
rights debate), the Iranians showed a greater affinity to this universalist Western 
way of thinking than the Arabs22. Moreover, the book was of modest size, which 
is always an advantage when the reception has to cross a language barrier. It had 
been written by a philosopher who was neither a historian nor a sociologist and 
 
15  Less negatively, by the way, as we might expect today; Becker, Carl Heinrich 
(1923) “Spenglers Magische Kultur. Ein Vortrag.” ZDMG 77, pp. 255-271. Weber 
was already dead by then. 
16  Spuler, Bertold (1952) “Einige Gedankensplitter zu Toynbees Bild der oriental-
ischen Geschichte.” Der Islam 30, pp. 214-221, in reality a review of Toynbee’s 
Der Gang der Weltgeschichte (Stuttgart 1950) which was, in German translation, a 
shorter version of his original work. 
17  Kraemer (1959) Das Problem der islamischen Kulturgeschichte, Tübingen: Max 
Niemeyer. Max Weber’s brother Alfred is mentioned, but only in a few footnotes. 
18  Schluchter, Wolfgang (1987) Max Webers Sicht des Islams, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 
19  Though, as it turned out, not always with sufficient expertise; cf. Schluchter’s long 
introduction entitled “Überlegungen zu Max Webers Sicht des frühen Islams” (pp. 
11-124) where, at the end, he criticizes the approaches of Rodinson, Turner, Cook, 
and Crone (pp. 85 ff.). Weber’s ideas had been popularized in the English-speaking 
world through translations which were fragmentary and not always sufficiently pre-
cise. Some of the contributors duly quote, however, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft ac-
cording to the German original. 
20  Jaspers (1968) The origin and goal of history, New Haven/London: Yale University 
Press. 
21  Agház ve andjám-i táríkh, Teheran : Intishárát-i Khwárazmi, by Muh. Hasan Lutfi 
who had already translated other works by Jaspers. The publication bears no date. 
For 1363 h. š. = 1984 AD I rely on the catalogue of Tübingen University Library. 
The translation itself seems to have been made before the Islamic revolution. 
22  In the Arab world, the only hint at the “axial age” I know of is found with the Mo-
roccan historian Abdesselam Cheddadi (2004 Les Arabes et l’appropriation de 
l’histoire, Paris: Sindbad, p. 15). Characteristically, Cheddadi has translated Mar-
shall Hodgson’s Venture of Islam into French (Paris 1998). 
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who looked at world-history as something which “makes sense” and can be 
grasped in a kind of “morphology,” to use Spengler’s expression. Jaspers shared 
this outlook with Alfred Weber, his colleague at Heidelberg who understood his 
“Farewell to history as it used to be” (Abschied von der bisherigen Geschichte) 
as an attempt at overcoming nihilism. What stuck to the reader’s mind was, how-
ever, not this optimistic approach as such but the claim that the entire develop-
ment could be focussed into one particular historical moment, as a “break-
through” which happened during an Axial Age some centuries before Christ23. 
To be precise: What was new here was merely the chronological horizon and the 
term whereas the idea itself, namely the concept that the history of mankind 
could be – and had in fact been – changed by one singular event at one particular 
moment, had always been in existence; it was the crucial point of Christian 
Heilsgeschichte. The specific difference added by Jaspers was that now, accord-
ing to his chronology, which was the chronology of modernity as it were, the 
breakthrough was not achieved thanks to the birth of Christ but by Greek tragedy 
and Old Testament prophecy. Occidental theology had been replaced by German 
humanism, the kind of humanism offered in the Prussian “humanistische Gymna-
sium” of the nineteenth century. This is why Islam could not fit. The “Axial 
Age” could be smoothened so far as to accommodate the Buddha and, with some 
good will, Zoroaster, even Echnaton and Moses, but never Muhammad. Islam 
seemed to remain the “heresy” it had always been. 
Nobody cared. Jaspers was not particularly religious and consciously avoided 
religious language; when he talked about the homeland of the Prophets he did not 
say “the Holy Land” or “Israel” but said “Palestine” instead. As to those who 
read his book in Germany we may assume that they had had enough of 
Heilsgeschichte, at least in the form favored by the previous political regime; af-
ter the enormous loss of cultural heritage, ideally as well as materially, due to the 
last war, they did not mind seeing the pivot of history being shifted away from 
where it had been before. The only people who did not feel at ease were the 
Islamicists. They were not able to join the discussion unless their colleagues de-
cided to change the outlook and the terminology, from “Axial Age” to “axial 
syndromes” or from “Achsenzeit” in the singular to “Sattelzeiten” in the plural24. 
 
23  “Breakthrough” is a term of this period; Alfred Weber used it a lot. I assume that in 
anglophone sociology it was originally borrowed from German “Durchbruch.” It is 
true that in both languages the word is older, but only with regard to military jargon; 
there it dates back to the First World War (first attested usage in English according 
to The Oxford English Dictionary, sec. ed. 1989, II 517: Daily Express 5. Nov. 
1918). The metaphorical usage in the sense of a scientific breakthrough seems not 
to have appeared, in English, before 1958, and then with regard to the production of 
H-bombs (ib.). 
24  The term “Sattelzeit” is sometimes used by German historians, but I do not know 
whether there is any discussion going on between them and the “Achsenzeit”-
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These are not mere verbal differences. More than ever, the terms are loaded 
with value judgements. Emotionalization was almost inevitable once the Axial 
Age was supposed to mark the birth of the modern subject. It is true that this 
“modern subject” is a rather mysterious being which seems to defy any defini-
tion, but what matters is that it is identical with ourselves. Liberty was chosen as 
its main characteristic; Jaspers conceived the human type who emerged during 
the Axial Age as the individual who emancipated itself from the tyrannies of the 
past and developed a hitherto unknown sense of singularity, lonely as yet and 
therefore tragic in his confrontation with the old structures but nevertheless able 
to serve as the nucleus of a new elite which became the standard-bearer of a bet-
ter way of dealing with social and political reality. This was a rather optimistic 
view of things, but we should not overlook the fact that Jaspers, writing as he 
was in the aftermath of the Second World War, presented it in a somewhat bro-
ken form. His book is full of critical observations about the modern world, a 
world of machines and guns, of “Technik” as one used to say in Germany at that 
time, an expression used by Heidegger as well and in the same negative sense. 
“Technik” did not sound as vague as it does nowadays; what everybody under-
stood by it was not the computer but the atomic bomb and, in connection with it, 
the impersonality of modern warfare, a gruesome and brutal impersonality which 
reached its peak at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Jaspers therefore explicitly denied 
that his own present time could be considered a second axial age or the fulfill-
ment of the former one25; his own world, he thought, was devoid of humanity 
(“arm an Menschlichkeit”). Strikingly enough, he did not elaborate on democracy 
as one of the phenomena of the axial age; we may assume that he knew his clas-
sical sources too well in order to believe that the democratic experiment at Ath-
ens could serve as a paradigm apt for imitation. And he had, of course, been wit-
ness to the Weimar democracy ending up, with the consent of almost the entire 
population, in a dictatorship. Alfred Weber, too, though saying fare-well to “his-
tory as it used to be” put a question-mark behind his message of overcoming 
Nietzsche’s nihilism. Jaspers does not have much to say about Islam, but it is ob-
vious that when remaining silent about it he does not do so because he thinks that 
the “West” is superior or less dangerous. 
When our own generation is confronted with something like the “Axial Age” 
the reaction is different. Value discussions have had a fulminatory revival in in-
ter-civilizational dispute, and we are even willing to wage war because of values 
– or, to put it more cautiously, the Western values are left over when all other 
reasons for going to war have faded away or are no longer fashionable. If, in our 
days, we exclude Islam from the breakthrough which happened during the Axial 
 
school. Cf. Brunner, O./Conze, W./Koselleck, R. (1972-1997) Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe, 1-8, Stuttgart: Klett, Vol. I xv and III 885, n. 427. 
25  Jaspers (1949), p. 127. 
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Age deep in the past we produce a political statement; the Muslims, as it seems 
then, have missed the evolution to the “modern subject.” If the Western mind 
emerged from Greek philosophy and Israelite prophecy this sounds as if it had 
stopped at the banks of the Jordan river. Such a conclusion would, of course, be 
mere ideology and a misunderstanding for which Jaspers and those who follow 
his ideas in contemporary scholarship are not responsible. The problem is one of 
reception as I said. Jaspers himself was quite aware of the polarizing effect which 
his concept, if applied without caution, could possibly produce. In his view, 
however, the danger still came from a different angle, for at his time people were 
not afraid of Islam but of Asia. “Asia” was the term favored in the political dis-
cussion of his days; it had been introduced by Ernst Troeltsch who considered the 
Islamic world as a part of the “vorderasiatische Kulturkreis,” an entity which, ac-
cording to his philosophy, had nothing in common with Europe and did not allow 
for any cultural synthesis26. Jaspers therefore warns his reader not to turn Asia 
into a “metaphysical principle.” Nevertheless he admits that there may be some-
thing like the “eternal Asiatic” (“das ewig Asiatische”): despotism, fatalism, and 
absence of any feeling for history (“Geschichtslosigkeit”)27 – a somewhat care-
less statement which when applied to the Islamic civilization or to China comes 
close to sheer nonsense. 
 
 
Breakthroughs and ruptures.  The case of  Is lam 
 
What can be done in such a situation? Potential misunderstandings are no reason 
for giving up a theory. But they may instigate us to differentiate. What do we 
mean when we say that Islam is late? One millenium is certainly not a mere trifle. 
However, Islam is “late” only as long as we think of it as a religion; if we take 
“Islam” as a civilization the question is not so easy to decide. Islamic religion has 
a clear beginning; conversely, Islamic civilization, we may be sure, did not start 
from a point zero. No civilization does. The new religion brought a rupture 
whereas the civilization may have derived its strength from its continuity with 
the past. Jaspers was cautious enough not to think in terms of religion alone, but 
rather of human self-awareness. However, he focussed on Europe; he assumed a 
continuity between the axial age and modernity. In doing so he omitted the Mid-
dle Ages; in agreement with German Protestant tradition he jumped right away 
from Jesus to Luther. Therefore he forgot to ask the question whether the Chris-
tian Middle Ages represented a rupture; in his view the modern subject simply 
seemed to have disappeared for a while. A “breakthrough,” however, craves for 
continuity; the word would be out of place if the phenomenon which “breaks 
 
26  Kraemer (1959; cf. above n. 15), pp. 15 f. 
27  Jaspers (1949), p. 96. 
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through” sinks into the ground again. Could it be then that there was less rupture 
in the Islamic world than in Medieval Europe? 
There was a lot of continuity between Hellenism and Islam, in Umayyad 
Syria as well as in Abbasid Iraq. Generally speaking, the Islamic world remained 
close to Antiquity insofar as it was a civilization of lay people whereas the Occi-
dent, for some centuries, became a primarily clerical culture. It is true that in 
Damascus or Baghdad, too, there was always a number of scholars who dealt 
with religious questions, especially the divine law. But even they continued to 
live “in this world” whereas in Europe the scholars lived in monasteries – at least 
until the universities were founded, universities which, in a certain way, had ex-
isted in Islam long before28. The Arabs created the only universal empire of Late 
Antiquity after Alexander and Rome whereas the Germanic onslaught trickled 
away and merely resulted in the foundation of unstable and usually short-lived 
governments. It is true that Islam as a religion brought a rupture, but there was 
enough continuity alongside with it. Even if we define “civilization” in the nar-
row sense as we tend to do nowadays, as technical comfort, the relationship with 
Antiquity is evident. One of the symbols of the Islamic town was the public bath, 
like in ancient Rome; there were dozens of them in medieval Baghdad29 whereas 
in Europe, up to fairly recent times, they remained an exception. Rupture and 
continuity are not mutually exclusive. Seen under this aspect Islamic civilization 
looks like the elder brother of the “West.” Only when the younger brother had 
overcome his seclusion did he find the strength to engender the “modern sub-
ject.” 
It is not difficult to find further indications of this continuity. There is, of 
course, philosophy. European scholarship has always dwelt upon this item; even 
people who did not care much for Islam did not mind admitting that we owe the 
knowledge of Aristotle to the Arabs. But in the meantime the perspective has 
changed. For a long time, Western scholars were primarily interested in recon-
structing texts which had been lost in Greek. That means: In a way, they always 
thought in terms of continuity, but this continuity was, in their view, nothing par-
ticularly positive. The question they asked was: Where was it that the human 
mind opened up, and who had a certain idea first? German classicists wrote fa-
 
28  Cf. especially the research done by George Makdisi: (1981) The Rise of Colleges. 
Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West and (1990) The Rise of Humanism in 
Classical Islam and the Christian West, with special reference to scholasticism, 
both Edinburgh University Press, books which remain valuable because of the ma-
terial collected in them even if their overall thesis (the dependence of the West on 
Islam in these matters) remains controversial or is simply ignored. 
29  Grotzfeld, Heinz (1970) Das Bad im islamischen Mittelalter. Eine kulturgeschicht-
liche Studie, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. In general cf. Encyclopaedia of Islam III 
139 ff. s. v. “Hammam” (J. Sourdel-Thomine). 
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mous books entitled “Vom Mythos zum Logos”30 or “Die Entdeckung des 
Geistes”31. The idea of the “axial age” owed its existence to this same question. 
Only now do we recognize that, in Arabic philosophy, we are not simply dealing 
with the transmission of a heritage and a mere “translation movement” but with 
an overall and original adaptation of scholarly material which, one way or the 
other, had always been available and then was changed or improved in the proc-
ess. The “Theology of Aristotle” is a case in point, or the text which, later on, in 
Latin, was called “Liber de Causis.” The best examples, however, stem from out-
side philosophy proper: from astrology, from medicine, from alchemy, i.e. from 
those sciences where people were expected to make predictions or diagnoses and 
where, for mere practical reasons, the ancient errors had to be rectified. This was 
a kind of knowledge which was of immediate use, and the errors which were de-
tected were best corrected right away in the process of copying, i.e. in the manu-
script where the information was found: certain calculations in Ptolemy, for in-
stance, or medical recipes, horoscopes etc. Gerhard Endreß and Remke Kruk, in 
the title of a recent publication (1997), therefore speak of “the ancient tradition in 
Islamic Hellenism,” and what they mean by “Islamic Hellenism” is Abbasid Iraq 
in the second and third century Hijra32.  
We should, however, not forget that, as a consequence of the expansion of 
the Islamic empire, the transmission did not only go via Syria or Ptolemaic and 
Christian Egypt but also via ancient Iran, taking up the heritage of the Sasanids. 
Philosophy and the sciences could emerge from the East as well – like the wa-
termelons or the citrus trees which migrated all the way from India to Spain in 
the Umayyad period33. The most famous astrologer of the time, Abu Ma’shar, the 
Albumasar of the Latin tradition, had come to Baghdad from Balkh, i.e. ancient 
Bactria. Already one century before Islam, during the reign of Khosrau Anoshir-
wan, a few Greek philosophers, among them Simplikios, the famous pagan 
commentator of Aristotle, had sought refuge at the Sasanid court which, at that 
time, was situated in Iraq, at Ctesiphon. Justinian, the Christian Byzantine em-
peror, had made their life unpleasant in Athens. Up to the time of Biruni and 
Avicenna the most remarkable achievements in science and philosophy were 
made in the Eastern part of the Islamic world. 
During Late Antiquity, Upper Mesopotamia (the area around Nisibis, Edessa 
etc.) had been the border-line – and, for a considerable time, the no man’s land – 
 
30  Nestle, Wilhelm (1940) Vom Mythos zum Logos. Die Selbstentfaltung des griechi-
schen Denkens von Homer bis auf die Sophistik und Sokrates; Stuttgart: Kröner. 
31  Snell, Bruno (1946) Die Entdeckung des Geistes. Studien zur Entstehung des eu-
ropäischen Denkens bei den Griechen; Hamburg: Claaßen und Goverts. 
32  The ancient tradition in Christian and Islamic Hellenism. Leiden: Research School 
CNWS. 
33  Andrew M. Watson (1983) Agricultural innovation in the early Islamic world, 
Cambridge University Press, p. 8 ff. and 42 ff. 
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between the two superpowers Rome and Iran. This was now a matter of the past; 
Iran had become the bridge to India. Evidence for this may be found not only in 
the Indian origin of our “Arabic” numeral system but also in astrology and in 
medicine. David Pingree was perhaps the scholar whose work was most influen-
tial in this respect. But we find examples for the phenomenon even in a field 
where we would expect them least: in literature. The Greek novel “Metiochos 
and Parthenope” the original of which is lost reappears in ´Unsuri’s Persian epic 
Wámiq u ´Adhrá’ which is partially preserved. All the names in the Persian ver-
sion are still Greek, with exception of ´Adhrá’ which is Arabic but at the same 
time a “calque” of Parthenope since both words are derived from the same mean-
ing: virginity34. The plot, if looked at with sympathy, seems to give us a presen-
timent of the “modern subject,” for the heroes of these ancient Persian love sto-
ries behave like those we know from Hollywood films. Jaspers would perhaps 
not have been pleased, but we are less fastidious in this respect, I bet.  
One might object that, in contrast to the Persians, the Arabs were less openly 
receptive of Antiquity in the sphere of belles lettres; as is well-known they never 
developed any interest in Greek theatre or in Homer’s Iliad. But on the other 
hand their way of producing books, especially in the academic sphere, strongly 
resembled Hellenistic practice, at least in the beginning. Gregor Schoeler has 
shown35 that in early Islam we have to differentiate between two sorts of writ-
ings: literary texts on the one hand which were destined for a larger public and 
had a definite and polished, unalterable form, and less elaborate products on the 
other which resulted from lecture courses, i.e. through direct contact between 
teacher and disciple, as a kind of aide-mémoire. The terms used by the Greeks in 
this respect were συγγραµµα and υποµνηµα respectively. Plato’s dialogues are 
συγγραµµατα, Aristotle’s treatises were only υποµνηµατα since they were not 
put together into a final corpus until much later, “Literatur der Schule für die 
Schule” as Werner Jaeger once called it. The same still applies, by the way, to 
Hegel’s philosophical works; they are merely “Nachschriften,” notes taken by the 
students. Right from the beginning, book-production was a very conservative 
cultural phenomenon which could easily be handed on from one civilization to 
the other. 
So much for continuity. The items I mentioned support a working-hypothesis 
current among Ancient historians in the English-speaking world, at least for the 
moment: the assumption of a so-called “long” Late Antiquity which includes the 
Umayyad period, as opposite to decline theories of the Gibbon type. This is, of 
 
34  Richard Davis (2002), Greek and Persian Romances, in Encyclopaedia Iranica XI 
339 ff. s. v. “Greece” where this is only one of several examples. 
35  First in German (in several articles which were published in the periodical “Der Is-
lam” between 1985 and 1992), but now also in French, in book form: Schoeler 
(2002) Ecrire et transmettre dans les débuts de l’islam; Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France. 
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course, mainly a matter of periodization. But periodization is usually not as inno-
cent as it looks. Andrew Watson’s book about “Agricultural Innovation in the 
Early Islamic World” stirred up a discussion about whether the Umayyads could 
really have been able of such an achievement, for provided they had been mere 
uncultivated bedouins they would not have contributed to “innovations” with re-
gard to the ancient world, and least so in a field as quintessentially “cultural” as 
agriculture where the Latin term cultura had been derived from. I am not yet sure 
whether protests of this kind may be regarded nowadays as mere rearguard ac-
tions. But at least the term “Late Antiquity” as such is old; it was brought up by 
the Austrian art historian Alois Riegl (1858-1905)36 and then taken over by the 
French scholar Henri-Irénée Marrou and others. Today Garth Fowden, Irfan Sha-
hid, Oleg Grabar and others pursue this approach37. Could it be then that the Is-
lamic “rupture” in which we tend to believe more than ever in these days loses 
some of its obviousness if looked at more closely? Is religion alone a category 
sufficient for a historiographical model? We have to admit that, in the case of Is-
lam, religion, because of its triumphant emergence, was soon associated with a 
second factor which symbolized rupture in a very tangible way: Arabic language. 
Islam had succeeded in creating an empire, and the language of the new revela-
tion, the lisan ´arabi mubin of the Quran (sura 16: 103), quickly served as a tool 
for Arab administration. We should, however, not exaggerate. In the Orient, lan-
guage was for a long time – up to the twentieth century, as a matter of fact – not a 
criterion as dominant as it had become for modern European nation-building, and 
religion, even when presenting itself as a product of strikingly new prophecy, 
could not live without exegesis and theology. Theology, however, was again a 
field where rupture quickly mixed with continuity. The result could amount to an 
astonishing originality. 
I choose merely one example: atomism, something which, as “modern sub-
jects,” we would not expect in theology at all but which, in early Islamic thought, 
turned out to be the prevailing model, and not only in theology at that. We are 
still not entirely sure whether Islam had learnt about atomism from Greece or 
from India (mainly because there is nobody in today’s scholarly world who is 
equally competent in the three languages and civilizations concerned). But for the 
moment the balance is tipped in favour of Greece. The influence was not exerted 
through books but through a subterranean intellectual tradition, a “transmission 
diffuse” as Paul Thillet would call it. Therefore the point of departure was not 
 
36  Riegl, Alois (1901) Die spätrömische Kunstindustrie nach den Funden in Öster-
reich-Ungarn: Vienna: Österreichische Staatsdruckerei, but also already in Riegl 
(1889) Die ägyptischen Textilfunde im K. K. Österreichischen Museum; Vienna: 
KK. Österreichisches Museum für Kunst und Industrie. 
37  Cf. generally Clover, F.M./Humphreys, R.S. (1989) “Toward a Definition of Late 
Antiquity.” In Clover/Humphreys (eds.) Tradition and Innovation in Late Antiquity: 
Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 3-19. 
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Democritus who, chronologically speaking, was much too far away, but Epicurus 
with his theory of elákhista (or minima, to use Lucretius’s term). What happened 
to Epicurean philosophy in the Orient during the centuries after his death is 
shrouded in darkness. The Christian Churchfathers did not particularly like him, 
and when his ideas came up again in Islam they looked rather rudimentary and 
disjointed; not even his name was any longer connected with them. What re-
mained of the original system was a theory of movement, i.e. locomotion in an 
atomic, discrete space, and, in addition to that, perhaps the explanation of speech 
as a chain of isolated, “atomic” sounds which are represented by the letters of the 
alphabet. Islamic theology, however, when adopting these elements, mixed them 
with something which had never been associated with them before, namely the 
idea of a God who, as the creator of everything, keeps nature in his hands. Not 
that God uses the atoms as pre-existing parts which are available to Him like a 
materia prima, for then He would depend on them. He rather creates the things 
by His Word, the imperative “Be” as was said in the Quran. But when they have 
thus come into existence they consist of atoms so that He is free to dissolve them 
again, simply by taking out the link between the atoms; we call this “death,” an-
nihilation etc. And He can add this link again, in order to re-create the same enti-
ties a second time; we call this “resurrection.” Atomism had become a means of 
explaining God’s omnipotence. Epicurus would not have dreamt of that, and no 
Christian Churchfather had ever had such an idea. The Islamic theologians had 
managed to put Epicurus from his feet on his head, as it were. 
What I have said so far about the cultural transfer concerned is certainly not 
the last word in this affair; too much work has still to be done with regard to the 
“dark centuries” which separate Islam from the heyday of Hellenistic thought38. 
But it shows at least that religious speculation did not necessarily pursue a com-
pletely different track by the mere fact of new prophecy; only people who think 
in terms of true and false can believe this. What Islam offered to its community 
was a new “constitution,” a Law which regulated the life of the believers and 
thus furnished “right guidance.” Even in this respect, though, i.e. on the social 
level, there was more continuity than we tend to assume. Let me take, as a final 
example, the so-called millet-system which we know from the Ottoman Empire, 
i.e. the restricted juridical independence of the Christian and the Jewish commu-
nities which harks back to the first centuries of Islam. We are normally told that 
it is in the Quran, but as a matter of fact it was worked out by the fuqaha,’ the ju-
rists. They were obviously confronted with a social reality which they had not 
 
38  For a preliminary summary cf. the chapter on atomism in van Ess, Josef (1997) 
Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra, Berlin/New York: 
Walter de Gruyter, Vol. IV, pp. 459-477; also van Ess (2002) 60 Years After. 
Shlomo Pines’s Beiträge and Half a Century of Research on Atomism in Islamic 
Theology, Jerusalem. The Israeli Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Proceed-
ings VIII/2. 
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created themselves but were simply asked to codify. This reality preceded the 
Quran; it seems to have originated in Sasanid Iran, during the last two centuries 
before Islam, the period when the Jews collected the so-called “Babylonian” 
Talmud and when the Nestorian Church built up its ecclesiastical law, a kind of 
law, as a matter of fact, which in spite of being “ecclesiastical” exceeded the af-
fairs of the clergy and included everyday life in the community. What we notice 
here really deserves being called an “innovation;” there is no trace of it in the 
Hellenistic heritage. On the contrary: The Nestorians were forerunners, not fol-
lowers, and forerunners insofar as they had to find their own way to “Daseins-
bewältigung,” separated as they were from the Byzantine, Greek-speaking High 
Church. To use Michael Morony’s words, we are dealing with “the part of a gen-
eral social transformation taking place in southwestern Asia from the fourth to 
the ninth century (CE)” which, as such, became “the single most important dis-
tinction between Muslim and Hellenistic society” (1984: 277 ff.)39. 
 
 
The Axia l  Age and other  explanatory models –  
a  free market  
 
Would inclusion into an Antiquity of longue durée elevate Islam then onto the 
civilizational highway which led from the Axial Age to modernity? Possibly, 
though only con amore. But if we ask the other way round: Is it necessary for a 
positive understanding of Islam to assume something like an Axial Age? I am 
less sure of how to answer. Not so much because I have my doubts about the 
“modern subject.” Jaspers had them already, and Alfred Weber even more so. 
When reading the introduction to Weber’s (Alfred, not Max!) “Farewell to His-
tory” we get the impression of being confronted with a forecast of globalization. 
Alfred Weber saw the freedom of the modern subject threatened by the power of 
anonymous institutions, and what we feel ourselves nowadays seems to differ 
from this only insofar as, from the late forties onward, German intellectuals were 
afraid of the “masses.” Ortega y Gasset had set the key (1930), and Elias Canetti 
was to elaborate on the topic later on (1960) in “Masse und Macht.” It is true that 
Alfred Weber rather focussed on Nietzsche and the desastrous influence of his 
Übermensch; he does not quote Ortega, and he may have realized that it is diffi-
cult to speak of the masses in an age of democracy. But the new spirit has not 
guarded us from barbarity, neither in the century which has just passed nor in the 
one which is now in its first years; we can watch war again, and not only that, but 
also torture and impersonal brutality of all sorts. This may simply be the ongoing 
reality of history “as it used to be.” Nevertheless: If we indulge in speaking of 
 
39  Morony, Michel G. (1984) Iraq after the Muslim Conquest, Princeton: University 
Press. 
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“breakthroughs,” should we not speak of relapses as well? To make things clear: 
Of relapses which occur in our own civilization, not in those of the others for 
which we are responsible only in a somewhat derivative sense. And if we admit 
that U-turns are possible on the royal road to civilization, should we not persuade 
then ourselves to weigh the pros and cons of differing historiographical models 
which claim the same universality as does the Axial Age? 
There are not many of them nowadays, and I am not in the position to pass a 
sentence anyway. Goitein once called Islam the “Intermediate Civilization,” a 
civilization which had a value of its own because “for the first time in history (it) 
formed a strong cultural link between all parts of the ancient world”40. That is to 
say: Islam engendered a civilization of its own by taking up the heritage of the 
ancient world. But Goitein pronounced his statement only for the period of “clas-
sical” Islam which ended at a certain moment, just as the Christian civilization 
found its definite shape in the European and Byzantine Middle Ages and “ended” 
with enlightenment. In both cases the specific moment of the end would be diffi-
cult to fix, but we would have to assume that what we see happening in the Is-
lamic world nowadays has its roots in modernity rather than in the “Middle 
Ages.” Such a periodization would perhaps spare us some problematic value-
judgments. Unfortunately, it would also burden us with new chronological prob-
lems. But this is our lot as historians. 
Or, just in order to continue in this vein: Hans Küng recently published his 
volume on Islam41, the last one of a trilogy42 which explains the growth of the 
three Near-Eastern prophetic religions as a sequence of parallel steps following 
the “paradigm”-concept of Thomas Kuhn43. Küng’s model is unabashedly theo-
logical, and its parallelisms are invitations to dialogue. Dialogue was not fore-
seen in Jaspers’s book; his concept still had a slightly authoritarian ring, and be it 
only by taking the Occident as the exemplary model. Afterwards the intellectual 
climate changed, at least for a certain period; there was not only a dialogue of re-
ligions, but even of civilizations. Islam took part in it, especially with Iran under 
Mohammad Khatami’s presidentship. Franco Cardini showed in his “Europe and 
Islam. The History of a Misunderstanding” to what extent Western historiogra-
phy was affected by this approach44. Küng for his part has no place for the Axial 
Age. Nevertheless he, too, starts with a symbol far back in the past, a figure 
 
40  Goitein, Shlomo Dov (1963) “Between Hellenism and Renaissance. Islam, the In-
termediate Civilization.” Islamic Studies (Karachi) 2, pp. 217-233, see p. 218 f. and 
222. Reprinted in Goitein (1966) Studies in Islamic History and Institutions, Lei-
den: Brill, pp. 54-70. 
41  Küng, Hans (2004) Der Islam. Geschichte, Gegenwart, Zukunft, München: Piper. 
42  Cf. Küng (1991) Das Judentum and Küng (1994) Das Christentum. Wesen und Ge-
schichte, both München: Piper. 
43  Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: Univer-
sity Press. 
44  Cardini, Franco (1999) Europa e Islam. Storia di un Malinteso. Rome-Bari: Laterza. 
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which preceded the Axial Age by centuries: Abraham. We are thus confronted 
with a different foundation myth. Abraham had nothing to do with the “modern 
subject;” on the other hand he could be regarded as the “father” of the three 
monotheistic religions. He could, of course, play this symbolic role all the more 
easily since we know even less about him than about the Axial Age. But this is 
not the point. “Father” means here: the person whom all three religions equally 
venerate, the point of orientation where they would meet when they were to retrace 
their footprints into the past. Küng became acquainted with this idea when he at-
tended the second Vatican Council; the concept had been developed by an Orien-
talist, Louis Massignon, and Father Georges Anawati, another Orientalist and an 
Egyptian at that, took care of its being inserted into the Declaration about the Mus-
lims. When Massignon, a French Catholic, chose Abraham as a key symbol he had 
the Quran in mind rather than the Old Testament, and Islam was integrated into an 
extended vision of salvation history where it ceased to be the outsider who was one 
millenium late. Certainly, Küng’s work has not met with unanimous assent, and 
Thomas S. Kuhn’s “change of paradigm” is, as far as I can see, no longer received 
with a heartily welcome either, at least not in the field it was originally intended 
for, i.e. history of science. But for a fruitful discussion, and as a contrast to Jas-
pers’s crypto-Protestant model, Küng’s approach is worth some reflection. 
And let us not forget, for a change, the Muslims themselves. What would 
they say if they were allowed (and ready) to have a word in these deliberations? 
They would, of course, have as many different views as we have. But let us try to 
think in the vein of the traditional Islamic “Geschichtsbild” and then imagine 
what would happen if they were to universalize it the way we are used to. They 
would probably interpret Muhammad’s historical appearance as a “break-
through,” a radical change of perception accompanied by a strong “pathos of ne-
gation,” to use Nietzsche’s expression. Seen against the background of Eastern 
Christianity Islam would then be a kind of reformation, the first reformation 
which hit Christianity. For according to the image which Muhammad had of 
himself, he had not brought something entirely new but rather come with an old 
message in order to purge Christianity and Judaism from their aberrations. He be-
lieved that whoever had preceded him as a prophet had established his own 
covenant with God and that these covenants had successively been broken by 
those to whom they had been addressed. “Covenant” is a concept taken from the 
Old Testament; the Christians had made it malleable by assuming an Old and a 
New Covenant, and now the Quran claimed the same concept for a third 
Prophet’s message45. This idea, which was not without some inherent logic, 
 
45  Cf. sura 57:8 and the parallels mentioned in Paret, Rudi (1971) Der Koran. Kom-
mentar und Konkordanz, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, p. 470; C.E. Bosworth in Ency-
clopaedia of Islam, sec. ed. VII 187 f. s. v. Mithak; G. Böwering in: Encyclopedia 
of the Qur’an I 464 ff. s. v. Covenant. For the connection with hebr. berit cf. Wans-
brough, John (1977) Quranic Studies, Oxford University Press, pp. 8 ff.  
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would even survive a change of terminology, for even when Christian theologi-
ans of our days prefer talking about a “First” and a “Second” Covenant instead of 
an Old and a New one (or a First and a Second Testament) it would be still pos-
sible to ask: If God really made two wills, why not three? Under this premiss and 
in the context of salvation history, the almost total disappearance of Christianity 
in the areas occupied by Islam could then be interpreted as a providential act. As 
a matter of fact it would not be far-fetched to assume that Christianity had lost a 
great deal of its spiritual vigour in the Orient when Islam set on its triumphant 
advance. The bitter struggle about coining the correct formula for incarnation and 
trinity had visibly split the community, and many a convert to Islam may have 
left his old religion because he had ceased experiencing Christianity as anything 
else but a conglomerate of at least three different churches. Christian theology 
had ended up in a deadlock and in constant strife; the Quran was quite aware of 
this danger46. This may have also been the erason why in Islam the speculative 
theologians never played the role they had played in Byzantium during the centu-
ries after Constantine. 
This is only a thought experiment. But we cannot deny that Christianity, apart 
from the rather reduced Byzantine territory where it survived until 1453, became 
a phenomenon of the Roman West. In Europe Islam never presented itself as a 
reform movement but simply as a heresy. Yet when Western Christians had to 
define their historical locus they were in a rather awkward position. Squeezed in 
between Judaism and Islam they had to pretend, against Judaism, that they repre-
sented a more developed stage of religion, as people of a new “covenant,” 
whereas against Islam they were forced to claim that whatever was new in the 
sphere of religion was wrong. Theologically speaking they had to put much em-
phasis on faith as such, for when asked for their ultimate criterion of truth they 
could not but point to a miracle: resurrection. Compared to this, a prophetical 
message was a simpler thing; prophecy could always be justified by its mere con-
tents, as a rational necessity, whereas resurrection could not. Resurrection had 
originally been the expedient of the “Urgemeinde” to get away from the sad fact 
that Jesus had died on the cross, but when their belief survived just for this rea-
son they had to stick to it for ever. In order to further explain it they had to insist, 
in one way or the other, on the divine nature of Christ, and the concept of incar-
nation then led them to the dogma of trinity. This sequence of ideas was as inevi-
table as it was irrational. Islam laid bare the axiomatic character of the procedure 
and could therefore claim having brought clarity again, “knowledge” (´ilm) ac-
cording to the vocabulary of the Quran, as opposite to mere “opinion” (zann) 
which had characterized the period of ignorance (al-jahiliyya). As a matter of 
fact, Muslims never speculated about the tension between knowledge and belief; 
 
46  Sura 11:118 f. or 42:8; cf. Y. Friedmann in: EQur I 538 f. s. v. Dissension (also 
S.H. Griffith, ib. I 312 ff. s. v. Christians).  
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this topic remained a priviledge of medieval Christian thought. Admittedly mira-
cles were in the long run accepted in Islam, too, but they did not become as in-
dispensable as in Christianity. Thus Christianity, though suffering badly in the 
East, could survive in the West, in Europe, where the new religion spread among 
a young and rather unexperienced population for whom miracles were not a 
metaphysical problem. The Muslims, on the contrary, stood in a long and unin-
terrupted tradition of sophistication, at least in the urban areas of their empire 
which already during Late Antiquity had been the intellectually prominent part of 
the Roman world. 
Would this tell us anything about the “modern subject”? The modern subject 
emerged when, due to the onslaught of enlightenment, the European Christians 
gave up their belief in miracles. But this “breakthrough” equally affected the 
foundations of Christian dogmatics. In order to make up for this defeat the 
“West” turned towards ethics, a move which the Christians shared, in the nine-
teenth century, with European Judaism. Ethics lent itself to be presented on a ra-
tional basis; in our days human rights are the best example. When reacting 
against this change of paradigm the Muslims never lost the impression that the 
so-called enlightenment they were now supposed to learn from the West was al-
ready found in the Quran. The discussions which ensued from this were, and are, 
full of misunderstandings and therefore not void of tension and aggression. And 
ethics can, of course, never be the same as religion. 
Are “Gedankenexperimente” of this kind47 legitimate or even useful? Perhaps 
insofar as they help us to discover that historical models, wherever they come 
from, are based on “Vor-Urteile,” pre-judices in the Heideggerian sense. We 
should not take them too seriously; they may turn out to be mere chimeras. Nor 
should we, however, demonize them. All models are primarily a game of our in-
tellect, axiomatic, but not dangerous unless they ossify into an ideology. They 
widen our horizon and tend to engender valuable detailed studies, but it may 
happen that the more we know about them the less we trust them. What is impor-
tant is that they are indispensable for any research, they are the pattern according 
to which we select or interpret what we consider to be the “facts.” We are then 
not necessarily simply giving a meaning to something meaningless (“Sinngebung 
des Sinnlosen”) as Theodor Lessing put it shortly after the First World War when 
people like Troeltsch (1865-1923) or Spengler (1880-1936) were still alive48. 
Talking about the sense of history, its “origin and aim,” rather contributes to the 
discovery of our civilizational identity. We should only retain a critical distance: 
 
47  Like “breakthrough,” the term “thought experiment” seems to be of German origin. 
In an English context it was still used in its German form in 1958 (cf. The Oxford 
English Dictionary ²VI 417 s. v.). There is, though, a first attested usage of the Eng-
lish parallel (“thought experiment”) already in 1945 (ib. XVII 985). 
48  Lessing, Theodor (1919) Geschichte als Sinngebung des Sinnlosen oder Die Geburt 
der Geschichte aus dem Mythos. Revised edition 41927 Leipzig: Reinicke. 
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Any civilizational identity is neither static nor universal, and the freedom of the 
“modern subject” should not be used to impose own axioms on others but rather 
stimulate us, in a self-referential way, to continuously check what, in all sincer-
ity, we still have to offer to the world. “Historical significance is one of the most 
difficult concepts to treat or to measure”49, and breakthroughs are perhaps not for 
ever. Axial syndromes are probably easier to verify than the Axial Age. 
 
 
49  Morony, Michael G. (1989) “Teleology and the Significance of Change.” In F.M. 
Clover/R.S. Humphreys (eds.) Tradition and Innovation in Late Antiquity, Madison: 
The University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 21-26; cf. p. 25. 
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In a companion essay (Arjomand forthcoming) I have examined the role of the 
cities, guilds and futuwwa associations of men and youths in the developmental 
path of Islamicate civilization. In this paper, I wish to do the same with the insti-
tutions of higher learning and the culture they produced. As in the earlier case, I 
will pay special attention to the legal framework of civic agency as it affected the 
constitution of the madrasas. I will, however, go beyond the earlier analytical 
scheme by also focusing on intercivilizational encounters and their institutional 
frames as an important feature of what might be called late axiality, and show 
their decisive importance in determining the directionality of social and civiliza-
tional transformation.  
The recent move from Karl Jaspers’ idea of a specific Axial Age in world 
history to a typological conception of Axial Civilizations (Arnason/Eisenstadt/ 
Wittrock 2005) is an important theoretical advance. Its focus on the dynamics 
rather than origins of the institutionalization of transcendence brings out several 
urgent analytical needs. Of these I will concentrate on the significance of com-
mon or interconnected cross-regional patterns and the role of intercivilizational 
encounters (Nelson 1981). As Arnason, Eisenstadt and Wittrock (2005: 12) point 
out, the typological thesis forces us to move from the model of (ahistorically 
conceived) insulated civilizational complexes with distinctive dynamics to 
world-historical transformations and intercivilizational processes. This requires a 
historicization of Axial constellations, especially in later formative periods, often 
involving intercivilizational dialogue. I consider the reception of Aristotle in me-
dieval Christianity and Islam as a common encounter with the Greek civilization 
with, needless to say, different outcomes. I will attempt to explain different con-
sequences of this encounter in terms of differences in law and institutional struc-
tures between the universities and the madrasas, and finally comment on the ef-
fect of this differential reception on the divergent paths to modernity in the West-
ern and Islamicate civilizations.  
In contrast to Toby Huff’s (1993) focus on the unique modern science in the 
West, my contrast centers on the rise of universities and their decisive contribu-
tion to secular culture, especially the political culture. My focus is thus on the 
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development of modern political thought in the West and the contingent and 
structural factors that hindered a similar development in the Islamicate civiliza-
tion. This should in turn throw some light on the differentiation of religious and 
political cultures that have been singled out in this volume as the problematic 
feature of Islamicate axiality. 
 
 
Madrasas,  universit ies  and the law 
 
The absence of the concept of corporation and juristic personality in Islamic law 
was highlighted in Joseph Schacht’s (1935: 225) early essay, and has more re-
cently been singled out as the key factor hindering the development of modern 
science in Islam (Huff 1993: 79, 127-29). It is equally true that the possibility of 
municipal self-government was also adversely affected by this lack, and it is cer-
tainly true that no elected city officials emerged in the Islamicate world. The in-
fluential Oxford symposium on the Islamic City (1970) proposed a different legal 
explanation for the lack of urban political autonomy – indeed for the failure of Is-
lam to develop modernity: the individualism of Islamic law, which can conceive 
no intermediate legal personality between the individual and the umma (universal 
community of believers). The Shari´a is accordingly said to withhold recognition 
to the most crucial such intermediary, the city (Hourani 1970; Stern 1970). Ac-
cording to this theory, the individual freedom of action, contractual obligations, 
notably commercial partnerships and transactions in private property are legally 
protected by the Shari´a, but free and autonomous civic and public action is se-
verely restricted because no intermediaries between the individual and the uni-
versal umma is recognized in the Islamic law. 
The assertion of the absence of intermediaries between the individual and the 
umma has been vigorously refuted with reference to the Ottoman guilds by Haim 
Gerber (1994: 119), who states that “the guild system enjoyed a wide measure of 
autonomy and […] its legal basis was customary law.” Gerber is absolutely right 
that guilds were covered by customary law, which was in turn recognized by the 
Shari´a. The agency of guilds was made licit as custom and thus granted auton-
omy by the legal order in principle. The legal position of the city is, however, 
more complicated. I have similarly argued against this view elsewhere (1999), 
maintaining instead that a sphere of autonomy and universality along the lines of 
Hegel’s conceptual definition of civil society was in fact constituted and pro-
tected by the Shari´a, in particular by the law of endowments (waqf). The (civil) 
law of waqf served as the basis for the creation of a vast sphere of educational 
and charitable activity; and the same civil law granted the ruler, the royal family 
and the highest office-holders an instrument of public policy which they could 
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activate as individual agents1 The strength of that civil society should be seen as 
historically variable, whereby protection by the law is one factor among many, 
and in fact was overwhelmed by a contrary development in nomadic state forma-
tion after the 11th century. 
In his magisterial studies on the Islamic educational system, George Makdisi 
(1961; 1981; 1990) traces three stages in the development of the madrasa into 
colleges for the study of the Koran, the Traditions of the Prophet and jurispru-
dence. The three stages are the following: 1) the development of teaching circles 
(halqas) for various subjects in mosques from the earliest times to the 10th cen-
tury, 2) the emergence of the “mosque-inn colleges” toward the end of the 10th 
century, and finally, 3) the development of the “madrasa colleges of law,” in 
which the functions of the mosque and the hostel were combined in an institution 
based on a single deed of endowment. Makdisi includes the official establish-
ment of the madrasas by the great Seljuq vizier, Nizam al-Mulk, in the second 
half of the 11th century in this stage. Makdisi offers an incisive analysis of the 
impact of the Islamic law of endowment (waqf) on the development of Islamic 
education as the instrument of foundation of the madrasas. 
This account needs to be modified in some important respect. Roy Mottahe-
deh (1997) has shown the alleged second stage, which Makdisi further consid-
ered the prototype of European colleges, to be based entirely on the misreading 
of a single text. It has also been pointed out that the madrasas were not just col-
leges of law but also taught other subjects, except for philosophy, and that the 
development of the madrasa in northeastern Iran predates Nizam al-Mulk’s pol-
icy by a good century and a half (Mottahedeh 1997; Arjomand 1999). Yet Mak-
disi’s (1981) argument that the madrasa professors enjoyed exclusive “teaching 
authority” to issue the ijazat al-tadris/licentia docenti to their graduating doctors 
in jurisprudence and the science of Traditions holds firmly. The fact that there 
was no “episcopal authority” in Islam from which it could be disengaged, how-
ever, leaves it both more undifferentiated and not extendable to other fields of 
knowledge that actually were, or could potentially be, taught in colleges. 
Furthermore, Makdisi’s account of the development of colleges does not go 
far enough in history. What he does not consider is a further stage of the devel-
opment of the institutions of learning which begins in the latter part of the 13th 
century, and is marked by the emergence of what I call the educational-charitable 
complex (Arjomand 1999). The consequences of this omission are not merely 
chronological but substantive. On the one hand, this development invalidates 
Makdisi’s assertion that philosophy and medicine were not taught in the ma-
drasas. On the other, it brings out certain deleterious effect of the organizational 
 
1  A crucial implication of this Islamic legal system is that the private/public distinc-
tion of Roman Law applies very imperfectly, as the line between the two sphere 
was drawn very differently. 
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form for the autonomy of the madrasas and the development of secular culture 
that Makdisi leaves out.  
The law of waqf served as the instrument of agency in a civic, public sphere 
of charitable and educational institutions. Furthermore, 
 
the possibility of affecting the constitution of the public sphere […] was open to a pri-
vate person and a public official alike. The civil law of waqf therefore served as an in-
strument of agency available both to the individuals in the civic community and the rul-
ers and officials of the patrimonial state.  
 
The law of waqf was, however, quite rigid, in large part due to the fact that Is-
lamic law had no concept of corporation (universitas). To be more precise, it 
 
enabled the founder of an endowment to create public space and specify the socio-
cultural activity for which it was to be used. With the combination of the mosque and 
the college in the institution of the madrasa by a single deed of waqf, the founder of a 
madrasa could determine the subjects to be taught and the credal and denominational 
affiliation of the beneficiaries. 
[…] the personal nature of delegated authority under patrimonial monarchy meant that 
the significant acts of the vizier always had a public character, and, more importantly, 
that there was no real distinction between the private property of a vizier and the public 
funds at his disposal. Amassing enormous property holdings was inseparable from their 
extensive procurement of the means of administration, and a part of that property could 
be expected to be used in pursuit of state policy. This was done in the sphere of educa-
tion and welfare through the instrumentality of the (civil) law of waqf (Arjomand 1999).  
 
In other words, the dead hand (mortmain) of the founder lay upon the college in-
stituted through the law of wafq and deprived it of the built-in mutability and ac-
tive agency of a corporation. 
Makdisi (1984; 1989; 1994) has also claimed corporate status for the schools 
of Islamic law, arguing that they were, by the 11th century, indeed corporations 
and “guilds of law”2 (Makdisi 1984: 239). His argument, however, is based on a 
loose and flawed analogy between the hierarchical status terms in guilds and 
schools of law. It is invalidated by the fact that the schools of law, though con-
sisting of individual jurists authorized to issue an ijâza, which he sees as the lit-
eral origin of the European licentia docenti, were translocal and transgenera-
 
2  Makdisi is correct in asserting that the transformation of “the followers” of promi-
nent individual jurists into the (eventually) four Sunni Schools of Law (madhhabs) 
was of crucial importance. However, there is some exaggeration in his statement 
that “the new professional system, autonomous in its guild, exclusive in its colleges, 
and monopolistic in its doctorate, was a veritable revolution in higher learning in Is-
lam” (Makdisi 1994: 25). In any event, the ulema were not a guild and had no gov-
erning body. 
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tional. Probably the correct sociological concept for what Makdisi has in mind is 
what Weber called a Rechtsgenossenschaft (“legally recognized sodality”) and 
not a corporation. 
Immediately after the period studied by Makdisi, changing fashions produced 
varying blueprints for charitable foundations, which included madrasas. The 
complex, on the basis of the Islamic law of waqf, typically came to consist of a 
mosque, a madrasa, a public bath, a soup kitchen and the tomb of the founder. 
This is worth noting as the major institutional innovation of 13th-century Iran that 
might have contributed to a breakthrough in the Islamicate civilization. It was 
certainly adopted by the Delhi and Mamluk sultans, and by the Ottomans at the 
beginning of their empire. Orkhan Ghazi (1326-1359) modified the use of the 
waqf complex into an instrument of urban development, and built a bedestan at 
the center of the Ottoman capital, Bursa. In the bedestans or more generally the 
`imaret complex the Ottomans set up as waqfs in the commercial centers in their 
cities and they made increasing use of new urban property, mostly shops, in addi-
tion to rural estates that had constituted the bulk of the Il-Khânid endowments in 
Iran. Waqf was similarly used throughout the next century of Ottoman conquests 
as an instrument of state policy for the development of the cities of Edirne and Is-
tanbul (Inalcik 1973: 142-44). Creation of ´imârets around their tombs as public 
waqfs by the great Sultans, notably Mehmed the Conqueror and Suleyman the 
Lawgiver, was imitated by Ottoman officials, who also acted as endowment ad-
ministrators, and became an important means for urban development in Istanbul. 
Having traced the development of colleges as a component of the charitable-
educational complex created, however, I found this procedure of lumping to-
gether various components on terms rigidly fixed in the deed of endowment very 
detrimental to the autonomy of the colleges. Other activities of the complex 
could take precedence over the needs of the college and stifle its growth. Maya 
Shatzmiller (2001) points to the rigidity and economic inefficiency of the chari-
table foundations caused by the restrictions of the law of wafq, considering them 
more deleterious in the Mâliki Andalusia and the Maghreb than the Hanafi and 
Shâfi´i East. 
The collegium as a component of European universities had the greatest af-
finity with the madrasa in that it often included a hostel for students. For this 
reason, Makdisi aptly calls the latter ‘college.’ However, beginning with the es-
tablishment of the Sorbonne in 1257, the residential connection became looser, 
and many scholars at Oxford, Cambridge or Cracow rented lodgings in town 
(Leedham-Green 1996: 20-21; Podlecki/Waltoœ 1999). Other differences be-
tween the madrasas and universities were more consequential. 
The madrasa had two major disadvantages as compared to the newly estab-
lished European universities of the 13th century: corporate legal personality, and 
legal jurisdiction. Although major centers of learning called studia generales had 
been and continued to be established by the bulls of popes, emperors or kings, 
which laid certain conditions for their constitution and operations as did the 
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deeds of waqf, they became by law capable of autonomous agency as universitas 
in the 13th century. Bologna was established in 1193 as a university or corpora-
tion of students, and Paris was make into a university or corporation of masters in 
early 13th century. They provided the alternative archetypes or blueprints for 
European universities. By the 15th century, the distinction between the two terms 
was lost and they became synonymous (Rashdall 1936, 1: 4-17). The union of 
studium generale and universitas was responsible for the elevation, during the 
13th century, of studium alongside the two long established forms of authority, 
sacerdotium and imperium as the three powers “by whose harmonious coopera-
tion the life and health of Christiandom are sustained” (Rashdall 1936, 1: 2). 
The University of Paris had already been a renowned studium generale, and 
had thus emerged, around 1200, as a new order alongside temporal and spiritual 
authority. In the next two centuries, “teaching authority” became differentiated 
from “episcopal authority” and was variously appropriated by university profes-
sors as experts in knowledge, as in the writings of William Ockham, or more ex-
clusively by the masters of theology at the university (Thijssen 1998: 93-117). As 
a corporation and a new order of authority, the University of Paris played a major 
role in the politics of France in the 14th and early 15th centuries (Rashdall 1936, 1: 
540-84). This had no parallel in the 14th -century urban politics of Iran (Ar-
jomand forthcoming). In the latter case the ulema could play a role as individuals 
but not as representatives of a corporate entity. The corporate legal status of the 
universities contributed to the institutionalization of European politics, a possibil-
ity precluded by the legal status of the madrasas. 
Secondly, the rectors or chancellors of universities were freed from subjec-
tion to episcopal confirmation by the end of the 14th century while enhancing 
their internal disciplinary and penal jurisdiction over the community of scholars 
and with regard to the immunities of university. Their courts and courts of the 
masters became firmly institutionalized (Leedham-Green 1996: 8-15). At the 
same time, the deliberations of academic assemblies were formalized and written 
down as early as 1250 in Cambridge in a form which may be taken as an official 
code of statutes (Leedham-Green 1996: 6-7). Furthermore, the universities de-
veloped extensive institutional interlinkages to both temporal and religious struc-
tures of authority. They had special privileges in the ecclesiastical court system, 
and developed their court and consistory and their “magisterium to suppress false 
teaching” in the course of the 13th century. In short, the university capitalized on its 
legal status as a corporation in order to establish its autonomy and self-government 
(Thijssen 1998: 5-6, 96). The madrasas did not develop a similar jurisdiction and 
institutional interlinkages, and did not benefit from a similar legal status. 
The conception of corporation (universitas) in Roman law was as a matter of 
course the critical legal foundation for the autonomy of European universities 
and development of their jurisdiction. The absence of a parallel concept in Is-
lamic law hampered the autonomous agency of the madrasa as a civic organiza-
tion. The absence of the legal concept of corporation is thus the fundamental fac-
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tor differentiating the Christian and Islamic paths of development of higher edu-
cation in the Middle Ages. The historical evidence we have clearly shows that the 
colleges could neither free themselves from the weight of the other components 
of the educational-charitable complex, nor from the control and public authority 
of the patrimonial state, because of the absence of the idea of corporation in Is-
lamic law in general, and in the law of waqf in particular. Without this legal pre-
requisite, the madrasas could not become autonomous universities. I think this 
emerges clearly from a book on the ethics of the madrasa and the mosque written 
in 1710, toward the end of the last period of unusual flourishing of the madrasa 
culture in Isfahan. The fact that the author was commissioned by a civic benefac-
tor to write on the appropriate ethical rules for mosques and colleges lumped to-
gether is in itself revealing of a lack of differentiation harmful to the institutional 
autonomy of the latter. But it is above all the rambling and formally incoherent 
content of the tract (Tabrizi 1995) that is worlds apart from the statutes of the 
governing bodies of the self-governing European universities. 
 
 
Interc ivi l izat ional  inf luences on the Is lamicate  and 
Western transformat ion 
 
Wittrock’s (2001) provocative suggestion of a “Eurasian ecumenical renais-
sance” focuses our attention on common patterns of development across Eurasian 
civilizations, and the search for such patterns highlights inter-civilizational en-
counters as an easy way of explaining commonalities. The two critical factors 
making for the great transformation of the 13th century are the Mongol ecumeni-
cal empire, with branches in China and Iran as well as Russia, and the “dialogue 
between the living and the dead involving Greeks, Arabs [read Muslims] and 
Europeans” (Huff 1993: 13). Where the former facilitated the most significant 
encounter between the Islamicate and the Chinese civilizations, the latter marked 
the divergent path of late axial development of the Christian and Islamicate civi-
lizations set in motion by their respective encounters with the same Greek civili-
zation of antiquity. 
The Chinese-Islamicate encounter requires a separate treatment, but I will 
mention one significant scientific encounter concerning astronomy as it concerns 
the protagonist of the next section of this paper. Huff (1993: 50) notes the trans-
mission of trigonometry to Chinese astronomy through the employment of 
“Arab” astronomers in the Astronomical Bureau in Beijing from the 13th century 
onwards, but he does not seem aware of the fact that, on the Iranian side, Nasir 
al-Din Tusi employed Chinese mathematicians and astronomers in his famous 
observatory in Marâgheh (see below), translated the date of the year of the Pig 
(1203) to various other calendars and “made extensive use of Chinese technical 
jargon […] and the Chinese names for the ten celestial stems and twelve earthly 
branches of the sexagenary cycle” (Lane 2003: 218). Whatever the impact of 
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such specific cultural exchanges, there can be no doubt about the flourishing of 
Persianate culture and the revival of the very idea of Iran, with the pictorial as-
similation of the ancient Persian kings to the new Mongol rulers in the illustra-
tions of Ferdausi’s Shâhnâma (Soudavar 1996), in the Il-Khanid period. George 
Lane (2003) aptly subtitles his comprehensive study of the reign of Hülegü 
(1256-65) and his successor as “a Persian renaissance” and reminds us that the 
troops of the Atabeg of Fars, the great patron of learning and culture and of the 
great Persian poet, Sa´di of Shiraz (d. 1291), who wrote the most moving elegy 
on the demise of the last `Abbasid Caliph, in fact accompanied the Mongol con-
queror in the fateful siege of Baghdad in 1258 (Lane 2003: 30). 
The encounter with the Greek civilization was, however, of much greater ax-
ial significance for Christianity and Islam. The transmission of Greek scientific 
and philosophical texts through Arabic and of the Muslim medical treatises to 
Europe in the Middle Ages is indisputable. The importation of institutions has 
not been proven, however. There is little evidence for the influence of the fully 
developed madrasas on the nascent European universities in the 13th century. 
Makdisi’s argument for the influence of the mosque-khân model on the Inns of 
Court as the first English law colleges set up in London in the 12th century by the 
Knights Templar returning from the Holy Land rests on a misreading of the tex-
tual source and is therefore unacceptable. Inspired by Makdisi, Monica Gaudiosi 
(1988) claims the law of waqf as a source of the English law of trust or use, and 
argues that the 1264 statutes of the House of Scholars of Merton, the deed of 
trust that set up the first Oxford College, can “be analyzed as a waqf instrument” 
(Gaudiosi 1988: 1250). But she can only show generic similarities between the 
deeds of trust and waqf rather than giving any direct proof of borrowing. It is true 
that the influence of the trust’s founder was as great as that of a waqf endow-
ment. Walter de Merton names members of his own family as the primary bene-
ficiaries. Hugh of Balsham, the Bishop of Ely, founded the first Cambridge Col-
lege, Peterhouse, in 1284 “for the sake of public utility” (pro utilitate rei publi-
cae). It was, however, explicitly modeled on Merton and reserved the appoint-
ment of the master and confirmation of fellows for the bishop (Leedham-Green 
1996: 21-22). Merton College was soon incorporated by a subsequent deed of 
1274, however, and it was not the unincorporated Inns of Court or Peterhouse 
but, as we have seen, the corporations of masters and/or scholars of Paris or Bo-
logna that provided the blueprint for European universities3 and assured their 
autonomous civic agency.  
Makdisi’s (1981) argument from the literal correspondence of ijâzat al-tadris 
 
3  The first university at Cracow, established in 1364, was modeled on Bologna, and 
students elected the Rector. When it was reestablished in 1400, like Heidelberg 
(1386) and other more recently established universities, it used the Parisian model 
for its constitution, with the masters electing the Rector (Podlecki, J./Waltoœ 1999). 
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and licentia docendi is somewhat stronger, but he goes too far in claiming that 
“Islamic seeds were planted for what was soon to become a second magisterium 
in Christianity, that of the professors of theology” (Makdisi 1990: 128). Again, 
this probable original influence cannot explain the enormous growth of the uni-
versity trained doctors of theology who outnumbered the priests and bishops at 
the Council of Basel in 1439 by 300 to 20 (Makdisi 1990: 129). 
One of the least appreciated features of the Islamicate civilizational synthesis 
perfected in the 13th century is the composite medieval Muslim conception of 
state and society. I have argued that certain features of pristine Islam invited the 
political thought of other civilizations, in particular the Indian science of gov-
ernment and the Greek political science. With the cultural integration of Iran into 
the Muslim Caliphate, especially after the `Abbasid revolution in the mid-8th cen-
tury, the Indian borrowing via the Middle Persian translations emerged as an in-
tegral part of the Arabic and Persian literature on statecraft. The reception of the 
Greek political science was integral to the translation of Greek philosophy and 
medicine into Arabic a century later, and was developed into the discipline of 
practical philosophy or political science. Through the mutual accommodation of 
the Shari´a and a political culture derived from Greek and Perso-Indian sources, 
the civilizational encounters under consideration introduced an unmistakable 
element of pluralism – or at any rate, dualism -- in the normative order of medie-
val Islam (Arjomand 2001). The consummate presentation of this medieval syn-
thesis, which remained definitive for the early modern Muslim “gunpowder em-
pires” as well, is found in the Akhlâq-e Naseri, whose author is no other than Na-
sir al-Din Tusi. Works on ethics and statecraft by Tusi’s epigones as well as his 
own treatise dominated the political thought of the Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal 
empires, and other than the immediate Islamic rejectionist reaction of the Han-
balite Ibn Taymiyya, to be discovered and cherished by the contemporary Islamic 
fundamentalists, there was no Islamic reaction before the reassertion of the 
Shari´a in the late-17th century Ottoman empire and the reign of Auranzeb and 
Shah Wali Allâh of Delhi in the 18th century.4 Down to that century, a university 
educated European and a madrasa graduate, if they could communicate in a 
common language, would have shared the Aristotelian division of the human sci-
ences into ethics, economics and politics as pertaining to the management of the 
individual self, the household and the polity. This similarity, however, is some-
what deceptive as the development of political thought in the two civilizations 
follows a sharply divergent path. 
 
 
 
4  The fact that the Islamic reaction was so late in coming should cast doubt on Huff’s 
(1993) attribution of the failure to develop modern science to medieval Islamic 
ethos, which was in fact less hostile to science than the medieval Christian ethos. 
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Nasir  a l-Din Tusi  the viz ier  and 
Thomas Aquinas the professor 
 
Two great intellects of the 13th century died three months apart in the same year 
of 1274: the professor friar Thomas Aquinas at Fossanova on his way to the 
Council of Lyon in March, and the vizier Khwâja Nasir al-Din Tusi in Baghdad, 
while inspecting the accounts of colleges and other endowments, in June. Nasir 
al-Din Tusi was prominent among the elite of the radical heterodox Ismâ´ili sect 
until his mid-50s, and joined the more moderate heterodox Twelver Shi´a when 
entering the service of the non-Muslim Mongol ruler of Iran. Both were, how-
ever, deeply involved in the institutions of higher learning and key figures in the 
reception of Aristotle into the secular and political cultures of their respective 
civilizations. Aquinas was the champion of Christian orthodoxy and a member of 
the Dominican Order set up in its defense, at the service of the pope.  
The Dominican Order had been established in the year of Thomas’s birth to 
preach orthodoxy against the Cathars and to defend the Christian faith by fortify-
ing it with Aristotelian logic. The year he arrived in Paris to begin his studies at 
the university, 1252, the Cathars assassinated the Italian inquisitor, Peter of Ve-
rona. Nasir al-Din Tusi was at that time at the service of the last ruler of the 
Ismâ´ili fortresses in the northern Iranian mountains, and was to arrange his sur-
render to the Mongols in 1256, whereupon he entered the service of Ghengis 
Khan’s grandson, Hülegü, and accompanied him in the sack of Baghdad and the 
overthrow of the `Abbasid Caliphate in 1258. The Ismâ´ilis, Hodgson’s “order of 
Assassins,” were the most radical of the heterodox Shi´ite sects, and are generally 
considered the transmitters of Dualism to the Cathars through the Bogomils of 
Bulgaria. After jumping the rocky Ismâ´ili boat into the solid Mongol ship, Nasir 
al-Din declared his belonging to the non-radical Shi´ite sect, the Twelvers. Tusi 
made an important contribution to Twelver Shi´ite rational theology as the lead-
ing intellectual and political figure in the sect, as he had done earlier for the 
Ismâ´ili doctrine. Tusi’s heterodoxy entailed, as his autobiography shows (Tusi 
1998: 3-5, 19), his love of secular culture and the dislike of all religious doc-
trines, which he considered distortions of the same ultimate truth. His philoso-
phical, ethical and political writings were accordingly completely non-sectarian. 
According to the contemporary Jacobite monk, Bar Hebraeus, “he held fast to the 
opinions of the early philosophers, and he combated vigorously in his writings 
those who contradicted them” (Cited in Lane 2003: 214) 
Aquinas was a product of the great University of Paris and a professor par 
excellence. A decade before Aquinas’s birth, a “university of masters” had been 
established in Paris, already an illustrious center of learning, and quickly devel-
oped in his lifetime, and with his participation, into the first “university of mas-
ters and scholars” or the first autonomous corporation with the right of self-
government identical to that granted to a guild or a communia (Ferruolo 1985: 3-
5). His teaching career in Paris is closely tied to two epochal institutional devel-
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opments. The first is the struggle over the combination of two new institutions: 
the mendicant orders and the universities. Thomas was imposed upon a combat-
ive party of secular masters who were demanding the exclusion of the mendicant 
masters from the university as a corporation during the 1252-1257 anti-
mendicant controversy, which was accompanied by violence in the streets of 
Paris. His first appointment to one of the two chairs of theology reserved for the 
Dominicans was in 1256, when Thomas was only thirty-one – four years younger 
than the minimum age for masters. He held the chair until 1259, and returned to 
Paris to occupy the chair of theology unusually for a second time from 1269 to 
1272 in order to defend the right of the Dominican and Franciscan Orders to hold 
chairs of theology (Weisheipl 1974: 80-103, 263-72; Inglis 2002: 11). His task 
was to consolidate the fusion of the college and the convent which was facing the 
determined opposition of the secular masters at the University of Paris for a sec-
ond time – a remarkable parallel to the fusion of the madrasa and the Sufi con-
vent attempted by Caliph al-Nâsir half a century earlier, and equally unsuccessful 
in the long run. In the subsequent century, however, the Faculty of Arts became 
predominant at the University of Paris. The predominance of the Faculty of Arts 
in 14th century Oxford was even more conspicuous (Rashdall 1936, 1: 439-71; 3: 
60). European universities primarily became centers of secular learning.  
The second development was the reception of Aristotle. In March 1255, the 
year before the inception of Thomas in the Dominican chair for foreigners, the 
Faculty of Arts had passed new statutes that put most of the books of Aristotle on 
the curriculum (van Steenberghen 1955: 164-65, 191-92). Aquinas’ second mis-
sion when sent back to Paris in 1269 was indeed to justify the use of Aristotle in 
rational theology in defense of revelation as advocated by the Dominicans. Here, 
he found himself in complete sympathy with the secular masters of the Faculty of 
Arts and was later considered their accomplice by the conservative clerics.  
Nasir al-Din Tusi had a higher supervisory authority over all the madrasas of 
the Il-Khânid empire as the vizier in charge of the waqf revenues of the empire 
which supported them. He translated his love of philosophy and dislike of the re-
ligious sciences of Traditions (hadith) and jurisprudence into educational policy. 
According to the historian Ibn Kathir, 
 
Khwâja Nasir set the stipend of the students of philosophy at three drachmas a day, that 
of the medical students at two, that of the students of Islamic law at one, and the Tradi-
tionists’ at one half of a drachma. For this reason people crowded the colleges of phi-
losophy and medicine over those of law and Traditions, whereas earlier those sciences 
were taught in secret (cited in Arjomand 1998: 120). 
 
A generation later, however, the great Mongol Vizier, Rashid al-Din Fazl Allah 
(d. 1318), though a late convert from Judaism, put the Islamic law above other 
subjects and did not favor philosophy. Being a physician by training, he also set 
up chairs and assistantships for the study and teaching of medicine in the numer-
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ous colleges he founded with the enormous revenues and resources he appropri-
ated as vizier. From the comparative point of view, there was no mechanism 
available to the madrasas, which were not self-governing corporations, for bring-
ing about either of the above changes in the curriculum or any other themselves, 
as the Faculty of Arts of the University of Paris had done in 1255. Nevertheless, 
despite the handicap of the law of waqf, the reception of Aristotle did result in 
the multiplication of disciplines or branches of learning. The growth of secular 
sciences was not as spectacular as in Europe, where the proportion of theologians 
dropped from some 40 per cent to some 15 per cent between the 13th and early 
15th centuries (Leedham-Green 1996: 19), but it was substantial. It is interesting 
to note that a century later, Ibn Khaldun, who affirmed that “sciences multiply 
with the increase of civilization and the growth of cities” (Muqaddima, 465 [Bk 
6, title of ch. 3; tr. Section 8 [2: 434] modified)5 enumerated a large number of 
secular sciences6 and went so far as to state that, because heretics and innovators 
have been destroyed, “the science of theology is not something that is necessary 
to the contemporary student.”7 (Muqaddima, 499; tr. 3: 54 modified) 
In 1259, Hülegü put him in charge of building an observatory in his capital, 
Marâgheh, and appointed him the head of the waqf bureau of the empire, a posi-
tion he held for fifteen years. Nasir al-Din Tusi used waqf not only for the foun-
dation of the observatory but also as a general instrument of public cultural pol-
icy. He appointed officials in each district responsible for remitting one tenth of 
the revenues of the endowments (the usual administration fee) to the treasury, 
mainly for expenditure on the observatory. The building of the observatory was 
completed under Hülegü’s successor, Âbâqâ (1265-81). Nasir al-Din also 
 
5  This assertion, and the fact that over a third of the Muqaddima is devoted to sci-
ences as the culmination of the superior type of civilization, namely urban civiliza-
tion, confirms Arnason and Stauth’s (2004: 37) doubts “about the universality and 
invariance of cyclical models” attributed to him. 
6  These include practical sciences based on experience (tajriba) as they cover man’s 
life in society (Muqaddima, 501-2). This chapter is for some reason not included in 
Rosenthal’s translation.  
7  Having explained the decline of sciences with the collapse of strong dynasties and 
languishing of city life in the Maghreb (Muqaddima, Bk 6, ch. 2), Ibn Khaldun 
turns to explaining the flourishing of sciences in the last two centuries in Egypt, 
where he had taken up residence, in institutional terms in a way that brings out the 
personal motives of the Mamluk elite in using the law of waqf: 
 The Turkish amirs under the Turkish dynasty were afraid that their ruler might pro-
ceed against their descendants, in as much as they were his slaves and clients, and 
because the chicanery and confiscation were to be feared from royal authority. 
Therefore they built a great many colleges and Sufi convents, and endowed them 
with income-producing waqfs […]. Students and teachers increased in number, be-
cause a large number of stipends became available from the endowments […]. Thus 
the markets for sciences flourished and seas of science swelled to the brim.” 
(Muqaddima, 465-66, tr. 2:435, modified) 
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brought the books captured in Khorasan (from the Ismâ´ili fortresses), Mosul and 
Baghdad, and housed them in the library of the observatory which is said to have 
contained four hundred thousand volumes. Tusi personally directed the research 
at the Marâgheh observatory. “And there were gathered together about him in 
Marâgheh […] a numerous company of wise men from various countries” (Bar 
Hebraeus as cited in Lane 2003: 214). Tusi spent the last dozen years of his life 
on astronomy in the Marâgheh observatory, developing the planetary and lunar 
models as well as “the Tusi couple” that were all later drawn upon by Coperni-
cus, making the latter “the most notable follower of the Marâgheh School” 
(Swerdlow & Neugebauer as cited in Huff 1993: 57). Khwâja Nasir al-Din trav-
eled to Iraq to collect more books in 1264, and “since the councils of all the 
mosques and the houses of instruction (i.e., colleges) of Baghdad and Assyria 
were under his direction, he used to allot stipends to teachers and to the pupils 
who were with him” (Bar Hebraeus as cited in Lane 2003: 214).  
Tusi died in Baghdad while inspecting the accounts of its waqf department in 
June 1274. His son, Sadr al-Din ´Ali, succeeded him as the director of the obser-
vatory and administrator of its endowment. Except for a brief interruption in the 
late 1280s, the administration of the endowment for the observatory remained in 
the hands of Nasir al-Din’s sons well into the 14th century. Öljeitü (1305-1317) 
visited the observatory and appointed Tusi’s second son, Asil al-Din, to the posi-
tion of court astronomer (Arjomand 1998: 120). By that time, the Mongol rulers 
of Iran had converted to Islam and created extensive endowments of their own, 
while their grand viziers resumed the traditional role of being the benefactors of 
civic institutions through equally extensive waqfs. 
 
 
Different ia l  recept ion of  Ar istot le  and 
pol i t ica l  modernity 
 
In this final section, I want to argue that the greatest disadvantage of the Islami-
cate world for a medieval breakthrough was due to a gap in the reception of Aris-
totle. Thomas Aquinas and his teacher, Albert the Great, were the key figures in 
the reception of Aristotle in Western Christendom. Aquinas was completely fa-
miliar with the translations of the Philosopher from the Arabic that came from 
Toledo and from Sicily distributed among the Italian universities by Emperor 
Frederick II in the 1230s, and studied Ethics with Albert in Cologne, compiling 
the surviving notes for his course (van Steenbeghen 1955: 90-91, 167). Aris-
totle’s Politics was not yet available, as it had to be translated from the Greek. 
But once its translation by William of Moerbeke was published, both Albert (ca. 
1265) and Thomas (1269-72) wrote commentaries on it that undoubtedly con-
tributed to the revolutionary impact of that work in Western political thought and 
constitutional law (Canning 1988: 260). Not only did Aquinas transmit the key 
Aristotelian political ideas in his introduction of politics as an independent sci-
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ence and the most important of practical sciences (Aquinas 1965: 198-99), but he 
put forward a remarkably Aristotelian definition of law as “nothing else than a 
rational ordering of things which concerns the common good, promulgated by 
whoever is charged with care of the communit” (Aquinas 1965: 112-113). This 
paved the way for making the integration of Aristotle’s natural law into divine 
law as “participation in the eternal law by rational creatures” (Aquinas: 114-15) 
the cornerstone of Thomism. Human laws proceed from natural law to more par-
ticular dispositions, and are “directed to the common good of the city” (Aquinas: 
130-31). Therefore, 
 
Human law has the quality of law only in so far as it proceeds according to right reason; 
and in this respect it is clear that it derives from the eternal law. In so far as it deviates 
from reason it is an unjust law, and has the quality not of law but of violence (Aquinas: 
120-21).  
 
Furthermore, Aquinas elaborated his “constitutionalism” (Sigmund 1993: 219-
22), using both Aristotle’s ideas of the commonwealth (res publica), in which the 
whole body of citizens rule for the attainment of the common good, and of a 
mixed constitution as the judicious combination of monarchy, aristocracy and 
democracy, defined by the participation in some respect of all the members of a 
city or nation in government (Aquinas: 148-49; Pennington 1988: 448), together 
with a corporatist differentiation of community following Aristotle’s division of 
the city (Quillet 1988: 526-30). Aristotelian political ideas could be readily com-
bined with other legal notions. In combination with the canonistic corporate the-
ory, they produced the constitutional conception of the structure of the church 
(Pennington 1988: 448). And in combination with Roman corporate theory and 
public law, they gave birth to the modern idea of the state (Canning 1988: 361). 
The reception of Aristotle in the Muslim world had taken place some three 
centuries earlier, and the Mu´tazilites had used him as the First Teacher to defend 
the faith by creating rational theology (kalâm). There was, however, one startling 
Muslim omission in the Arabic Aristotelian corpus. Unlike Aquinas, Nasir al-Din 
Tusi and the Muslim philosophers were unfortunate in that the one and only one 
work of Aristotle which was not translated into Arabic was his Politics. They 
therefore tended to mistake Plato’s Republic as the natural extension of Aris-
totle’s Ethics, as Averroes did explicitly. To make good the lacuna, Nasir al-Din 
Tusi had written Akhlâq-e Nâseri, a much expanded translation of the commen-
tary on Aristotle’s Ethics by Ibn Moshkuya (d. 1037; Miskawayh in Arabized 
form), which was to remain the main work on political ethics and statecraft 
taught in the colleges of the early modern Muslim empires. Partly for this reason, 
with Tusi and after him, Persian norms constituted much of the substance of the 
new political theory, while Greek practical philosophy provided its form. To give 
one crucial example, Tusi’s treatment of justice begins with an interesting gen-
eral philosophical discussion, but when he turns to the topic in the chapter on 
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statecraft and kingship, which is immediately followed by the need for spies in 
statecraft, the Greek spirit is subordinated to the ethos of the Persian social hier-
archy (Arjomand 2003a).  
Tusi’s groping toward the missing concepts of the Philosopher is evident. In 
Akhlâq-e Nâseri, he develops (207-12, 307-8) the Aristotelian notion of “the 
common good” (Tusi: 207-12, as “maslahat-e ´omum,” 307-308 as “khayrât-e 
moshtarak”). In a short tract he wrote much later for the Mongol emperor 
Hülegü, the idea of common good is applied systematically to distinguish be-
tween the king’s personal (khâssah) revenue and expenditure and those pertain-
ing to “public royal goods” (mâl-e masâleh-e pâdshâhi). Gifts, benefices and 
jewelry should be paid for from the private purse, while the public revenue of the 
kings should be spent on the army and the bureaucracy, the poor and orphans, 
couriers and ambassadors, and a postal service throughout the empire (Arjomand 
2003a). Nevertheless, it is clear that Tusi could not go far enough on his own, 
and his synthesis contains only a remote echo of Aristotelian political thought as 
compared to that of Aquinas. The unavailability of Politics meant continued un-
awareness of many key Aristotelian political concepts that became available to 
Aquinas and others in the 13th century and shaped Western political thought, such 
as the commonwealth (res publica) and the rule of law (government by laws and 
not men), with the citizen being the ruler and the ruled at the same time (Aqui-
nas: 138-39). These ideas penetrated the Islamicate world as the implicit concep-
tual substratum of modern constitutionalism in the 19th and 20th centuries. Only 
much later did modern translations of Politics appear, and then as something of 
an antiquarian text in the history of philosophy. 
My final counterfactual question is who would have been the social bearers 
of Aristotle’s Politics for it to have made a difference in the Islamicate develop-
mental path? The simple answer is: the very graduates of the post-Mongol ma-
drasas, just as did the graduates of Western universities, especially those of the 
law faculties. But that would also have required finding an alternative to the civil 
law of waqf as a means for institutionalizing politics.  
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Chapter 10 
Global Ages, Ecumenic Empires and 
Prophetic Religions 
 
ARPAD SZAKOLCZAI 
 
 
Introduct ion:  naming ‘modernity’  
 
Since the moment sociology came into being, one of the favourite – and arguably 
most pointless – predilections of social theorists was to find a name that best cap-
tures the new, epochal reality. Is this new type of society ‘modern’ or ‘indus-
trial’? Should it be called as ‘capitalism,’ or rather as ‘modern capitalism’? Or 
are we living inside a new period within modernity, a ‘late’ or ‘post’-modern 
age; which then, with an ‘inventive’ use of the suffix ‘post,’ can be also charac-
terised as ‘post’-industrial, ‘post’-materialistic, ‘post’-Fordist, and so on?  
At least some of the reasons for the attractiveness of such verbal games are 
quite evident. It is part of an infatuation with concepts and a mistaken identifica-
tion of language with the act of naming; a development that more or less de-
stroyed medieval philosophy and that again gained ascendancy with German ide-
alism, especially with neo-Kantianism. It is a part and parcel of ideological think-
ing, another main characteristic of modern thought, a way to describe ‘us’ (part 
of the theoretical or political sect) from ‘them,’ who use a different, ideologi-
cally/politically ‘incorrect’ terminology. It is part of the hubristic identity of our 
age, the belief of us ‘moderns’ that we are living in a not just different but new 
and better age, in opposition to all those other cultures and civilisations who were 
all ‘traditional’ (Latour 1991). Finally, it is part of a theoretical hubris, the smug 
satisfaction of the thinker who fancies to come up with a new and better defini-
tion of the age that so far everybody attempted in vain; or, even more, to identify 
the signs of the times and recognise, as a herald, a brand new epoch. 
The new label ‘globalisation,’ which pushed literally out the term ‘post-
modern’ from the top of the hit-parade of such expressions, is mostly just another 
fancy of the intellectual fashion. The general quality of the literature hailing the 
new intellectual idol is certainly not above the level of the discussion of post-
modernism. There is some sense, however, in which this new expression, maybe 
against itself, carries new potentials. First of all, the term is effectively value free 
– even though such a claim may seem paradoxical, even untenable, given the cur-
rent, highly politicised debate on globalisation and the activity of various type of 
‘anti-global’ movements. But the term ‘global’ is purely formal term describing 
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extension and not development, not even in the sense of growth. Second, and 
most importantly, it does not define the epoch in terms of an absolute novelty, 
and in this way it allows to bring out parallels between this age of ‘globalisation’ 
and other historical periods that could be characterised with similar kind of in-
creasing interconnectedness. Most importantly, from this perspective it becomes 
possible to revisit the problem of the links between the ‘ancients’ and the ‘mod-
erns;’ especially the striking parallels between the world-conquering empires of 
long bygone times and our own age. 
Taken seriously, this perspective leads to a fundamental reversal of perspec-
tive on the thought of the last two centuries; probably even going back to the 
times of the Renaissance and the Reformation. The dividing lines between the 
main modern theories and ideologies become small, each of them losing much of 
its inflated importance and studied seriousness. The first thinker who reached the 
height of such a perspective was Nietzsche, in his diagnosis of modern nihilism 
and the idea of the ‘eternal recurrence of the same,’ even if – as it often happens– 
his truly pioneering ideas were muddled together with gross errors and huge ex-
aggerations. The central analytical tool which Karl Jaspers developed, in the 
footsteps of Nietzsche and especially Max Weber, was the by now well-known 
thesis about ‘axis time’ or ‘axial age.’ 
 
 
Revisit ing the ‘Ax ia l  Age’  thesis  
 
There are two aspects of the axial age thesis that I’d like to revisit here: the ques-
tion of whether it is possible to give some kind of explanation for the startling co-
incidences; and whether this period of 6-5th century BC was indeed the turning 
point of history. The standard answer, I believe, is no to the first question and yes 
to the second. I suggest that the two questions closely belong together, can be 
thus answered at the same time, but in a manner that is opposed to the classical 
account. 
The sudden outburst of spiritual movements in various parts of the globe can 
be explained through the concept of liminality, as applied to the outbreak of a 
global empire building process that took increasingly shape from the 8th century 
BC onwards. It started with the neo-Assyrian empire, spreading first towards the 
West (Lydian and Phrygian empires), then towards the East (Median and Persian 
empires). The aim of these empires was – arguably – completely new: to conquer 
the entire planet. The results were also unprecedented, in terms of the size of the 
armies suddenly mobilised, the wealth amassed (one only has to think about still 
widely used expressions as the ‘Midas touch’ or ‘rich as Croisus’), and the 
bloodshed and mass suffering created. The first empire to gain an – almost – 
global status was the Persian, after its victory over Croisus in 546 BC and the 
conquest of Asia Minor, the victory over Babylonia in 538 BC, and finally the 
conquest of Egypt in 525 BC. 
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The connection between the axial age and empire building was already noted 
by Jaspers and emphasised by Voegelin, who proposed to replace the concept 
‘axial age’ with that of ‘ecumenic age.’ Through the concept of liminality, how-
ever, it is possible to give both a precise conceptual definition and a respective 
timing of these periods. According to this theoretical framework, the ‘axial age’ 
is a typical liminal phenomenon, emerging at the temporal and spatial limit, or 
‘limes,’ of the emerging global empire.  
Concerning space, the key developments of the axial age took place in Pales-
tine, a coastline on the margins of Assyria, and Ionia (the birth-place of all major 
early Pre-Socratics), another coastline on the margins of the Lydian and Phrygian 
empires; while Northern India, where Jainism and Buddhism arose, was also at 
the limits of Persian expansion. China was not directly touched by imperial con-
quest; however, it had contacts with both Persia and India, and it would be diffi-
cult to argue that it was completely unaware and sheltered from the impact of 
such developments. 
Moving to temporal liminality, I will only call attention to a singular point. It 
has been pointed out by Jaspers, and emphasised ever since, that the most strik-
ing coincidence in the axial age was the almost identical life span of three among 
its most important and characteristic figures: Heraclitus, Confucius and the Bud-
dha, each being born around 550-540 BC and dying around 480 BC. This coinci-
dence, and thus the height of the axial age, can possibly be explained by the fact 
that the crucial period in the rise of the Persian Empire, the decades lasting from 
546 to 525 BC was at the same time the formative period in the life of each of 
these epochal figures. 
I would like to stress that the explanation offered here is of a very specific, 
formal kind, with strict limits. Liminality refers to a certain type of situation, and 
certainly cannot explain in any way the content of the ideas, religious, spiritual or 
philosophical, that emerge in a liminal time or place. Even further, as Victor 
Turner emphasised it, the aim of rituals that staged liminality was by no means to 
stimulate creativity or innovation (though this also can happen in liminal mo-
ments), rather to evoke and render manifest the ‘sacred’ that was at the heart of 
the value system of the community. It is, however, exactly such intensive evoca-
tion of the most important values and traditions of the community that can be no-
ticed among the most important figures of the axial age, especially in its early pe-
riod. The great prophets of the 8th and 7th centuries BC did not create a new relig-
ion, rather re-stated, in the context of threats of Assyrian and then Babylonian 
conquests, and in a particularly concise and effective way, the central tenets of 
the religion of the fathers, including a call for a return to the traditional ways. 
The same traditionalist perspective animated the ideas of Lao-Tzu, the great fig-
ure of Taoism, or Mahavira, the founder of Jainism. Thus, first of all, and espe-
cially in its early period, the ‘axial age’ was not an unprecedented and simultane-
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ous eruption of the transcendent into the world, rather an intensification of the 
various classical traditions as a response to the rising global empire.1 
It is true that with the three great figures mentioned above, and their various 
contemporaries, a new tone is being introduced into the picture. Buddha is differ-
ent from Mahavira, and also more ‘modern,’ moving further away from the clas-
sical ways, and the same contrast can be established between Confucius and Lao-
Tzu, or Deutero Isaiah and Jeremiah. This new note, however, is not simply a 
novel transcendence, and not even an effective, resounding response to the trou-
bles of the age, rather a novelty that can be best characterised as an increasing 
resignation to the inevitable, a tone of hopelessness only coloured by excessive 
and unrealistic expectations. It is this resignation which can be identified as the 
common mentality behind the Nirvana of Buddha, the propagation of the ritual-
ised learning of the Confucian courtly gentleman, or the pre-Socratic sage epito-
mised by Heraclitus, while the ecstatic but unrealistic hope can be captured in the 
vision of the new Messiah, whose first great prophet was Deutero Isaiah. 
If the axial age, especially in its early moments, was the expression of trauma 
(Alexander 2003; Giesen 2004), the threat produced by the liminal moment of 
the rising empires, then the classical thinkers of the axial age rather reflected the 
reality of the emerging age of empires. This would suggest a quite gloomy out-
look: the solution to the ‘time of troubles’ was not provided by the great thinkers 
of spiritual reformers, rather by the grim reality of empire-building.  
There was only one exception to the rule; a temporary exception, it is true, 
but extremely significant, and this was Athens. As it is well-known from history, 
in the Persian Wars the Greek city-states under the leadership of Athens managed 
to defeat the Persians, against all the odds, and thus not only delayed the emer-
gence of the first ‘truly global’ empire by a century and half, but also produced 
an astonishing flourishing of culture, having at its centre the city where both de-
mocracy and philosophy were born. Three aspects of this development will be 
singled out for attention here. First, this period of Athens has been repeatedly 
characterised by the expression ‘grace.’2 Second, after only a few decades, Ath-
ens itself succumbed to the pursuit of an imperial politics. Third, there is the 
question of the paradoxical role played by the sophists in Athenian history, espe-
cially the contrast between the sophists and Socrates; a contrast that seems to 
have been fundamental for Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, and thus to classical 
philosophy; but also a difference that time and again seems to have been lost – 
not the least, in our own age, which tends to treat Socrates as just another sophist. 
 
1  This was argued by Béla Hamvas (cf. Szakolczai 2005). 
2  See Meier (1987) and MacLachlan (1993). Foucault’s concern with parrhesia, 
which could be defined as charismatic or graceful speech, also belongs here (see 
Foucault 1996; and Szakolczai 1998, 2003). 
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After this Athenian ‘interlude,’ however, with the rise of the Macedonian 
Empire and the conquests of Alexander the Great, it was a clear victory for the 
age of global empires. It was this recognition that made Eric Voegelin to suggest 
the idea that instead of an ‘axial age,’ one should rather talk about the ‘ecumenic 
age.’ The ecumenic age, however, if we take it to include the Persian, Macedonia 
and Roman Empires, is an extremely huge time period, covering about a thou-
sand years, and the original idea of Jaspers about an ‘axis time’ in history be-
comes lost. It seems to me much more rewarding to return first to the original 
definition of the axial age by Jaspers as the period between 800-200 BC, but re-
visiting its various sub-periods instead of considering it as a whole. There, after 
the interlude of Athens, the axial age according to Jaspers ends with the various 
Hellenistic religious and philosophical movements. These movements, however, 
are indeed developing under the shadow of the age of empires, magnifying and 
exaggerating exactly those elements of resignation and hopelessness on one 
hand, and of exaggerated, unrealistic hopes on the other, that we have already 
seen with the great figures of the late 6th and early 5th centuries BC. Thus, in the 
field of religion, the Hellenistic age is increasingly characterised by the various 
apocalyptic, dualistic, Gnostic and Messianistic sects, or the ‘religious rejections 
of the world’ (Weber); while at the philosophical level by the proliferation of the 
various sophist, cynic, stoic, epicurean and sceptic schools; and even the utopian-
ism characteristic of Plato and Platonism can be situated here. Of particular im-
portance is the rise of Cynicism, that can be traced directly to the disciples of 
Socrates, and was identified by Foucault as lying both at the limit and heart of 
Ancient philosophy for about 8th centuries,3 and whose central characteristic was 
to turn, in a true trickster fashion, the ‘natural’ functions of human beings (like 
eating, defecating and copulating) into the essence of mankind that must be con-
stantly revealed and performed in public, thus allegedly demonstrating the 
‘deeply secret’ truth that human beings are simply animals. 
This argument will be concluded by two comments. First, even this short 
enumeration alludes to a series of striking parallels with modernity, or the ‘new’ 
or ‘second age’ of globalisation, and especially its current phase in which we are 
living. It would be an interesting and instructive game trying to identify our 
popular and influential philosophical, spiritual or ideological movements by the 
various sects and schools of the Hellenistic period. Second, in this way the thesis 
of Jaspers can clearly be refuted, at least in one important sense. Jaspers at-
tempted to shift the centre of world history, in a polemics again Hegel, from the 
birth of Christ (allegedly of relevance only in one tradition) to a period in which 
fundamental spiritual and religion movements started all around the globe. How-
ever, as we have seen, the axial age did not produce new solutions; and the em-
 
3  In the as yet unpublished 1984 Collège de France lectures, available at the Foucault 
Archives; see Szakolczai (2003: 202-9) for details. 
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phasis is placed separately on both the words new and solutions. The ideas of the 
axial age were not that new; and in so far as they were genuinely new, they did 
not really produce solutions; at any rate, by the end of the period identified by 
Jaspers, they were overtaken by (or degenerated into) the various religious and 
philosophical rejections of the world. 
The axial age did not produce solution. The genuine, lasting and effective so-
lutions were produced by the great prophetic, monotheistic or salvation religions. 
 
 
Revisit ing the ‘prophet ic  re l ig ion’  thesis  
 
Seemingly, this leads us back from the axial age thesis to the old thesis of Max 
Weber, and many others, concerning the unique significance of prophecy in 
world history, especially the prophecies that gave rise to the three great monothe-
istic religions. However, I would like to argue that the axial age discussion was 
by no means a mere digression, as this discussion can shed new light on the un-
derstanding of the specific characteristics of prophetic religions. 
First of all, just to restate the obvious, the main prophetic world religions, Ju-
daism, Christianity and Islam, even Zoroastrism, emerged outside the axial age, 
no matter how broadly we draw its boundaries. This fact led Eisenstadt to coin 
the concept ‘secondary breakthroughs,’ which is somewhat problematic, as – 
given their effective impact – it is difficult to consider Christianity and Islam as 
‘secondary’ compared to the spiritual movements of the axial age. 
Second, the axial age hypothesis was reinterpreted, following Voegelin’s 
ideas, in the context of the rising age of global empires. This also helps to shed a 
somewhat new light on the rise of the three great prophetic religions, as each of 
them emerged in the very specific context of major empires. Judaism emerged – 
and the crucial element here is the tradition, not the impossible question of 
whether Abraham or Moses were ‘historical’ figures of not – in between and in 
the context of the two great empires of the early times, Mesopotamia and Egypt. 
Christianity came into being together with the rise of the Roman Empire; and in 
this context it is of special symbolic value that Jesus was reputedly born exactly 
the moment in which, as a particularly striking act of hubris, the first self-
acknowledged Roman emperor wanted to count the number of his subjects. Is-
lam, finally, as it has been powerfully argued by Henri Pirenne, emerged out of 
the context of the collapse of the Roman Empire, indeed bringing the protracted 
last moments of this empire to an end. 
The third point, however, seems the most important of the three, especially 
because of its deeply paradoxical character. It is simply taken for granted that the 
great monotheistic religions came up with a solution that was not only different 
from the logic of empires, but radically opposed to it as well. Yet, and most 
paradoxically, each of them developed, almost since the beginnings, a peculiar – 
one is tempted to say: almost ‘perverted’ – affinity with such imperial logic. For 
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the founders of ancient Judaism the great cities and empires embodied hell on 
Earth; and yet, the great promise of Yahweh to Abraham was a rule of his heirs 
over the world. For the early Christians the Roman Empire was the embodiment 
of the Antichrist; and yet, a few centuries later, it became first the official relig-
ion of the Empire, and then of the so-called ‘Holy Roman Empire;’ not to men-
tion the various adventures of the papal state, a main model for the modern state. 
Finally, and probably in the least controversial manner, less then a century after 
its emergence Islam created an empire on its own. 
The question is whether it is possible to explain, in a coherent framework, 
both the radical innovations and promises, and the problems, of the prophetic 
world religions in a single and coherent theoretical framework. 
 
 
Elements of  a  theoret ical  f ramework 
 
In a very sketchy and preliminary manner, three elements of such a theoretical 
framework will be presented in the following. The first is related to the distinc-
tion between good and bad in the form of the benevolent and the evil, central for 
the world religions; the second attempts to capture the dynamics of the change 
characteristic of the ecumenic age; while the third revisits a fundamental theme 
of social and political theory, the question of order. 
The setting up of a new and definite measure for values, a distinction be-
tween good and bad, in the specific form of opposing good and evil was perhaps 
the single most important characteristic of prophetic and salvation religions. This 
was also the aspect singled out for target in Nietzsche’s attack against the alleged 
‘revaluation of values’ brought about by such prophetic religions. It seems thus 
an almost inevitable starting point for our analysis. However, instead of starting 
with a critique, this paper suggests an effort of contextualisation, relying on the 
combined tools of comparative anthropology and mythology, offering the con-
trast between charisma (or the charismatic hero) and the Trickster as the context 
in which the opposition between the divine and the diabolical can be situated. 
The concept ‘charisma’ is well-known from the works of Max Weber, so 
only a few comments will be offered. First of all, Weber took the term from the 
Christian theology of grace – a term that will be revisited soon in greater detail. 
Second, in elaborating his term, especially in discussing the military hero or the 
charismatic magician, Weber made ample use of anthropology and mythology. 
Finally, partly preparing the later discussion of grace, I would like to emphasise 
that the theological concept of grace, just as the Weberian concept charisma, has 
a fundamental link to the idea of gift. 
The term ‘trickster’ is much less known in sociology, though quite familiar in 
anthropology. It is one of the most archaic, and most ambivalent, figures in folk-
tales and myths. Its classic exposition can be found in the works of Paul Radin 
(cf. also Baumann 1978), a main protagonists of the founding period of modern 
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anthropology. The Trickster is a prankster and joker, always ready for a laugh, 
and is thus often a very pleasant company, his cunning and funny stories much 
loved by children; but his tricks often involve deceptions, the laughs can easily 
turn sour, and the nice fellow can be suddenly transformed into merciless impos-
tor, even a cruel murderer. The Trickster is always a thief, while a recurrent 
theme of the various trickster stories is his fascination with human bodily func-
tions. It has an insatiable appetite, and the same applies to his sexual organs and 
activities, often being depicted with an enormous phallus. Finally, one of his pre-
ferred theme for jokes concerns defecating, an activity which he also loves to 
perform in public. 
Let me call attention to a few aspects of the trickster that are specifically 
relevant for this paper. First, trickster figures often play a mediating role between 
humans and divinities; they are sometimes even explicitly defined as the messen-
gers of gods. This is true particularly for the Greek Hermes, an archetypal trick-
ster (Kerényi 1958, 1984), but it is just as significant that Satana, out of whose 
figure the devil emerged, already in Hellenistic Judaism, was also originally one 
of the angels, or messengers of Yahweh (Pagels 1995). Second, a key personality 
characteristic of the trickster is a basic human defect: a lack of ability to be grate-
ful, especially to give or to return gifts. This feature is again brought out in sev-
eral important works of art about the figure of the devil,4 but is analysed with 
particular clarity in an amazing work written in the early Renaissance, the Mo-
mus by Leon Battista Alberti.5 Momus was a marginal figure of Greek mythol-
ogy, given some prominence by Lucian: another figure in between gods and men, 
mostly involved in the spinning of intrigues, trying to convince the gods to de-
stroy humans, and trying to convince the humans that the gods don’t exist. 
Finally, a most perplexing feature of the trickster is his role is a second creator 
of the world; in particular, as a creator of culture. In fact, Radin sometimes speaks 
of the trickster as being not even separate from the culture hero. This is especially 
striking given the contrast between the Trickster and the charismatic hero. In spite 
of all the importance of the latter, its potential impact is limited to restoring order, 
while the deeply ambiguous and often repulsive Trickster is outright credited with 
the foundation of culture. This is certainly a puzzle that needs to be solved. 
The second point is related to the problem of social change. My central point 
is that the most widely used theoretical models, like the idea of a gradual, natural, 
organic growth, or the dialectics of opposites and their struggle, are simply ir-
relevant for capturing the particular dynamics characteristic of the ecumenic age. 
The movement instead has the character of turbulence, avalanche, maelstrom, 
whirlwind, hurricane or tornado, starting from small, almost imperceptible 
movements, then gradually gaining momentum and developing into an irresisti-
 
4  See for e.g. the classic epic poems by Milton, Goethe, or Madách. 
5  I owe this point to Agnes Horváth. 
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ble storm. This type of movement is captured by chaos theory, but in the world of 
human beings the animating force of the movement is imitation. This indicates 
that the paradigm of the rationality of human beings must be bracketed in favour 
of a study of the imitative nature of humans, an approach pioneered by Le Bon 
and Tarde, and which had an major impact on such classics as Durkheim, Pareto 
and Freud, while in contemporary social theory it was developed further by Nor-
bert Elias or René Girard. The spiralling movement of imitative behaviour can 
take off with especial force under volatile, malleable ‘liminal’ conditions.6 
One of the fundamental implications of such a model concerns the much-
debated question of resistance. The term has become the key word for any ap-
proach that does not accept and take for granted the contemporary world of mod-
ernity, modern capitalism or globalisation. However, it is clear that a hectic, fre-
netic movement spinning out of control cannot be resisted. One can only wait 
and hope for the storm to pass; anybody trying to resist it will be either simply 
carried away life a leaf or, even worse, contribute to animate the same spiralling 
movement. This is best visible in the fact that all those political and social 
movements who put resistance into the banner simply became just another play-
ers in the same game, often changing sides, individually or collectively in the 
process. Opposites within a spiral have no stable, distinct substance, as it is really 
of not much interest who and from where is spinning further the turbulence. 
Apart from remaining stable, in a Stoic manner, there is only one option: this 
is conversion,7 or the radical transformation of the movement into a completely 
opposite type of dynamics. The completion of such a reversal involves the ques-
tion of grace; and this opposite type of spiral is illustrated in an at once simple 
and striking manner by the figure of the Three Graces. 
The third point concerns another of the central issues of social and political 
theory, the question of social order. My observations will take off from Alessan-
dro Pizzorno’s seminal article (Pizzorno 1991), which revisited the Hobbesian 
problem and questioned the very foundations of an individualistic approach to 
the problem of social order.  
One of the central issues concerning social order is inequality. It seems to me 
that practically all the different contemporary approaches share the premise that 
full equality is a desirable model for the relationships between human beings; 
and that the problem is how to reconcile this unquestionable ideal with the reali-
ties of existing inequalities. This idea, however, is based on certain assumptions 
which are not only mistaken and untenable, but positively harmful and dangerous. 
 
6  Two representative poets of the twentieth century use a stunningly similar spiralling 
metaphor in two key poems; see ‘The Second Coming’ (1919) by William Butler 
Yeats, and ‘I Live in Expanding Rings’ (1905) by Rainer Maria Rilke. 
7  This has been discussed in contemporary thought by Pierre Hadot, Michel Foucault, 
Franz Borkenau or Károly Kerényi, much influenced by another famous line of 
Rilke, the call for ‘change your life.’ 
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First of all, I suggest to situate the discussion of equality or inequality on the 
broader plain of the question of the symmetry or asymmetry of relationships. The 
usefulness of this distinction becomes visible in the second step, concerning the 
possible modalities of establishing a new relationship between human beings. 
The central point here is that such an introduction, initiation or initiative must of 
necessity be asymmetrical. Somebody must start to act and speak; and if by acci-
dent both sides start doing something at the same time, the result will be unintel-
ligible or threatening – which more or less amounts to the same thing, as lack of 
intelligibility is always threatening. 
There seems to be two, and in this case only two, possibilities for the estab-
lishment of a link between two persons. One is the application of force, con-
straint or violence – to impose one’s own will or desire, or simply one’s self, on 
the other. The other is the exact opposite: to withdraw or subordinate one’s self, 
and instead of asking or forcing something; to present a gift, or to give a present.  
Within the limits of this paper only a few preliminary comments will be of-
fered. First of all, it seems quite peculiar that while the problem of force and vio-
lence took up a major place in classical political thought, the question of gifts and 
gift-giving was hardly discussed, its importance being only pointed out in mod-
ern anthropology by Malinowski or Polányi, but especially by Marcel Mauss 
(1990). In political thought, the classical presentation of the first point was given 
in Plato’s Gorgias. As the argument is well-known, I only single out one point: 
that in this highly programmatic piece of Plato the argument that unavoidable 
violence is the foundation of social order is presented by the Sophists; indeed, 
this is one of the main point identifying the sophist position. Second, the problem 
of the necessary asymmetry of an initiating contact between two human beings 
can be solved by the introduction of a third person, who indeed ‘introduces’ the 
side. This resembles to the logic of the legal system – but is not a solution of the 
problem at all, and for at least two different reasons: either because this third per-
son knows both, thus it is not really the establishment of a brand new link; or be-
cause this third person possesses power or authority, thus the asymmetry is 
solved only through another asymmetry.8 
Third, it should be pointed out that such introductions are accompanied by 
words and expressions like ‘thanking,’ ‘greeting,’ ‘gratitude,’ or the like; and that 
each such expression in most languages is etymologically linked to words depict-
ing the giving or receiving of gifts. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, behind 
these two possibilities, force or gift-giving, there is a definite state of mind that 
can be described as benevolence or malevolence. I want to emphasise that this re-
fers to a character trait, not simply a matter of a single intention behind a single 
 
8  The term ‘asymmetry,’ as used in this paper, stands in between the usual meanings 
of inequality and difference: it is less than the huge and abusive contrasts of wealth 
and power implied by the word ‘inequality,’ but more than mere ‘difference.’ 
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act; thus, to an entire mode of being and not only a feature of a concrete and 
well-defined action.9 
From here, one could move to the easy generalisation that there are therefore 
two types of durable social relationships: one based on force, violence, oppres-
sion, repression, exploitation and the like, and the other based on generosity, 
magnanimity and benevolence. This, however, would overlook the problem that 
one cannot start ex nihilio: there is always already a social relationship, or an en-
tire social order; and the question is on what principles it is based. Bypassing, 
among other things, the mystery of the origin of language, I only refer to one 
concept, or rather one fundamental, original experience: the experience of home, 
or of being at home in the world, an experience that is the foundation for every 
single human life, from the earliest days of childhood, yet has been very little 
theorised in social thought.10  
Again, only two short comments will be made. First, the basic mode of being 
associated with the experience of home, and of living in a family, can again be 
best characterised by the word benevolence. A home, and a family, only exists in 
so far as it is based on principles of gift-giving and magnanimity, and not mutual-
ity of interests. Second, relationships at the level of the home or the family, are 
again profoundly asymmetrical, though this by no means can be reduced to force 
or even inequality. This is partly because asymmetries related to age are fleeting 
and reversible – the helpless baby (whose powers are in many respects extraordi-
nary) becomes a child, then an adolescent, then perhaps a head of family, finally 
again helpless and powerless in old age; while the asymmetries related to gender 
– again except very specific times and places – are also labile and reversible; the 
thesis about the universal rule of patriarchy being just as untenable, even nonsen-
sical, as the Marxist claim about the universality of class struggle – of which it 
was directly derived. 
Asymmetrical relations are therefore pervasive in the life on any human 
community – and it is on this basis that we can understand the various manners in 
which symmetrical social relationships develop. The first point to notice is that 
all such relations are profoundly artificial; and even further, that they are origi-
nally looked upon by deep suspicion, even horror, that can be observed in the 
almost universal horror the birth of twins creates in simple human communities. 
Symmetry undermines the distinctions that are the basis of healthy, mutual, be-
nevolent relations in a community; the possibility of a trust that is the basis of 
stable, durable relations: that a gift given will be eventually returned, and abun-
 
9  In line with the etymological meaning of ‘bene-’ or ‘male-’volence, it has to do 
with good or bad will. In this sense, it qualifies Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’ in the 
sense of Weber’s charisma. What matters, pace Nietzsche, is not simply the quan-
tity of will, but its quality or direction. 
10  This line of argument is explicitly opposed to Heidegger, and represents a slight 
change of emphasis compared to the classical sociology of family. 
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dantly. It also helps to identify the fundamental principle underlining the drive 
for symmetry: a growing suspicion and mistrust, that such gifts will not be re-
turned; that the fountain of benevolence feeding a community is being exhausted, 
and that therefore everybody should be concerned not about the magnanimous 
giving of gifts and favours to the others, but rather to assure the reception of a 
fair share of the pie. 
Having defined these three modalities of social relationship: asymmetry 
based on force, asymmetry based on benevolence and assured by gift-giving, and 
symmetry animated by a growing suspicion ‘foul play,’ we can return to the 
analysis of the ecumenic age. 
 
 
The dynamics of  the ecumenic age 
 
At the phenomenological level, the age of growing imperial conquests can be de-
scribed – and has indeed been described by the very first historical and philoso-
phical analysts – as a tempest, a whirlwind, an epidemic, a spiralling movement 
of violence that is increasingly spinning out of control. The origins of this 
movement are lost in the mythical past; though the scenes evoked by Herodotus, 
the series of rapes (of Europa, Io and Helen) do possess a crucial explanatory 
power, linking violence and sex, the two most powerful human emotions, and 
also the most imitative aspects of human behaviour, at the source of the frenetic 
movement.  
Warfare and conquest on an unprecedented scale create similarly unprece-
dented sufferings, but also the accumulation of huge fortunes, thus the growth of 
inequalities, or of asymmetries of the abusive kind. But such ‘simple facts’ of po-
litical ‘realism’ are also accompanied by an intellectual, reflexive interpretation, 
a growing conviction that not only such developments are inexorable, but that 
this is really life; this is the rule of existence; and furthermore, that the only way 
to ‘resist’ such developments is to assert, as an ideal, a world of complete equal-
ity; or a world of fully symmetrical relations. I think it is here that we can trace 
the phenomenon that Nietzsche first identified as the great ‘revaluation of val-
ues,’ the source of nihilism, and which he mistakenly assigned to the Judeo-
Christian morality. Nietzsche’s diagnosis was modified by two great thinkers of 
the past century: by Weber, who called it the ‘religious rejections of the world;’11 
and by Voegelin, who identified this, in various stages of his work, with inner-
worldly eschatology, with Gnosticism, and with the Sophists. 
It is at this point that I will return the third of the major theoretical tools in-
troduced in the previous section, the conceptual pair ‘Grace vs. Trickster.’ The 
 
11  It should be noted that for Weber Ancient Judaism, early Christianity and Islam 
emphatically were not world-rejecting religions. 
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first point is the draw close parallels between the Sophists and the Trickster, and 
also with some key features of modern, secular, Enlightenment humanism. The 
second is to indicate how the theology of grace, as central to each of the three 
main monotheistic religions, suggests a solution exactly to the problem of the 
ecumenic age as exposed above. 
As it is well-known from the law of entropy, symmetry is the death of 
movement; it is the elimination of the tension that enables something to happen. 
The ideal of full symmetry, one could thus say, is deeply nihilistic; and it is by no 
means accidental that in folktales, in art, in architecture, or in the number of 
flowers one is supposed to give to the loved one, human beings were always keen 
to avoid even the appearance of symmetry. 
However, the problem, and the danger of the Sophist Trickster, is even more 
complex. This is because human beings are not simply particles that attract or 
push back each other. They always have their internal moving forces. The conse-
quence of symmetry is therefore not the absence of movement, rather the stimu-
lation, excitement or incitement of an ever increasing, eventually frenetic, spiral-
ling movement, because of the absence of limiting and regulating, ‘educating’ 
asymmetries. The best metaphor from the physical world is therefore not stasis, 
rather short-circuiting.  
The nature of the activity of the Sophist Trickster can be captured through 
Girard’ analysis of the scapegoating mechanism. The trickster is the human being 
with a singular psychiatric defect, close to the sense of Radin: he cannot give 
gifts, lacking any benevolence or magnanimity himself, thus lacking any trust or 
confidence in the others. He is the par excellence anti-social outcast and outsider; 
but who therefore, short of hating himself, must elevate rigid and rigorous, im-
mediate and generalised symmetry and equality to the centre of social life; who, 
therefore, feels much at home in the special type of crisis situation when the in-
ternal order of a society breaks down in a mimetic crisis. 
Let me single out here again the fundamental symmetry between the posi-
tions of the charismatic hero and the trickster. Both of them are figures of the out 
of ordinary, not at ease, or not in place, in normal, ordinary social life. Their time 
comes in crisis and emergency; but in a completely different way. A charismatic 
hero is called upon when the community is threatened from the outside. He man-
ages to defeat the enemy, to unify the community, to generate consensus and 
support against the threats. A charismatic person, however, is helpless in a situa-
tion of an internal collapse of order, when the distinctions and dividing lines 
break down, the community is segmented into hostile and warring factions, and 
by necessity he would immediately be classified as being just a member of one of 
the factions. The problem of an internal collapse of order as a problem of sym-
metry, or equality – and this is when the time of the trickster comes, the homeless 
outcast who is at home exactly in a time of trouble where both the community at 
large and any potential charismatic heroes are at a loss. 
The trickster is not afraid of symmetry and equality, as it is his ideal; the 
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situation in which his deep deficiencies are cancelled. Because he speculated so 
much about equality – had the time to speculate, being impotent and useless for 
the normal business of life, and thus escaping into a fantasy world, sulking on his 
resentment, as Nietzsche analysed it so well -, he understood its greatest secret: 
that the solution of the problem of equality lies through terror, through the sacri-
fice of an innocent victim on whom the violence and hatred spinning out of con-
trol can be focalised. In this way, through the founder murder, out of the outcast 
the Trickster becomes the culture-hero. 
A detailed study of the history of political thought would be required to show 
how the logic of the Sophist Trickster became, from the late Renaissance and the 
Enlightenment, through the English and French Revolutions, and then especially 
the various left and right-wing revolutions of the 20th century, a basic principle of 
modern political life. 
The solution to the problem of the spiralling logic of the ecumenic age, and 
its ideologisation by the Sophists Trickster and its fellow travellers, is a return to 
the logic of gift giving. This is what – among others, but with particular force – 
the three monotheistic religions attempted, in spite of all the other, by no means 
negligible, differences. In this section, I offer a very preliminary analysis of the 
related ideas. 
In the Old Testament, grace is expressed through two different family of 
words. The first, belonging to the root ‘hnn,’ refer to a ‘gifted initiation of rela-
tionship’ (Campbell 1993: 259-61; Weiser 1998: 351-2). In this sense Yahweh is 
the one who gives, who distributes favours, being the source of hope, and the role 
of human beings is to imitate him and behave accordingly to their fellows. The 
second root is ‘hsd,’ which also means favour but in the sense of compassion or 
mercy, and shifts the focus on the side of the human recipients. The mercy of god 
reaches the needy, the poor, those who are desperately in need of saving acts; but 
also those who committed sins, who erred, and who therefore are in need of a 
saving grace, for a turning back of god’s favour towards them.  
Grace is thus fundamental for the relationship established between the deity 
and human beings, between Yahweh and his people; and it is also a fundamental 
asymmetrical relationship. The deity initiates and gives, while humans – who 
desperately need this saving act – receive, or are given. However, since the very 
first moments of contact, a different type of link is also present, inscribed in the 
interaction between the deity and Abraham: a contract, covenant or alliance; a le-
gal, thus strictly symmetrical relationship, where both sides make certain prom-
ises and are therefore bound to behave according to this pre-established and mu-
tual agreement. There are two comments I want to make here concerning this 
quite perplexing insertion of symmetrical legal ties at the heart of a fundamen-
tally asymmetrical relationship. First, it is exactly here that the problem identified 
above can be located: the ‘promised land’ offered to the ‘chosen people,’ and the 
ensuing repetition of the exact imperial ambitions against which the tradition of 
ancient Judaism emerged. Second, the legal perspective, and the related rationali-
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sation of the world-view, occasionally resulted in quite striking formulations, like 
the following statement from Wajikra Rabba: “An agreement was stipulated be-
tween them [i.e. God and Israel] that [God] would not repudiate them and they 
would not repudiate him” (Weiser 1998: 352); a formulation which seems to re-
place a saving act of divine grace with a mutual clause of refraining from harmful 
acts, or a positive deed with a double negation. 
Grace in the New Testament closely follows the Old Testament meaning 
(Campbell 1993: 259-61; Weiser 1998: 352-4). The two Greek words used, cha-
ris (Latin gratia, or grace), present especially in the Pauline corpus, and eleos 
(Latin misericordia, or mercy), closely correspond to the two basic Hebrew 
roots, denoting respectively the pure, undeserved divine gift on the one hand, and 
his compassion on the other. The fundamental difference lies in the way for 
Christians the grace of god has become incarnated in Christ, the very embodi-
ment of divine love and a gift for mankind, who has thus become the mediator of 
human salvation.  
This implied first of all not simply a ‘new covenant,’ but a paradoxical, radi-
cal reassertion of asymmetry in the links between God and Man. Grace is a free, 
gratuitous act of God, done without any act or even invocation of human beings, 
and therefore the divine-human relationship cannot be in any way ascribed in a 
legal terminology. This novel emphasis on inequality, on the other hand, is para-
doxical, as it is a consequence of the human incarnation of God, in the figure of 
Christ. This paradox will occupy a fundamental place in theology, perhaps most 
importantly (and certainly most controversially) as related to the figure of the 
Mother of Jesus, Mary.  
Given this fundamental asymmetry, in so far as human beings are concerned 
the emphasis shifts even more on the part of imitation. Grace is a gratuitous act 
of god, but human beings also have a task in preserving and remembering such 
acts of grace, developing them into an entire mode of life, a habitus. In the lan-
guage of Aquinas, the freely given grace (gratia gratis data) must turn the re-
cipient into a ‘graceful’ person, in the sense of a person filled with grace (gratia 
gratum faciens) (Lonergan 1970). The word habitus was used both by Weber and 
Elias, later becoming a central term in the sociology of Bourdieu, and not without 
a profound reason, as it implies a constant concern with the reflexive improve-
ment of conduct, itself relying on the idea of the care of the self or the soul (Fou-
cault 1984b; Patocka 2002; Szakolczai 1994), that lies at the heart of the Euro-
pean civilising process. 
The acknowledgement of the radical asymmetry between the divine and hu-
man sides rendered any ‘contract’ or ‘covenant’ impossible. Yet, it was exactly at 
the heart of the Christian theology of grace, in the writings of Paul, that in the 
specification of the human response two closely related and highly problematic 
elements came to be introduced: the doctrine of justification and the emphasis on 
individual salvation. The first re-introduced a legal terminology, that will have 
specially fateful effects with the Reformation; while the second contributed to the 
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assimilation of Christianity with the ‘salvation religions’ and the ‘religious rejec-
tions of the world,’ shifting the emphasis from the re-instatement of the logic of 
gift-giving (or the ‘Kingdom of God,’ Mk 1: 15) into the heart of human relations 
to the escapist and egoistic implications of individual salvation. 
Both in terms of form and substance, the concept of grace in Islam is just as 
closely tied to the Christian interpretation as the New Testament was to the Old 
Testament (Weiser 1998: 354-5). First of all, as a form of greeting the word ‘Ra-
him’ (usually translated as ‘merciful,’ close to the meaning of the second Hebrew 
root for grace ‘hsd’) introduced all but one of the Suras of the Koran, just as it was 
used abundantly in the opening sentences of Paul’s letters, and most importantly 
by Gabriel when meeting Mary in the scene of the Annunciation (Cook 1986: 
307). ‘Rahim’ is also the Arabic term for the womb, evoking the idea of a ‘gratis’ 
protection through the womb.12 Together with the crucial importance played by the 
angel Gabriel in the revelations given to Mohammed, this establishes extremely 
close contact between the formal aspects of grace in Christianity and Islam. 
Concerning the theological substance, even in Islam grace is an unmotivated 
act of god, conceding favours and pardons to its undeserving recipients. The di-
vinity who acts in this way is characterised as the Indulgent, the Pitiful, the Be-
nevolent, the Magnanimous and the Dispenser of love. The role of human beings 
is to recognise this grace and to be grateful for it, and then to imitate this mode of 
being in their own lives. Given their own nature, human beings cannot act rightly 
without this divine grace, which is their only hope in overcoming the difficulties 
of their lives. 
The revelations of divine grace were granted to Mohammed through the an-
gel Gabriel. Mohammed, on his turn, became then the mediator of human beings 
for the restitution of their sins and the help for their salvation. This aspect of in-
dividual salvation, and the promise of Paradise, already problematic in Christian-
ity, became particularly strongly accentuated in Islam, turning into the driving 
force of quick and spectacular military conquests. 
In spite of significant differences, there is a definite and unique pattern shared 
by all three great world religions. According to this, grace is the eruption of the 
divine into the world, an unrequited, gratuitous gift of the deity who in this way 
reveals himself. It established, or reveals, a fundamentally asymmetric relation-
ship between God and Man, with the initiative fully on the side of the divine. 
This gift does not have the character of an object, and cannot even be reduced to 
a specific, concrete favour granted to a concrete individual; it is rather the dem-
onstration of a fundamental predisposition of benevolence, of loving care, and 
the consequent message of hope that human beings are not alone in the world.  
Though the asymmetry is total, and the original grace granted can in no way 
 
12  I would like to thank Armando Salvatore for his clarifying comments concerning 
this issue. 
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be merited by the person(s) touched by it, human beings also have their task, and 
this is to preserve the original gift, to imitate it not simply by giving or returning 
gifts, but to turn benevolence and charity into the guiding principle of their life 
conduct, to transform the sudden and surprising eruption of grace into a perma-
nent and effective force. It is this transformation that the word conversion cap-
tures: in limit cases, the sudden and radical change of the entire personality 
touched by the divine. But there is something more in it, and it is exactly here 
that the fundamental connection with the line of argument presented in this paper 
lies. Beyond the change of individual life and salvation, and beyond even singular 
sects or entire religions, arguably the crucial message, shared by all three world re-
ligions and thus uniting them, is the promise, and the heroic attempt to restore, in a 
world threateningly and hopelessly dominated by abusive asymmetric relation-
ships, graceful asymmetry in the heart of human relationships; the only type of so-
cial relationship that has the power to reverse the spiral of violence and desire fuel-
ling abusive asymmetry, and to remain untouched by the sirens luring the careless 
towards the legal-economic dream of symmetry and equality. 
As a last note, let me point out that the monotheistic religions are not alone in 
posing grace into the heart of their world-view. The same has been attempted, 
with remarkable success, in the line of development that connect the ancient Mi-
noan civilisation of Crete, through the Mycenean world, to classical Greece, es-
pecially the ‘miracle’ of Athens (Hall 1998; Meier 1987, 1996).  
One could object that Greek grace was a purely aesthetic concept, with no re-
lationship to the divine grace of monotheists, the similarity being only superfi-
cial. This, however, is not true; and the profound connections go way beyond the 
use of the same word (charis) in both cases. The Greek concern with aesthetics, 
as Foucault argued recently, was inseparable from ethics; while the Czech phi-
losopher Jan Patocka pointed out the close connections between Greek episte-
mology and aesthetics in the emphasis placed on the manifestation of truth (Pa-
tocka 2002). Even further, it was a principle central for Athenian democracy, 
animating the conduct of the democratic citizens, as Christian Meier argued it. It 
is also central for the conflict between Socrates/Plato and the Sophists. 
But gracefulness, together with beauty, and beyond, was also central to Greek 
religion, going back to its roots in Crete. Let me mention only two examples. 
One is the tradition of seals and signet rings in Cretan art, one of the most grace-
ful manifestation of Minoan culture, and the stunning scenes of epiphanies some of 
its best pieces evoke. The other is the figure of the Three Graces, central especially 
to Hellenistic art and religion, and resurrected with particular emphasis in some of 
the most important books and paintings of the Renaissance: a group that manifests, 
in its very composition, the spiral of giving, receiving and returning of gifts.13  
 
13  Such considerations were by no means restricted to Western Christianity; see 
Evdokimov (1990). 
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Conclusion: Hope beyond modernity 
 
Let me formulate my concluding remarks in a provocative way. The current in-
tellectual mood is to assign the cause of troubles in the current world to the 
prejudices of the past, especially the survival or religion; while the hope, suppos-
edly, lies in the enlightened attitudes of secularised intellectuals who overcame 
these errors and who can lead a rational discourse towards the establishment of a 
just an equal world. The historical overview presented in this paper, and the con-
ceptual framework that has been worked out to understand its implications, how-
ever, comes to the exactly opposite conclusion. According to this, it is the 
Enlightenment model that is chimerical, a modern resurrection of ancient Trick-
ster-Sophist-Cynic attitudes and worldviews; while the solution can only come 
through a concern with grace, shared by all the three great world religions, and 
also by classical Greek culture, acknowledging and accepting benevolent, loving 
asymmetry. 
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Chapter 11 
Reflexivity, Praxis, and “Spirituality”: 
Western Islam and Beyond 
 
ARMANDO SALVATORE 
 
 
Introduct ion:  ref lexivity,  praxis ,  and “spir i tual i ty”  
 
Axial Age theory is a research program for locating and explaining, in compara-
tive-historical, sociological terms, the crucial breakthrough that allowed, through 
the shaping of notions of transcendence, for the emergence of institutionalized 
forms of human reflexivity through a transition conventionally identified as the 
passage from mythos to logos, or – sociologically speaking – from a compactness 
of visions of order to a differentiation of the religious and political spheres, and 
in particular towards critical reflexivity (Jaspers 1953 [1949]; Eisenstadt 1986; 
Stauth 1998). However, as suggested by Johann Arnason, this theory possesses a 
wider heuristic and methodological significance, since “the interpretation of the 
Axial breakthrough serves to concretize a critique of functionalism – and espe-
cially of functionalist conceptions of culture – that had been in the making at 
least since the early 1960s” (Arnason 2005: 37). Indeed, Axial age theory has 
been used as a compass in the long march of reckoning with modernization the-
ory and represents a novel port of entry into the sociology of modernity. 
If it is true that the Axial rupture implied the emergence of agential forms of 
reflexivity, transcendence itself should not primarily to be interpreted in theo-
logical terms, but as the capacity to imagine an order that transcends the particu-
larism of rituals more immediately tied to the reproduction of life and genera-
tional cycles within a given community order based on cultic forms of represen-
tations of godly power and bestowal of prosperity. Thus the main novelty of axi-
ality seems to reside in “the capacity of human beings to reflect upon and to give 
expression to an image of the world as having the potential of being different 
from what it was perceived to be here and now” (Wittrock 2005: 62). On the 
other hand, this key axial dimension cannot be rigidly equated with the demise of 
a certain type of cosmology (a cosmology of the mythos) and its replacement 
with an outright new cosmology (a cosmology of the logos). Transcendence 
gains a new profile within Axial breakthroughs or “syndromes” if we disjoin it 
from a cosmological typology and consider it the engine of a specific type of ex-
perience-rooted discourse proclaiming the problematic if not unsustainable char-
acter of any mundane order left on itself and the necessity to transcend it: by 
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making the power holders accountable to a transcendent power or divinity. God 
(or equivalents thereof) takes over the traits of unitary and supreme majesty over 
the cosmos, over human society, and over the individual soul. Reflexivity is 
therefore a function within the tension determined by transcendence. 
A crucial node related to the issues of reflexivity is therefore the question of 
prophecy. Eric Voegelin, a virtual early participant in this theoretical field par-
ticularly concerned with the dimension of transformation (cf. Arnason/Eisen-
stadt/Wittrock 2005: 9), has evidenced a chain of momentous shifts of the dis-
course of the Hebrew prophets that targeted the shortcomings of the socio-
political order. This is a good example of a path of reflexivity tied to transcen-
dent within an unfolding Axial order. He called this discourse “metastatic,” be-
cause characterized by subsequent waves of instructing-exhortative speech that 
reassemble and metamorphose symbols of mundane and transcendent orders. The 
metastatic effect is to continually push forward the boundary between those or-
ders, up to trespassing the critical threshold when the Hebrew prophecy was no 
longer concerned with the restoration of the Covenant that Moses did with Yahvé 
in the name of the “chosen people.” In this way, successive prophetic voices al-
tered the meaning of Exodus, the Covenant, and the attainment of the “promised 
land,” by reflecting on their insufficiencies in containing the tension between 
mundane and transcendent orders. The metastasis results in nothing less than a 
full-fledged notion of “salvation,” which thus becomes one possible outcome of 
Axial reflexivity (Voegelin 1956: 428-513). Transcendence is rehabilitated as a 
propeller of reflexivity and so of Axial transformation. Moreover, Voegelin’s 
metastatic model of prophecy has the advantage of bringing to relief a cumulative 
change and not a “breakthrough.” Consequently the metamorphosis activated by 
prophecy, marked by increases and consolidations of reflexivity, was to last till 
Muhammad. 
Yet there are key thresholds in the metastatic change, and the climax of the 
Axial drama among the Jews is reached when the prophets Jeremiah and Isaiah 
acknowledge that there is no one-for-all covenantal solution to the problem of 
order. This problem can only be managed via an ongoing “Exodus of Israel from 
itself”(zitat von wem?) that exemplifies in the most extreme fashion the rupturing 
potential of Axial transformations: that transcendence has less immediately to do 
with specific doctrines of the thereafter and dramas of salvation, than with the ar-
ticulation of a discourse facing “the experience of the gulf between true order and 
the order realized concretely by any society.” The consequence is that “the ter-
minus ad quem of the movement is not a concrete society with a recognizable or-
der” (ibid.: 491). Transcendence is synonymous with movement, as the source of 
order but also as the perpetual questioning of any existing order. 
Building on Voegelin, Jan Assmann (2005) has maintained that the Axial im-
petus is basically a revolution in the model of authority, which is solemnly de-
clared independent from political domination, above of it. The notion of “salva-
tion,” accordingly, is not a purely “religious” concept, but is – sociologically 
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speaking – a vector of the crystallization of a radical, metastatic contestation of 
political domination and of the foundation (subject to subsequent alterations and 
contestations) of a new, much more plastic notion of authority. Heil can only be 
understood as the antidote to absolute Herrschaft. 
Due to the metastatic character of Axial transformations, the patterns of de-
pendence of the derivative (mundanely socio-political) from the ultimate (tran-
scendent) level of order cannot be a plain homework for orthodox virtuosi. Their 
emergence, the idea itself of orthodoxy, is the result of the need to tame the me-
tastasis. Prophetic warnings, excoriating, and exhortations are first and by neces-
sity couched in a poetic-imaginative language. The post-prophetic era of theo-
logical systematization intervenes after the proclamation of the end of the metas-
tatic chain of prophecy. This is specific to each religious tradition. With Christi-
anity, it was inaugurated by the coming of the Christ, while with Islam, were 
messianism is put at the margins or outside its orthodoxy and the Christ is con-
sciously rejected, this era started right after the Qur`anic revelation, which was 
given to Muhammad, whom scripture proclaims the seal of all prophets. It is also 
symptomatic that both in Christianity and Islam, during the post-prophetic era the 
role of thematizing and reclaiming the implications of the imperatives of the sal-
vational path for the socio-political order is most typically performed by hetero-
dox movements, many of which not surprisingly reclaim a renewal or restoration 
of prophetic charisma. These movements are sometimes reabsorbed within insti-
tutional orthodoxy as “reform” movements.  
Through such dynamics social conflicts became more complex and irreduci-
ble to contests for power and riches, since inherently clothed in a discourse that 
did not refer to localized and circumscribed issues, but to the wider realm of 
symbolic evocations of moral and transcendent order. At the same time when 
protest and reform movements tried to restore the balance, they also acted as 
forces of destabilization (Szakolczai 2001: 359). Orthodoxies and their virtuosi 
controlled the metastasis but could not neutralize it, in spite of frequent calls to 
the annihilation of heterodox movements, often pushed up to justifying the 
physical suppression of all its adherents (like with the Catholic extermination of 
the Cathars in the 12th century, or with the followers of the radical Christian 
movements led by Thomas Münzer and Jan van der Leyden in the 16th centuries). 
We should acknowledge therefore that reflexivity denotes at the same time 
too much and too little of the specific format of prophetic discourse. As stressed 
by Voegelin (1997: 69-85), the “parabolic” nature of prophetic discourse requires 
to build a symbolically dense nexus between the perception of wrongness in or-
dinary interactions among people and a sense of disintegration of the cosmologi-
cal order. The latter is the consequence of the erosion of the integrative force of 
the “pre-Axial” empires of the Nilotic and Mesopotamian areas. It has been ob-
served that this type of rupture and corresponding reconstruction of order occurs 
in periods and situations of acute “liminality” (Eisenstadt 1985; Szakolczai 
2003). This concept, launched by Victor Turner, was redefined, in the context of 
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Axial age theory but also of the sociology of modernity, as denoting the destruc-
turing of social relationship and the rebuilding of order from its borders or limits. 
The prototypical example of this liminal situation can so be identified with the 
metastatic climax of prophetic voices proclaiming the collapse of the order and 
reclaiming a new order through salvation (ibid.). 
At this point, however, in order not to remain trapped in the plot of the Axial 
prophetic narrative, the focus should be shifted from metastatic dramas of salva-
tion to the concrete social patterns that facilitated prophetic intervention into eve-
ryday situations, which legitimized the deep metamorphosis of concepts of order: 
on the shaping of a praxic, interactional compassion for the other as the “poor.” 
The specific focus of this chapter is in a distinctive Islamic trajectory, with spe-
cific developments centered in the Western part of the Islamic world, indeed in 
Europe, which particularly exalts the praxic dimension of Axial reflexivity. This 
development also constitutes an immunization of Islamic traditions from the 
post-eschatological separation of the spirit from praxis that influenced the totalis-
tic and immanentistic syndrome of what Voegelin called modern European “po-
litical religions” (Voegelin 1993 [1938]). Nested within certain intellectual and 
juridical cultures within specific schools of Sunni Islam, this praxic orientation 
emerged in spite of their sharing some “reformist” and “gnostic” motives with 
the European Latin Christianity that provided the background to modern political 
religion. The issue of reflexivity as it emerges from the analysis of these devel-
opments might assist us in the work of reassessing and reformulating basic Axial 
categories in their relations to the theory of modernity/modernities. In particular 
reflexivity is related to practical rationality and communication, which are key 
concepts in modern theories of the “public sphere.” The implication of this move 
is that some dimensions and trajectories within Islamic traditions not only prove 
their Axial affiliation and post-Axial development, but contribute key elements to 
distinctive patterns of modernity within the history of Western Europe or the 
“West” at large. Moreover, these emerging patterns, which have been quite influ-
ential in the elaboration of Muslim reformers worldwide from the 18th century to 
the present, are particularly interesting for their distance from the modern syn-
dromes and tragedies that political religions, which, as truly Axial heterodoxies 
which both affirmed and denied key Axial tenets, have inflicted on the shaping of 
Western European modernity: from the liquidation of the Jewish and Muslim 
presence in the Iberian peninsula and the massacres of those who resisted the 
English Puritan Revolution, to the destruction of the two world wars and the 
genocidal crimes of 20th century totalitarianism. 
But let us start over again from those ends of prophetic chains that Axial Age 
theory for a while improperly identified as “secondary” and even “tertiary” 
breakthroughs (Arnason/Eisenstadt/Wittrock 2005: 4), more than as large scale 
processes of governance of the metastasis and of its symbolic apparatus. The fi-
nal prophetic voices, who happened to be founders of new religious traditions – 
like Jesus, Mani, and Muhammad – made use of a discursive approach that 
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linked the parabolic form of prophesy to more continuous and effective mecha-
nisms of inculcation and dissemination of their messages. These transformations 
made preaching particularly important as a discursive genre. This perfecting of 
the effectiveness of the exhortative instruments of the Axial traditions went along 
with momentous reformulation of the attending forms of reasoning, based on the 
act of making the logos itself available to the faithful: through the Christ in 
Christianity, and through the Qur`an in Islam. Axial traditions became intrinsi-
cally discursive tradition (cf. for this definition Asad 1986). 
In particular, the work of the emerging Axial virtuosi of the word was con-
centrated on justifying the supreme good with regard to a more mundane notion 
of the “common good,” which ended up occupying a strategic position within the 
hierarchy of goods of excellence. The culmination of this work on the common 
good was reached in the 13th and 14th centuries, at the end of an era which, both 
in Latin Christian Europe and within the area dominated by Sunni Islam, can be 
defined as the “Axial renaissance”: an epoch of intensive elaboration on the tradi-
tional fundaments of Axial thought and practice in order to make them match a 
social reality in upheaval and fit with the emergence of new social actors within 
the thriving town economies (cf. Salvatore 2006). As evident in the work of 
Aquinas, who engaged directly with Ibn Rushd (Averroes) at a time when the 
new Dominican monks started to build the intellectual leadership and cadres to 
the Spanish reconquista, Catholicism and Islam are not only competitors, but in-
teractant in the process. At stake were not only purely theoretical concepts (phi-
losophical and theological), but the modalities to implement them not only within 
social worlds that were growing increasingly complex, but also through a more 
assertive universal projection of the message. 
 
 
A model  of  praxic  Axia l i ty? 
 
By the 7th century AD, Christianity found a valid Axial emulator and a powerful 
challenger in Islam. The centrality of preaching is a strong element of commonal-
ity between Christianity and Islam in spite of all their institutional and dogmatic 
differences, which also reside in the different status of “scripture” as logos and 
speech, within the textual and discursive economy of the tradition. There are sev-
eral reasons why focusing on Islam can substantially enrich and complexify the 
view of the post-Axial potential of elaboration on praxis, communication and re-
flexivity. Islam is the latest comer in the family of Abrahamic prophetic relig-
ions. Its scriptural bases and the ensuing traditions are quite coherently reflected 
in the awareness by the prophet Muhammad and his successors among the lead-
ers of the Islamic community that they were grounding – via revelation, its re-
cording, canonization, and authoritative interpretation – a religious civilization 
setting upright and remolding key elements of the other main “religions of the 
book,” i.e. Judaism and Christianity. Additionally, the Greek philosophical heri-
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tage had a substantial influence on key tenets of Muslim traditions. Even Roman 
law had an impact on some aspects of Islamic law and jurisprudence, though the 
measurement of this influence remains controversial (cf. Crone 1987; Masud 
1995 [1977]). As a result, it is fair to say that Islam has attempted to bring to per-
fection a crucial feature of Axial civilizations in the reconstruction of the social 
bond, through the final overcoming of archaic ties of authority and domination 
lacking a transcendent source of legitimacy. Its goal was the reconstruction of an 
uncontaminated nexus of “connective justice” inscribed in the triad between ego, 
alter, and God. As aptly formulated by Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, 
 
the emphasis on the construction of a political-religious collectivity was connected in Is-
lam with the development of a principled ideological negation of any primordial ele-
ment or component within this sacred political-religious identity. Indeed, of all the Ax-
ial Age civilizations in general, and the monotheistic ones in particular, Islam was, on 
the ideological level, the most extreme in its denial of the legitimacy of such primordial 
dimensions in the structure of the Islamic community […] In this it stood in opposition 
to Judaism, with which it shared such characteristics as an emphasis on the direct, un-
mediated access of all members of the community to the sacred (Eisenstadt 2002: 148-
149). 
 
The rise of Islam is therefore the last and most consciously managed manifesta-
tion of the Axial transformations in the “West,” in spite of the fact that Islam 
later spread in Central and Eastern Asia as well. The Qur`an gives prominence to 
the earlier chains of Judaic prophets, from Abraham to Jesus, and stresses the op-
position they met in their call to submission to God’s will, which is condensed in 
the meaning of the Arabic word islam. In this sense, Muhammad’s message was 
neither new nor intended to be new, but was conceived as the full restoration of 
the true Abrahamic faith through a completion of its prophetic chain and, though 
it, a final and unequivocal revelation of God’s word and will to humankind.  
However, not only the content of the Qur`an but the communicative and au-
thoritative infrastructure itself of prophetic discourse and its means of inculcation 
were made particularly effective by Muhammad and by the generations of Is-
lamic scholars and “friends of God” (the Sufi spiritual leaders) who came after 
him. God’s message revealed through the earlier prophets had been received and 
incorporated in Judaism and Christianity in imperfect ways – so Muhammad’s 
message – due to sectarianism. Islam, the new-old call to submission to God, was 
to overcome sectarianism and embrace mankind in a truly universal umma, i.e. 
community of all believers.  
However, the model of constructing the ego-alter-God triadic link was a quite 
pristinely Abrahamic one, based on faith, compassion, and obedience. And it was 
the sweeping success, after initial resistance and difficulties, of Muhammad’s ca-
reer in the specific Semitic tradition of the armed prophet that made the turn from 
parabolic exhortation to an activist reconstruction of the social fabric a crucial 
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part of his preaching and leadership during the last part of his own life. Muham-
mad’s practice and judgment in shaping and regulating human relationships ac-
quired paradigmatic value beyond the Qur`an itself, which, centered on the call to 
conversion and on the retelling and reshaping of several Biblical and other 
mythical narratives, only dealt – unlike the encompassing Deuteronomic Torah – 
with a limited number of issues immediately related to the ordinance of social 
life. Law emerges therefore less from a covenantal process than through the 
building of a tradition of modes of interaction and judgement that could be re-
ferred back to the life of Muhammad and his companions. To dare a synthetic 
formula, Islam is built on a re-energized, but also secularized kernel of Western 
prophetic axiality, reflected in a just mundane order regulated by the obedient 
and active commitment of man to God that makes him his trustee and “vicere-
gent” (the meaning of “caliph”) on earth. If each Axial pattern is a set of selective 
radicalizing shifts compared with earlier patterns (Arnason 2005: 41), the rise of 
Islam consciously selects out the Christ and radicalizes the focus on the moral 
glue of the community to be reached through reaching out to the other as a 
brother in faith. The gap between mundane and transcendent orders neither pro-
duces a metastasis of the orders nor its encapsulation into a mystery of incarna-
tion, but a relatively open-ended balance with mild messianic undertones. 
The nexus between salvation and human action in the Qur`an appears from a 
Christian viewpoint, but also from the perspective of the salvational drama of 
metastatic prophesy depicted by Voegelin, as not the primary concern of Islam. 
Islam’s founding document is a teaching chiefly concerned with producing the 
correct approach to human action, understood as ‘ibada or “the service due to 
God,” in order to produce and maintain the open-ended balance between al-
’alamayn, the two worlds. The Qur`an, therefore, emphasizes all those psycho-
logical tensions that, rooted in that unstable balance, generate the correct moral 
frame for action and interaction. A crucial warning in the core Islamic scripture is 
directed against positing human agency as proudly self-sufficient, while on the 
other hand the Qur`an also scorns passivity and hopelessness. A key exhortation 
to man is to be one’s own guard via fear of God (taqwa), while the faithful is also 
reassured about God’s mercy toward his creatures, based on the assumption that 
man has been created good in essence (Rahman 1979 [1966]: 241). 
Even more since distant more than a millennium from the original Axial 
“breakthrough,” the type of Axial transformation reflected by Islam’s irruption 
into world history is a unique case of traditionalization and canonization of pro-
phetic discourse, and of its amalgamation with other sources and forms of post-
Axial and post-prophetic conceptions of legal and political order. It is also a case 
of strong and early social objectivation of the normative import of prophetic dis-
course. The Qur`an itself consecrates the Prophet’s sunna as authoritative, and 
Muhammad adjudicated and pronounced authoritatively on a number of prob-
lems or disputes, so the prophet’s voice, claiming to convey God’s speech, was 
immediately effective in its own time. However, the social objectivation of the 
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normativity of prophetic discourse went one step forward, based on the fact that 
most social transactions in the pristine Muslim community were settled without 
the intervention of the Prophet or his close companions, yet in terms that were 
largely understood as reflecting the new faith and its normativity (ibid.: 51). We 
see here a specific sociological strength of Islam and its immunization from an 
uncontrollable eschatological metastasis, in spite of the fact that many aspects of 
Muhammad’s preaching, especially in its earlier face, did have a strong eschato-
logical connotation, in line with earlier prophetic speech. Now however instead 
of opening up new breaches in the conceptualization of order, prophetic dis-
course (indeed not only Muhammad’s but, retroactively, the interpretation of the 
entire prophetic chain included in the Qur`an) acquires a paradigmatic value 
through its extension and “application” to actual social practice: not however 
based on a listing of rules like in the Torah, but mostly through the delineation of 
key principles of correct behavior to be submitted to human, and so consciously 
imperfect interpretation and application. Islam so closes the normative gaps of 
earlier Abrahamic manifestations of prophetic voices that had metastatically an-
ticipated – yet in reality indefinitely deferred – a just world of reconciliation with 
God. While a messianic projection is not erased by Islam, for which the Day of 
Judgement is as central an article of faith as is belief in God’s oneness and in 
Muhammad’s prophecy, Islam tames symbolism, myth and messianism through a 
normative approach whose solidity yet also flexibility is unprecedented – not 
surprisingly, due to the historical distance from the original breakthrough – com-
pared with other Western Axial traditions. 
A concomitant factor of differentiation of Islamic orthodoxy was that the 
process of canonization of sources and traditionalization of methods and schools 
was not centralized. As we will see, disagreement emerged and crystallized first 
of all on the issue itself of what tradition is and how it has to be constructed. “Or-
thodox,” Sunni Islam was based on a principled acceptance of a regulated dis-
agreement and on the rejection of any charismatic source of authority in adjudi-
cating the “dogma” (in fact, the sunna). The orthodox Islamic community 
emerged as a basically lay ecumene engaged in a competitive search for knowl-
edge (’ilm). AYN Its inherent risk of fragmentation created a counter-impulse to 
establish non-scriptural ordering principles. These were found in the principle of 
ijma’ AYN (consensus) and in the notion of maslaha, covering a semantic terrain 
close to common good, public weal, res publica.  
Essential to both the idea of consensus and the search for implementing the 
common good was the method of ijtihad, intended as an original effort of juris-
prudential reasoning necessary to supplement the insufficiency of the other main 
sources of the law. However, ijtihad was gradually hijacked by a more basic and 
less creative method of analogical reasoning (qiyas) that in particular the Shafi’i 
school of law succeeded in consecrating as a canonical method of jurisprudence 
formally on a par with ijma,’ and factually with a much larger practical influence 
in everyday jurisprudential work. Qiyas was a quite strict method of deduction of 
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rulings by analogy from other rulings anchored in the text (Qur`an or certified 
hadith). Therefore, it imposed strict limits on ijtihad. This latter method was in-
herently bent to a more inductive, less text-oriented, and therefore more creative 
kind of reasoning, which found much less application in routine jurisprudence 
(Rahman 1979 [1966]: 71-77). On the other hand, neither ijtihad nor ijma’ were 
ever fully institutionalized. While the former depended on the commitment of the 
individual scholar to pushing forward the jurisprudential reasoning wherever no 
solutions were readily available on the basis of the study of the main sources, 
ijma’ was more of a pragmatic approximation of the ideal, and never accom-
plished situation where all those who possess knowledge by necessity agree on 
truth.  
The emergence and consolidation of four schools within the Sunni orthodox 
mainstream (the Shafi’i, the Maliki, the Hanafi, and the Hanbali schools, all 
named by their founders) out of several hundreds restricted this potential of or-
dered disagreement, up to the point that the myth of a “closure of the gates of 
ijtihad” emerged by the 10th century AD. The conditions for exercising ijtihad 
were then formulated in such a restrictive way as to make this method unfeasible 
for normally talented practitioners. Ijma,’ now facing a truncated ijtihad, ended 
up being absolutized at an ideological level, though its impact on actual jurispru-
dence was limited. A doctrine of the infallibility of ijma’ emerged, which se-
verely restricted its original scope of consecrating the authority of the living tra-
dition through pragmatic accommodation. This authoritarian dogmatization of 
consensus did not rest on concilia like in Catholicism, presiding over the fixation 
and revision of dogma. Therefore, the infallibility of ijma,’ and its authoritarian 
potential, remained largely fictitious and scarcely effective. It simulated the exis-
tence of an impossible consensus and reduced the stimuli for creativity, while 
factual spaces of autonomy were preserved as essential to the daily work of 
Sunni jurisprudence.  
We can now better appreciate the degree of complexity, ambivalence, but 
also sophistication of tradition-making in Sunni Islam, which makes it a unique 
case for conceptual and theoretical reflection on the post-Axial development of 
patterns of practical rationality, reflexivity and communication. It is also a good 
case for showing how restrictive the obsession with consensus can work when 
authority is structurally fragmented. But this limitation was matched by the ongo-
ing, never suppressed strength of Sunni Islam in streamlining theological nodes 
of Abrahamic Axiality and prophetic discourse and combining them with the as-
piration to a greater and more realistic adherence of doctrine to practice. The 
grand scheme of classification of action within Islamic legal-moral traditions – 
under the five categories of wajib (mandatory), mandub (recommended), mubah 
(permissible or indifferent), makruh (reprehensible), and haram (illicit, forbid-
den) – offers a particularly ingenious grid of categories to all practitioners, in-
cluding the commoners. It also encourages a diffuse effort to categorize types of 
action and determine the degree of creative interpretation permitted vs. undue in-
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novations (or “heterodox” practices). The consequence is an ongoing work of re-
formulating and reconceptualizing the spaces of freedom and the responsibility of 
the agent and of persuading a Muslim audience that any such solution is accept-
able (Asad 1993: 211-212). 
Being based on a grid and not on a strictly binary code of good and bad, the 
actions that are covered by all categories and on particular by the three mediane 
ones have to fit into a general rule of “resoluteness and relaxation.” This ap-
proach exalts the link between the agent’s practical judgment in the application 
of a given rule to a specific situation, and the modulation of his will that is there-
fore no subjective voluntas, but an interaction-oriented channeling of “intention” 
(niyya). The frequent verbalization of the agent’s will through the formula “I in-
tend” clarify the voluntary character of the action, yet through its subsumption 
under a given rule the action is also pragmatically linked to the given interactive 
situation. This operation does not entail a philosophically or theologically cogent 
substantiation of human will as e.g. related to the avoidance of sin. Thus Sunni 
Islam inoculates against an hyperinflation of subjectivity, a risk luring behind the 
Augustinian, and, to a minor extent, the Thomist elaboration of the will underly-
ing action within Latin Christianity. 
This channeling of intention by the agent clarifies reflexivity as first of all a 
reflective understanding of the situation. Therefore, while the Qur`an’s goal is to 
create a just society by shaping righteous men and women submitting to a God 
enjoining good and prohibiting evil, the emphasis is on faith guiding action via a 
praxis-oriented reflection (Rahman 1979 [1966]: 85). While ‘ilm was intended as 
knowledge in the sense of learning, the activity of fiqh denoted the capacity to 
understand a situation on the basis of ‘ilm. Fiqh means therefore praxis-oriented 
interpretative activity, finally coinciding with (juris) prudential work, which is 
the way it is usually translated (ibid.: 101; Crone 1987: 103). However, fiqh still 
retains a shade of the meaning of judgement based on Aristotelian phronesis, 
which is exactly the capacity to act based on a telos and given all factors at stake 
and in particular he legitimate interests of all interactants. This reflective compe-
tence cannot be completely incorporated into a body of knowledge. 
 
 
Knowledge,  spir i tual i ty and praxis  within 
the Sunni  consensus 
 
A non-speculative, quite anti-metaphysical philosophy of law reached its peak in 
14th century al-Andalus (the Islamic name of the Iberian peninsula) and laid the 
basis for the reconstruction of reflective public reasoning in Islam well into the 
modern era. It would be however a gross mistake to think of speculative philoso-
phy or philosophy proper (falsafa) as being erased from any influence on the Is-
lamic consensus and thus on this trajectory of public reasoning. Islamic philoso-
phy contributed key elements to a theory of prophetic discourse that affected, 
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though indirectly, the most penetrating reflection of the Islamic philosophy of 
law. The same Islamic philosophy was also to enter reflections on the common 
good and the res publica within European modernity in particular through the 
work of Spinoza, a thinker of Jewish-Sephardi origin heir to the rich theoretical 
heritage of al-Andalus, from which his family fled due to the Christian persecu-
tions. In particular the leading Islamic philosopher, Ibn Sina (980-1037), known 
in Europe as Avicenna, formulated the path-breaking hypothesis that prophetic 
discourse was wrapped in mythical imagery in order to match the imagination of 
the commoners and induce them to perform good. This does not mean – so his 
argument – that prophetic discourse is untrue (Rahman 1958). The use of imagi-
native symbols is necessary for effectively communicating the truth of religion. 
Ibn Sina was the prime formulator of a theory of religion as an equivalent of phi-
losophy of and for the masses that found eager reinterpreters among leading 
modern European thinkers such as Spinoza, Vico, Leo Strauss and even Gramsci. 
According to this theory the prophets translated the philosophical maxim “if you 
pursue moral good, your mind shall attain the real spiritual freedom which is 
bliss” into the command “if you are virtuous and perform these specific acts, you 
shall enter Paradise and will be saved from the flames of Hell” (Rahman 1979 
[1966]: 119-120). 
Not unlike his European followers, however, Ibn Sina’s theory had an intel-
lectualist bent and elitist overtones. It was mainly for this reason, and not for any 
heretical character towards Sunni dogma – since it acknowledged that specific 
discursive forms of prophetic speech were carriers of truth – that this approach 
and falsafa in general raised the suspicion and often the overt opposition of the 
orthodox legists. In other words, falsafa had a different constituency from fiqh. 
While it was the most ingenious systematization of the relationship between 
revelation-based and speculation-driven strands of Axial thought, between “Jeru-
salem and Athens,” Islamic philosophy was in itself of limited practical use in 
reconstructing the Sunni consensus. In spite of these limitations, falsafa’s later 
influence on the modern European coping with prophetic discourse as “religion” 
shows how this theory was a unique contribution to the long term post-Axial de-
bate on the fundaments and modalities of reflective public reasoning. The rela-
tion of philosophy to Islamic jurisprudential traditions will leave nonetheless sig-
nificant traces, however indirectly. Many among those scholars who were overtly 
using the rational methods of falsafa, like Fakhr al-Din Razi (d. 1209), or writing 
against philosophy, like Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111), or taking a distance 
from philosophical methods, like Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi (d. 1388), contributed to 
introduce philosophical rigor into theology, Sufism, and, finally, into the theory 
or philosophy of law. 
With philosophy on the sidelines of the socio-political confrontation, Sufism 
represented the biggest challenge to the hegemony of the legists. The precarious 
balance that resulted from the challenge favored the crystallization of weakly in-
stitutionalized models of governance of the social bond. The advantage of the 
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Sufi approach, compared to the theologians and the philosophers, was in its ca-
pacity to anchor its spiritual goals within collective practices. This focus helped 
Sufism avoiding the dogmatist impasse of the theologians and the elitist trap of 
the philosophers. The roots of Sufism are as old as the translation of Muham-
mad’s message into practice by his companions and other contemporaries. From 
a first nucleus of Medinese piety and asceticism based on the Qur`anic notion of 
faithful trust in God (tawakkul) and of love for God, the Sufi path took a first 
shape during the first two centuries of Islam. It was however not before the 11th 
and 12th centuries that Sufism was included into the mainstream Islamic consen-
sus and took up a clear organizational form (Hoexter and Levtzion 2002: 12). 
At that stage, the Sufi path appeared as highly innovative in that it formulated 
a solution to the problem of the relationship between rational speculation on the 
one hand, and the prophetic discourse’s impact on the categories of practitioners 
on the other. This inherently tense relationship seemed to have reached a grave 
stalemate in the Sunni Islamic world with the work of the Andalusi philosopher 
Ibn Rushd (d. 1198), known in Europe as Averroes. His rationalist philosophy 
was the object of vehement attacks by the fuqaha,’ in spite of the fact that he was 
also a leading jurist. Sufism exploited this tension to its advantage in order to 
show its commitment to orthodoxy via a focus on the exemplary value of the 
sunna of the Prophet. Sufism demanded to the single Muslim the appropriation of 
the sunna through a disciplined training placed under the guide of a master, and 
finalized to access the essential truth, the haqiqa. This inner truth could only be 
achieved through establishing a close relationship to the human being who is par-
ticularly close to God, the prophet Muhammad, and to the other “friends” of 
God, the new Sufi saints. 
However, Sufism was in many ways the flip side of the legists’ authority in 
Sunni Islam, and took upon itself the task of shaping that form of faithful trust 
among brothers in faith that the fuqaha’ discourse was not able to capture on its 
own. This is why several interpreters (among whom the already mentioned, au-
thoritative 20th century Muslim scholar and reformer Fazlur Rahman) tend to see 
the relationship between Sufism and jurisprudence more as a concerted, though 
tense division of labor than as a conflict between mutually exclusive approaches 
to Islam. Noteworthy is that the emerging orthodox shape of Sunni Islam pre-
vented Sufism from establishing a form of monasticism, which was not unknown 
to the spiritual ferments in Arabia that provided the immediate antecedent to 
Muhammad’s preaching. Similarly, however, to the new monastic movements in 
13th century Latin Christian Europe, the simultaneous consolidation of Sufism 
took from the beginning the form of a socio-religious movement of the com-
moner. The main differences with Latin Europe concerned the institutional envi-
ronment, the organizational forms of Sufism, and its understandings of the basic 
disciplines demanded to its practitioners. 
While liminality was a key element of Axial transformations and in particular 
of prophetic discourse, it acquires in the 13th century a distinctive sociological 
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anchorage. At this historical stage marginal forces occupying a low institutional 
level within hierarchies of Axial authority start to play a central role both in Latin 
Christian Europe and in the Islamic world, and initiate a lengthy and continuous 
– though in no way smooth – march into social institutions. While the connecting 
and in-between role of these forces is not a novelty, what is new in this period is 
that they developed their strengths and penetrative capacities starting from the 
margins or interstices of the socio-political order (Szakolczai 2001: 361-362). 
In the case of the European saeculum these forces – whether they were eccle-
siastical or lay, and Franciscans did at the beginning understand themselves as 
lay – manifested an acutely liminal character by showing an initial resistance to 
follow a clear path of institutionalization. While they spurned social and cultural 
creativity, they also engendered a spiraling confusion on the categorization of the 
ongoing process of the fragmentation of the Latin Christian ecumene. Partly in 
analogy and partly by contrast to them, the most interesting aspect of the wave of 
institutionalization of Sufism in the 12th and 13th centuries was that while the new 
monastic movements in Europe colonized civic life, the Sufi movement entered 
into a symbiotic relationship with urban associations. Sufism provided them a 
permanent infrastructure of ties of trust, underpinned by the authority of the 
shaykhs of the brotherhoods. The associations that overlapped with the brother-
hoods were the craftsmen guilds and other groups, including military or paramili-
tary organizations, like, among the Ottomans who were advancing in the Anato-
lian peninsula, the Turkish Janissaries and groups of frontiers warriors, as well as 
the urban futuwwa, a sort of youth gangs based on a chivalry code and committed 
to the protection of shared values. 
Sufi leaders played a role of conciliation and arbitration in civic disputes, up 
to the point that their houses were considered sanctuaries, also in the sense of ex-
traterritorial sites for peace and arbitration meetings, and therefore safe havens 
from factional violence (Levtzion 2002: 110). Sufi orders reached out to a variety 
of constituencies, like traders, townspeople, peasants, and people of diverse so-
cial classes, regions, and economic condition. Sufi leaders used not only scholas-
tic Arabic but also the vernacular languages of their regions. Ruling authorities 
were often suspicious of the orders because of their autonomy and capacity for 
independent action, linking the local with much wider spheres of influence. For 
the same reasons, rulers often sought links and advice from Sufi shaykhs. 
It is important to keep in mind the praxic orientation of Sufism and its mate-
rial foundations, in order not to misunderstand its “spiritual” orientation as an 
“Eastern” illuminationist doctrine with dubious relationships to the core, ortho-
dox Islamic teachings. This is also what set it apart from the socio-religious 
movements of 13th century Europe, in which Voegelin saw seeds of the imma-
nentist, subjectivist, and spiritualist twist of modern political religions (Voegelin 
1994). Nasab al-khirqa, one of the last writings of the “great master” of Sufism, 
Ibn al-’Arabi (1165-1240) from Murcia, al-Andalus, and in many ways the tes-
tament of his praxic spirituality, delineates the relationship between the inner and 
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the outer dimensions of the truth. It provides an almost prototypical catalogue of 
Axial praxic compassion, calling to observance of pious behavior to Other (El-
more 1999). The khirqa, i.e. the mantel of Sufi initiation, is malabis ahl al-
taqwa, i.e. the vestiture of the God-fearing, which is the core Islamic virtue to 
operate wisely and interactively in a social and practical life of orientation to 
Other. The spiritual realm is not constructed as a separate domain of the Geist, 
but is solidly anchored in praxis. “What stands out in Sufi esoterism is that it re-
lates to the domain of Islam’s faith and works, and it is contrasted with an exoter-
ism that relates to the same domain” (Chittick 1992: 9). Ibn al-’Arabi grew in al-
Andalus, in the far West of the Islamic world, not only influenced by Sufi mas-
ters but also through matching his own mystical experience against the back-
ground of the great philosophical teachers, among which, prominent in his age, 
Ibn Rushd, whom he knew personally. At the age of 35 he started disseminating, 
in a continual development, his teachings into the East, through North Africa, 
towards Mecca and Damascus. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that partly in analogy and partly in contrast 
with the new, mendicant, monastic movements that mushroomed in Latin Chris-
tian Europe in the 13th century, the Sufi orders provided moral leadership, a dis-
course of justice, and a permanent channel of communication that facilitated the 
link between commoners and authorities (Levtzion 2002: 117). The monastic 
movements in Europe were able to take over the issue of local sainthood so as to 
mediate between popular drives and the church’s suspicion towards a bottom-up 
approach that challenged the centralized procedures of saints’ canonization. They 
thus made local saints the symbols of civic allegiances. The Sufi brotherhoods, 
instead, followed a straighter path: they instituted on their own a notion of saint-
liness that was in principle excluded by the Sunni dogma. This was and still is a 
contentious issue. The Sunni incorporation of prophetic charisma into a highly 
fragmented notion of authority does not recognize, in principle, authoritative 
sources external to the Qur`an and the sunna. Therefore, the making of saintli-
ness through movements and groups distinct from the colleges of teachers and 
the corporations of lawyers, yet laying a claim to the preservation and transmis-
sion of Qur`anic piety, constituted a new, parallel form of authority that also 
claimed orthodox status and inclusion in the consensus. 
In organizational terms, the Sufi movements impacted on the socio-political 
configuration of forces in both urban and rural contexts. The making of saintli-
ness became strictly associated with autonomous civic powers, mostly linked to 
professional organizations, not unlike in Europe. In the Islamic case there was a 
weaker religious legitimacy of political power in increasingly fragmented Mus-
lim potentates after the 11th century, and towards which the Sufi organizations 
acted as a bulwark and as a permanent source of popular unrest. Yet the main dif-
ference with Europe was that the organizational unit of Sufism, the tariqa, was 
kept much more malleable than the monastic form prevalent in Europe, which 
ended up imprinting on even those radical monastic movements which were ini-
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tially conceived as alternative to it. The tariqa did not necessarily coincide with a 
brotherhood and not even to a lay confraternity like those promoted in urban con-
texts by the new monastic movements in Europe. A tariqa, which literally means 
a “way,” remained basically a network of variably organized levels of master-
disciple relations, kept together by strong congregational moments epitomized by 
the collective séances of the adepts. It might appear as a puzzle – at least from a 
Weberian perspective – that the lower formalization and institutionalization of 
Sufi authority made it less “liminal” and more institutionally “absorptive,” to use 
Voegelinian categories (cf. Szakolczai 2001).  
We can therefore summarize the picture by identifying in the urban centers a 
variable geography of legal schools (several hundreds in the early centuries, then 
consolidating into a dozen, and with four emerging as “canonical schools”), 
guilds, brotherhoods and ethnic communities. This organizational map found a 
transversal institutional glue in how public services were funded: not by non-
existing municipalities, but by pious endowments, originating from the institution 
of waqf (Mardin 1995: 286-287). More than a prevalence of outright informal 
ties in the relationships among scholars and between scholars, commoners, and 
rulers, we see here an approach to organization of a more “scalable” kind than in 
European counterparts, in terms of degree (and reversibility) of formalization. At 
stake here is the type of reflexivity incorporated into institutions. This is nicely 
illustrated by the institution that best incorporates the inclusion of the commoners 
in the practices and discourses of doing good: the waqf. While shari’a-based ju-
risprudence provided the normative ideal to Muslim society, and Sufi orders pro-
vided it moral leadership, the waqf represented the social and even fiscal infra-
structure that secured the public weal. Though being a clearly formalized type of 
institution, based on a specific law, unlike the legists’ schools and the Sufi or-
ders, the waqf retains and optimizes the scalability of formalization and flexibil-
ity of use of resources for the pursuit of its institutional ends, based on local de-
mands but also structures of power based on networks and clans. For sure, this 
flexibility did not protect it from abuses and diversions of resources from their 
institutionalized objectives. The imperative of “doing good” and the principle of 
“common good” were nonetheless well served by a continuous renegotiation and 
interpretation of all legitimate interests at stake. Therefore it is through the prac-
tice of waqf and not only through jurisprudential reflection that an “ongoing dis-
course” on common good and associated methods of public reasoning emerged. 
This process facilitated the emergence of a rich jurisprudential knowledge, but 
also one that eschewed rigid codification. To the theoretical fundaments of this 
ongoing, practical and juridical, yet also reflective, discourse on the common 
good I will now turn. 
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The phi losophy of  law of praxic  Axia l i ty 
 
The fundaments of jurisprudence, the usul al-fiqh, required a method of reason-
ing different from that of theology and philosophy. They demanded a focus on 
the simultaneously intentional and interactional dimension of human action, in 
order for man to be held not just morally but also legally responsible for his acts. 
It has been stated that the main issue of the philosophy of law was that, “since 
obedience to Divine Commands […] depends on human volition, the Command 
must be shown to be motivated by the consideration of human interest” (Masud 
1995 [1977]: 119). It is therefore unsurprising that especially from the 11th cen-
tury onwards various thinkers started to concentrate their reflections on maslaha 
(common good/public weal) as the universal general principle which permeated 
all commands with legal value (ibid.: 122). Maslaha provided the conceptual 
proof stone for underpinning theoretically informed but practice-oriented views 
of the common good liable to become platforms for concrete articulations of the 
pursuit of the public interest. 
The notion of maslaha is based on the root s-l-h that denotes being and be-
coming good, in a sense that conveys the full scale of positive values from uncor-
rupted to right, honest, virtuous, and further up to just (ibid.: 135). By the 11th 
century, maslaha and the related notion of istislah – stemming from the same 
root, and indicating the actual method of reasoning for seeking maslaha – 
emerged as the principal key-words in the discussion. The emerging method of 
reasoning stood out against other approaches that sought an exclusive basis on 
scriptural sources. But it is also interesting to note that in the method of the 
Maliki school, one of the four canonical Sunni legal schools – the one among 
them that worked to uphold the centrality of maslaha most consistently – the ap-
proach to maslaha was also employed to discard the earlier mentioned limitations 
of the notion of ijma,’ i.e. consensus.  
The orientation to maslaha, which still stands out as the most progressive and 
open method of Islamic legal reasoning, appears, symptomatically, not only a 
less text-bound and more context-friendly approach, compared to other methods. 
It also promotes a processual view of the common good not enslaved to a ficti-
tious, fragile, and largely arbitrary view of consensus existing at any given point 
in time. The related methodology (istislah) was from its inception quite suitable 
to shift the boundaries of any existing consensus, on the basis of modes of public 
reasoning applied to any given actual situation (ibid.: 137). Concomitantly, any 
reduction of istislah to a form of qiyas, i.e. to an analogic reasoning strictly ad-
hering to textual sources, was rigorously opposed. The attempt to dilute the ap-
proach to maslaha in terms of qiyas was upheld especially by Shafi’i jurists and, 
most strongly, by al-Ghazali, who confined istislah, i.e. the seeking of maslaha, 
to the discretionary realm of the mujtahid, and therefore subjected it to the strict 
limitations and exceptional character of ijtihad (ibid.: 140-142). 
Using in particular the method of induction and generalization shaped by the 
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Hanafi school, and merging it with the Maliki notion of the common good as in-
trinsic to shari’a, the Andalusi jurist al-Shatibi asserted that the principle under-
lying all shari’a rulings is and cannot be other than maslaha. It is the intent of the 
Lawgiver, and therefore the objectives of the law (maqasid al-shari’a), that make 
maslaha central to legislation (ibid.: 118). In other words – so his claim – legal 
reasoning could not focus on a single doctrine or case while looking at the legal 
sources, but had to simultaneously relate to the telos of the law. The theological 
premise was as simple as it had been controversial in the earlier philosophy of Is-
lamic law: “the premise is that God instituted the […] laws […] for the […] good 
of the people, both immediate and future” (ibid.: 119). According to this ap-
proach a reliance on qiyas (analogic reasoning) was not acceptable, because it 
limited legal reasoning to deducting rulings from a particular text, thereby inhib-
iting any inductive reasoning based on aggregated textual evidence and not on a 
single text (ibid.: 128). 
Furthermore, istislah as the method of inductive search for maslaha differed 
from the istihsan preferred by the Hanafi school. While the latter promoted the 
discretion of the individual jurist in searching for the most useful solution to a 
given case whenever the reasoning by analogy would yield a solution harmful to 
such utility (and has been therefore compared to the notion of equity in common 
law), istislah relied on a more integrated method for identifying and promoting 
the public interest (ibid.: 129). In this sense, istislah departs form any merely 
utilitarian logic, which is not completely extraneous to Islamic thought. The re-
sult is that, based on maslaha and on istislah, a ruling should not be simply use-
ful in itself, i.e. by reference to a notion of utility seen as inherent in a given em-
pirical situation, but with regard to a wider concept of common good, compara-
ble to the res publica of the Roman law tradition and that provides the root con-
cept to all European notions of the public sphere (Salvatore 2006). The common 
logic is the application of existing rules within the background and with the 
backup of a wider collective interest that corresponds to the basic finality of the 
law itself (Masud 1995 [1977]: 130-131). This is a remarkable achievement in 
the long Axial genealogy of ideas of connective justice rooted in prophetic dis-
course (cf. Assmann 2005). 
Maslaha is different from sheer utility and has a clear Axial prophetic affilia-
tion also because it is not limited to this world but links the good in this world to 
the hereafter. Sociologically, it does not limit the common good to material util-
ity, and especially not to the sum of the utility of various agents (Masud 1995 
[1977]: 132). Moreover maslaha does not show the limitations of the utilitas 
publica of Roman law (Crone 1987: 11), whereby the faculty to reinterpret a law 
in the name of the public weal became in the imperial epoch subordinated to the 
prerogative of edictal legislation that undermined the traditional law and recon-
structed ad hoc rulings based on specific situations, thereby torpedoing the ratio 
of res publica at its fundaments (ibid.: 104-105). In those cases, utilitas publica 
hijacked res publica, while maslaha, as a theoretical construct, approximates an 
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interpretation of res publica uncontaminated by power considerations, also 
thanks to its Axial prophetic origin. In more recent epochs and also in the popular 
perception, however, maslaha also became associated with power abuse for pure 
expediency. 
One can detect a sense of caritas incorporated in maslaha, which crosscuts 
the service function of the waqf institution, as the pivotal establishment for seek-
ing and implementing maslaha. However, this cannot be equated with the incor-
poration of caritas that was the achievement of European Latin Christianity, via 
the elaboration on the notion of respublica christiana developed during the Mid-
dle Ages. The latter was the product of the combination of at least two different 
traditions (the Christian tradition of caritas and the legal tradition of Roman law 
centered on res publica), while maslaha, although it incorporated several lega-
cies ranging from Greek philosophy, to the influence of Judaism and Christianity, 
and to Roman law itself, was developed in a more linear way from within the as-
sets of the ongoing and precarious search for an Islamic consensus.  
At the same time, the notion of maslaha can be easily articulated in a plural 
way, in the form of the masalih (plural of maslaha), i.e. the goods to be sought in 
different situations and legal cases. In this sense, it structurally crosscut the realm 
of private and public law. Nonetheless, maslaha is never a particularistic good 
even when it is identified with a discrete good. Various species of maslaha refer 
to maslaha as a genus. It is interesting that in a fatwa (legal opinion) on a case 
concerning a waqf controversy issued by al-Shatibi, the principle of maslaha was 
applied in order to safeguard the nature of waqf as a type of endowment that cre-
ates a good that is collective yet specific (a particular mosque, or school etc.). Al-
Shatibi’s ruling was intended to fight the practice, which was widespread at his 
time, of using waqf revenues for the undifferentiated funding of a general cate-
gory of collective service (i.e. all mosques in a town) and therefore as a supple-
ment to the sultanic treasure (bayt al-mal) (Masud 1995 [1977]: 93). The protec-
tion of maslaha – al-Shatibi judged – requires to stick to the particular will of the 
endower, provided it is finalized to qurba (coming closer to God) and conform to 
the related notion of actively performing the good that is required by this search 
for closeness to God. 
The solution pursued by al-Shatibi highlights the relation between phronesis 
and telos from a practical and legal angle that helps evidencing some of the nodes 
encountered in the process of upgrading practical reasoning into reflective public 
reasoning. Moreover, it shows a conception that makes transparent how phrone-
sis, in such a developed post-Axial prophetic context, is still linked to command, 
while on the other hand it cannot be defined by authority alone and has to rest on 
reasoning and reflection. God’s command – according to most theologians, in-
cluding al-Ghazali – has to coincide with the maslaha of man, but “in order to 
decide that something is maslaha, even to say that God’s commands are based on 
maslaha, some criterion outside of these commands has inevitably to be ac-
cepted” (ibid.: 145). Istislah represents therefore nothing less than the specific 
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phronetic criterion to ascertain and seek in concrete situations the maslaha on 
which God’s commands are based. Al-Shatibi inherited from some of the theo-
rists spanning the period from the 11th century to the 14th century the view that 
the objectives (maqasid) of God’s will, and therefore of the shari’a, are derived 
from the maslaha of the people. He was particularly straightforward in consider-
ing the finality of the shari’a being one with maslaha. We find therefore a view 
of maslaha that is at the same time strongly objectified and quite concrete, not 
unlike the pristine Roman view of res publica, with the difference that as a theo-
retical notion denoting good or interest, maslaha was also immediately applica-
ble to the modalities of legal reasoning. It is symptomatic that in his work on the 
philosophy of law, al-Shatibi manifested his outright distaste for any purely intel-
lectual or theological discussion of shari’a. 
Wherever unrelated to questions immediately relevant for action and judge-
ment, such an abstract discussion was, in his view, hostile to the scope itself of 
shari’a. It is remarkable that it was precisely on the basis of such a radically anti-
intellectualist platform that al-Shatibi delivered the probably most compelling 
theoretical formulation of Islamic notions of “common good” and “public inter-
est.” The emergence of his concern for maslaha was also stirred up by the serious 
socio-economic changes that Andalusian society was experiencing in the 14th 
century. These transformations made a reliance on analogy and precedent insuf-
ficient to solve legal cases, and raised the necessity to reflexively reconstruct 
broader principles of Islamic law from which to derive rulings (ibid.: 55). 
Al-Shatibi was quite outspoken in asserting that within legal reasoning one 
must give priority to the results of action in order to check whether any given ac-
tion serves the purpose of law (ibid.: 123). He also introduced a welcome ele-
ment of complexification when he insisted on distinguishing between the masalih 
as defined in the discourse (khitab) of the Lawgiver, and as found in the world of 
human life and relations. He thus considered the discursive tradition and the 
world of practice and “common sense” as two distinct, though interrelated layers 
of human action and reflexivity. And he admitted that human relations are com-
plex enough, so that they cannot configure pure masalih, i.e. goods to pursue for 
the human benefit, but are mingled with hardship and discomfort.  
For Al-Shatibi it is habit and practice (’ada) that customarily defines certain 
things as masalih and other as mafasid (nuisances, discomforts). This specifica-
tion indicates that practical common sense is not purely receptive towards needs, 
but has also a definitional and, as it were, discursive and reflexive capacity (ibid.: 
155). It is therefore social practice in the first instance that deploys phronesis in 
seeking maslaha. This faculty is not part of a specialized enterprise led by expert 
knowledge, but is in the hands of the commoner, so it is – we would say – com-
mon sense driven. On the other hand, one cannot deny that the discourse of 
shari’a also defines the masalih in a more direct way. As an extension of the 
function of prophetic discourse, this definitional effort by the experts of the law 
inculcates a telic sense of right and wrong in human agency and practical ration-
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ality, without which action would degenerate into a pure utilitarian hunt for dis-
crete and separate goods. 
It is precisely in this permanent tension between the complexity of the social 
world were goods and ills are not found in a pure form, and the moral command 
of shari’a, that the agential capacity of phronesis grows on the bedrock of the 
faculties of man as a free agent (mukhtar) who is responsible for his acts, not 
only morally, but, through his inclusion in an ordered community, also legally 
(ibid.: 156). In those cases where neither habit or custom, nor the shari’a provide 
a clear definition of what is right or wrong, ijtihad (the effort to find creative so-
lutions through reasoning) has to be exerted. Laying emphasis on ijtihad is for al-
Shatibi essential to explain deliberation and satisfying the underlying need for 
certainty in the legal process. After all hypothetical answers to the question 
whether a certain act is right or wrong (like e.g. whether eating carrion is allowed 
when it is indispensable to survival) have being weighed off, the decision of the 
mujtahid has to be considered binding (ibid.: 157). 
The complexity of the social worlds and the related intricacies of the process 
of defining and adjudicating maslaha are incontestable, yet this recognition can-
not be equated with a relativistic conception. Al-Shatibi firmly distinguishes 
maslaha, which carries – since it is plunged into an intrinsically plural dimension 
of human action – the connotation of “interest” in the general sense of what is 
good to man, from the pursuit of purely particularistic interests, personal prefer-
ences and passionate desires. Al-Shatibi clearly reaffirms that maslaha, in as far 
as it is the motor of the human pursuit of the objectives of the shari’a, is finalized 
to free the human actor from the dictates of passion and make him the servant of 
God and his Law (ibid.: 158). He insists in clarifying that maslaha is the engine 
itself of the law in that it serves human welfare and the removal of hardship in 
general, and is therefore present as a genus in all rules. It is retrieved by the 
phronetic approach of jurisprudence via the application of the method of istislah 
and cognates. In contrast with the hierarchic-dualistic model of the subject preva-
lent in Latin Christian Europe and that liberal modernity will not dissolve but ag-
gravate (see Santoro 2003 [1999]), in the Islamic case epitomized by al-Shatibi’s 
post-Axial, legal and social thought the superior interest is not rooted in a pure 
volition of the virtuous subject, but emerges through interaction and is therefore 
intrinsically intersubjective. 
It is revealing that one synonym of istislah used by al-Shatibi is istidlal, 
which does not mean “finding good” in a given situation but “finding the right 
sign” (Masud 1995 [1977]: 161-162). This is not surprising, because al-Shatibi’s 
theory of law reposes on a theory of language that compares the shari’a issued of 
prophetic discourse to an “ordinary language.” The Islamic scholar maintained 
quite straightforwardly that “the judgement (hukm) is not derived on the basis of 
what meanings are posited (wad’) for the words but on some other basis, that is 
the aspect of following the action (iqtida’ bi-l af’al)” (ibid.: 175). Al-Shatibi ex-
plains the enigmas of the regulating impetus of the “logic of practice” via the 
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ummi (“common” or “ordinary”) character of prophetic discourse, i.e. its being 
addressed to the “common man.” One cannot understand shari’a and its objec-
tives without referring to the common sense of the addressees of the Qur`an, who 
are commoners. Clearly – and this sets the prophet Muhammad apart from his 
predecessors – the ummi disposition of the receptor of the Qur`anic message 
matches the character of the speech of al-nabi al-ummi, as Muhammad is desig-
nated in the Qur`an, i.e. “the common prophet,” or “the prophet of the common-
ers.” Here the Axial sense of connective justice culminates into the Islamic in-
vention of the pious commoner. 
The ordinary character of prophetic speech might seem to clash with the con-
comitant notion of the sacral, miraculous features of Qur`anic discourse. How-
ever, the latter was understood as rooted in the immediacy or unmediated power 
of the word. The words of the Qur`an weren’t even mediated by “scripture,” 
since the prophet Muhammad was considered illiterate, and the written recording 
of the Qur`an is a later process determined by obvious practical and institutional 
reasons, on whose necessity, significantly, Muhammad was completely silent. 
Clearly the Qur`an, which means recitation or precisely speech, intended to abro-
gate the previous scripture – collected in the Bible – exactly because they were 
scripture, and so they had been – according to Qur`an – manipulated by impious 
and unscrupulous men for their own particularistic interests. This time God 
speaks to Muhammad through Jibril (Gabriel), and the prophet in turn transmits 
the revealed word to his followers who retain it by heart. The Qur`an is thus held 
to have been recited and transmitted in “pure Arabic.” 
Al-Shatibi clarifies that the first level of intelligibility of shari’a resides pre-
cisely in the fact that its primary source, the Qur`an, was cast in ordinary Arabic, 
which makes the rules, on a first level, context-bound. The ideal speech situation 
configured by the Qur`an and the circumstances of its initial transmission build, 
nonetheless, a second level of intelligibility that is universal since translatable in 
all existing languages. This level operates via a mechanism of retrieval through 
the type of reasoning promoted by al-Shatibi, consisting in an induction of col-
lective meaning from the text on the basis of the presumption of maslaha inher-
ent in the situation addressed. It is this type of induction that helps instituting 
universal intelligibility. In other words, it is through this method of istislah teli-
cally oriented to the objectives of shari’a that the pure ordinary language of pro-
phetic discourse is translated into a universal language upholding and regulating 
social practice. Its phronetic dimension is brought to a level of sophistication that 
helps transcending the close boundaries of a given primordial community, and 
therefore constitutes a high point in the Axial pursuit of universality on a practi-
cal level. The analogic method of qiyas, in its double constraint of being text-
bounded and based on a binary, scarcely dialectical Aristotelian logic, is insuffi-
cient for responding to this Axial promise of universality (ibid.: 178-179). 
Al-Shatibi goes one step further and clarifies that the attribute ummi as used 
by the Arabs for designating themselves and their language was also intended to 
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differentiate them from the Greeks and all civilizations of antiquity that rested on 
literacy and on the massive use of the written world, while they, the Arabs, pre-
ferred oral transmission and tradition. This orientation was due to change quite 
rapidly in the first two centuries of Islam, mainly as an effect of Islam’s rise and 
rapid spread. This process also encompassed the recording first of the Qur`an and 
then of hadith collections, and encouraged the flourishing of the written sciences 
of the law, theology, philosophy, not to speak of medicine and other sciences in 
which the Arabs attained excellence, not least in the rich social and cultural 
worlds of al-Andalus. In spite of the acquisition and development of these post-
Hellenistic cultural assets that were quite consolidated by the time of al-Shatibi, 
his insistence on the ummi character of the Islamic shari’a as well as of the pro-
phetic discourse from which it originated is a clear rebuttal of the specific trajec-
tories of the civilizations of the written world which culminated in philosophy, 
but were deprived of prophetic voices, like the Greek civilization. 
Al-Shatibi’s theory puts in evidence how in the shaping of what he – and in-
deed many Muslim reformers inspired by him up to our times – saw as the supe-
rior Axial universality of Islam’s notions of connective justice based on a praxic 
reflexivity the civilization of the written world played the role of a sufficient 
condition for the spread and consolidation of the civilization, while prophetic 
discourse in its pure ummi form was the necessary one. This observation can be 
linked to what some scholars have evidenced as a likely concurrent meaning of 
ummi as referred to Muhammad, his language, and the Arabs in general. It is a 
meaning derived from Hebrew and denoting “the people of the world in general,” 
therefore with a meaning close to “gentile.” Muhammad as the “gentile prophet” 
would then highlight an additional dimension of post-Axial maturity of his mes-
sage, i.e. its capacity to transcend its first level of being ummi, i.e. native and 
confined to a given community of ordinary language seeing itself as the chosen 
people. This second meaning of ummi could be linked to the asserted character of 
Muhammad’s prophecy as completing and sealing the whole chain of Semitic 
prophecy, by projecting it towards embracing the people of the world in general, 
i.e., “man” (ibid.: 179). 
Even if the reference to Ibn Sina is not explicit, it is apparent how al-
Shatibi’s argument owes something to the above mentioned theoretical approach 
to prophetic discourse by the leading Islamic philosopher, in spite of al-Shatibi’s 
ostentatious disregard for philosophical, and in particular Aristotelian discourse, 
and his more general conviction of the superiority of the prophetic way. The An-
dalusi scholar, who not unlike Ibn Sina considered not only Muhammad but all 
his prophetic predecessors and their laws (shara’i,’ plural of shari’a) as admon-
ishing and exhorting their people to the right path in ordinary language, has the 
merit, however, of putting on its head the elitist approach of Ibn Sina. Instead of 
assuming a superior truth made understandable and palatable to the commoner 
who cannot command the sophisticated rational discourse of the philosopher, al-
Shatibi takes entirely the perspective of the common social and legal actor and 
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asserts that legal obligation can only be legitimate if a rule can be understood by 
the commoner. For him there is no responsibility of the legal actor without com-
prehension of the law. 
This is also the part of al-Shatibi’s argument where it appears that one cannot 
rely on a self-enclosed view of ordinary language matching a Bordieuian “logic 
of practice.” Any self-sustaining practice needs efficient communication, and it is 
the understanding and active seeking of maslaha that makes communication 
among human actors possible via agreements on shared goods and methods to at-
tain them. Here it also appears that the phronetic, reflective and communicative 
task of the jurist only is only feasible as an extension of the phronetic activity re-
siding in the practice of ordinary people. This basic layer of practice, however, 
already incorporates a knowledge of maslaha through the intelligibility of 
shari’a. In this sense, maslaha has not to be taught and inculcated ex nihilo by a 
class of ‘ulama, neither does it ground obligations for the elite of knowledge 
alone. Obligation in the shari’a is rational and therefore universally comprehen-
sible. The task of the jurists is to keep open and functioning the circles of com-
munication, seeking in maslaha the methodological guidance necessary for help-
ing to solve those problems of the commoners that they cannot solve on their 
own. The condition for performing this job is to cast into a ummi, comprehensi-
ble, ordinary language the solutions sought under the umbrella of the universalis-
tic method of induction provided by istislah (ibid.: 181). 
Faced with the problem of how to deal with what by his time was a quite 
powerful and established spiritual elite, i.e. the Sufis, who had recruited wide 
masses of commoners and had penetrated many civic institutions, al-Shatibi drew 
a distinction between the ordinary people who act on the basis of self-interest 
(and therefore need the guidance of maslaha), and the Sufis, whose approach to 
shari’a obligations he considered extraordinary and therefore transcending the 
rule applicable to common man. He called the Sufis “the people who disregard 
their self-interest,” and therefore saw them as consciously transcending the 
common sense of right and wrong of the ordinary people. Though it is known 
that al-Shatibi did not sympathize with the Sufis, he justified their approach as 
indirectly beneficial to how maslaha orients the legal actors toward the just mid-
dle between the opposite extremes of too much hardship and too much laxity in 
performing obligations, thus echoing a well-known Aristotelian motive concern-
ing the virtues (ibid.: 192-193). He saw that the great stress laid on piety and as-
ceticism by the Sufis was ultimately useful, on a social level, to counter the 
looming risk of a fall into laxity of commoners. Sufism therefore contributed to 
Islamic normativity through their permanent, exemplary correction of the latent 
laxity of the commoner, in spite of a lack of regulative strength, in strictly legal 
terms, of their way, or tariqa.  
It remains that al-Shatibi’s view of the legal actor, of his obligations and of 
the notion of maslaha underlying them was based – in an indeed quite anti-
Aristotelian and in general un-Greek fashion – on a view of the actor not as a 
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“subject” of virtuous or vicious conduct, but as a genuinely relational agent, who 
discharges duties incumbent on him, whose origin and justification are inscribed 
in the triangular relationship between ego, alter, and God, and therefore on the 
proto-Axial view of “connective justice.” God matters here as the initiator of a 
Law that provides goals and guidelines, and activates an engine (maslaha) that 
gives orientation, activates discernment and induces reflexivity into human 
agents. Whereas Sufism reflects the closest approach in Islam to a subjectivity of 
virtue and excellence through an ethic of renunciation – the nearest therefore to 
the monastic path, whose legitimacy was explicitly denied in a famous hadith by 
the prophet Muhammad – al-Shatibi was coherent in considering the Sufi path as 
subsidiary and not central to the Islamic view and practices of the common good. 
 
 
Conclusion.  Which ref lexivity:  
interact ive vs.  subject ivi ty based? 
 
In spite of the evident differences with the synthesis achieved in Latin Christian 
Europe by Aquinas, al-Shatibi’s challenge of Sufi asceticism’s claim that only 
the negation of selfish interest is a basis for true obedience to God echoes Aqui-
nas’ response to the challenge of the new monastic orders. The common answer 
was that self-interest is not denied by the notion of obedience to God, since con-
formity with the will of the lawgiver (based on maslaha) is what constitutes obe-
dience to the law of nature (ibid.: 196). If fitting into maslaha, the pursuit of self-
interest is not only legitimate, but necessary for common welfare. This appar-
ently simple answer pushed al-Shatibi – similarly to Aquinas – towards clarifying 
and complexifying the view of the legal agent and the category of intention in a 
way that, while it added sophistication to his theory, put in evidence its points of 
vulnerability. Practice, custom and the pursuit of legitimate self-interest therein 
are embedded in a sort of natural law whose relationship with shari’a has been 
scarcely problematized in Islamic legal philosophy. Al-Shatibi’s distaste for Ar-
istotelian approaches and more generally for the speculative theology that had 
largely relied on Aristotle – in spite of his partial and unacknowledged indebted-
ness to falsafa – was doubtless a limiting factor in his theorizing. However, the 
terrain on which al-Shatibi’s theory sought to vindicate its coherence is where he 
established a nexus between act and intention, with a strategy quite different 
from the Christian Thomist theory of voluntas, which was still dependent on the 
Augustinian construction of the sinful subject. 
Al-Shatibi maintained that intention (niyya) is necessary for an action to be 
valid. The social actor as a mukhtar, i.e. as an agent of choice endowed with 
freedom of the will, manifests, through acting, his intention to obey to the com-
mands of the Lawgiver via orientation to maslaha, or to disobey. Seeking 
maslaha is therefore a requirement for a correctly directed intention, which is in 
turn indispensable to act (ibid.: 206-207). This definition of intention is called to 
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attenuate the ambiguities of al-Shatibi’s dealing with passions, self-interest, and 
common good. Ultimately the commitment to maslaha and the orientation of 
self-interest to it become a matter of responsibility and reflexivity of the free 
agent. He adds a welcome sophistication to this view by admitting that in his 
seeking to do good, ego may happen to do harm to alter. The agent therefore 
should concur to the definition of maslaha in every specific case through under-
girding his pious intention with a reflection upon the consequences of action. 
This operation requires going beyond the appearance or the simple assumption of 
good and bad, and the development of an analysis of the complex ways in which 
benefit and discomfort are intermingled in social life (ibid.: 209). 
Therefore, the agent’s responsibility does include reflexivity, and reflecting 
about one’s action’s consequences is considered the highest form of phronesis, in 
spite of the fact that it is no antidote against macro-sociologically unintended 
consequences of action. This is a type of practical reflexivity that can be only as-
certained after the fact, based on its effects, and cannot therefore be preemptively 
subsumed within a higher, collective dimension that maslaha is supposed to in-
stitute. This form of reflective phronesis is ultimately applied through ijtihad, as 
expounded above, intended as “a process in which one exhausts one’s efforts to 
one’s full capacity in order to acquire exact or probable knowledge to reach 
judgement in a given case” (ibid.: 230). We know that modern social theory is 
also concerned with the social technologies that are deputed to “anticipate” and 
neutralize such unintended consequences. Modern normative views of the public 
sphere do encompass – and often aspire to tame – such social technologies (cf. 
Eickelman and Salvatore 2004 [2002]). What I have analyzed here is that prior to 
the grounding of these social techniques, the modalities of intersubjective en-
gagement instituted and nurtured by the praxic Axiality of the Western Islam 
from al-Andalus were based on a view of scientific probability that makes any 
dualism between traditional phronesis and modern techné extraneous to the de-
velopment of this particular tradition. 
As Aquinas, al-Shatibi clearly bypassed the type of Axial dichotomic polari-
zation between civitas terrena and civitas Dei as constructed by Augustine in late 
antiquity, i.e. towards the end of what we might still call the primary Axial cycle 
of transformations. It is fair to say that the Dominican monk and the Andalusi ju-
rist represent the culmination of a renaissance that reconstructed Axial formulas 
in an almost proto-sociological fashion, and can be therefore tentatively termed 
“Axial renaissance” (Salvatore 2006). But it is also possible to observe that as a 
representative – though not an uncontested one – of the Islamic philosophy of 
law, and more general as an Islamic theorist of the social and legal agent and, 
concomitantly, of the common good and public interest, al-Shatibi has the merit 
of posing limits to the unsociological oversubjectivation of the agent that has af-
fected the Christian Europe’s genealogy of the hierarchic-dualistic subject and fi-
nally produced the Voegelinian syndrome of the “free spirit.” Al-Shatibi has the 
merit of sticking to a relational view of the agent as ego relationally involved 
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with alter on all nodal issues attending the construction and maintenance of the 
social bond. Therein the agent’s responsibility is upheld without falling into the 
trap of oversubjectifying its volition by insulating reflexivity from its practical 
effects. Probably weaker in purely theoretical and theological terms if compared 
to the masterful architecture of its Thomist counterpart, al-Shatibi’s approach 
holds a stronger potential for a socio-anthropological reconstruction of the social 
agent under modern constraints. 
 
 
References 
 
Arnason, Johan P. (2005) “The Axial Age and its Interpreters: Reopening a De-
bate.” In: Johann P. Arnason/Shmuel N. Eisenstadt/Björn Wittrock (eds.) Ax-
ial Civilizations and World History, Leiden: Brill, pp. 19-49. 
Arnason, Johan P., Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, and Björn Wittrock (2005) “General 
Introduction.” In: Johann P. Arnason/Shmuel N. Eisenstadt/Björn Wittrock 
(eds.) Axial Civilizations and World History, Leiden: Brill, pp. 3-18. 
Asad, Talal (1986) The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam, Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University (Center for Contemporary Arab Studies).  
Asad, Talal (1993) Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in 
Christianity and Islam. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 
Assmann, Jan (2005) “Axial ‘Breakthroughs’ and Semantic ‘Relocations’ in An-
cient Egypt and Israel.” In: Johann P. Arnason/Shmuel N. Eisenstadt/Björn 
Wittrock (eds.) Axial Civilizations and World History, Leiden: Brill, pp. 133-
156. 
Chittick, William C. (1992) Faith and Practice of Islam. Three 13th Century Sufi 
Texts, Albany, NY: SUNY Press. 
Crone, Patricia (1987) Roman, Provincial and Islamic Law. The Origins of the 
Islamic Patronate, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. (1985) “Comparative Liminality: Liminality and Dynam-
ics of Civilization.” Religion 15, pp. 315-338. 
Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. (1986) “Introduction: The Axial Age Breakthroughs: 
Their Characteristics and Origins,” In: Idem (ed.), The Origins and the Di-
versity of Axial Age Civilizations, New York: SUNY Press, pp. 1-25. 
Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. (2002) “Concluding Remarks: Public Sphere, Civil Soci-
ety, and Political Dynamics in Islamic Societies.” In: Miriam Hoex-
ter/Shmuel N. Eisenstadt/Nehemia Levtzion (eds.) The Public Sphere in Mus-
lim Societies, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, pp. 139-161. 
Elmore, Gerald (1999) “Ibn al-’Arabi’s Testament on the Mantel of Initiation (al-
khirqa),” Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabi Society 26, pp. 1-33. 
SALVATORE: REFLEXIVITY, PRAXIS, AND “SPIRITUALITY”  |  305 
Hoexter, Miriam and Nehemia Levtzion (2002) “Introduction.” In: Miriam Hoex-
ter/Shmuel N. Eisenstadt/Nehemia Levtzion (eds.) The Public Sphere in Mus-
lim Societies, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, pp. 9-16. 
Jaspers, Karl (1953 [1949]) The Origin and Goal of History, New Haven, NJ and 
London: Yale University Press. 
Levtzion, Nehemia, 2002, “The Dynamics of Sufi Brotherhoods.” In: Miriam 
Hoexter/Shmuel N. Eisenstadt/Nehemia Levtzion (eds.) The Public Sphere in 
Muslim Societies, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, pp. 109-118.  
Mardin, Sherif (1995) “Civil Society and Islam.” In: John Hall (ed.) Civil Soci-
ety: Theory, History, Comparison, Boston: Polity Press, pp. 278-300. 
Masud, M. Khalid (1995 [1977]) Shatibi’s Philosophy of Islamic Law, Kuala 
Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust. 
Rahman, Fazlur (1958) Prophecy in Islam. Philosophy and Orthodoxy, London: 
George Allen & Unwin. 
Rahman, Fazlur (1979 [1966]) Islam, Chicago and London: University of Chi-
cago Press. 
Salvatore, Armando (2006) The Public Sphere: Genealogies and Traditions, 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Santoro, Emilio (2003 [1999]) Autonomy, Freedom and Rights. A Critique of 
Liberal Subjectivity, Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Stauth, Georg (1998) “Nachwort: Geschichte, Modernität, Fundamentalismus. 
Eisenstadts zivilisationstheoretischer Ansatz zum vergleichenden Studium 
moderner fundamentalisticher Bewegungen.” In: Shmuel N. Eisenstadt Die 
Antinomien der Moderne. Die jakobinischen Grundzüge der Moderne und 
des Fundamentalismus. Heterodoxien, Utopismus und Jakobinismus in der 
Konstitution fundamentalistischer Bewegungen, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 
Szakolczai, Arpad (2001) “Eric Voegelin’s History of Political Ideas.” European 
Journal of Social Theory 4/3: pp. 351-368. 
Szakolczai, Arpad (2003) The Genesis of Modernity, London and New York: 
Routledge. 
Voegelin, Eric (1956) Order and History, Vol. I: Israel and Revelation, Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 
Voegelin, Eric (1993 [1938]) Die politischen Religionen, München: Wilhelm 
Fink. 
Voegelin Eric (1994) Das Volk Gottes, München: Wilhelm Fink. 
Voegelin, Eric (1997) The History of Political Ideas, Vol. 1: Hellenism, Rome, 
and Early Christianity, Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press. 
Wittrock, Björn (2005) “The Meaning of the Axial Age.” In Johann P. Arna-
son/Shmuel N. Eisenstadt/Björn Wittrock (eds.) Axial Civilizations and 
World History, Leiden: Brill, pp. 53-85. 
 
 
Chapter 12 
Public Spheres and Political 
Dynamics in Historical and Modern 
Muslim Societies 
 
SHMUEL N. EISENSTADT 
 
 
Introduct ion 
 
In this paper I would like to analyze briefly from a comparative civilizational 
point of view some of the characteristics of public sphere in Muslim societies as 
they developed in ‘traditional’ Muslim societies and to point out to some impor-
tant tendencies of their transformation in modern ones. 
For a very long time there has been prevalent in scholarly literature as well as 
in – especially Western – public discourse the view that in Muslim societies, in 
contrast especially to the Western societies, there did not develop a strong, 
autonomous public sphere or civil society. This view was closely related to the – 
Orientalist – conception of the political regimes that developed within them as 
epitomes of Oriental despotism – of Muslim (as well as Chinese and even Indian 
kingdoms) societies ruled by Oriental despots, in which all the power was seen as 
concentrated in the hands of the rulers and the various sectors of society were not 
granted any autonomy beyond purely local affairs, with even these affairs being 
often tightly regulated by the Great Despots. One of the best-known illustrations 
of this conception was Karl Wittfogel’s book Oriental Despotism, in which he 
applied this term to the Chinese imperial system (Wittfogel 1957). 
This line of argument was continued in the more recent discussion in which 
the absence or weakness of the public sphere and civil society in various Asian, 
including Muslim societies served often as an “explanation” for the difficulties of 
establishing democratic regimes within them. In this discourse two very strong 
assumptions emerged: first, that the development of a public sphere and civil so-
ciety constitutes a critical condition for the formation and development of consti-
tutional and democratic regimes; second that the concepts of public sphere and 
civil society are often coupled, overlapped, almost conflated, without clear dis-
tinction between them (Cohen 1999; Galston 1999; Mardsen 1999; Barber 1999). 
However a look at the available historical and contemporary evidence shows 
these assumptions to be very problematic. First, the relations between civil soci-
ety, public sphere and the political arena are much more variable than is implied 
in these assumptions. Second, and closely related, the public sphere and civil so-
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ciety should not be conflated. The public sphere must be regarded as a sphere 
situated between the official and the private, which expands and shrinks accord-
ing to the constitution and strength of those sectors of society that do not share in 
the rulership. Civil society entails a public sphere, but not every public sphere en-
tails a civil society – whether of the economic or political variety – as defined in 
the contemporary discourse or as it developed in early modern Europe through 
direct participation of corporate bodies or a more or less restricted body of citi-
zens in the political process in which private interests played a very important 
role (Eisenstadt, Schluchter and Wittrock 2001). Whatever the differences with 
respect to the relations between the public sphere, civil society, and the political 
arena, in all societies these relations have entailed continual contestation about 
power and authority, as well as about their legitimation and accountability. The 
concrete ways in which such negotiations or contestations develop differ greatly 
among diverse civilizations – attesting to the different ways in which power and 
culture are interwoven – and shape their distinct dynamics.  
 
 
The public sphere in  Musl im societ ies:  
the role  of  the ulama  
 
A closer critical look at Muslim societies does indeed indicate that there devel-
oped within them a very vibrant and autonomous public sphere that was of cru-
cial importance in shaping the dynamics of these societies (Hoexter, Levtzion 
and Eisenstadt 2001). As stated by Hoexter and Levtzion: 
 
The picture is that of a vibrant public sphere, accommodating a large variety of autono-
mous groups and characterized by its relatively stable but very dynamic nature. The 
community of believers was the center of gravity around which activity in the public 
sphere revolved. Its participation in the formation of the public sphere was a matter of 
course; its well-being, its customs and consensus were both the motives and the main 
justifications for the introduction of changes in social and religious practices, in the law 
and policies governing the public sphere. The independence of the shari’a and the dis-
tribution of duties towards the community between the ruler and the ‘ulama,’ estab-
lished very clearly in Islamic history, were crucial factors in securing the autonomy of 
the public sphere and in putting limits on the absolute power of the ruler (Hoexter and 
Levtzion 2002). 
 
These public spheres were arenas in which different sectors of the society could 
voice their demands in the name of the basic premises of Islamic vision. Indeed 
the dynamics of these public spheres cannot be understood without taking into 
account the crucial importance in them of the place of the community, rooted 
also in the basic premise of Islam – the equality of all believers and their access 
to the sacred. These conceptions have necessarily given members of the commu-
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nity a right to participate, if not directly in the central political arena, certainly in 
the communal and religious ones, in the promulgation and voicing of norms of 
public order. It was indeed the ulama, however weak their organization, who 
were the guardians of the pristine Islamic vision, upholders of the normative di-
mensions of the umma, and keepers and interpreters of the shari’a. They were 
the religious leaders, the custodians of the divine law, and through it of the 
boundaries of the Islamic community. They performed important juridical func-
tions but mostly acted in concert with other social actors, with the representatives 
of families and members of community or communities as well as, of course, 
with the rulers. As Hodgson has indicated, it was the ulama who, through their 
activities in schools of law, the waqf (charitable endowment), and the Sufi orders, 
constituted the public spheres in Islamic societies and provided arenas of life not 
entirely controlled by the rulers (Hodgson 1974). 
From among the many organizations that developed in Muslim societies, it 
was mainly the schools of law, the waqf, and the different Sufi orders that consti-
tuted the most important components of the public sphere. While the relative im-
portance and scope of these institutions did change in different historical settings 
and periods, some combination of them seems to have existed in all cases. Many 
aspects of the institutional arenas constituting the public sphere varied in differ-
ent societies and periods; though regulated by the ruler, they were yet autono-
mous and could exert far-reaching influence on the ruler: an influence that went 
far beyond simple subservience to official rule or attempts to evade it. 
It was indeed the central place of the ulama – its relatively high symbolic 
standing despite minimal organizational autonomy – that distinguished Muslim 
regimes from other traditional patrimonial regimes in South or Southeast Asia or 
in the early Near East. Truly enough, this highly autonomous religious elite did 
not develop into a broad, independent, and cohesive ecclesiastic organization. 
The religious groups and functionaries were not organized as a distinct, separate 
entity; nor did they constitute a tightly organized body – except, and even then 
only partially, in the Ottoman Empire (Gibb 1968; Inalcik 1973; Gerber 2002), 
where large sectors of the ulama were organized by the state, or in different 
modes in Shi’a Islam (Arjomand 1988). Yet even in the Ottoman Empire the 
ulama were largely autonomous, in that they were constituted according to dis-
tinctive – even if highly informal – criteria of recruitment and were, at least in 
principle, independent of the rulers. It was these religious leaders who created 
major networks that brought together, under one religious – and often also social-
civilizational – umbrella, varied ethnic and geopolitical groups, tribes, settled 
peasants, and urban groups, creating mutual impingement and interaction among 
them that otherwise would probably not have developed. And it was the ulama, 
acting through different, often trans-state networks, who were the crucial element 
forming the distinctive characteristics of public spheres in Islamic societies.  
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The umma and the pol i t ica l  community 
 
Most important among the factors bearing on the constitution of public spheres in 
Islam were the ideal of the umma – the community of all believers – as the major 
arena for the implementation of the moral and transcendental vision of Islam, the 
strong universalistic component in the definition of this Islamic community, the 
closely connected emphasis on the principled political equality of all believers, 
and the continual confrontation of this ideal with the political realities of the ex-
pansion of Islam. 
This pristine vision of the umma, probably implicit only in the very formative 
period of Islam, entailed a complete fusion of political and religious collectiv-
ities, the complete convergence or conflation of the sociopolitical and religious 
communities (Cook 1983; Hodgson 1974; Lapidus 1997; Schluchter 1987: 11-
124; Gibb 1968). Indeed, the very conceptual distinction between these two di-
mensions, rooted as it is in the Western historical experience, is probably not en-
tirely applicable to the concept of the umma. 
In this vision strong tensions developed from the very beginning of Islam’s 
history between the particularistic primordial Arab components, seemingly em-
bodied in the initial carriers of the Islamic vision, and the universalistic orienta-
tion. Such tensions became more important with the continual expansion of Is-
lamic conquest and incorporation into its frameworks of new territorial entities 
and ethnic groups (Lapidus 1997). 
The final crystallization of this universalistic ideology took place with the so-
called Abbasid revolution of the 8th century AD. Paradoxically, also in this period 
– indeed, in close relation to the institutionalization of this universalistic vision – 
there developed, especially within Sunni Islam, a de facto separation between the 
religious community and the rulers. This separation, partially legitimized by the re-
ligious leadership, was continually reinforced, above all by the ongoing military 
and missionary expansion of Islam: expansion far beyond the ability of any single 
regime to sustain it (Shaban 1970; Sharon 1983; Lapidus 1975; Lapidus 1996). 
In the various Muslim regimes that developed under the impact of the contin-
ual expansion of Islam, a separation took place between the khalifa and the actual 
ruler, the sultan, heralding de facto separation between the rulers and the reli-
gious establishment mainly represented by the ulama. This process culminated in 
the 11th century and became further reinforced under the impact of the Mongol 
invasions. The khalifa often became de facto powerless yet continued to serve as 
an ideal figure – the presumed embodiment of the pristine Islamic vision of the 
umma and the major source of legitimation of the sultan – even if de facto he and 
the ulama legitimized any person or group that was able to seize power. Such 
separation between the khalifa and the sultan was reinforced by the crystalliza-
tion (in close relation to the mode of expansion of Islam, especially Sunni Islam) 
of a unique type of ruling group – namely, the military-religious rulers, who 
emerged from tribal and sectarian elements. It also generated the system of mili-
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tary slavery, which created special channels of mobility – such as the ghulam 
system in general and the Mamluk systems and Ottoman devshisme in particular, 
through which the ruling groups could be recruited from alien elements (Ayalon 
1951; Ayalon 1996; Pipes 1981; Crone 1980). Even when some imperial compo-
nents developed – as was the case in Iran, which became a stronghold of Shi’a Is-
lam in which relatively continuous, strong patrimonial regimes developed – a 
complete fusion between the political ruler and the religious elites and establish-
ment did not ensue (Rosenthal 1958; Arjomand 1999). 
 
 
The decoupl ing of  the publ ic  sphere from 
the pol i t ica l  arena 
 
It was in this framework of continual tension between the ideal of the umma and 
the sociopolitical realities that there developed a continuous yet variable vitality of 
the public spheres in Muslim – especially but not only Shi’a – societies character-
ized by the autonomy of the ulama and the hegemony of the shari’a. But the vi-
brancy of these spheres did not however imply a direct autonomous access to the 
political arena, i.e. to the domain of rulership, as they did in European parliaments 
and corporate urban institutions. Needless to say some – often very strong – at-
tempts to exert such influence did develop in many Muslim societies. But in con-
crete matters, especially foreign or military policy, as well as in such internal af-
fairs as taxation and the keeping of public order and supervision of their own offi-
cials, the rulers were quite independent from the various actors in the public sphere.  
Indeed the separation between khalifa and sultan was in a way taken as given 
in the mainstream of Islamic (Sunni) religious thought which tended accordingly 
to legitimize any ruler who ensured the existence of the Muslim community and 
the upholding of the shari’a. At the same time this mode legitimated – indeed as-
sumed – the possible coercive nature of such rulers and their distance from the 
pristine Muslim ideal regarding the moral order of the community. But while rul-
ers, even oppressive ones, were legitimized in the seemingly minimalistic tone 
necessary for the maintenance of public order and of the community, they were 
not seen as the promulgators, guardians, or regulators of the basic norms of the 
Islamic community. Whatever the extent of the acceptance of their legitimation, 
it usually entailed the rulers’ duty to uphold the social order and to implement 
shari’a justice – and hence also the possibility of close scrutiny of their behavior 
by the ulama – even if such scrutiny did not usually have clear institutional ef-
fects. Paradoxically enough, the fact that political problems constituted a central 
focus of Muslim theology was to no small extent rooted in this disjunction be-
tween the ideal of the Islamic ruler as the upholder of the pristine transcendental 
vision of Islam and the reality of his rulership (Rosenthal 1958). 
Thus in Muslim, especially Sunni, societies there developed a very interest-
ing decoupling between the make-up of the public sphere and access to the po-
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litical arena proper and the decision making of the rulers. This decoupling was 
manifested in the combination, on the one hand, of large sectors of the society, 
the major actors in the public sphere having rather limited autonomous access to 
concrete policymaking, and on the other hand, the fact that the upholding of the 
moral order of the community was vested in the ulama and in the members of the 
community, with the rulers playing a secondary role.  
It was this decoupling between the make-up of the public sphere and access 
to the decision making of the rulers that gave rise to the wrong perception of the 
rulers of Muslim societies as Oriental despots. This image is wrong because in 
fact the scope of the decision making of these rulers was relatively limited. Even 
if the rulers could behave in despotic ways in their relations with the officials 
most close to them, or even towards any single subject, in internal affairs beyond 
taxation and the keeping of public order their process was limited, and not only 
because of the limits of technology. Their power was limited also because, unlike 
the European experience, rulership (“politics”) especially in Sunni dominated so-
cieties did not constitute – contrary to the pristine image of the Muslim ruler as 
the embodiment of transcendental vision of Islam – a central ideological compo-
nent in the upholding of the moral order. Moreover the “political” weakness of 
many of the major organizations in the public sphere, as Arjomand has shown, is 
to be attributed not to the despotic tendencies of the ruler but to the absence of 
legal concepts and of corporations (Arjomand 1999). 
This decoupling of an autonomous and vibrant public sphere from the politi-
cal arena – or to be more precise from the realm of rulership – which differed 
greatly from its counterparts in Europe, especially Western and Central Europe, 
constituted one of the distinctive characteristics of Muslim civilization. It was 
distinct, too, from the relations between the public sphere and the arena of politi-
cal rulership that developed in other, non-Muslim Asian civilizations. It differed 
from India, where the political order did not constitute a major arena for the im-
plementation of the predominant transcendental and moral vision, sovereignty 
was highly fragmented, and rulership was to a large extent embedded in the very 
flexible caste order, giving rise to a public sphere with relatively strong access to 
the rulers. And it differed from China, where the political order constituted the 
major arena for the implementation of the transcendental vision but where it was 
the rulers who, together with the Confucian literati, constituted the sole custodi-
anship of this order, leaving very limited scope for an autonomous public sphere 
(Eisenstadt 2002). 
 
 
Character ist ics of  Islamic publ ic  spheres 
 
The constitution of the public spheres in Muslim societies and the mode of inter-
action between different actors within these spheres were very much influenced 
both by some of the basic premises of Islam as well as by the relative distance 
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from direct involvement in political decision making. This mode of interaction 
was characterized by close physical interaction between different actors, by the 
development of some common modes of dress and food and of many strong in-
formal, labile ties, often cutting across more formal institutions, which even 
when porous were yet very forceful. These ties were of crucial importance in the 
continual constitution and activities of public spheres in which many people and 
social sectors could interact. 
Concomitantly, there developed within this public sphere a very strong poten-
tial for what may be seen as crowd-like outbursts. It was often the oscillation be-
tween the continual informal ties and membership, and outbursts that characterized 
many of the public spheres in Muslim societies. Such outbursts could also serve as 
important signals of political discontent – and in more extreme cases they could 
serve also as components or bases of sectarian activities which presented them-
selves as the bearers of the pristine Islamic vision and which constituted a very 
continuous component of the socio-political dynamics Muslim societies. 
It is in the framework of these developments that the specific combination of 
a vibrant public sphere with highly limited autonomous access of the major so-
cial actors to the rulers’ decision making gave rise in Muslim societies to a quite 
paradoxical situation with respect to the impact of these actors on changes in the 
political arena. The most important fact here – one that seemingly strengthens the 
view of these regimes as despotic – is that despite the potential autonomous 
standing of members of the ulama no fully institutionalized effective checks on 
the decision making of the rulers ever developed in these societies. Therefore 
there was no machinery other than rebellion through which to enforce any far-
reaching “radical” political demands. 
And yet in contrast to other – for instance South-East-Asian or Meso-
american – patrimonial regimes, the potential not just for rebellion but also for 
principled revolt and possible regime changes was endemic in Muslim societies. 
True, as Bernard Lewis has shown (1973: 263-93), a concept of revolution never 
developed within Islam. Yet at the same time, as Ernest Gellner indicated in his 
interpretation of Ibn Khaldun’s work (Gellner 1981), a less direct yet very force-
ful pattern of indirect ruler accountability and the possibility of regime changes 
did arise. This pattern was closely connected with a second type of ruler legitima-
tion and accountability in Muslim societies that was embodied in the ruler’s per-
ception as the upholder of the pristine, transcendental Islamist vision. This con-
ception was promulgated above all by the different sectarian activities that consti-
tuted a continual component of the Islamic scene. These sectarian activities were 
connected with the enduring utopian vision of the original Islamic era, and with the 
fact that this vision was neither fully implemented nor ever fully given up. Such 
sectarian-like tendencies have indeed existed in the recurring social movements in 
Muslim societies; and one of their distinctive characteristics has been the impor-
tance within them of the political dimensions, frequently oriented toward the resto-
ration of that pristine vision of Islam, which has never been given up. 
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While the possibility of implementing the pristine vision of Islam, of achiev-
ing that ideal fusion between the political and the religious community, of con-
structing the umma, was given up relatively early in the formation and expansion 
of Islam, yet although never fully attained, it was continually promulgated, as 
Aziz Al Azmeh has shown, with very strong utopian orientations, by various 
scholars and religious leaders, in the later periods. Given the ongoing perception 
of the age of the Prophet as an ideal, even utopian model, the idea of restoration 
constituted a perennial component of Islamic civilization, promoted above all by 
some of the most radical; reformist movements. Muhammad’s community in 
Medina became, in the apt phrase of Henry Munson Jr., the Islamic “primordial 
utopia” (Munson Jr. 1998). Many of the later rulers (the Abbasids, the Fatimids, 
and others) came to power on the crest of religious movements that upheld this 
ideal and legitimized themselves in such religious-political terms. 
By virtue of the combination of this mode of Islamic expansion with such 
sectarian, reformist orientations, Islam was probably the only Axial civilization 
in which sectarian-like movements – together with tribal leadership and groups – 
often led not only to the overthrow or downfall of existing regimes but also to the 
establishment of new political regimes oriented, at least initially, to the imple-
mentation of the original pristine, primordial Islamic utopia. But significantly 
enough once these regimes became institutionalized they gave rise to patrimonial 
or imperial systems within which the “old” Ibn Khaldun cycle tended to develop 
anew. 
Such orientations were embodied in the different versions of the tradition of 
reform, the mujaddid tradition (Lamdau Tasseron 1989), focused on the person 
of a mahdi and/or promulgated by a Sufi order in a tribal group such as the 
Wahhabites, or developed within a school of law. Such political, often reformist 
orientations could be directed toward active participation in the political center, 
its destruction or transformation, or toward a conscious withdrawal from it. But 
even such withdrawal, which developed both within the Shi’a and in Sufism, of-
ten harbored tendencies to pristine renovation, leading potentially to political ac-
tion. 
The fullest development of the political potential of such tendencies took 
place when they became connected with a tribal reassertion against “corrupt” or 
weak regimes, rooted in the mode of Islamic expansion. This tendency became 
closely related to the famous cycle depicted by Ibn Khaldun – namely, the cycle 
of tribal conquest, based on tribal solidarity and religious devotion, giving rise to 
the conquest of cities and settlement in them, followed by the degeneration of the 
ruling (often the former tribal) elite and then by its subsequent regeneration out 
of new tribal elements from the vast – old or new – tribal reservoirs. Such new 
“converts”– along with the seeemingly dormant tribes of the Arabian peninsula, 
of which the Wahhabites constituted probably the latest and most forceful illus-
tration – became a central dynamic political force in Islamic civilization. Natu-
rally the concrete thought of these reform tendencies varied greatly in different 
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Muslim societies and in different periods of their history, but they constituted a 
continual component in the constitution of public spheres in Muslim societies 
(Voll 1991). 
In so far as such movements did not create, in the Ibn-Khaldunian mode, new 
regimes, their impact on Muslim societies, as that of many other groups, was 
through the continual reconstruction of autonomous and vibrant public spheres, 
especially of the schools of law, the waqf and Sufi orders. As we have seen, these 
public spheres were largely autonomous in the sense that they were constructed 
according to autonomous criteria of recruitment and action. They constituted also 
arenas in which different sectors of the society could voice their demands in the 
name of the basic premises of Islamic vision. Although these public spheres 
were, of course, de facto often highly dependent on the rulers, yet their develop-
ment was to a very large extent autonomous, creating also wide, trans-state net-
works, and there could develop confrontational stances between them and the 
rulers.  
It was indeed in these contexts that the construction of such autonomous pub-
lic spheres gave rise in the historical experience of Muslim societies to specific 
patterns of pluralism that are characteristic of these societies. Such pluralism was 
characterized, even in imperial Islamic societies, by very strongly patrimonial 
features such as the existence of segregated – regional, ethnic and religious – sec-
tors; and by a relatively weak permeation of the center into the periphery and im-
pingement of the periphery on the center; as well as the prevalence of multiple 
patterns or bases of legitimation. But in contrast with those patrimonial regimes 
which developed in such non-Axial civilizations as Mesoamerica, the ancient 
Near East, or (Hinduized) South Asia, the Muslim patrimonial regimes were in 
constant tension with the more sectarian tendencies and they could be under-
mined by the more extreme proto-fundamentalists, who could attempt like, for 
instance, the Wahhabis to establish new “pristine” regimes. 
 
 
The impact  of  modernity on Musl im public  spheres 
 
Not surprisingly, the constitution of public spheres, above all in relation to the 
political arena, has greatly changed with the onset of modernity and with the 
constitution of modern states (Eisenstadt, Schluchter and Wittrock 2001). Many 
of the characteristics of the “traditional” Muslim public sphere – its very vitality, 
the multiplicity of informal ties, of direct physical encounters and interaction, is 
the strong emphasis on patterns of dress and on public appearance and interac-
tion, and the possibilities of eruption of “crowd”-like confrontation– have con-
tinued, but given both the basic premises of the modern state as well as of mod-
ern means of communication, have became subject to deep changes. There de-
veloped multiple new “modern” social actors and associations such as profes-
sionals, intellectuals, media experts and the like, quite often in close relation with 
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new modes of political organization – be it social movements, or political parties. 
Concomitantly there developed many new religious groups or movements – be it 
the transformation of the older Sufi orders or modern religious movements, in-
cluding the fundamentalist ones – not embedded in the traditional Islamic institu-
tions. All these groups naturally attempted to carve out distinct new public social 
and even political spaces for themselves. The extent to which there developed 
contacts between the more “traditional” types of public action, grounded in the 
Islamic tradition and institutions and the modern actors varied greatly between 
different societies yet on the whole for a long time they tended to develop in 
separate niches; and it is only lately that there developed more intensive coopera-
tive or competitive contacts between them. Yet another most important new de-
velopment in the public spheres of Muslim societies in the contemporary era, 
both among more modern but also, significantly enough, also in the new reli-
gious groups, was the growing autonomous participation and visibility of women 
and women’s movements. 
Yet it was not only that the incorporation of the actors in the public sphere in 
Muslim societies has greatly changed in modern times – important as these 
changes have obviously been – but above all the very premises of this sphere, 
above all in its relation to the state, have been dramatically transformed. The sin-
gle most important aspect of this change was, of course, that given the basic 
premises of modern polities the traditional separation, even if partial, between the 
public sphere and the political arena has seemingly almost disappeared. There 
developed a very strong tendency to a more direct engagement of the actors both 
in the public sphere and in the political arena. But while the tendency to the 
emergence of many new cultural or political actors in the public spheres attests to 
the potential democratization thereof, it did not necessarily always broaden the 
scope of autonomous political participation and of pluralism. Instead there in-
creased also possible confrontations of the actors in the public spheres – rooted in 
the ideological premises of modernity with their strong emphasis on political 
homogeneity – with the newly constituted modern political regimes; with the 
state attempting to appropriate, control, and even monopolize it. Accordingly, the 
autonomy of the public spheres could also be greatly undermined and there de-
veloped continual tensions and contestations between the various actors in the 
public sphere and between them and actors in the political arenas. 
Thus these modern developments have exacerbated the tensions and confron-
tations between pluralistic and totalistic tendencies in Muslim societies, “open” 
and repressive tendencies within them to a much greater extent than was the case 
in “traditional” Muslim societies. These problems became even more acute with 
the rise of contemporary fundamentalist movements that build on the older sec-
tarian tendencies and politicize them into hitherto unknown extent. Many of 
these movements developed from within the public sphere and often combine the 
control mechanisms of the modern states with strong Jacobin tendencies, legiti-
mized in terms of an essentialized tradition. 
316  |  CULTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS 
But the developments within the religious arena need not always develop in a 
totalistic direction. Indeed, some very interesting developments like among Sufi 
groups in Indonesia and elsewhere have led to greater pluralistic open spaces and 
directions, and also to the constitution of vibrant public spheres which disen-
gaged to some extent at from the state (Howell 2001). These developments con-
stitute part of attempts of many social sectors to develop new vibrant public 
spheres which in a “post-modern” way attempt to distance themselves from the 
state by carving autonomous spheres for themselves without direct political dis-
engagement. Thus contemporary Muslim societies can be seen as moving be-
tween two poles: attempts to establish territorial states with some elements of 
pluralism that build on their earlier historical experience but are reconstituted in 
novel ways; and strong anti-pluralistic tendencies in the form of either extreme, 
secular, oppressive – often military – regimes or of Jacobin fundamentalist ones. 
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Abstracts 
 
Marsha l l  Hodgson’s  Civ i l i zat iona l  Analy s i s  o f  I s lam:  
Theore t i ca l  and Comparat ive  Perspect ives  
Johann P. Arnason 
 
Marshall Hodgson was one of the very few area specialists who not only adopted 
a civilizational perspective, but also formulated an explicit and distinctive theo-
retical approach to civilizational studies. The paper reconstructs his basic as-
sumptions and main lines of argument, and links them to current debates in the 
field of civilizational analysis. Hodgson’s conceptual framework developed in 
relative isolation from sociological inquiry, but his ideas are in some ways com-
parable or complementary to those of the sociologists who have ventured into the 
field of large-scale comparative studies. That applies, in particular, to his under-
standing of cultural traditions and their transformations during the Axial Age. In 
the broader context of comparative history, these themes can also be linked to his 
trans-cultural concept of absolutism, which appears as an alternative to the We-
berian model of patrimonialism. When it comes to the analysis of early and clas-
sical Islam, the theoretical orientations and their implications must be discussed 
in connection with more recent historical scholarship in the field. Hodgson’s in-
terpretation would seem to be compatible with a more revisionist historical ac-
count than the one it relies on, and it even prefigures some revisionist arguments. 
But it is not compatible with radical revisionism; in that regard, it anticipates 
some of the metacritical objections to revisionist criticism. If Hodgson’s analysis 
of the classical phase is reconsidered in light of these questions, a somewhat dif-
ferent perspective emerges: a more differentiated picture of the very early stages, 
but also a stronger emphasis on divergent trends and problematic legacies of the 
classical period.  
 
The  Middle  Per iod  I s lamic  Ax ia l i ty  in  the  Age  o f  
Afro-Euras ian Transcu l tural  Hybrid i ty  
Babak Rahimi 
 
An attempt is made to develop Marshal Hodgson’s notion of “interrelations of 
societies in history” by focusing on the Afro-Eurasian landmass from the 9th/10th 
to the 13th/14th centuries. This study identifies this period as the age of transcul-
tural hybridity, defined as the inaugration of a period in the escalation of shifts in 
civilizational hybridization dynamics towards hemispheric integration, fusion 
and cross-fertilization that brought about an impressive degree of intense creativ-
ity and exceptional broadening of cultural horizons. In the first section, while 
briefly covering regions like China, Japan, Southeast Asia, north Africa and 
Europe, it is argued that the age of transcultural hybridity was formed as a result 
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of contact between societies and the formation of new hybrid civilizational com-
plexes with the increase of interaction between cultures that led to the prolifera-
tion of myriad forms of public spaces, social organizations, institutions and po-
litical orders. Yet the upshot of such transcultural interactive zone in the Afro-
Eurasian landmass was determined by conflict, rivalry, exchange, encounter and 
chronic collision between competing forms of political orders that, in turn, led 
the way to complex processes of greater intercivilizational hybridization. The 
second section focuses on the appearance of the Turkish and Persianate cultures, 
marking an era of unprecedented political fragmentation and cultural creolization 
in the context of nomadic and sedentary relations. “The Middle Period” of Is-
lamic history, which marked the formation of new Islamic civilizational com-
plexes, was the result of cultural encounter and civilizational cross-fertilization 
between the Central Asiatic and the Iran-Mesopotamian societies as a result of 
successive waves of Turkish tribal migration from the steppe grass lands of Cen-
tral Asia to the settled regions of Anatolia and the Iran-Mesopotamian plateaus. 
Accordingly, the proposed notion of the “Middle Period Islamic Axiality” de-
notes the emergence of new modes of reflexivity and communication in Islamic 
history, in relation with the crystallization of distinct social movements and po-
litical orders and in the context of heterdoxical and orthodoxical settings, as a re-
sult of such interciviliational encounters. 
 
Ident i ty  Format ion  in  Wor ld  Re l ig ions :  
A  Comparat ive  Ana lys i s  o f  Chr is t ian i ty  and  I s lam 
Arpad Szakolczai 
 
The aim of the paper is to compare the manner in which the unique charisma and 
mission of the founders of the two most influential world religions, Jesus and 
Mohammed, was recognised in the early part of their mission by their immediate 
followers and disciples. For this purposes, apart from the Weberian concept of 
‘charisma,’ the paper relies on Alessandro Pizzorno’s theoretisation of identity 
formation through recognition, and also on the work of Victor Turner about limi-
nality and René Girard ideas about the mimetics of desire and rival brothers.  
The comparative analysis of the earlier period of Christianity and Islam fo-
cuses on four main themes. The first contrast the way the descent of Jesus breaks 
with traditional genealogical lineage on both ends with the problematic of the de-
scent and the ‘true heir’ of Mohammed. The second theme moves from issues of 
personal identity to identity as a religious founder, and focuses on the exact se-
quence in which charisma was recognised, and the link between this recognition 
and various experiences. The next section contrasts the different kind of persons 
who first recognised, or failed to recognise, charisma in the two traditions, in-
cluding other prophets, women, children, and disciples, focusing especially on 
the question of the difference between recognising human sincerity and prophetic 
or in general charismatic gifts; and the extent to which the pronouncements of 
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personal acquaintances on such qualities can be taken as authoritative. Finally, 
the last section of the paper moves to the image of the enemy, contrasting and 
comparing the attacks of Jesus on the Pharisees, using Weber’s brilliant but little 
known essay at the end of Ancient Judaism, with the attacks of Mohammed on 
the ‘hypocrites’ (munafiqun). 
 
The  Emergence  of  Is lam as  a  Case  o f  Cul tura l  
Cry sta l l i za t ion .  Hi s tor i ca l  and  Comparat ive  Ref lec t ions  
Johann P. Arnason 
 
The concept of cultural crystallization has been used to describe world-historical 
transformations of a particular kind: those that combine major redefinitions of 
cultural premises with corresponding institutional innovation and the formation 
of traditions that generate their own internal disputes and conflicts. This model 
has proved particularly relevant in the context of debates about the Axial Age 
and its place in world history. The emergence of Islam would seem to be an ex-
emplary case in point, all the more so since the formation of a new monotheistic 
religion was – within a strikingly short span of time – combined with the con-
struction of a new empire and the cultural unification of a large, central and di-
verse region. But discussion of the Islamic historical experience has been ob-
structed by dominant trends in civilizational analysis: both classical and contem-
porary approaches have tended to neglect the Islamic world and focus on issues 
more attuned to confrontation of the West with East or South Asia. On the other 
hand, attempts to redress the balance must come to terms with changing histori-
cal perspectives on the sources, beginnings and early developments of Islam as a 
religion and a civilizational core. Traditionalist view have been found wanting, 
but radical revisionism has also been criticized on convincing grounds. A tenta-
tive account of the Islamic crystallization must distinguish a pre-conquest, intra-
Arabian phase from the post-conquest one. Within the latter, further distinctions 
are best based on the changing relationship between religious and political forms 
of central authority and social power.  
 
Revolut ion in  Ear ly  I s lam.  The  Rise  of  I s lam as  a  
Const i tu t ive  Revo lut ion  
Said, A. Arjomand 
 
Muhammad’s unification of the Arabian tribes on the basis of a new monotheis-
tic religion is analyzed as a revolution and in the light of a typology of revolu-
tions in world history. From the viewpoint of sociology of revolution, it is found 
to fit closely the ideal-type of ‘constitutive revolution.’ Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, Muhammad did not constitute a centralized state or even provide clear 
guidelines to that end. By contrast, it did create a new supra-tribal political com-
munity, and mobilized it for revolutionary struggle in the path of the one God. 
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The cultural pre-conditions for the unification of Arabia and the Messianic stimu-
lus to it are presented as the background to the constitution of the new commu-
nity and its revolutionary mobilization. The essay concludes with an analysis of 
the succession to Muhammad’s charismatic authority as the decisive factor in set-
ting the direction of the consequences of the revolution. 
 
´Abdal lah  b .  Sa lam:  Egy pt ,  Late  Ant iqu i ty  and  
I s lamic  Sainthood   
Georg Stauth 
 
Ancient Egypt, with the exception of Moses and his times, was sidelined in Axial 
Age theory. Focussing on monotheism and revelation, Egypt was hardly made an 
issue of axial breakthroughs and of the emerging patterns of cultural reconstruc-
tion culminating in Early Christianity and Islam. This paper brings Egypt into the 
story of the formation of Islam. It attempts to show some of the antagonisms 
which relate to the synchronic co-existence between ‘primary’ civilisational heri-
tage of Egypt and the axial impacts on the absolute monotheistic principles fol-
lowed by Islam. It are these antagonisms which have shaped the vitality of a 
lived religion, and specifically, as viewed here, in local contexts of the eastern 
Nile Delta. Taking a view on the role of ´Abdallah b. Salam – the first Jewish 
witness of Muhammad’s monotheistic revelations in the prophetic tradition, and 
at the same time a local Islamic venerated saint today – it becomes evident that 
the “negation” of ‘Egypt’ is as much a source of orthodox monotheist reconstruc-
tion in Islam (as it was in Christianity) as much as it bears a great part of the 
‘primary’ symbolic, legendary and mythological civilisational heritage. In this it 
is important to know that ‘axiality’ can not merely explain new symbolic and in-
stitutional order. It are the negations of Pharaonic civilisation and its miracles 
and wonders which occupy – and have occupied – a great role in Islam. Para-
doxically, it is the negation which also preserves and incorporates the archaism 
which is so important to understand mass religion and the terms of its modern 
continued importance. 
 
His tory ,  Know ledge  and  Sp ir i tua l i ty :  
The  Yemen as  the  Turn ing  P lace  be tw een the  Pers ian ,  Arab  
and  Bibl i ca l  Trad i t ions  
Raif G. Khoury 
 
Yemen was an important cultural centre in pre-Islamic times, it also formed a 
field of intensive cultural exchange which had a great impact on later Islamic tra-
ditions. Story telling in the main, wisdom literature and prophetic tales have en-
tered this field and were passed on to the expanding Islamic world. Thus, the 
Yemeni share in institutional and religious settings of Early Islam was highly 
significant and can be traced today mainly in fields of Early Islamic narratives. In 
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Yemen some very well established literary figures like for example Wahb b. 
Munabbih, who was a wandering figure between Persian, Arabic and Jewish 
identities,  developed and maintained the art of transmitting mythical, prophetical 
and literary wisdom in a region that seemed marginal to the major civilisational 
events of the time. However, as it more and more becomes clear to historians and 
literary specialists today, the Yemeni crossroads of highly intensive cultural ex-
change shaped much of the religious and literary tastes of later Islamic periods. 
Public life in Early Islam where story telling and representation of religious and 
historical wisdom became so important, was shaped drastically by institutional 
and conceptual imprints which Yemeni figures left behind. A large body of later 
Islamic historiography and literature can be traced back to the Yemeni meeting 
ground of Persian, Arabic and Biblical traditions. 
 
I s lam and  the  Ax ia l  Age  
Joseph van Ess 
 
The article mainly intends to express some doubts about the validity of the Ach-
senzeit-model. In its first part the author tries to put Jaspers’s concept into its his-
torical context, with regard to German and European thought after World War II. 
The second part raises a few points concerning Islam, the “belatedness” of its 
civilization and its connection with a Late Antiquity of longue durée. The third 
part compares Jaspers’s Achsenzeit with other and more recent models; it also 
ponders over the hypothetical question whether there could be a genuine Muslim 
positioning of Islamic history within world history. 
 
I s lam and  the  Path  to  Moderni ty :  Ins t i tut ions  o f  Higher  
Learn ing  and  Secu lar  Pol i t i ca l  Cul ture  
Said A. Arjomand 
 
This essay is part of a series of studies that examine the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries as a possible turning point in Eurasian social transformation with refer-
ence to the Islamicate civilization. Following an earlier study of urban politics in 
this period, the present paper focuses on the colleges of higher learning (madrasa 
s), and the impact on political culture of their teaching. Comparing the legal 
foundations of the madrasa in Islamic law to that of the newly established Euro-
pean universities of the thirteenth century in Roman law, it finds the latter suf-
fered from two major disadvantages: lack of corporate legal personality as uni-
versitas, and the consequent lack of autonomy and legal jurisdiction. Turning 
then to a comparison of the reception of Aristotle in the Western and Islamic in-
stitutions of higher learning in the same period, the fact that Politics is the one 
and only major work of Aristotle that was not translated into Arabic is singled 
out as a serious setback for the development of political modernity in the Islami-
cate civilization. 
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Globa l  Ages ,  Ecumenic  Empires  and  Prophet i c  Rel ig ions  
Arpad Szakolczai 
 
The aim of this paper is to revisit, jointly, the ‘axial age’ thesis and Weber’s 
ideas about the importance of prophetic religions, and to draw some conse-
quences both for social theory and concerning the rise and dynamics of moder-
nity. It starts by arguing that the remarkable spiritual outbursts that constitute the 
core of the axial age, especially the co-temporaneity of Heraclitus, Confucius and 
the Buddha, can be explained as the outcome of the temporal and spatial liminal 
conditions produced by the rise of the first truly global empire, the Persian. The 
problem with Jaspers’ idea of the ‘axis time,’ however, is that the three emer-
gence of the three great world religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) escape 
this time frame, suggesting a return to Weber’s thesis about prophecy, though 
recognising the links between the emergence of prophetic religions and the rise 
and fall of major empires. 
On this basis, the paper develops three elements of a theoretical framework. 
It argues that the contrast between charisma and the Trickster present a broad, an-
thropologically, mythological and theologically based framework for the sociol-
ogy of shifting normative evaluations; that the metaphor of the spiral can serve as 
a model to capture the type of changes represented by the emergence of world-
conquering empires and in general of global ages; and that the model of gift-
giving, developed in the footsteps of Marcel Mauss, can serve as a third model 
for establishing social order, beyond the duality of violence and the law. On the 
basis of this theoretical framework, the paper argues that the dynamics of global 
ages can be explained by the activity of Trickster-like figures who help to esca-
late the movement, while a genuine solution to such maelstrom-like, all-
encompassing social changes can provided by a different type of spiralling 
movement, connected to the way ‘grace,’ in its various meanings, equally em-
phasising the theological and the philosophical, and within it the epistemological, 
ethical and aesthetic components, can be turned into a lasting guiding force of 
human conduct. 
 
Ref lex iv i ty ,  Prax i s ,  and “Spir i tua l i ty ”:  
Western I s lam and  Beyond  
Armando Salvatore 
 
The approach to axial transformations has laid a privileged emphasis on the 
emergence of specific patterns of reflexivity, considered as the axial contribution 
to later modern trends in public and political life. This study critically reconsiders 
the centrality of reflexivity within western axiality and situates it within the prob-
lematique of the relation between the prophetic and the philosophical modes of 
axial transformations. It focuses on the theoretical development of praxic and in-
stitutional forms of reflexivity within Islamic traditions. 
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After a synthetic portrayal of Islam as a plea for taming the sequence of pro-
phetic eruptions and therefore as moderating their long term messianic impetus, 
the study probes into the specific strength of the Islamic philosophy of law in 
imposing a common denominator on Islamic traditions (prophetic, philosophical, 
juridical and “mystical,” i.e. Sufi) through the elaboration on the concept of 
maslaha. This is translatable as “common good” or “public interest,” and its 
theorizing culminated in the work of the Andalusi jurist al-Shatibi in the 14th 
century. 
The approach to maslaha and the trajectory of its maturation are examined in 
their capacity to provide a model of praxic reflexivity, which is integral to the 
history of Europe before the end of the Christian reconquista of the Iberian pen-
insula, and in contrast with the sectarian and often spiritualist movements that 
have characterized European history since the 13th century and even stronger af-
ter the Reformation, finally ushering in what Voegelin has called “political relig-
ions.”  
The patterns of praxic and institutional reflexivity produced by Western Is-
lam lived on in the work of thinkers like Spinoza, whose family was also of An-
dalusi origin, and provide seeds of a post-axial alternative to both the totalitarian 
and the liberal trends that have dominated European modernity thus far. It is not 
surprising that these seeds have been revived first by Muslim reformers under 
European colonial domination, and now even stronger in the contemporary con-
figurations of Euro-Islam. It is the process through which maslaha is folded into 
res publica and revives it, also affecting the latter’s conflicted and securitized na-
ture. 
 
Publ i c  Spheres  and  Po l i t ica l  Dynamics  in  His tor ica l  and  
Modern  Socie t i es  
Shmuel N. Eisenstadt 
 
For a very long time there has been prevalent in scholarly literature as well as in 
– especially Western – public discourse the “orientalist” view that in Muslim so-
cieties, in contrast especially to the Western societies, there did not develop a 
strong, autonomous public sphere or civil society. In this paper will show in con-
trary that a very vibrant and autonomous public sphere was of crucial importance 
in shaping the dynamics of Muslim societies. Of crucial importance to under-
stand these vibrant dynamics, in them is the place of the community, rooted also 
in the basic premise of Islam – the equality of all believers and their access to the 
sacred. These conceptions have necessarily given members of the community a 
right to participate, if not directly in the central political arena, certainly in the 
communal and religious ones. This is where a decoupling between the make-up 
of the public sphere and access to the political arena proper and the decision 
making of the rulers is to be observed. This decoupling was manifested in the 
combination, on the one hand, of large sectors of the society, the major actors in 
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the public sphere having rather limited autonomous access to concrete policy-
making, and on the other hand, the fact that the upholding of the moral order of 
the community was vested in the ulama and in the members of the community, 
with the rulers playing a secondary role. The constitution of public spheres, 
above all in relation to the political arena, has greatly changed with the onset of 
modernity and with the constitution of modern states. The single most important 
aspect of this change was, of course, that given the basic premises of modern 
polities the traditional separation, even if partial, between the public sphere and 
the political arena has seemingly almost disappeared. There developed a very 
strong tendency to a more direct engagement of the actors both in the public 
sphere and in the political arena – with the newly constituted modern political re-
gimes, with the state attempting to appropriate, control, and even monopolize it. 
Accordingly, the autonomy of the public spheres could also be greatly under-
mined and there developed continual tensions and contestations between the 
various actors in the public sphere and between them and actors in the political 
arenas. These modern developments have exacerbated the tensions and confron-
tations between pluralistic and totalistic tendencies in Muslim societies. These 
problems became even more acute with the rise of contemporary fundamentalist 
movements that build on the older sectarian tendencies and politicize them into 
hitherto unknown extent. Many of these movements developed from within the 
public sphere and often combine the control mechanisms of the modern states 
with strong Jacobin tendencies, legitimized in terms of an essentialized tradition. 
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